Note from Editor: The following article is a reprint of the conclusion of Brent Nosworthy's With Musket, Cannon and Sword: Battle Tactics of Napoleon and His Enemies which in our opinion summarizes what we have been preaching for years in Empires, Eagles & Lions. We are glad to see that historians are finally endorsing the importance of tactics and grand tactics in the art of warfare.
Reprinted with permission of the publisher, Sarperdon, 166th 5th Ave., New York, NY 10010.
Chapter 23
Conclusion:
A Blueprint for
Tomorrow's Military History
Although the goal of this work has been to answer questions about how troops fought during the Napoleonic Wars and the reasons why these practices were adopted in the first place, it is also hoped that at the same time many other questions have been raised about the nature of tactics, combat experience and how military history should be studied on this lower level of detail. To fully comprehend the scope of these prospective changes and their potential significance, it is necessary to review several recent trends that have affected how military history is currently approached.
When John Keegan's now highly acclaimed and influential The Face of Battle was first published in 1976, it heralded a new era that challenged several cornerstones of the then traditional military methodology. Up to this point, to a great many writers military history was little more than the 'study of generals and generalship.' The actions of individual soldiers were treated as mere dots on the wide canvas depicting a European battlefield. The common soldier's experience, feelings and point of view, if not totally ignored, were only cursorily treated and ultimately reduced to an aside or footnote.
By taking the opposite approach, and eschewing the well-travelled high level approach which had limited main stream military history to the study to a chronology of major events or the view from the commander's tent, that is, his objectives, strategies and actions, etc. Keegan succeeded in redirecting the focus to the experiential and psychological arena. One could say Keegan democratized the scope of what should considered relevant and thus worthy of study.
Paradoxically, however, The Face of Battle poses a curious dilemma to anyone seriously studying either the nature battlefield dynamics or combat experience during the Napoleonic era. Artfully written, this little volume in many respects is the very embodiment of a workable synthesis between scholarly research/analysis and the cogency and simplicity needed for mass appeal. Quite deservedly, this work will probably always remain in the Pantheon of truly great military writings.
Nevertheless, as the years go by the very success of this classic increasingly has begun to impede our further understanding of warfare during the Napoleonic period. The problem arises not so much in Keegan's book but in the expectations and attitudes of its numerous readers. In the mind of many military historians and probably most casual readers, The Face of Battle all too often has been elevated to the 'final statement' on combat experience. Like every other genuine iconoclastic work before it which based on its merit has rightly gained its place in our intellectual heritage, The Face of Battle has slowly but inevitably migrated from the truly radical which has shaken up conservative thinking and traditions to the realm of intellectual orthodoxy. This, of course, is unavoidable, and is simply a reflection of how new ideas are and always will be propagated.
Any writer of non-fiction has a number of stock literary vehicles at his disposal. Historians, frequently have relied upon, one might say over-relied, on the simplicity and the power of the narrative. Facts, events and personalities are presented in chronological order. This is particularly the case for campaign studies, the chronicles of a particular war, and so on. Psychological studies have also been utilized with varying degrees of success.
Keegan's work is a refreshing blend of the narrative with the experiential, and hence, at least indirectly, the psychological. The subject matter, analysis and method of presentation flow from the in depth analysis of three major battles from widely separated points in time. Keegan's Waterloo vignette, the one we are most concerned with, is organized into five or six logical groupings, which Keegan has termed 'categories of combat.' These are simply the different practices and experiences of each of the various arms of service, cavalry versus cavalry, infantry versus infantry, cavalry versus artillery, etc. Grouping the material and treatment into these major archetypes, however, has implied that the dynamics and forces described in this particular battle somehow have a broad application and are, indeed, 'universals' which describe the nature of warfare throughout the entire Napoleonic period.
