Book Review
Author: Nofi, A. A.
The market has two new works on the Waterloo campaign, this one and another by Mr. Hamilton-Williams. This campaign is and probably always be, the most frequently written about of Napoleon's campaigns in English. This is demonstrated by the near simultaneous release of these two works. Mr. Noffi's work is well illustrated, the quality of the reproduction of the illustrations being far superior to those of Mr. Hamilton-Williams work. His command of English makes the work an easy and enjoyable read. His description of the battle is adequate and supported by several maps. The text has numerous illuminating inserts on various topics, such as biographies or details on warfare of the day. It is with these inserts that Mr. Noffi very quickly gets into trouble. In reading them I quickly became aware that Mr. Noffi's expertise is not the Napolenoic wars. What follows is a quick spot checking of various "facts" he presents: On page 47 he describes the infantry battalion organization of various nations. His first error is listing "light, heavy and line" companies in battalions. Though I know what he means, there was no such thing as a "heavy" company nor is the term "line" company a proper term in this case. They should be "grenadier" and either "center," "fusilier," "rifle" or "musketeer" companies. He states French infantry companies had 100 men each. In fact, the Regulation of 18 February 1808 set them at 121 men each. He does, however, correctly list the guard infantry organization, erronously calling the guard companies "line." In his listing of battalion strengths he forgets that there were battalion and regimental staffs. He shows the Nassau battalions with companies of 260 men each. In fact, by regulation there were 154 men. The average on the field at the beginning of the battles around Waterloo was 858 men per battalion or about 143 men per company. Most of the rest of his figures are equally suspect. On page 49 every theoretical strength figure shown for the French cavarly is in error. He shows Prussian landwehr cavalry type A and B. I never heard of such a thing and his strength figures are wrong. On page 73 he says that infantry carried 40 rounds each. In fact the French carried only 30, but he could be talking about some other, unidentified, army. On page 94 he provides the details of the 1790 Prussian muske try accuracy trials and cites the accuracies at 70, 140, 200, and 300 meters as 70%, 40%, 25%, and 20%. They are, in fact, 65%, 49%, 32% and 25%. On the next page he lists ranges for various muskets and I am rather surprised at that, since I've never seen such "ranges" before. To be precise, he lists the Prussian 1782 musket as having a range of 140 (he neglects to say what in the chart). My surprise arises because the Prussian 1790 tests give an accuracy of "Old Prussian 1782 Musket" of 42% at 300 meters. On page 123 he lists the ratio of guns in the French army at the start of the campaign at 3.0:1. My documentation shows it at 3.7:1. On page 128 there is an amusing typographical error that shows the British having 90pdr guns. On page 129, in his conversation on British artillery, he lists 12pdr guns, which the British abandoned around 1808. He also says that a 12pdr or 9pdr would have 200 round shot and 30 cannister and a 6pdr would have 300 ball and "about" 50 cannister. In fact, the British allocated 106 rounds per 9pdr gun and 194 for a 6pdr field gun, horse having slightly less. If he intended this to address all nation's guns in ths period his figures are equally off the mark. On page 130 he lists French Guard and line horse batteries with six cannon and two howitzers. In fact, they had four cannons and two howitzers. He also says that the Prussians had several batteries "composed entirely of howitzers." In fact, there was only one. I am surprised at his unusual use of his source documents. He states on page 287 "The best published order of battle for the campaign is Scotty Bowden's Armies at Waterloo, but says he doesn't agree with it. I'd like to know what source he used for his order of battle. He doesn't list a date for his order of battle and all his strength figures end in either "0" or "5." I inherently distrust such figures as estimates or guesses. An example is the 2/,3/1st Guards, which he says had 975 and 1,020 men respectively. Wellington, in his correspondence, lists them with 773 and 847. I dug into Gurwood's Wellington's Correspondence, Vol 12, pg 486 and found his problem. This return is for 18 June 1815. Mr. Noffi's first error was not pick ing up the numbers of officers and NCOs. Those he ignored. Then he took the "Total Rank and File" figures, ignored the "present under arms" figure and began rounding. His figures, as a result, have no officers or NCOs included, and list every man who was assigned, but absent for any reason, including POWs, sick, and AWOL. This is not the last of his errors either, but there are too many more to list. He's right, Scotty still has the best published order of battle. This addresses the question of Mr. Noffi's Napoleonic technical expertise adequately, but there remain other problems with the book. It has no bibliography. It has a "Guide for the Interested Reader," which I suppose is his substitute. In reviewing the books listed, none are in either French or German, which limits his research to tertiary sources. I have a suspicion that he may have had access to Couderc de St. Chamant's Napoleon, Ses dernieres Armees, but he obviously was limited to looking at the charts and tables, as he misses important details contained within the text. As there are no footnotes, an error I did commit in Napoleon's Invasion of Russia, I couldn't review the source any of his comments or figures. It does, however, have a short index. As for a recommendation, I think my opinion of this work is already quite clear. Mr. Noffi has continued his writing in the same vein as he did while writing for S&T. This book shows no change in his research style or quality. More Book Reviews
The Waterloo Campaign Napoleon: An Intimate Account of the Years of Supremacy On the Napoleonic Wars Rod of Iron, French Counterinsurgency Policy in Aragon during the Peninsular War Back to Empire, Eagles, & Lions Table of Contents Vol. 2 No. 13 Back to EEL List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1995 by Emperor's Headquarters This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. |