In my article on NON-SPECIALISTS IN ARTILLERY CREWS (NJN # 15, page 21) I was mentioning the ability for part of the 20th Chasseurs a cheval to fire guns. My reference was Parquin page 17. 1 was raising the question if that type of training, i.e. the ability to fire guns.was unique to the 20th Chasseurs or had been extended to other cavalry units. Of course that was pure speculation with no evidence to back my "reverie". I was very surprised ... but I found the reference I was looking for in Thiers HISTOIRE DU CONSULAT ET DE L'EMPIRE volume I pages 532-533. In 1803, the time came to concentrate all the boats of the Boulogne flotilla in the harbors of Embleuse, Etaples, Boulogne, Vimereux etc. It was not a very easy task since the Royal Navy was commanding the sea and, consequently the vessels of the flotilla had to coast the shore, keeping constantly at very short distance from land, and running aground when too closely pressed ' by the English cruisers. In several instances some bricks had to run ashore to escape the enemy and were helped by the inhabitants of the neighboring villages. The First Consul had the idea of a system of succour. Numerous units of cavalry were to be distributed along the coasts of France from Nantes to Boulogne. These units of cavalry, divided in arrondissements, had with them batteries of horse artillery, trained to manoeuvre with extreme rapidity, and to gallop over the smooth sands left by the sea in receding. The sands were usually so solid that they could carry horses and carriages. The cavalry squadrons drawing the artillery after them were to patrol the beaches incessantly, and to protect the boats in their course by their fire. Thiers relates that even 12 pounder guns were used and could be moved as rapidly as 4 or 8-pounders. Bonaparte had insisted that every French horse soldier, qualified for all services should be able to dismount to fire the pieces, or to run carbine on hand to the assistance of the seamen aground on the coast. In a letter to the War Ministry dated September 29, 1803, Bonaparte said: "The hussars, must be taught to recollect that a French soldier must be a horseman, foot-soldier, artilleryman, that he must be competent to anything." Two generals, Lemarais and Sebastiani, were charged with the command of all that cavalry. They had the order to be incessantly on horseback, make sure that the squadrons manoeuvred everyday with their artillery and kept themselves constantly informed with the movements of convoys to escort them in their progress. A letter to Davout on October 30, 1803, from Bonaparte requested improvments in the organization etc. Apparently things went well and the system produced excellent results since the flotilla was able to concentrate and that convoys of 30, 50 or even 60 sails were used. But that is another story. The pertinent point is that in 1803 several cavalry regiments were trained to fire guns. The 20th Chasseurs was not unique. I have not identified yet the units able to do so, however the length of the French coast from Nantes to Boulogne is in the order of 700 miles and it is logical to assume that quite a few cavalry units were necessary to cover effectively such a territory. Any help would be appreciated. Training of Sailors and Infantrymen Also in NJN#I5 page 21, I presented the quotation from HISTOIRE DE LA MARINE FRANCAISE page 211, on grenadier Coignet's description of the mixed training of the sailors and the infantrymen part of the Boulogne flotilla. The pertinent point was that both sailors and soldiers were capable and trained to fire a gun. Again in HISTOIRE DU CONSULAT ET DE L'EMPIRE volume 1, pages 534 and 535, I have found the detail on the training of the infantry embarked on the Boulogne flotilla: "...care was taken to produce complete harmony between the seamen and the soldiers, by constant appropriation of the same vessels to the same troops. The dimensions of the gun-brigs and gun-boats had been calculated for them to carry a company of infantry, besides some artillery. This was the element employed to determine the general organization of the flotilla. The battalions were then composed of 9 companies; the demi-brigades of 2 war battalions, the third remaining in the depot. The gun-brigs and the gun-boats were arranged in conformity with the composition of the troops.. Nine brigs or boats formed a section, and carried nine companies or a battalion. Two sections formed a division and carried a demi-brigade. Thus the brig or boat answered to the company, the section to the battalion, the division to the demi-brigade. Naval officers of a corresponding rank commanded the boat, the section, the division. To produce a perfect coherence of the troops with the flotilla, each division was appropriated to a demi-brigade, each section to a battalion, each brig and boat to a company; and this appropriation once made was invariable. Thus the troops were always to keep the same vessel, and to attach themselves to it, as a rider attach himself to a horse. Land and sea officers, soldiers and sailors, would by these means learn to know and have confidence in one another, and be more disposed to render each other mutual assistance. Each company was to furnish the vessel belonging to it with a garrison of twenty-five men forming a fourth of the company, always on board. These 25 men remained on board for about a month. During that time they lodged in the vessel with the crew, whether the vessel went to sea to manoeuvre or lay in harbor. There they did all that the sailors themselves did, assisted in working the vessel, and exercised themselves in particular in the management of the oars and in the firing the cannon. When they had passed