In terms of the relationship between the events that took place during the engagement and contextual information needed for any deeper understanding, there are two ways of examining a battle. One can look at these events and bring what is known about warfare of the time, etc. in order to elaborate upon these. In other words, one can draw from one is known about the military science or the art of war of the period and interpret and comment upon the various phenomena encountered during the battle. The opposite approach is to first examine the actions, events and phenomena making up the battle and then theorize how warfare was conducted more generally. The first method can be thought of as taking information from the more general context and applying it to a specific application. The second is to work from the particular to gain an insight into the universal.
Many studies use a combination of both methods; however, Keegan's Face of Battle is noticeably more interested in the second approach than the first. This is not to say that Keegan never provides background information about tactical practices, etc., but these represent a small fraction of the information presented, and this information often is provided to distinguish theoretical doctrine from 'what really happened under fire.'
At first glance, Keegan's approach appears the most attractive. What reader with any sense of intellectual self-worth would submit to the military historical equivalent of applications analyses, a pedestrian search for examples of the already known and well cataloged, when offered the alternative of following along on a promising treasure hunt for military historical universals? It is a much more meaningful venture to look at something if it thought to provide an insight to a much larger whole, than it is to take existing concepts and facts and apply it to a particular situation or event.
But this approach, regardless of how much more emotionally fulfilling for the author to create and for the audience to read, is at the same time much more subject to error. It is easy enough for someone to isolate an action or phenomena in a particular battle and then conclude this was the norm. But what if there were regional variations or differences in the way a technique was practiced a mere few years earlier? What if the observed event was simply an anomaly, some sort of battlefield aberration from what was more commonly found over a broader sampling?
It is this problem of confusing the aberrant with the norm, that one bumps into so frequently in Keegan's work. Two examples should be sufficient to illustrate. During his discussion of cavalry versus cavalry combat, Keegan quite correctly dismisses the idea that opposing cavalry actually met each other at speed:
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"Both popular impressions and copy-book drill - and the initial charges in the two great series, British and French, were launched copy-book style - supposed cavalry versus cavalry charges to mean the meeting of dense formations at high speed ."
Of course, opposing cavalry formations never did literally run into one another, one side or the other would break before contact actually occurred. In this passage, however, Keegan appears to suggest that those who had first developed the prevalent cavalry charge doctrine (cavalry begins the advance at the walk, proceeds to the trot and finally accelerates to the gallop) as well as those who throughout the Napoleonic period advocated its employment shared this unrealistic expectation.
Although during the final moments of each charge both French and British cavalry at Waterloo either pulled up short or loosened their ranks and passed harmlessly through one another's formations, such eventualities hardly came as a revelation to experienced cavalry officers. The tendency for opposing forces to somehow avoid running into one another had been commented upon at least as far back as the days of de la Colonie during the War of Spanish Succession.
It was, in fact, this very realization that had forced Frederick and his generals to devise the walk, trot, charge tactic in the first place. Frederick realized that no cavalry on earth would voluntary run full tilt into their opponents charging in the opposite direction. One side or the other would back down and flee or both sides would take evasive action to ameliorate the shock. However, if one side was able to retain its cohesion and continued to move at speed, the other side would always be forced to back down.
It is also important to realize that the two cavalry forces involved at Waterloo could hardly be said to be representative of so-called 'Napoleonic cavalry.' During the Seven Years' War, the Prussian cavalry under Ziethen and Seydlitz performed charges modeled on the theoretical system with tremendous results. The British cavalry, however, never known for being highly disciplined, were notorious even among their own officers for their proclivity to over-zealous. Wellington, himself, was forced to concede i.e. that British cavalry was noticeably more undisciplined than its continental peers. True, the French cavalry under Murat never matched the capabilities or spectacular achievements of those lead by Seydlitz. This notwithstanding, Lasalle and Kellermann time and time again lead controlled charges at a fast trot. However, the French cavalry at Waterloo lacked the experience, training, or quality of horses enjoyed by the French troopers up until the 1812 debacle.
