Lord Derby's Army

The Lancashire Royalist Forces
1642-45

1642
Battle of Sabden Brook
Prince Rupert's Campaign

by John Barratt


THE END OF 1642

At the end of 1642 the Royalist garrison towns were generally governed by their Mayor, and the garrison consisted of the citizens, company supplemented by whatever forces had been raised among the tenants and friends of the local Royalist gentry. These units, probably the "freehold band" mentioned earlier, had replaced the local Trained Bands, disbanded by Derby because of their unreliability.

The main effect of all this was, that for all practical purposes, there was no effective Royalist standing army in Lancashire. At this stage, it is doubtful whether Derby had any units approaching regimental strength; the evidence suggests that both sides followed the practice of the Cheshire Parliamentary forces and made the troop and the company the normal operational unit. (24)

Derby raised his field forces by three main methods. Throughout the war, but increasingly from early 1643, he had a small number of "regulars", principally the horse and foot of Tyldesley, Molyneux and Girlington, plus a few Welsh troops. These were supplemented by the "freehold bands", sometimes resulting from a general attempt to call out the gentry of a particular locality and their tenants, and sometimes limited to reliable Royalists.

Finally the Royalist forces would be filled out by a general levy of the able-bodied male population of a particular locality, often called out to meet a particular threat; usually Parliamentary Plundering was made the reason. An example of how this system operated occurred in March 1643, when the Royalist Commissioners of Array ordered all males aged between 16 and 60 in Fylde "upon payne of death to be and applare before his Honour (Derby) at Kirkhain the next morning bv 8 of clock in their best weapons to attend the King's service, which was obeyed of all the Country." (25)

Threats were used to coerce any recalcitrants. It was no doubt the usual practice, as on this occasion, to appoint captains for these "clubmen" from among the local yeomen. In this case two of them were Hoole of Singleton and John Ambrose of Plumpton.

Derby was never able to arm these levies, who were frequently equipped only with agricultural implements. Discipline and enthusiasm were also low; in practice the "clubmen's role was largely that of cannon- fodder. At the storming of Bolton in 1643 the levies, armed mainly with pitch forks, were driven on by a line of regulars in their rear. (26)

Pay was practically non-existent for all the Royalist troops; in consequence plunder was not only a driving force among them, but an essential means of keeping Derby's forces in the field. The clubmen who stormed Lancaster in March 1643 "Plundered unmercifully" and carried away "great packets" of booty, (27) and were later very ready to join Derby again. But Plundering was not confined to the irregulars; Tyldeslcy and his Major, Hugh Anderton, were noted as leading plunderers at the capture of Preston in March 1643. (28)

By the spring of 1643 the Royalist position had improved slightly. Tyldesley and Molyneux had been recruiting throughout the winter. Tyldesley's Dragoons were being raised in December, when William Blundell of Crosby was commissioned as a Captain. (29)

All of these units seem to have included a large proportion of Catholics; in the case of Tyldesley's foot, a number of the rank and file were raised in the Fylde. There was however still a shortage of ammunition, which was not eased until after the capture of Preston in March. (30)

The increased coherence of Royalist operations during the early spring of 1643 was probably due to Ty1desley's presence. His foot and dragoons seem to have been the spearhead of the Royalist offensive, seeing action at Lancaster and Preston.

But, though by early April the Royalists seemed to be gaining the upper hand, their success was laid on fragile foundations. The survival of both sides in the war in Lancashire depended upon the small number of regular troops which each had; if either sides were destroyed the results would be serious; for the Royalists, whose ability to raise new adequately armed and trained units was non-existent, they would be a disaster. Derby's regulars seem to have consisted of Tyldesley's, Molyneux's and Girlington's foot, all weak units, some troops of horse and Tylelesley's dragoons.

SABDEN BROOK

The decisive encounter took place at Sabden Brook on April 20th. Derby had the largest force he had probably ever fielded; 11 troops of horse, 700 regular foot, and about 3,000 clubmen. The engagement ended in a chaotic Royalist rout; losses in men were light, but in their flight many of Derby's men threw away their arms, and this loss was irreplaceable. (31)

Though two days after the battle Tyldesley had mustered 9 troops of horse and 700 foot at Wigan, they were in no condition to fight. At this point Tyldesley, Girlington and Molyneux abandoned any attempt to maintain the struggle in Lancashire, and, despite pleas from Derby, withdrew the remains of their forces to join the Queen's troops at York. It seems likely that they placed the blame for the debacle on Derby, and that because Of this he was henceforth regarded with suspicion by the Royalist leadership. (32)

Derby himself withdrew to Chester, leaving only his garrisons at Lathom and Greenhalgh to maintain the struggle in Lancashire.

