On September 16, Dumouriez made camp with part of the Armee du Nord at Saint-Menehould. Considering the shaky morale of his troops, "..any other general would have headed for Chalons [13] and would have refused to keep such men near the enemy until they had shown real confidence. Far from doing so, Dumouriez calmly drew up to meet any attack, not only from his original front, to the east, but also to the west, his former rear." [14] The nervous and shaky state of Dumouriez's troops is well illustrated by the fact that, on September 18, as soon as Kellermann's command had arrived near SaintMenehould, Dumouriez persuaded him to send some of his troops in his own camp, so that his troops might be sure that the Armee du Centre was really close by! [15]  During the whole affair prior to the Battle of Valmy, Dumouriez, in spite of the shaky state of his army, showed remarkable confidence and steadiness. On September 16, Dumouriez and Kellermann made their junction. Kellermann numbered only 16,000 men but considered himself very strong. [16] Kellermann's artillery [17] and cavalry was composed entirely of soldiers of the regular army. The infantry included 14 battalions of regulars and 9 volunteer battalions of the 1st ban. [18] Of these, 4 battalions of volunteers were left at Vitry with the artillery of the park. He also limited his artillery to 36 guns with double ammunition allotment. Hence, Kellermann's army, in sharp contrast with that of Dumouriez, was composed almost entirely of regular soldiers under reliable and experienced officers. In fact, it was an army as would have been fielded by the Ancien Regime. It was clearly a notch above Dumouriez's Armee du Nord. At Valmy, not only was the proportion of volunteer to regular battalions (36 volunteer to 21 regular) far higher than in Kellermann's force (4 volunteer to 16 regular), but also the organization was different. Dumouriez, continuing Lafayette's practice, looked on his volunteer units as an integral part of his army and brigaded them with regular units. On the other hand, Kellermann reorganized some of his volunteer battalions by taking the grenadier company and picked men from the less trained ones and forming new battalions in this way. Altogether, Dumouriez's force was 35,000 strong of which only 20,000 participated to the battle and Kellermann's 16,000. According to Chuquet, (p.228, vol.2), at Valmy the French army consisted of: Kellerman 16,000 Dumouriez: Stengel 6,000 Beurnonville 9,000 Chazot 5,000 These troops were deployed in two lines (see map). The stiff, formal and cautious Kellermann was not in favor of fighting Brunswick and recommended withdrawing to Chalons, but Dumouriez was strongly opposed to any further retreat. On September 19, Kellermann crossed the Auve and took a position, as recommended by Dumouriez, on a plateau to the right and north of the road from Chalons to Saint-Menehould [19] near the village of Moncel. Dumouriez's forces were deployed on the other side of the road near the village of Braux-St.Cohiere. Kellermann's cavalry occupied the space between the two armies. Dumouriez expected Brunswick to come from the north and believed the attack would come on his command, hence the position chosen. Kellermann strongly disliked his position. Behind him was the Auve, running in a marshy valley and his left was commanded by the mound of Valmy. In addition, a pond cut communications with Dumouriez. Consequently, Kellermann informed Dumouriez [20] that he would retire the next day across the Auve to a height on the left, south of the main road. Dumouriez made no objection but asked him in case of a Prussian attack to take post on the heights of Valmy and La Lune (the moon), a mound south-east of Valmy. At the moment, part of Dumouriez's force occupied the heights of Valmy and La Lune. On the morning of September 20, Kellermann's guns opened against an enemy barely visible through the morning mist. Brunswick with his army of 35,000 strong was in front of him. Brunswick intended to place himself to the north-west of Dumouriez while his left would cut him off from the hills and from Paris, forcing him to withdraw. Once he had Dumouriez in the plain, he would have struck him there and destroyed him forcing Kellermann to withdraw. However, the King of Prussia was with the Duke and insisted on cutting the Chalons road. Brunswick complied. Consequently, it was Kellermann's outposts that the Prussian vanguard encountered missing Dumouriez's shaky troops in the process. Hence, the battle developed with the only army in France that was capable of stopping the Prussian advance. Even after August 10, when Kellermann called his soldiers to cheer for the Nation, he still surprisingly rallied them as "Messieurs" instead of the more revolutionary "citoyens" (citizens). Anyhow, in early 1792, despite all the change and the political meddling of the Revolutionary government, France was still a kingdom and its army was still led by generals produced by the Ancien Regime! As far as the troops knew, the King still reigned [21] despite the