Thus, when examining how the French and British cavalry conducted itself at Waterloo, before one can make generalizations about the whether or not the prevalent official doctrine one must be cognizant of why it was developed, if it had been utilized by other cavalries successfully, and to what extent the French and British cavalry at Waterloo differed from other armies of that and the immediately preceding period. The answer, of course, is that the both French and British cavalry at Waterloo are relatively poor representatives of this arm for the period and it is unfortunate that anyone would attempt to generalize on the cavalry's capabilities based on their performance during this battle.
The relationship between theoretical developments in the Prussian cavalry during the 1742 to 1748 period and practical events during the late Napoleonic Wars is not at all obvious and a historian can hardly be faulted for failing to unravel the convoluted threads connecting the two. However, in the second example of methodological problems intrinsic in Keegan's approach the interval separating Waterloo and other events providing a cross check can be measured in days rather than years. Summing up the relative capabilities of cavalry versus infantry when the two arms faced each other in a fair fight, at the end of his 'Cavalry versus Infantry' section Keegan rather contemptuously concluded 'Here come 'those d__d fools again' seems an appropriate judgment on the character of the conflict'. In other words, well lead, steady infantry would invariably best cavalry, regardless of the latter's elan, leadership or tactics, and the British infantry realized that henceforth all cavalry assaults would be doomed to failure.
Once again this observation about the infantry's strength was anything but novel. Writing in the 1740's, Puységur noted that well-lead cavalry which recognized its strength would always be able to resist a cavalry assault, provided it was sufficiently prepared. However, this did not mean that infantry was invulnerable to cavalry. As we have seen, experienced cavalry officers realized that during the course of any extended engagement fortuitous events would here and there afford the cavalry with the opportunity it needed to catch an infantry formation insufficiently unprepared to receive a charge. Reeling back our examination a mere two days before Waterloo, French cavalry adroitly led by General Kellermann was able to destroy one British and one Hanoverian infantry formation at Quatre Bras.1,2,3...
In both of these examples, Keegan has looked at some aspect of the events or phenomena observed at Waterloo and elevated these to universals which are to be applied throughout the entire era. However, when we broaden our examination to look at events entire the Hundred Days and previous continental Napoleonic campaigns, as well as the body of military art and science during the era it becomes obvious that much more of Keegan's descriptions of 'categories of combat' pertain to idiosyncratic during the battle being described (Waterloo) than has been first thought.
These remarks have not been provided to malign Keegan's efforts or in any belittle this author's contribution to the study of military history. Rather, they are intended to show these methodological problems are symptomatic of more broad based limitations and prejudices pervading the whole of the English speaking community, than a want of ability or conscientiousness on the part of individual authors.
As Keegan has noted in his opening discussion of the major influences in military historiography, when Sir Edward Creasy set out to write his immensely popular Fifteen Decisive Battles of the Western World, he selected only those highly notable events along history's long panorama that 'have helped to make us what we are.' Keegan's intent was to produce a work that would head in the opposite direction: to redirect the focus from particular events and famous personalities and explore the commonality of human nature under combat conditions.
But if Keegan was driven by entirely different set of goals, ironically he choose a vehicle remarkably similar to that used by this nineteenth century historian, that is, confining his analysis of several major military historical events to gain an understanding of a larger whole, in this case understanding of human nature and the battlefield experience. The intrinsic problem with this approach is that too small a sampling has been considered to establish whether the phenomena, events, etc. being studied are indeed representative of some more general dynamic or principle.
However, there is another, much more subtle tendency at work, one which has affected the work of most English-speaking historians. This is the belief that lower level tactics did not play a significant role in determining how a battle unfolded and its eventual outcome, and hence the study of formal doctrine and training provides little insight into what actually happened during the heat of combat. The belief has enjoyed continued popularity for several reasons. One is the recognition that during the musket era complex drill systems were rarely, if ever, applied on the battlefield exactly as described in the official doctrine and practiced on the parade grounds. Even simpler procedures, such as the various firing systems could only be conducted for a few moments before invariably breaking down into a ragged and uncontrollable individual fire.
