Beeston Castle in the Civil War 1643 - 45

Part 3

By John Barratt


THE FINAL ROUND

During the period after the leaguer had been raised, the Beeston garrison made at least one major sortie, on June 4th, aimed at a small Parliamentarian outpost at Ridley Hall, about two miles south-east of the Castle, which was held by 16 men: "The King's Party being farr more in number, assaulted the gates, but the Soldyers in the House defended theim selves very bravely and killed fyve of theim: whereof one Vernon, a man of Wybunbury towne which had begun on the p'liament side before, and taken the covenant was one of theim; onlie the soldiers in the House had one man shott in the shoulder, but in noe danger of Death." [33] Operations against Beeston seem to have been resumed in late July 1645, and the first task of the besiegers, in the absence of Brereton, under the overall command ot Lieutenant-General Michael Jones and Major-General James Lothian, was to complete the siege works which had been commenced in the spring, and apparently not completely destroyed in the interim. Much of the labour seems to have been carried out by the Trained Bands of Nantwich, Northwich and Bucklow Hundreds.

Nathaniel Lancaster gave further details of this operation:"To make the worke sure (which formerly proved abortive) they erected a strong Fort within musket shot of the Castle, before the Gate, furnisht it in seaven dayes, built a convenient house in it [ apparently a barn brought over trom Beeston Hall ] which they stored with provision and ammunition, afterwards made a Counterskarffe, whereby all hope of reliefe to the Castle was utterly cut off, and enabled to call off the greatest part of their Force, when called thereto." Lancaster claimed the workings of providence had been displayed in the fact that: "God so farre smyled upon this enterprise, that in all the dangerous worke of the Fort, we lost not a man, nor a drop of Blood, though perpetually a fair marke to a violent enemy." [34]

One reason for this, he suggests, was that a pro-Parliamentarian gunsmith had been infiltrated into Beeston during the days after the Royalists had raised the blockade, and "so rested their arms in firing of them that none could take such aime as to come neere the marke." [35] This seems rather an unlikely explanation, though remains of several damaged weapons have been unearthed in the Outer Gatewav. In all probability, once the leaguer had been firmly established, neither side would have been anxious to incur unnecessary losses in what was effectively a stand-off. Excavators have found the graves of three young males, dated to the Civil War period, in the Inner Ward, who may have died of natural causes. [36] It seems most likely that they were Royalists who died during the leaguer, and, although it is possible that other graves may lie undiscovered eleswhere, does not suggest a high fatality rate among the garrison.

By the middle of September, Beeston had been so closely blocked up that it was "gasping for everything necessary but aire and water." So secure were the besiegers, that on the night of September 19th they were able to detach a considerable force under cover of darkness to surprise the suburbs of Chester.

Henceforward, particularly after the major Royalist defeat at Rowton Heath (September 24th) the chances of Beeston again being relieved were remote. The besiegers were content to allow starvation to take its course. Jones was determined to take no unnecessary risks at this late stage, writing to Brereton on October 28th: "I think it best not to draw off any Beeston forces. I have given Mr Dod directions to have a trench cast above each guard there and have promised each guard £3. I have sent 12 lean cattle to help them [the besiegers] at Beeston." [37] Brereton encountered constant problems in paying and feeding his troops at Chester, and those stationed around Beeston were similarly affected. On October 29th, Lothian warned Sir William: "My Lieutenant will inform you of the condition of our men at Beeston. If you have not an eye to them to prevent it I much fear the consequence, the care of which I refer to your wisdom." [38]

The garrison were evidently maintaining some kind of communication with the remaining Royalist forces in the area, very probably by means of signal fires. In any case, they were able to inform the garrison of Holt Castle of their desperate condition, and a new relief attempt was organised. It is uncertain whether Vallett was aware of this, when, on November 13th, he asked for terms. Negotiations began next day, Vallett being represented by a Captain Robert Barrow and Mr William Smith, both otherwise unknown, though Barrow may well have been another professional soldier. Brereton himself may have represented the Parliamentarians. No agreement was reached that day, and Brereton was called away before they resumed on the 15th, when the Parlimentarians were represented by Colonel Thomas Croxton and Lieutenant-Colonel Chidley Coote.

