French Light Troops Part I French Light Troops Part II We have seen that in 1764, in spite of the recommendations of Marshal de Broglie, the French War Ministry refused to create permanent chasseurs companies in each line battalion. However, the Regulation of 1764 drawn up by Broglie, recommended a section of tirailleurs to be used in front of each column of attack. ref. Quimby, THE BACKGROUND OF NAPOLEONIC WARFARE, page 92. Please note: TIRAILLEURS IN FRONT OF EACH COLUMN OF ATTACK. It almost sound like we are already speaking of the Napoleonic Era. To be complete we should mention here that in 1764, the French Army was stirred up by the controversy between the partisans of the ordre profond (deep order) and the partisans of the ordre mince (thin order). The column was nothing new already in 1764. The skirmishers were not new either.... The Regulatlon of 1764 is one of the few Regulations to mention skirmishers. It sought to regulate the practice of the Seven Years War by pointing out that, while one should always charge the enemy without stopping to fire if possible, one should always detach two wing half-sections and scatter them in front to fire on the enemy during the advance. ref. Quimby, page 99. The Regulation of 1764 was completed by the Instructions for Light Troops of 1769 which was also the work of Broglie. The use of skirmishers did not stops with the above Regulations. On the contrary the great French Military thinkers of the period were the advocate of skirmishers which apparently were accepted by everyone of them. The controversy was only between the partisans of the ordre profond and the partisants of the ordre mince. Guibert in ESSAI GENERAL DE LA TACTIQUE, in 1772, was the advocate of tirailleurs and his battalion included a company of chasseurs, a company of grenadiers and eight companies of fusiliers. Guibert went quite deeply in the analysis of the art of warfare during tha Seven Years War. He found that about one fifth of the troops were light troops which did not fully participated in battles if the two armies engaged. This led de Guibert to the famous following quotation(Quimby, page 141) What will hinder one day a general, a man of genius, commanding 50 thousand men against an army of the same strenath, from turning aside from the accepted routine, from not having in this fifty thousand ten thousand light troops, or from so constituting them that they could perform line service at need, and hold a place in the combat dispositions? ... What will hinder him in almost all circumstances from refraining from splintering his army, from making fewer detachments, fewer reserves, fewer movements of detail than one makes today, from maneuvering more with his whole mass? What would the enemy do, astonished at this new kind of war? Will he parcel his army out, will he separate his army, will he have there a pawn here another, will he seek to make one uneasy, to threaten, to conceal a march? The first will remain always closed up, always united, if he can, in range or in sight of him, always in readiness to attack the bulk of his army or the parts which he has detached, always in force and secure from surprise, because he will be assembled and disposed for combat, while his adversary will always be obliged to be fearful, always to wear himself out in fatiques, because he will be dispersed and vulnerable at several points. Quimby to conclude page 142: Taken by itself, out of context, this quotation is practically a sketch of the methods used by General Bonaparte in the Italian campaign of 1796. Guibert went on and claimed that it was possible to make a system in which there was less necessity to employ great bodies of Light troops. It was even more possible to employ line troops to perform their duties. He claimed that there was no great differences between the two. Both were armed and equipped alike and subject to the same discipline. He said he would use the same system as Marshal de Broglie, who formed special battalions of elite chasseurs (called grenadiers) to serve outside of the line in 1760. The events that took place at the Camp of Vaussieux are significant and illustrate well the thinking and the experiments carried out by the French Army after the Seven Years War up to the French Revolution in 1789. The Camps de Vaussieux was set up in Normandy in early 1778 during the War of the American Revolution (ref. Quimby page 233) to test the new tactical system of Mesnil-Durand which was partisan of the ordre profond that is the exclusive use of the column. Broglie supported such system. The experiment was quite extensive. Altogether, forty-four battalions of infantry, six regiments of dragoons and a large train of artillery were collected. After the troops were established in the camp they began to drill in accordance with the new system of Mesnil-Durand during three weeks. Then they began the tests with skirmishers, columns etc. Several maneuvers took place. The one of September 14, 1778 is of interest: (ref. Quimby page 287) The chasseurs were then advanced a hundred paces in front of this formation and spread out to act as a skirmisher screen. A similar maneuver was executed on the 15th. This time de Broglie used some chasseurs in the edges and brush patches to repulse those of the enemy. The charging troops were covered by the fire of their chasseurs. ref. Quimby page 239. The same took place in several other maneuvers. The Campsde Vaussieux was of capital importance in