This initial impression that official doctrine was not useful seems to be confirmed whenever we glance through the various infantry and cavalry drill booklets of the time. Although one can easily spot numerous minor differences of detail, such as how many companies in a battalion, or the number of steps per minute during a march one is hard pressed to isolate distinctive formations, maneuvers or fire systems that would account for the French successes up to 1809 or the subsequent British victories in the Peninsula or the Hundred Days. This shouldn't be surprising since by 1791 all armies purposely had based their official doctrine on the formation and maneuvering system first formulated by Frederick the Great between 1747 and 1756.
A large portion of the reading public is intrigued with some aspect of history. Unfortunately, most of this interest is limited to notable events and famous personalities. Few have the stomach or patience for a lengthy and complicated discussion of seeming obscure technology. How many will endure a detailed step-by-step examination of the evolution of the spinning wheel compared to those who enthusiastically read about the British labor riots in the early 1800's? Very few indeed. This differential in what most find interesting what is ultimately relevant, unfortunately, has infected even the most conscientious of military historians, the great majority of whom have felt that antiquated military technology is best left undisturbed on library shelves or forgotten boxes in dusty warehouses.
Unfamiliar with the full spectrum of the period's military science and its many attendant nuances, many historians have prematurely concluded that all formal practices and doctrine are of little practical use and have permanently dismissed these as purely theoretical systems. Someone of this bent looking at the French infantry regulations of 1791, for example, then tends to place a single battalion changing its direction of march on a movable pivot (an extremely common maneuver performed even within canister range) on the same level of impracticality as a multi-battalion change of face with (which was highly impractical). The result is that all too frequently, the entire drill booklet and its contents is permanently relegated to the dusty bin of 'useless facts.'
But the failure to recognize the true significance of tactical level events and dynamics has had a much more profound effect on our understanding of the nature of battle and the combat experience than simply the neglect of formal doctrine and arcane drills and maneuvers. Ultimately, it has restricted the entire intellectual system we use to conceptualize how the various forces on the battlefield interact to produce the results they did.
IMPORTANCE OF TACTICS
Hopefully, this present work has adequately demonstrated that although all but the simplest and most fundamental of tactical practices were infrequently applied in their pure text book form, ad hoc variants borne out of necessity thickly populated every crucible of battle. At Jena, for example, we see the men of the 3rd battalion of the 16th légère marching up to the opposing Prussian battery and then dispersing as skirmishers. At Austerlitz, the 55th de ligne meeting the enemy employed, in succession, fire by battalion, by platoon and finally fire by ranks. The use of text book practices certainly was not limited to the French army. The present work abounds with similar examples provided by Austrian, Prussian and even British troops. Thus, the more closely one examines lower level events occurring any battle, the more one is forced to recognize the ubiquitousness of tactical practices on the Napoleonic battlefield.
There remains one fundamental question. Conceding that tactical practices occurred repeatedly during every engagement, how important were these? Did these tactical-level events ever determine the outcome of a battle? Were there ever sufficient differentials between the opponents' tactical capabilities to make the outcome a foregone conclusion? In other words, were there ever cases where the tactical systems employed by one army were so superior to those of their adversaries' that victory was guaranteed, regardless of the quality of leadership, the determination of the troops or the overall strategic situation?
When one looks at the various contests that punctuated the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, one must concede that in a majority of cases, the opposing forces enjoyed what amounted to tactical equality. If we ignore minor regional variations, most often, the opposing forces employed the same types of tactical practices. And, even where opponents did not use exactly the same methods, each were able to employ sufficient tactical antidotes that most major contests were long drawn out affairs decided by so-called 'higher level' factors, such as who had the more competent commander, whose troops in a higher state of preparedness or more highly motivated, etc.