a month in this kind of life they were succeeded by 25 other soldiers of the same company, who came to devote themselves for the same space of time to nautical exercices. Thus the whole company took its turn on board the prior the boats. Each men, therefore, was alternately land soldier, sea soldier, artilleryman, sailor, and even labouring engineer, in consequence of the work carrying in the basins. The sailors likewise took part in this reciprocal training. They had infantry arms on board and, when they were in port, they performed the infantry exercise in the day-time on the quay. They formed consequently an accession of 15,000 foot-soldiers, who, after the landing in England, would be capable of defending the flotilla along the coasts, where it would be lying aground. by giving them a reinforcement of about 10,000 men, they might await with impunity on the shore the victories of the invading army." That is quite clear, the training of the infantry included firing of guns. Pinnaces were also used, they were about 60 feet long. According to Thiers, volume I page 535: "The pinnaces at first were left out of this organization, because they were not capable of carrying a whole company, and were fitter for throwing the troops rapidly on shore than for meeting an enemy at sea. Subsequently however they were formed into divisions and especially appropriated to the advanced guard composed of the united grenadiers. In the interim, they were ranged in thirds of companies in port, and every day the troops to which the vessels were not yet assigned went to practise, sometimes working them by oars, sometimes firing the light howitzer and the 4-pounder with which they were armed. Please note that the united grenadiers were the so-called Oudinot's Grenadiers. They were also capable of firing howitzers since a pinnace was equipped with a small howitzer and a 4-pounder. In addition to the three above type of vessels the flotilla was also including some special brigs call gun-boats to transport the field artillery and some infantry. Such boats carried a 24-pounder and one field piece capable of firing from the carriage while on the boat. An artillery caisson full of ammunition and two horses were also on board. Several other types of boats were also used to transport the artillery, horses, stores etc. A total of some 1977 vessels were assembled in the different ares to be seen later. Many times the projected invasion has been ridiculized. For instance Wells in OUTLINE OF HISTORY, volume 2 page 743 says: "In some "Napoleonic" fashion the British fleet was to be decoyed away, the army of Boulogne was to be smuggled across the Channel on a flotilla of rafts and boats." Boulogne Flotilla It is not our intention or purpose to speculate on the eventual failure or success of the project. Nevertheless the Boulogne flotilla was a reality and since we are concerned here with the magnitude of the training of a number of soldiers we better have an idea on the number of soldiers involved in the program beside the above impressive number of ships. HISTOIRE BE LA MARINE FRANCAISE page 211 tells us that an army of some 148,783 men and 8611 horses, with its artillery, food, baggages and ammunitions could be transported. Thiers again page 274, volume I tells the following: "The army now amounted to nearly 132,000 men and 15,000 horses, independently of the corps of General Marmont stationed at the Texel amounting to 24000 men and the 4000 men of Brest destined to sail with the squadron of Ganteaume. The 132,000 who were to go on board the flotilla and sail from the four ports of Ambleuse, Vimereux, Boulogne and Etaples were divided into six corps. The advanced- guard commanded by Lannes, 14,000 strong consisting of Gagan division and of the famous united grenadiers, encamped at Arras, was to embark at Vimereux. These 10 battalions of grenadiers, forming themselves a corps of 8000 men, of the finest infantry in the world, embarked on a light division of pinnaces, were called to be the first ones to throw themselves upon the shore of England, under the inspiring impulse of Lannes and Oudinot. Then came the main body divided into right wing, centre and left wing. The right wing, under Davout, numbering 26,000 men, consisting of the valiant divisions of Morand, Friant and Gudin which have since distinguished themselves at Auerstadt and in hundred fights, was destined to embark at Embleuse upon the Dutch flotilla. The centre, under Soult, numbering 46,000 men, disributed into 4 divisions at the head of which were Generals Vandamme, Suchet, Le Grand, and St. Hilaire were to embark upon the four escadrilles that were assembled at Boulogne. Finally, the the left, or camp of Montreuil, was under the command of the intrepid Ney. It consisted of 22,000 men; it reckoned three divisions and especially the Dupont division which soon after covered itself with glory at Albex, at the bridge of Halle, and at Friedland. This corps was to depart from Etaples upon two escadrilles of the flotilla. A division of the ELITE of the Guard, 3000 strong, and already on their march, was about to arrive at Boulogne, there to join the centre. Finally, the sixth subdivision of that grand army was what was called the reserve. it was under the command of Prince Louis, it comprised the dragoons and the foot chasseurs commanded by Generals Klein and Margarm, the heavy cavalry commanded by Nansouty, and an Italian division perfectly disciplined and not yielding in steadiness of bearing to the finest French divisions. This reserve amounting to 27000 men, and posted in the rear of all the other camps was to march was to march to the shore when the first five corps of the army had sailed.... the