More on the Firing of Guns
by Non-Specialists

More Data

by Jean A. Lochet

Firing of Napoleonic Guns by Non-Specialists (Issue v.1n18)

Once more, I coming again with some more data and comments on the firing of guns by non-specialists. I think that in our last issue very pertinent data, but, alas, incomplete on the firing of guns by non-specialists in the French army.

In issue#18 of NJN, page 46, our friend Dick Ponsini recommended that the practice of allowing British non-artillerists, i.e. grenadiers, light infantry etc. should be discontinued since he had not to-date found any references where anybody except members of the Royal Artillery were normally trained to man a gun.

I have found such a reference. In BRITISH ARTILLERY ON LAND AND SEA by Robert Wilkinson-Latham, pages 9 and 10 the following is said on regimental artillery.

    "...In the British service, a number of 6 pdrs were allotted to each battalion and manned by the Royal Artillery. This system led to a decline in the morale of the gunners, many of whom spent years attached to an infantry battalion. In 1789 and again in 1801, decisions were taken that 1 officer and 18 men of each cavalry regiment and 1 officer and 34 men of each infantry regiment were to be trained to serve the battalion guns and to release the gunners for duty on the heavier pieces. However, by 1799 the use of battalion guns had virtually died out in the British service."

Well, that is the first positive reference on the normal training of infantrymen to fire a gun in British service. I'll be the first one to agree that we don't know how far that training was carried out. Perhaps someone can help us on that matter. It would be very interesting. Please note here that the battalion guns were not used in the British army after about 1800, but that, apparently, some infantrymen had been exposed to the practice of firing guns. Ray Johnson in the same issue of NJN, tells us the following:

    "To man a battery at all, at least part of the crew must have been exposed to some artillery training. This implies that some part of the crew are artillerists or are infantry who had an opportunity for such training. These are most likely to be found among veterans; grenadiers, Guards etc."

Apparently, it's what happened at Waterloo when the 71st Highlanders took over the French grand battery and turned the guns against the French. (ref, Houssaye "1815", Lachouque WATERLOO, see EMPIRES, EAGLES and LIONS issue #18 page 13)

I agree that is not much to go on to justify a rule, but at least it is something. I would like to put here the emphasis on the difficulties to find pertinent data on the remanning of guns by non-specialists. Ray Johnson in NJN # 18, page 23 is of our opinion. He even says that he is lacking the one or two-sound references upon which these FRAPPE rules were based.

However it is not because an event or a capability is not related or mentioned that it does not exist or did not happened. We have several examples of that. Very few books mention that, at the battle of Waterloo, the 71st Highlanders turned the guns of the captured grand battery against the French. Rifleman Harris in his book SOLDIER OF THE SEVENTY-FIRST, does not relate the event either. As a matter of fact, he does not relate some other events of importance in which he was involved. He was at Almaraz and he does not report the capture of the flag of the 4th Foreign Regiment, i.e. the ex-regiment of Prussia, by the 71st!

Until I found the reference in Thiers' HISTOIRE DU CONSULAT ET DE L'EMPIRE (see EMPIRES, EAGLES and LIONS issue #18 pages 3 & 4) that we learned that several French hussars regiments were trained to fire guns in 1803-1805. We had a tendency to consider the case of the 20th chasseurs as an isolated case, since the only reference we had on hand was PARQUIN. Parquin even tells us in his book that the 20th chasseurs never had the opportunity to use that skill. Yet a small body of the 20th had that skill and even received extra pay for that. Consequently one could read all the battle accounts of the 20th and reach the conclusion that the 20th chasseurs could not fire guns ....

We had not too much either to back up our claim that French grenadiers could fire a gun until the reference from Thiers related in our last issue of EMPIRES, EAGLES and LIONS, pages 3 to 7.

That brings back the case of infantry units, that at one time or another had regimental or battalion guns that were withdraw at a latter date. That happened to many units in many armies, French, British, Austrian Prussian, Nassau etc. Very precisely, the case of the Nassau infantry is of interest.

According to Otto von Pivka in NAPOLEON'S GERMAN ALLIES (2) published by Osprey Men-at-arms series, in 1803, the united houses of Nassau raised 4 battalions of infantry. Each battalion had two three- pounders as "regimental cannon".

In 1808, the 1st and 4th battalion became the 1st Nassau infantry regiment and the 2nd and 3d battalion became the 2d Nassau infantry regiment. It is not clear when the "regimental guns" were withdraw from the above battalions. Apparently the removal was done before 1808. The 2d regiment was sent to Spain on August 20, 1808, apparently with no battalion guns. The 1st regiment was mobilised to participate in the Austrian campaign in 1809 and became part of Marshall Davout's Corps. The Nassauers did not come into action during this campaign but were part of the garrison of Vienna from June 22 to October 21, 1809.

During this time they received two cannons captured from the Austrian at the arsenal of Vienna. The order was given to form from the regiment a company of regimental Artillery. This step had been already taken by the infantry of the French Army of Germany. The Nassau regiment's artillerymen received their own uniform, with red plumes, epaulettes, collars and cuffs.

What I want to point out here is simple. Regimental guns were withdraw from the Nassau regiments sometime before 1808. Apparently at that time some men were trained to fire the "regimental guns" but certainly dispersed in the regiments. But the capability for part of the soldiers to fire guns, remained and when the decision was made to reintroduce the regimental guns like for the French Army in 1809, a company of regimental artillery was simply formed from the infantry ranks.

I don't think my point, except for reasons and facts unknown to me, is illogical. I also think it reasonable to allow the first regiment or at least part of the 1st regiment of Nassau to fire a gun. At that point we go back to the principle given by Ray Johnson that most likely such infantrymen are more likely to be found in the grenadiers etc. Hence the basis for the rule to allow the remaning of guns by grenadiers etc. Please also see my article on the same subject in the previous issue of EMPIRE$, EAGLES and LIONS.

That does not mean we should allow everybody to fire guns as efficiently as artillerists. I think we all agree on that, and that should be the base for a new proposed rule for the firing of guns by non-specialists and the like.


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