However, occasionally, an isolated tactical level event, which normally would have had but a localized effect, was transformed by extraordinary circumstances into the deciding factor, determining who would emerge the victor, and who would be forced to flee the field, the loser. The Battle of Lodi Bridge, for example, was decided by a faux pas on the part of the Austrian artillery, and the French infantry's ability to exploit this error. Trained to fire canister at close range, the Austrian gunners' failed to modify the usual tactic to account for the lengthy French infantry columns on the bridge before them. Once near the shore, large numbers of the French infantry jumped into water and spread out as skirmishers as they climbed ashore, where they were eventually able to overpower the Austrian batteries.
An even more spectacular result was achieved by Kellermann's cavalry at Marengo. Once again, the contest was decided by a tactical error on one side, and a brilliant tactical counterstroke on the other. The Austrians, flush with impending victory advanced in monstrous columns unprotected by an advance guard or flankers demanded by standard practice and common sense. Kellermann observing the Austrian's lack of preparedness, ordered his cavalry to quickly deploy and charge. Caught off guard the massive Austrian column was completely scattered.
Occasionally, an army did find itself possessed of a significant tactical advantage over the enemy. When this occurred, the army with the significant tactical or grand tactical superiority almost always easily won the contest. Such as was the case with the French when they encountered their middle eastern foes during the Egyptian campaigns and then again against the continental Allies during the 1805 and 1806 campaigns in central Europe.
In 1798 and 1799 both the French and the Turks and Mameluks possessed the same basic set of weapons, though both sides certainly had a different proportion of infantry, cavalry and artillery! What doomed the Turks and Mameluks to continual and certain defeat was the systemic failure of a tactical system which relied upon individual valor and fighting capability to make any impact on the European method of fighting in highly regulated and orderly formations. The extreme unevenness of casualties suffered by either side, demonstrates clearly that, in retrospect, the eastern forces had no chance of victory. At Austerlitz, Auerstädt and Jena, the French also enjoyed a decided advantage over their opponents, one that would ensure victory, though in this case, the advantage arose from the superiority of their grand tactical systems.
Almost by definition, however, this type of tactical or grand tactical domination tended to survive for only a relatively brief period of time, often only a year or two, though sometimes for as much as a decade. It is probably no exaggeration to say that warfare is the most competitive of all human activity. When one side develops a temporary advantage in doctrine or training, the other side, unless fettered by deep social and cultural constraints, invariably will catch up or develop its own tactical antidotes to negate its enemy's advantages. In this regard, one can say that tactics like water 'always seeks its own level.'
The recognition of the increased importance of both tactics and tactical-level events during combat is not a neutral development, simply accruing to the amount of 'facts' at our disposal. Rather, it must force a number of qualitative changes in how we must approach this aspect of military history.
The first of these changes lies in the psychological realm. We must expand the repertoire of forces understood to significantly affect human consciousness and behavior during combat. In recent years, interest in the experience of combat and the psychology of the individual soldier has increased in importance both among the historian and reader alike. However, in its incipient form this new experiential approach has tended to have an unmistakable monolithic quality. Seeking to identify archetypal situations, historians have assumed that in each situation there is a single overriding psychological dynamic that determines the soldiers' response and on a statistic level reduces their reaction to a predictable result. For example, in the case of the two cavalry forces charging one another, it has been observed, and correctly so, that neither side would ride directly into their opponents at speed. The instinct of self-preservation meant that ultimately one or both sides would alter their course in some way, either by pulling up short, turning and both sides riding parallel to one another for a distance, or the formation would open up so that both sides could 'thread' one another.