By now, Vallett probably was aware of the planned relief attempt; certainly the beseigers were, and the prospect was causing them considerable alarm. The forces immediately blockading Beeston were apparertly commanded by a Captain Thomas Walley, to whom Lothian wrote from Chester suburbs on November 15th, warning him that an attempt might be made "this night or very suddenly", and urging him to call on reinforcements from the Warwickshire horse under Major Hawksworth, and to collect his own men in a body. Colonel Duckentield added a postscript addressed to Captain Smith, commanding one ot his own foot companies at Beeston: "I do verily believe the enemy in Besston expect this night to be relieved and that they will make a desperate sally out upon you. Engage not your horse without your foot and do not pursue too hastily. I hope the enemy are more desperate than strong. You may easily deal with them if you be careful, but use all means and haste to get Colonel Greave' horse and what foot you can from Nantwich to make all haste to you this night."[39]

Unfortunately, the besiegers were far from confident that they could "easily deal' with the combined efforts of the Beeston garrison and a determined relief force. As Brereton later admitted with some embarrassment: "our guards about the castle were not in so good a condition as were to be desired, very many of our men being straggled abroad, secure upon the confidence of the castle being [about] to be delivered up the next day... Upon which grounds the gents, that there treated were induced to consent to better conditions than otherwise."[40]

Ironically, the force of about 80 horse and 40 foot, escorting packhorses laden with cheese and meat, which had been prepared at Holt had hardly begun its march when a contingent of the horse from Chirk mutinied through lack of pay, and the whole expedition was abandoned. But by then Vallett had held out for, and obtained, slightly better terms than he had originally been offered.

Brereton was understandably vague about what exactly had been conceded, and it seems certain that the terms actually carried out differed in minor respects in favour of the Royalists from those officially recorded, which were as follows.

"Concluded between Col. Thos Croxton and Lt. Col. Chidley Coote, for Sir William Brereton, c-in-c of forces raised for king and Parl. in the county of Chester, and Capt. Rob. Barrow and Mr. Wm. Smith for Capt. Wm. Vallet, gov. of Beeston Castle.

  1. Tomorrow, 16-11-45, before 10 am the castle shall be delivered up to Brereton or whoever he shall appoint, with all arms, ammunition and goods, except such as shall be excepted by these articles and, whether or not the garrison shall have marched out by the hour appointed, they shall suffer a guard of 200 musketeers appointed by Brereton to take possession ol both upper and lower wards of the said castle;
  2. No arms that are agreed on to be left behind shall be hid, made away with or impaired, no ammunition spoiled or mispent, none ot the goods embezzled, roofs or any part of the castle defaced, nor either of the wells poisoned or obstructed;
  3. The convoy sent with them for their safety shall safely return.
  4. Capts Vallet and Barrow with all their officers and soldiers shall march away from the said castle with complete arms, drums beating
    5. and colours flying, to Flint Castle and thence to Conwav or Beaumans, as shall seem best to them, each soldier with three shots ot powder and lighted matches and bullet answerable;
  5. Capts Vallet and Barrow with all the rest ot the gents, and officers shall carry away their trunks, their wearing clothes and proper goods, leaving behind them all such goods as truly belong to the said garrison and country, and the soldiers shall march away with their wearing apparel, whatever the apparel shall be, and all their own proper monies;
  6. All such gents, officers and soldiers and others, as have a desire or resolution to submit themselves to King and Parl. and to live at home peacably and quietly in their own houses, shall have tree liberty and passes to such places as thev desire to repair unto;
  7. Capts. Vallet and Barrow and the rest ol the officers and soldiers and all that belong unto them shall have a safe convoy two miles beyond Flint and a trumpet, if he be required, to Denbigh or Rhuddlan, and two carriages by the aforementioned time to carry their aforesaid goods." [41]

In fact, the Royalists did not apparently quit Beeston until midnight on November 16th, and Vallett and his men were granted their request to go if they wished to Denbigh, a garrison rather nearer the scene of action than those given in the "official" terms.

As Vallett and his band left Beeston, the besiegers must have realised how skillfully he had played his weak hand. Malbon said that there were 56 soldiers with Valett at the surrender, of whom 20 went home. Brereton's figure was 90, with 50 marching off with their commander, and the remainder going home. Lancaster related that the Royalists "had eaten their cats, and had not proven for that night." [42] Reporting to the Committee of Both Kingdoms that "The Lord hath been pleased this day to restore unto us the strong castle of Beeston..." Brereton went on to say of the defenders: "We found their horses in a waek and languishing condition, the governor's own horse being scarcely able to go out of the castle." [43]

On entering Beeston, the the full extent of the defenders' plight was apparent. According to Malbon: "there was neither meate, Ale nor Beere found in the castle; save only a peece of a Turkey pye, Twoe Bisketts, a lyve Peacock and a peahen." [44] Vallett had in fact carried through a well-executed piece of bluff, and obtained better terms than he would have been offered if Brereton had appreciated the true weakness of the Royalists' situation, and which evidently raised a number of Parliamentarian eyebrows when their details became known.

Vallett and his men mostly made their way to Denbigh, with some evidently joining the Conway garrison. Brereton continued to monitor their activities closely, expecting that they would be employed in any attempt to relieve Chester. Vallett was still in Denbigh on its surrender in the following year.

Beeston's active role in the war was at an end. On its surrender, it was garrisoned by Parliamentarian troops, and the day after its occupation, Brereton issued orders for the local countryfolk to be employed in dismantling the mount and siegeworks. A garrison was maintained in the Castle itself until the following spring, when orders were given for its dismantling. Beeston's military career was at an end.