the development tactics. Mesnil-Durand system was rejected because impracticable, but it crystallized the opinion of the great majority of French officers for a middle ground between the extreme positions of Pirch(ordre mince) and Mesnil-Durand (ordre profond) and consecrated the use of skirmishers. The Camps de Vaussieux was completed by the Camps de Parame later in 1778. Fewer troops were used but the conclusions were the same. In the light of the above the Ordinance of 1776 was slightly modified to allow both columns and lines to be used to satisfy the partisans of both orders although the extreme form of ordre profond of Mesnil-Durand was rejected. The only difference left between the moderates among the partisants of both orders was whether the columns could actually be used to push home an attack covered only by skirmisher --fire. -No peace time maneuvers could answer that question. ref. Quimby page 248. Please note here that the Ordinance of 1776 was very similar to the Ordinance of 1791, which was drawn up by the same school of officers that had participated to the above controversy and exercises. We started with light troops and we now strictly speak about Ordinances. The answer is simple, it is difficult if not impossible to dissociate the skirmishers, the light troops and the Ordinances of the French Army. There are all the evolution and the teaching of the Seven Years War. I extend on the subject because of the constant quotations by some sources that the French Revolution improvised a system including columns and skirmishers, It is not so the system was already in place and no improvisation took place. I would like to come back on that subject in a next issue. As a matter of fact, the Ordnance of 25 March, 1776 introduced some deep changes in the French Army. ref. Capitain Latreille L'ARMEE ET LA NATION A LA FIN DE L'ANCIEN REGIME (Librairie Chapelot Paris 1914) The changes were as deep as the changes introduced by Choiseul. The organization of the regiments, battalions and companies was completely modified. In the infantry all the regiments with the exception of the REGIMENT DU ROI, had two battalions. The regiments of infantry included one 'company of grenadiers and one company of chasseurs. The infantry battalion was reduced to four companies of fusiliers; each company was including six officers and 165 soldiers and non-commissioned officers. The grenadiers were still selected from the fusiliers. A company of grenadiers included six officers and one hundred and two grenadiers and non-commissioned officers. The chasseurs companies had the same strength than the fusiliers. St. Germain, the reformer and author of the Ordinance underlined the fact that the chasseurs were to be made exclusively of young and vigourous young men and officers. If chasseurs were introduced in the infantry one should not conclude that the light troops were necessarily fully accepted, We have seen already in issue # 23, that all the light troops were disbanded in 1776, (see issue # 23) that is the so-called legions. In 1784 a new Ordinance published on August 8, 1784 attached to each chasseurs a cheval regiments one battalions of chasseurs a pieds (foot chasseurs). The new units in which the horsemen were the majority were simply called Regiments de Chasseurs.. Each regiment included 4 squadrons of chasseurs (6 officers and 88 troopers on peace footin and 153 troopers on war footing) and 1 battalion of chasseurs foot) of 4 companies( 6 officers and 79 soldiers on peace footing and 128 on war footing). The officers of this regiment were to be chosen among the officers of the former legions previously disbanded. The soldiers were completed with recruits and soldiers from the line-regiments, The organization of 1784 did not last very long. In 1788 the chasseurs a cheval were definetely separated from the foot chasseurs. The light infantry was officially incorporated in the regular Army. The rest of the infantry kept the same organization that of 1776. (all above from L'ARMEE ET LA NATION A LA FIN DE L'ANCIEN REGIME) In 1789, only one year later, according to Roger's NAPOLEON'S ARMY page 58, we find 12 chasseurs battalions in the French Army. Apparently, some line regiments were changed to light battalions. The trend was definitely toward the increase of the regular light infantry. The post Revolution period and the Empire was to continue that trend since the light regiments, also called at some times "demie-brigade legeres" were increased to some 33 regiments. Please note here the influence of Guibert by looking back at the quotation of page 2: It was possible to make a system in which there was less necessity to employ great bodies of light troops ... etc Guibert like many others was against the Legions of light troops in peace time certainly because they were not part of the regular army, but not against light regular infantry as such. The need for the light infantry function was recognized. Guibert was the strong advocate on the following: (1) A company of chasseurs in each line battalion or regiment. (2) Independent light battalions of elite chasseurs (which were also sometimes called grenadiers). Both ideas were not new, de Broglie had used such formations during the Seven Years War. Also of interest is the battalion of Guibert. It included: 1 company of grenadiers 1 company of chasseurs 8 companies of fusiliers The French regiment of the Ordinance of 1776 had the exact same composition but was split into