The role of tactics in these situations has been largely ignored because of the conviction that they weren't applied in practice. The belief is that the impulses arising from human nature are so strong in these critical situations that they overpower prior training and make implementation of formal doctrine impossible. In our example, the subtle phases of the charge are ultimately considered to be irrelevant, because the psychological forces affecting both man and horse would force some entirely different action. Although this view is popular among twentieth century historians, it certainly would not have sat well with eighteenth or nineteenth century officers or tacticians, who because of their profession had to delve into detail and determine which methods were the most effective in practice.
These latter recognized, if we are permitted to use a neologism, that physical activity was never psychologically neutral but influenced how a typical soldier felt and acted in each situation. Frederick gradually realized that he could embolden the pathetic cavalry inherited from his father and the same time make them appear invincible by carefully orchestrating their actions. More than a half century later, British infantry officers, otherwise employing a similar method of attack to their French counterpart, intuited that by subduing the men in order to create an emotional reserve and then purposely unleashing this force at the critical moment guaranteed success against their less psychologically savvy opponents. Artillerymen gradually came to realize that by bouncing the round shot in front of their enemy they could rattle a formation much more than if they fired directly into it, even though they did not necessarily inflict a greater number of casualties.
These observations must force us to expand our definition of tactics. In Chapter 2, tactics was defined as 'the development of formal systems of troop movement and the use of available weaponry to derive a localized advantage over the enemy during combat.' This is more or less the standard definition as conceived since Napoleon's time. However, in light of the recognition that the nature of what the rank and file were called upon to do influenced their feelings and continued will to fight, to our basic definition we must add: 'those tactics which proved the most successful on the battlefield were those that tended to impart a positive psychological effective on those employing it, and a negative impact on those against whom it was being directed.' All physical activity on the battlefield is never psychologically neutral, but has a psychotropic effect, either positively or negatively affecting the morale of the troops depending upon how appropriate the action is to human nature and the circumstances where it is employed.
The way military historians must set out to analyze and explain the dynamics within each commonly occurring situation must therefore change. It is necessary in any situation to see what tactics were prescribed and how these would influence human feeling and behavior. To return to our example of cavalry charging cavalry, the analysis can now longer end with the observation that one or both sides will give way before contact. Each cavalry charge tactic to a greater or lesser extent influenced how the men responded to their fundamental instinct for survival. Cavalry traveling at speed in a tight, orderly formation benefited from positive feedback and the basal desire to avoid a mortal confrontation was delayed for a few more moments. Conversely, men in a looser formation perceived the compact mass of the enemy as possessing an almost insurmountable advantage and were a hundred times more likely to break first.
The more detailed examination of tactics and its effects on the battlefield also makes it necessary to reformulate the relationship between 'tactics' and 'grand tactics.' Rather than two truly distinctive and self-contained areas of human thought or activity, these are in reality two ends of a continuous linear scale. There has always been a temptation to view grand tactical elements as some type of set of pure ideas, as if Frederick the Great was able to introduce the oblique attack because he was the first person to think of attacking an enemy's flank with a concentration of force quickly assembled from forces deployed along the enemy's front.
The reality is that there is an intrinsic relationship between the grand tactical options available to a commander and the movement and organizational properties allowed by the tactical systems in use. In an earlier work, The Anatomy of Victory, for example, we saw that Prussian oblique attack was based upon the march by lines maneuver. This, in turn, only was possible because the Prussian infantry had adopted cadenced marching. Others had thought of the concept underlying the oblique attack, but they lacked the marching and maneuvering systems that made it possible to successfully implement this grand tactical ploy on the field of battle. The same type of considerations apply to the grand tactical system employed by Napoleon and his marshals. The French certainly were not the first to think of 'concentrations of force' or operating along multiple axis of operations. Marlborough and to a lesser extent Frederick the Great utilized both concepts during battle. However, they were only able to do so by working around the intrinsic limitations imposed by the formations and maneuvers then in use.
