by John E. Koontz
In EEL Nr. 39, pp. 18 - 19, George Nafziger provides some extremely valuable information on the mechanics of French skirmishing, the first such description that I have seen that does more than suggest that the "skirmishers," whoever they might be, were dispersed under cover as free individuals for the purpose of annoying the enemy. Details of British practice are more widely available, but are sometines misinterpreted or misinterpretable. The following extract from the General Order of 9 Vay 1815 at Brussels, issued by Wellington, is relevant: INFANTRY (LIGHT). 1. The light infantry companies belonging to each brigade of infantry are to act together as a battalion of light infantry, under the command of a Field Officer or Captain, to be selected for the occasion by the General Officer commanding the brigade, upon all occasions on which the brigade may be formed in line or column, whether for a march or to oppose the enemy. 2. On all other occasions the light infantry companies are to be considered w attached to their battalions, with which they are to be quartered or encamped, and solely under the command of the Commanding Officer of the battalion to which they belong. 3. The Commander of the Forces wishes that some of the light infantry battalions of each brigade should be practised in the manceuvres of the light infantry, and if possible in firing at a mark. A very similar General Order, but with somewhat more detail was issued in the Peninsula, at Coimbra. on 4 May 1809: LIGHT INFANTRY. 1. The light infantry companies belonging to regiments, and the riflemen attached to each brigade of infantry, are to be formed together on the left of the brigade, under the command of a Field Officer or Captain of light infantry of the brigade, to be fixed upon by the Officer who commands it. Upon all occasions in iviiieli the brigade may be formed in line, or in column when the hrigade will be formed for the purpose of opposing an enemy, the light infantry companies and riflemen will be of course in the front, flanks, or rear, according to the circumstances of the and the nature of the operation to be performed. On all other occasions the light infantry companies are to be considered as attached to their battalions, with which they are to be quartered or encamped, and solely under the command of the Commanding Officer of the battalion to which they belong. G. 0 Pero Negro, 12th Nov. 1810. 4. The Commander of the Forces refers the General Officers commanding divisions and brigades to his orders on the formation and use of light infantry battalions in each brigade, and he desires that they may be strictly adhered to. He again recommending the detached companies of the 60th Rifles and those now detached from the Brunswick Light Infantry to their care and attention. The desires that these companies, when not in battalions with the light infantry companies of the regiment in the manner and at the time pointed out in the General Orden, may be kept at the head quarters of the brigade. Rather good descriptions of actual practice are to be found in Young & Lawford, P,219, and in Wheeler 199. Wheeler, a private in the 1/51st, gives a particularly detailed description of his brigade's skirmishing at Waterloo. This was Mitchell's 4th British Brigade of Colville's 4th British Division, comprising the 3/14th,,1/23rd, and 1/51st. The latter was one of the regiments bearing the designation light. Wheeler describes the light troops in advance of the brigade as composing the light companies of the 23rd and the 14th, plus Captain Phelps' company of the 51st. They were under the combined command of Brevet Major Captain Keyt of the 519t. Wheeler reports that the battle began "at 9:00 with the firing of three guns as the signal for an attack. At this point, whatever time it actually was, Captain McRoss' company of the 51st (actually Captain John Rose) was sent to reinforce the advance party. He indicates that "15 minutes later" 4 more companies of the 51st were sent to join the skirmishing line. It is well reported that British skirmishers operated (at least in th: 95th) in pairs, of which one in was always loaded. It is also asserted by Oman. p. 85, that the British skirmishers operated in such numbers, and so thickly posted, that the French on occasion mistook the skirmishing line for a battle line, and reported breaking it as such. It is not clear how the French, who were presumably well versed in the matter of skirmishers, would be able to mistake a skirmishing line for a battle line, unless it were very tightly closed up, or they were used to British battle line which were not. In any case, while Oman shows plausibly that the strength of the skirmishers of an Anglo-Portuguese Division of 2 British brigades and 1 Portuguese brigade would have been about equal to 1/4 of the Division's complement, that is, to the individual strengths of the brigades, it would most likely be the came, gives the low troop density of Peninsular battlefields, that the Division's skirmishers would be operating, mot on the front of a single brigade , but on the front of 2 or 3 brigades. Oman. like the good historian he is, cites his sources (VigoRoussillon's account of Barross. and Reynier's report on Bussaco), so it should be possible to investigate this matter in more depth. Sources Charles Dalton. The Waterloo Roll Call. Hippocrene Books, Inc., New York, 1978.
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