two battalions. During the Revolution and the early Empire the chasseurs companies disappeared from the line battalions. We have to wait until 1806-7 to see the voltigeurs companies take officially their place back in the line battalion. Thus, the French line battalion of 1806-7 is nothing more than the battalion of Guibert or the regiment of the Ordinance of 1776 .... nothing new really... the next evolution was to reduce in 1808 the fusiliers companies from 7 or 8 to 4 companies. I don't see anything new there either. Please note here that British line battalions received their light infantry company back in 1771. Perhaps my conclusions appear to be controversial. I am just reporting available, pertinent data traceable to official archives and other authoritative reliable sources. There are not necessarily French. On the contrary some British authors like Oman report the same. The following quotation from Oman's WELLINGTON'S ARMY, page 75: But there was a second alternative course open to the British: instead of developing more skirmishers in each battalion, they might create new light-infantry corps, or turn whole units of the line into light troops. For the former there was good precedent : in the War of the American Revolution the British generals had of necessity embodied corps of riflemen, to oppose to the deadly marksmen from the backwoods who formed the most efficient part of the American armies. Such were Simcoe's Rangers, and the dismounted part, of Tarleton's famous Legion, whose remainder consisted of veritable mounted infantry the finest of their sort in the British army, since dragoons had forgotten their old trade and become cavalry of the line. But all the Rangrs, etc., had been disbanded in 1783, and their use seems to have been forgotten before the French War began. The system had to begin again de novo. It was not till 1798 that the first British rifle battalion was created, to wit the 5th Battalion of the 60th Regiment, or Royal Americans, which was formed as a Jager unit out of the remains of many defunct foreign light corps in British pay: it remained mainly German in composition even during the. Peninsular War. The above quotation is of interest. Please note that the system had to be learned "de novo" by the British Army. Another very interesting referrnce is from Becke, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF TACTICS, 1740-1905, published in London in 1909, the following is from pages 15 and 16: From 1745 we find skirmishers continually mentioned. Probably the origin of these light troops is to be traced to the small piquets of about fifty men which each battalion, used to find in the Seven Year War, and which were used to cover the troops of the line; and gradually the advance of the regiments began to be covered with a skirmisher swarm. Thus we see that the comprehensive use of skirmishers during the eighteenth century, and at least by the end of it had become a well-established custom. Well, I think the above is clear. Nothing was new in 1791 and after when skirmishers were used by the French and other countries. The skirmisher "system" was not improvised by the Revolutionary Armies. It is interesting to note how much was forgotten by the other Nations. It is true that everywhere, including France, light troops were considered too costly to maintain in Peace time. We should continue this interesting subject in some next issues. As a matter of facts the subject of light infantry and light cavalry are complicated enough to justify several articles. What about the socalled French system of columns....That is interesting also and we have started to see part of it in this series of articles. We should see that also in some next issue. To finish, let me present here some footnotes taken from Quimby, THE BACKGROUND OF THE NAPOLEONIC WARFARE: pages 353 and 354: 32. It is curious that while Guibert proposes to organize his battalion on the basis of three, giving, nine fusilier companies, he uses a battalion consisting of eight fusilier companies plus two elite companies, a grenadier company on the right flank and a chasseur company on the left. Apparently he wished his demonstrations to make use of the existing battalion, in order to make their practicality clear. 57. Actually they were chasseurs, elite light infantry. The term was later applied also to light cavalry of French origin, as distinct from hussars which were originally foreign regiments. The above foot-note refers to the battalion of elite chasseurs of de Broglie quoted page 2. 86. Guibert would form a chasseur company, or a second company of grenadiers, in order to give his battalions sufficient strength. A further reason which he gave was that the system followed in his day of having only one wing of a battalion composed of elite troops was an evil." The elite companies of a brigade would form a battalion when assembled for special service. The so-called battalion of elite was used at least until 1807. They were especially used at Iena. see Houssaye IENA for instance. On the next page you will find a letter from Mr Martinsen which is a fine article in itself on light troops. French Light Troops Part I French Light Troops Part II French Light Troops Part III French Light Troops Part IV Back to Empire, Eagles, & Lions Table of Contents Vol. 1 No. 26 Back to EEL List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1978 by Jean Lochet This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com