'Napoleonic Warfare,' rather than the product of one person's military genius, or a collective response to the emerging values and attitudes which culminated in the French Revolution, was instead simply the extension on a grand tactical level of the properties and capabilities of the basic tactical system which ironically had been in place since the 1750's. For example, as we have seen, columns of waiting came about because only cadenced marching was introduced and perpendicular methods of deploying into line adopted, commanders could maintain their troops in column well within cannon range. This was convenient not only because under ideal conditions allowed a much greater concentration of force, but columns could change directions and thus maneuver many times readily than had troops in an extended line. In turn, this maneuvering capability made it possible for a large body, such as a division, corps or even army, to act along multiple axis of operations.
The casual relationship between the tactics in use and the grand tactical principles and methods that are feasible, in turn, reveals something about how both tactics and grand tactics evolve in the first place.
During the first part of a weapon's era, the main focus is on discovering the best way of utilizing the weaponry. Focus on the best psychological impact comes later.
HOW TO STUDY HISTORY
This expanded conception of tactics and the realization that tactical level events were important will ultimately have a profound effect on the way we must pursue military history. The traditional de facto approach of divorcing military history from the military science of the period under study can no longer be tolerated. Only when this body of knowledge is available for other researchers plying the more traditional avenues can the types of errors and myths more readily be avoided than they have in the past. To avoid these pitfalls it is necessary to greatly expand the subject matter beyond what is normally taken under consideration. The full range of elements affecting the conduct of warfare on the Napoleonic battlefield must be examined. On a purely tactical level, this means looking at a broad range of issues such as methods of delivering fire, maneuvers, methods of attack and defense, use of cavalry weapons, cavalry charge doctrine, cavalry versus infantry techniques, and use of infantry squares.
Rather than limiting this effort to British and French practices, the experiences of all the major combatants who participated in the Napoleonic Wars must be taken into account. The research must be enlarged to include the experiences and events that occurred during campaigns usually ignored in the English-speaking world. It also means a greater number of non-English sources should be used than has typically been the case.
It is also vitally important to consider the evolutionary nature of warfare throughout the entire era that the musket dominated and defined warfare on the European battlefield. In order to be able to trace the origins of various truly innovative conceptions and practices that arose during the Napoleonic Wars, it is first necessary to determine what features of warfare were simply carried over unchanged from the earlier period, and which elements underwent some degree of transformation. Even knowledgeable readers will be surprised to discover how much of the practices and tactics traditionally viewed as cornerstones of the Napoleonic system, were actually developed and occasionally even used forty to sixty years before Napoleon's military debut.
There is, however, an even more compelling reason why a work on the Napoleonic period should not overlook material shedding light on the immediately preceding linear period. Many of the most fundamental characteristics of combat remained constant throughout the entire reign of the musket on the battlefield. The very nature of the weapons that were used ensured that many aspects of tactical systems remained constant, regardless of the development of many doctrinal innovations. Because of this constancy in certain important areas, many detailed descriptions written in the earlier period shed valuable light on some practices and events in the Napoleonic Wars. There has always been a decided tendency for observers to pay the most attention to what is new, different, or out of the ordinary. Examining the various memoirs and accounts of battles during the Napoleonic period, one encounters innumerable descriptions of forming squares, fighting in column, etc. These were practices, at least in their frequency of use, that broke with tradition, and thus were notable and worthy of comment.
A conscientious historian must be equally concerned with what is generally taken for granted: in this case, what it was like to fight in line, the dynamics of the ordinary assault, or the disorder in the ranks as a formation wavered, and so on. These remained much the same as in the preceding period, and though of extreme importance when attempting to reconstruct an accurate picture of the battlefield, were largely ignored in Napoleonic memoirs. Anyone wishing to reconstruct the dynamics and properties of these tactical elements is forced to go back to eighteenth century accounts. The introduction of the flintlock and the socket bayonet and the accompanying reduction in the depth of fighting lines transformed the art of warfare. Most of those elements though 'old hat' in latter times were new to those writing in the early 1700's, and were thus worthy of description and comment in earlier memoirs and accounts.