APPENDIX

Military "Finds" at Beeston

Excavations carried out over recent years at Beeston have produced large quantities of artifacts relating to different phases of its history. Among them are military items from the Civil War period. These include spurs, a gilt buckle belonging to an officer, and various buckles, including one from the tasset of a pikeman's armour. It does not follow from this that armour was necessarily worn by pikemen on active service, indeed other evidence from the area suggests that neither the local Royalist or Parliamentarian troops may have done so. More probably, as Beeston was used for storage purposes until its capture by the Royalists in 1643, the item may have belonged to Trained Band equipment being kept there. The same may apply to a the remains ot a plated "jack" of 16th century date which were also unearthed.

The Gatehouse, Inner Ward

Parts of several matchlocks, an exploded pistol barrel, and the jaw screw of a firelock have been found, together with a scourer and worm for clearing gun barrels. Also unearthed were the lead remains of powder flasks. The bulk of the musket shot unearthed, some flattened by impact, were found around the Outer Gatehouse, suggesting that the bulk of fighting took place in that area. Most of the lead shot came in three sizes; 11-13 mm (presumably for pistols), 18-19 mm (for muskets) and a middle size of 15-16 mm, which it has been suggested were produced somewhere centrally and issued to the Royalists forces to overcome the problem of non-stansdardised weapons. The discovery of the fragments of shot moulds and lead bars indicates that shot was also produced at Beeston in at least two locations; the Inner Ward and the Outer Gateway. [45]

SOURCES

  1. Nathaniel Lancaster, "Chester's Enlargement..." 1647, p.18
  2. ibid.
  3. For a comprehensive description of all the archeological evidence and a detailed history of Beeston Castle, see Peter Kills (ed), "Beeston Castle, Cheshire, Excavations by Lawrence Keen and Peter Hough, 1968-85", English Heritage, 1993.
  4. Lancaster, op. cit.
  5. ibid, and Ellis, op. cit.
  6. See Norman Dore, "Beeston Castle in the Great Civil War", in "Transactions of the Lancashire and Cheshire Antiquarian Society", vol. 75-76, pp. 119-21, which also includes a photograph oi the supposed route up the north face of the crag.
  7. Harleian MSS 2155, quoted in R. H. Morns and P.H. Lawson, "The Siege of Chester, 1643-1646", 1923, p.220..
  8. "Memorials of Thomas Malbon" in James Hall (ed), "The Civil War in Cheshire", Record Society of Lancashire and Cheshire, vol. 19, 1889, p. 91.
  9. "Mercurius Aulicus", Dec. 16th, 1643, p.716.
  10. Lancaster, op. cit.
  11. Elliot Warburton, "Memoirs of Prince Rupert and the Cavaliers", 1849, vol II, p. 331, prints a Setter from Sandford to Prince Rupert, in which the captain petitions that he and his firelocks may serve under the Prince's command. It is subscribed "From my garrison m Briston [sic] Castle", but is dated "November 30th, 1643", which, unless wrongly transcribed, must be incorrect.
  12. See Stuart Reid, "Officers and Regiments of the Royalist Army", Vol 1, p.28.
  13. Ellis, op. cit.
  14. Malbon, pp. 151-2.
  15. ibid.
  16. Quoted in Morris and Lawson, op. cit., p.68.
  17. Malbon, op. cit.
  18. ibid. pp. 152-3. "Owyn's Barn" was probably on the site of the modern Castlegate Farm.
  19. ibid., p. 153.
  20. Quoted in Morris and Lawson, p.70.
  21. See "English Civil War Notes and Queries", No.32.
  22. Quoted in Morris and Lawson, p.74.
  23. Norman Dore, (ed) "Letter Books of Sir William Brereton", Volume 1, Record Society of Lancashire and Cheshire, vol. 123, 1983-4, item 142.
  24. ibid, item 202.
  25. ibid.
  26. ibid, item 212.
  27. This is one interpretation of Lancaster's account, (also accepted by Dore, "Beeston Castle", p. 110.), though other contemporary accounts suggest onlv a ditch surrounding the mount. But, bearing in mind the known existence of at least one sally-port from the Castle, some more extensive siege works seem probable, though these may date to the latter stages of the leaguer.
  28. Malbon, p. 169.
  29. Dore, "Letterbooks", Vol I, item 175.
  30. ibid, item 439.
  31. ibid, item 459.
  32. ibid, item 460.
  33. Malbon, pp. 171-2.
  34. Lancaster, p. 25.
  35. ibid.
  36. Ellis, op. cit.
  37. Dore , "Letterbooks" Vol II. 1990, item 762.
  38. ibid, item 775.
  39. ibid, item 872.
  40. ibid, item 885.
  41. ibid, item 868.
  42. Lancaster, p. 30.
  43. Dore, "Letterbooks", item 875.
  44. Malbon. p. 189.
  45. Ellis, op. cit., contains comprehensive details of these and other finds

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