by Phil Jones
Decision Time for Barclay: A General Comes of Age During these tumultuous events, Ney's sector was comparatively quiet. Baggavout had managed to hurl back Ney's attack by 8.30 a.m., but had not moved quickly to the counterattack. During the next four hours, II Corps had blunted Ledru's second effort and launched two weak thrusts of their own. After seven hours of combat, they were only good for occupying ground and recovering their strength. Baggavout felt obliged to move his whole corps back more than a mile to their initial positions, where he rested them from 1 p.m. until nearly 3 p.m. Yet, Barclay only had the Guard with which to replace them, and he could not commit this formation while Napoleon's whereabouts were unknown (thankfully for Barclay's ulcers, he did not yet know that the Emperor and the cream of his troops had just "disappeared", only 10 miles to the South!). Now, with Tutchkow's command shattered, fresh guns had to be brought up and III Corps rested. Bad as things were, he knew that the French were in worse shape. One or two fresh infantry divisions were all he needed- but he did not have anything he could commit. All he could do was rest Tutchkow, bring up the reserve artillery, and wait. And hope. Hope Bagration would hold off Napoleon and allow him to finally sweep Ney and Oudinot away. Barclay could have chosen to retreat at this point. Indeed, many might say he should have. Without a clear picture of events in the South, he did not know whether Raevski had been defeated whether the road to his left rear was open whether, at any moment, survivors from Bagration's formations would be streaming into his position, with Napoleon on their heels. The General was obviously torn when, at 1.30 p.m., he wrote to Bagration: "Should I commit the Guard to smash beyond repair Oudinot?" (His syntax was questionable, but we feel his anguish!) Without definite word that his rear was secure, he could not commit his only infantry reserve. As noted earlier, Barclay was gracious in his comments on Oudinot's bravery. History should pass a similar judgment on Barclay for the decision he now took. There would be no retreat. The chance to crush these oh-so-fragile French corps and, in doing so, force Napoleon to abandon the invasion- this was a prize worth risking the army for. He had faith in Bagration. For all their personal animosities, he knew the prince to be a good soldier, a man of honor and a patriot. Barclay's greatest fear, in light of which his decision was the more heroic (or reckless?), was that Prince Eugene's French/Italian IV Corps was in the vicinity- probably coming South from Kolskyi, some hours behind Nansouty. True, he had the 2nd Cavalry Division and some cossacks screening out that way, with no reports of movement, but they could not protect his right flank from an entire French corps. Tutchkow needed plenty of time to recover, Baggavout was resting, the Guard were needed on the southern flank, and there were no other infantry available. The decision to remain in the field with so many unknowns and potential threats (even though some of them were the product of paranoia- not only would IV Corps not arrive, they were not even in the Order of Battle for this campaign!) was one that took significant intestinal fortitude. In short, Barclay's decision took guts. [It should be noted that the decision was NOT driven by the fact that this was only a wargame, and therefore didn't matter. Given the state of Ney and Oudinot, and the rift in the French army, the Russians could claim a tactical and strategic victory, even if they retreated at this point- they still had 80,000 men between Mogilna and Smolensk who were completely fresh! But Barclay wanted to be certain that the French would be so badly damaged that they could not continue to prosecute the campaign. To ensure this, he had to remain in the field, rest, wait, and attack again. In spite of the risks, this is the decision he took.]
The Battle of Liozno: Background Back to Empire, Eagles, & Lions Table of Contents Vol. 3 No. 1 © Copyright 1996 by Jean Lochet This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. |