However, not only is it necessary to compare how various characteristics of Napoleonic Warfare differed or remained the same as linear warfare, it is also essential to determine what transmutations occurred during the Napoleonic period itself. Each individual topic, such as cavalry charge doctrine, must be discussed as it was found throughout the Napoleonic Wars and not merely the form it manifested in the one or two campaigns most notable in the English-speaking world. When discussing cavalry tactics, for example, it is important to show variations exhibited among the major combatants, and not simply those used during the Peninsular War. Looking at the French army, it is important to first show the tactical practices and capabilities of the French army during the revolutionary period before moving on to its increased capabilities and performance at the height of Napoleon's ascendancy during the 1805-1808 period. Finally, the decline of French cavalry during the 1809-1815 period must also be examined.
No work on the Napoleonic battlefield can be complete without a thorough examination of the 'grand tactical' aspect of warfare, the variations found among different armies, and how it evolved throughout this general period.
Grand tactics is that part of military science which is concerned with the positioning, movement and orchestration of large bodies of troops on the battlefield. Unlike 'tactics', which deals with lower level and mechanical issues, such as firing procedures, how to move or change position, etc., grand tactics is much more conceptual in nature and is made up of a series of principles, concepts and guidelines. Its purpose is to gain an advantage over the adversary usually by bringing an insurmountable force to an important position at a critical moment.
Unfortunately, the general view is that there were two grand tactical systems in use during the Napoleonic period which were opposite in nature and mutually self-exclusive: the linear system and a new more dynamic system introduced by Napoleon which eventually replaced its less flexible predecessor. Armies are typically seen as utilizing one system, while eschewing the other. This is largely inaccurate on two counts. It does not account for the continual evolution of grand tactical systems throughout the entire period, or the regional differences which emerged. Moreover, the principles underlying linear warfare and the 'impulse' system which ultimately replaced it were not mutually exclusive. Tacticians in virtually all armies accepted concepts and practices from both the traditional approach and the new methods to create hybrid systems. Even the British army, known for its determined conservatism, began to integrate some of the most basic concepts of impulse warfare from 1812 onward, albeit almost unconsciously.
Probably the best, commonly available description of the new 'impulse' grand tactical system is to be found in David Chandler's Campaigns of Napoleon. However, Chandler's explanation of 'Napoleonic' grand tactics is only a very general description of the some of the systems used by the French during 1805-1806. This is but a single snapshot of complex and dynamic processes subject to continual mutation and does not accurately reflect even French practices either before or after this date.
To fully understand the full panoply of grand tactical systems used during the Napoleonic period, it is necessary to begin the story with the various practices employed during the French Revolution. Contrary to common belief, Napoleon did not simply enter the scene and introduce an entirely new grand tactical system wholesale. Some of the most basic concepts in this new system had evolved long before Napoleon's entrance, while others were the product of factors and influences that were beyond Napoleon's personal control.
Many works studying the tactics of this period have inadvertently limited the analysis to the formal techniques and procedures practiced on the parade ground during peacetime. Their treatment often does not extend beyond the official regulations and the maneuvers, drills and practices these prescribed. In addition to limiting its appeal to only serious scholars or enthusiasts, this approach also misses a very substantial part of what actually makes up tactics in any period. Throughout history, practice has never been completely congruent with theory. What the troops were trained to do, and what they actually were able to accomplish on the field of battle often varied dramatically.
Consequently, it is important to determine which techniques actually proved useful on the battlefield and which were quickly rejected as impractical. It is also necessary to see how those practices that were used were modified when applied under battlefield conditions. The study of tactics, in addition to consisting of the codified elements of doctrine and training, must also include informal elements such the lore and practice communicated to new officers by word of mouth and example in the field.
End Notes
2: Keegan: The Face of Battle, pp. 61-67.
3: Ibid., p. 147
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