transport flotilla was to come back and embark this reserve as well as the second part of the horses. In fact, out of the 15,000 horses the flotilla could only embark 8000 at a time....Thus, besides the 24,000 men of Marmont embarked in the fleet of the Texel, and the 4000 men embarked at Brest, Napoleon could at once put in motion a total mass of 132,000 men, being 100,000 infantry." I apologize for such a lengthy quotation but I believe that it was necessary. IT would be very nice to have the exact order of battle of the French army at Boulogne so the different regiments could identified behind the shadow of a doubt. To be complete it is important to consider that a full Italian infantry division received the training to fire a field gun. Also of importance is the following paragraph from Thiers volume I, page 534. It is the report of one action that took place during the concentration of a part of the Boulogne flotilla. Apparently the infantry embarked on the vessels had not received yet the training presented above; "....it was seen that assistance might be derived from the cooperation of land troops, which without any training had worked the oars and the marine artillery with extraordinary address, and above all shown no fear of the sea and great zeal in seconding the sailors." I think that quotation is also a very Pertinent piece of information. I do believe that many French infantrymen were capable in 1803-1804 of firing a gun with a reasonable amount of competence for the very simple reason that they were for the most part veterans of the French revolution wars and that a great deal of them had been exposed to the practice of firing guns at one time or an other during that period. It is very important to keep in mind that at one time infantry battalions had several guns to man as battalion guns. Such guns as reported before in other articles on that subject were manned by the infantrymen of the units involved. The quantity of battalion or regimental guns was several times reduced and it is logical to assume that the trained infantrymen-artillerists were kept in the unit and reverted to their former duties of infantrymen but nevertheless capable of firing a gun if an opportunity to do so presented itself like Grenadier Brabant at Marango and the Grenadiers and Chasseurs of the Imperial Guard at Wagram. Austrian Artillerists: Regimental Batteries That raises an interesting question on the fate of the Austrian artillerists assigned to the service of the regimental batteries of the Austrian Army. According to one of my source, an article written by David L. Arneson, the 1792 Austrian army had a total of some 20,000 of them. In 1809, the regimental artillery was eliminated altogether. At that time what happened to these artillerists (part of the artillery). Were they simply disbanded, or used as artillerists by the Austrian artillery or used as infantrymen like in the French Army? That is an interesting question. Let us say that in 1795 each battalion of the French Army had 4 guns. The number was reduced to 2 in 1795 and the regimental guns eliminated altogether in 1803 and the infantry gunners used as infantry. That also raises some questions as already mentioned in my article in NJN#15, page 23: (1) Was the measure carried on completely? (2) How can you explain the fact that the 26th Light infantry regiment had two regimental guns? Reference Camille Rougeron AUSTERLITZ page 231 (French edition). Of course they could be captured Austrian guns. The very same happened in 1809 when after the battle of Aspern-Esling Napoleon decided to supply each line regiment of the Massena, Devout and Oudinot Corps with two captured Austrian guns. I do believe that at the present time we have enough data on hand to completely substantiate our present rale of remanning guns at least by the Elite companies of the French infantry and by the Old and Middle Guard and also by the regimental sappers issued from the grenadiers companies as well as the sappers of the Engineer Corps. To the above list the following French troops can be included, since we have proven them capable to do so in several past articles published in this Newsletter. They are: (1) The Sailors of the Imperial Guard (2) The Flotilla crews and the several companies of sappers and similar units raised from them in 1809 and latter. (3) The Oudinot's Grenadiers of 1805-1806. The question remains open for the light cavalry regiments of the French Army with the exception of the 20th. Chassears a cheval since we do not positively know which units received the training of the 20th Chasseurs. There is also the question of the Italian division mentioned above in the quotation from Thiers. We should further investigate the question raised by the article of Dick Ponsini in NJN# 18 page 47. Dick has assured me that he only proposed to discontinue the practice of remanning guns with British grenadiers etc. To that I can only say that to-date only the quotations related in NJN # 15 page 24 from Houssaye, Margerit and Lachouque reported the 71st Highlanders, a light regiment, as having taken over the French grand battery at Waterloo and fired the guns against the French troops. That should provide us with plenty to talk about in oar next issues to come. Please take in consideration the comments of Ray Johnson in our last issue of NJN page 23. Let me remind you here gentlemen that our present rule on remanning guns with some infantrymen (see NJN # 15 page 15) is from FRAPPE rules developed by Ray Jonson. I hope the above is of interest to most of our readers. Your substantiated comments would be appreciated. Thank very much in advance. 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