political emissaries, and they saw Princes of Royal blood in their ranks. [22] It does not mean that the army was eager to toast the King or the Princes, but in the Armee du Centre, if the men drank "To the Nation", they also did so "Aux Princes francais" (to the French Princes). That was perhaps due to the fact that Kellermann's command included a Prince of Royal blood, the Duc de Chartres (the future Louis-Philippe). Kellermann deployed 11 regular and 2 volunteer battalions at the wind mill on the first and second lines. The battalions of the advance guard and reserve were on the left close to Orbeval. The cavalry was placed behind the infantry to give a sense of security. Dumouriez did his best to support his comrade, placing him between two bodies of his Armee du Nord. Beurnonville with 16 battalions supported Stengel who was already deployed on Mont Yvron on the right. Chazot with 9 battalions and 8 squadrons was on the left. Dumouriez planned a sweeping attack by his right which did not materialize. As far as Kellermann was concerned, the battle was to be a defensive one. He was perfectly content with his deployment and decided to await the attack. The superiority of his artillery was another reason for not hazarding his men. [23] The question was: "will the troops stand?" At about 6:30AM, two columns of Prussians were ordered to march off. The first consisted of hussars and dragoons with a horse battery followed by 2 battalions of light infantry, a foot battery, 2 line regiments and another battery. The second column consisted of a hussar regiment, half a horse battery, a foot battery, 3 line regiments and another foot battery. At 8:00AM, as Kellermann's artillery opened up against the Prussians, 35 squadrons of Prussian cavalry drove a French horse battery out of La Lune. The road to Chalons was now cut. Brunswick had not intended to attack Kellermann. Between that time and noon, only a long cannonade was exchanged by the two sides. The Valmy Battlefield: The picture taken from the exit of Roberval-Valmy service area (see map) approximately where Deprez-Crassier small command stood, clearly shows the 1300 yards of the flat, denuded slope that the Prussians would have had to cross under the French artillery fire to reach Kellerman's position around the windmill. At around noon, the mist finally dissipated. The Prussians, now visible to the French, formed up for the attack in the classical way of the day. The infantry was deployed in two lines with cavalry on each flank. Kellermann had deployed his men in three columns of deployed battalions and ordered them to wait without firing until the enemy had reached the top of the hill and then to charge with the bayonet. Raising his hat on the point of his sword, he led the cry of "Vive la Nation". He had the two sons of the House of Orleans. His artillery, under the command of men like Senarmont and d'Aboville, now concentrated its fire against the Prussian infantry. Brunswick was not prepared for the firm countenance the French were displaying in their position. The Prussian lines would now have to cross the space between the two forces completely exposed to the fire of the artillery and unbroken, unshaken troops. After his troops had advanced some 200 yards, Brunswick stopped them some 1300 yards from the French lines. He would not resume his attack unless the French were shaken or had fallen into disorder. The contest became an artillery duel. Dumouriez and Kellermann agreed that Brunswick would not assault. The battle was going well for the French when a Prussian shell blew up 3 ammunition wagons placed too close to the fighting line. Whole ranks of men disappeared and the first line recoiled. Two old regiments fell into disorder and the train of artillery fled in confusion. [24] Massenbach from La Lune saw the disorder and galloped toward Brunswick to bring him up and throw his weight against Valmy. The moment was critical but now Kellermann now reaped the reward of his personal exposure. He was on the decisive spot and Brunswick was not. He rallied his men while the Duc de Chartres, showing great resolution, brought up two fresh batteries, which immediately unlimbered and opened fire, supporting the guns worn down by the long cannonade. By the time Brunswick reached La Lune, the opportunity was gone. The French were once more in order. The time was now 3.30PM and Brunswick uttered his famous words: "We do not have to fight here". The battle was over. The exchange of artillery fire continued through the evening through pouring rain. The French lost about 300 men and the Prussians 184 men. More Battle of Valmy September 20, 1792 Introduction I. The French Army and the Revolution II. The French Revolutionary Army of the Northeast at the Beginning of the War in 1792 III. Battle of Valmy IV. Conclusions and the Aftermath of Valmy Back to Empire, Eagles, & Lions Table of Contents Vol. 2 No. 2 Back to EEL List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1993 by Emperor's Headquarters This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com