Meanwhile, to the South...

Whether they made it depended in large part on Napoleon. So where was the great man? Riding near the head of Davout's leading column, Napoleon had arrived at Lyubavitchi at 6 a.m. Finding only a few jaegers and hussars (detached from Baggavout) in the vicinity, the divisions by-passed the town while a brigade took care of the gallant defenders. Pressing on with all haste, the Guard light cavalry arrived before Mogilna at 8 a.m. to discover the town and road North screened by cossacks. Immediately charging, the Dutch Lancers got a nasty shock when the cossacks withdrew to reveal 72 guns backed by 13,000 infantry. Wheeling back, these elite riders reformed out of artillery range, but not before leaving many of their veteran comrades behind. Stung by this, the Guard light cavalry deployed to screen their advancing infantry and sat back to await events. Davout's divisions began arriving behind the cavalry at 9 a.m.

Napoleon was furious. To assault would waste precious time (and cost many casualties), but to leave the main road would require a detour of several miles and would possibly take even longer (always providing the troops did not lose their way on the myriad of minor roads which criss-crossed this part of Russia). The decision was made to deploy for action and simply overwhelm Raevski. However, the Russians were not content simply to surrender the initiative. Receiving word from Lyubavitchi of Napoleon's advance, Prince Bagration was personally leading Borozdin's elite VIII Corps from Gaponki through the woods toward Tur, two miles South of Mogilna. Now, with Davout's Corps just about to assault Raevski, and the Imperial Guard in road column at Tur, word was received of Bagration's approach on their right flank. This changed everything. While Napoleon knew he could defeat Bagration's forces, they were now swollen to nearly 30,000. This would take even longer, would cause more casualties, and would both delay and weaken the impact of the "hammer". He seriously doubted the "anvil" could wait that long!

At about 10 a.m., Davout's attack was called off and the troops returned to road column. Plan B was adopted- a march across country and along cart tracks to Kopti, Zachernya, Sutoki, Gerbly and finally Ney's position (should he still have one) at Shakhi. This would add fully six miles to the route, along inferior roads, and cause Napoleon to emerge on his own army's flank instead of his enemy's, but it was the better option under the circumstances. The task was now to disengage and get away from Bagration without further delay.

The handling of this maneouvre was flawless. The Guard heavy cavalry screened Borozdin while the Guard light cavalry, backed up by one of Davout's divisions, continued to screen Raevski. This latter was not moving- he knew a good position when he found one!- but Borozdin continued to deploy for attack. Meantime, Reynier's Saxons approached Tur from the South and were directed to join the rear of the Guard infantry columns as they snaked off toward Kopti. Some spirited charges by the Guard heavies kept Borozdin pinned in square before he could move to the assault, and by the time the Russians realized what was happening the only Frenchmen they could see were the Empress Dragoons and Grenadiers a Cheval of the Guard withdrawing westward. At a cost of several hundred of his finest cavalry, the Emperor Magician had caused 50,000 troops to "disappear".

Raevski was the first to receive notice that some French units were moving away. At 11.30 a.m., his cossacks (finally) reported the beginnings of the maneouvre, but did not indicate it's scale. By 1 p.m., however, Bagration had to report to Barclay (who would not receive the intelligence until 3.30 p.m.) that Napoleon, his Guard, and Davout's I Corps had slipped away- bad as this was, the Saxons had been completely missed!

Even so, Bagration had partially achieved his goal. He had seriously delayed Napoleon, blocked his direct route into Barclay's left rear, and forced him to take a much wider arc in his progress toward the battlefield around Liozno. It hadn't been a bad morning's work! He now ordered Raevski to move his corps North to Starini, to prevent Napoleon circling the Mogilna position and resuming his northward thrust from Rozunovo. He then set off in pursuit of Napoleon with Borozdin's grenadiers. Contact was made with Friant's 2nd Division (supporting the Guard light cavalry, they were the last infantry out of the field), but they were able to parry Bagration and, without cavalry, he found it very difficult to slow their progress. Wittgenstein was reportedly approaching Yeliseyevka and Bagration sent word that I Corps was to head to Rudnya to act as a strategic reserve for the army, since he considered it possible Barclay might be forced to retreat in that direction should Napoleon overturn him at Liozno.

Russian Redeployment

Back at Liozno, Barclay was reassessing his position. Since Baggavout had thrown back Ney, and Tutchkow had severely mauled Oudinot, things had fallen relatively quiet. Ney had tried to throw Ledru forward again, but this effort was quickly repulsed. However, Baggavout's counterattack had also petered out by the time it reached the western edge of Lake Buyevskoye. Olsufieff was unable to dislodge the 26th Legere from the Punische Wood (his own light troops had been left at Lyubavitchi to warn Bagration of the approaching French) and decided to fall back. Eugene, to his left, prudently decided not to continue on alone beyond the lake, and held his ground until Olsufieff's retirement forced him to do the same. Adding insult to injury, Eugene also had his horse killed beneath him for good measure.

Tutchkow's initial attempt fared no better. Konovinitzin was sent forward without any support, and Oudinot was able to arrest his progress by ordering his corps cavalry under Corbineau to charge the advancing infantry. Although committed to a reckless charge, Corbineau's sacrifice achieved the desired result. The Russians were forced into square and, as the cavalry recalled, the French gunners rushed to dish out what they had been taking all morning. Some battalions were broken by the fire, and all took casualties before Konovinitzin fell back to his original position, to lick his wounds and prepare for another attempt.

As a result, Barclay's early confidence had been somewhat blunted. At 8 a.m. he had sent word to Bagration-- "I do not expect any difficulty in defeating the French forces at Liozno." (Russian Official Archive) At 9 a.m., he was more exuberant: "The French are breaking. Ney is finished. Oudinot will be smashed by noon." (ibid) Events were proving him wrong. While they had repulsed the French attacks, their own assaults had been pre-empted or beaten off. It was taking time to reissue orders and organize another attack. Already it was 11 a.m. and Ney was still in the field (just), while Oudinot was holding his ground. Barclay was still worried about his left flank. He had detached the 1st Converged Grenadiers from the reserve and sent them off to Mogilna as early as 10 a.m. Now, he despatched the Guard light cavalry to follow them. (Ironically, these troops arrived just in time to meet Raevski debouching from Mogilna and moving North to Starini. By 3.30 p.m. the Guard cavalry were back in reserve with Barclay!). Although Napoleon, when he learned of the early French attacks, was far from impressed by the actions of his marshals, they strengthened Barclay's suspicions that his rear would soon be threatened. For this reason, he chose not to commit the Guard but to continue pounding the French with his tiring first line formations.

Even so, there could be little doubt that the decisive moment of the battle would soon be at hand, and Russian reserves were brought up to exploit the inevitable breakthrough. It was at 11 a.m. that Barclay moved the Guard forward to form a second line behind Baggavout, though well out of sight and range. This was insurance against the possible sudden appearance of Napoleon in his left-rear. The Guard infantry took post South-West of Dubroyka, their left anchored on Lake Buyevskoye. The 1st Cavalry Division came up on Tutchkow's left, while the 2nd Cuirassier Division, with the 72 gun artillery reserve, formed up in their rear, immediately West of Liozno. Finally, the 3rd Cavalry Division was sent out to Tutchkow's exposed right to offer support, taking post in front of the village of Admenki next to Tchoglokov's 11th Infantry Division. The 1st Cuirassier Division was in reserve at Liozno. The crisis of the day was at hand.

The Battle of Liozno: Background
The Battle of Liozno: Initial Dispositions
The Battle of Liozno: Opening Gambit
The Battle of Liozno: Meanwhile, to the South...
The Battle of Liozno: The Crisis of the Day
The Battle of Liozno: Decision Time
The Battle of Liozno: Order of Battle

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