Never again during the First Civil War were the Lancashire Royalists able to raise a field force able to operate unsupported.

PRINCE RUPERT

Prince Rupert's campaign of 1644 led to a brief revival of Royalist fortunes in Lancashire. His victories brought in some recruits, and a greater number of pressed men. These seem to have been enlisted in the Regiments of Edward Chisenhall and Thomas Tyldesley, which were largely destroyed at Marston Moor. (33)

A third Regiment, that of Cuthbert Clifton, was raised in the Fylde, with hopes of plunder proving a strong incentive to recruitment, and spent its brief and inglorious career as part of the garrison of Liverpool, evidently being disbanded on the surrender in November. Some horse were apparently also recruited when Sir Robert Byron's Regiment of Horse was raised. (34)

Derby played no part in these events; Prince Rupert had virtually packed him off to the Isle of Man, giving key commands in Lancashire to professional soldiers such as Byron at Liverpool and Colonel Vere at Lathom. (35)

These reforms had little time to bear fruit, Tyldesley and Molyneux, sent back to Lancashire after Marston Moor, proved unable to raise any support, and for the remainder of the war the only resistance to the victorious Parliamentarians was provided by the die-hard garrison of Lathom. (36)

There were a number of reasons for the Royalist defeat. Lack of arms and ammunition was a crippling factor which hindered the development of any coherent plan, as did the lack of a central base in touch with outside support, such as the Parliamentarians possessed in Manchester.

The Royalists were less whole- hearted in their commitment to the war in Lancashire than their opponents, whose local leaders, such as Assheton and Shuttleworth, though not necessarily more capable than some of their Royalist counterparts, unlike them devoted their full attention to the local struggle.

The strong Catholic element in Derby's forces, coupled with their lack of discipline, undoubtedly proved a valuable weapon in whipping up support for the Parliamentary cause.

The key factor in the Royalist defeat however, was undoubtedly the drawing of some 3,000 of their best men to fight with the King in the autumn of 1642. It was a blow from which Lancashire Royalism never recovered.

Notes

(1) The war in Lancashire is usually ignored, with the exception of the Siege of Lathom and Rupert's Campaign of 1644.
(2) See Blackwood, B.G. "The Lancashire Gentry and the Great Rebellion, 1640-60", Chetham Society, Vol. 25, 3rd Series, 1978, Chapter 2.
(3) ibid.
(4) ibid, p.38.
(5) On the outbreak of the Civil War he was, more correctly, Lord Strange, but succeeded to the earl dom on the death ofhis father in September.
(6) Robinson, Edward "Discourse of the Warr in Lancashire" Chetham Society, vol LXIL 1864, p. 12.
(7) "The Earl of Derby was narrow-minded, vain and silly; his warfare was brutal because he felt and encouraged his men to feel, hat rebellion in Lancashire was a personal affront to the House of Stanley...." Wedgewood, C.V., "The King's War", 1959, p179.
(8) Ronald Hutton, "The Failure ofthc Lancashire Cavaliers", "Transactions of the Historic Society of Lancashire and Cheshire", Vol. 129, 1980, p.50 '
(9) Robinson, p.6; Seacombe, "History of the House Of Stanley", 1793, p.188.
(10) Broxap, Ernest "Great Civil War in Lancashire" 1910, pp13-19; Hutton. pp 48-49.
(11) Hutton, p.55
(12) Seacombe, p.188-9; Young, Peter "Edgchill", pp.214-5; 226-7; 230; Hutton, pp5l-53.
(13) Hutton, p.52.
(14) Robinson, pp 1`9-20.
(15) Reid, Stuart "The Finest Knight in England",1979, p.3.
(16) Blackwood, pp50-51.
(17) ibid, pp52-53.
(18) ibid, p.87.
(19) Seacombe, p.201; Hutton, p.53.
(20) Broxap, p.58.
(21) "Military Proceedings in Lancashire", Chetham Society, vol.11, 1844, pp66-67; Young, pp41- 45.
(22) Anderton Papers, 16/23, (Wigan Public Library)
(23) "Lancashire's Valley of Achor" in Military Proceedings", p129-30.
(24) Dore, R.N. "Letter Books of Sir William Brereton" vol. 1, "Record Society of Lancashire and Cheshire, vol. 123, 1983-4, p. 15.
(25) Robinson, p.28; space precludes a more detailed description of this technique, other examples may be found in the Anderton Papers and notes to Robinson, ppl09-110.
(26) Broxap, p.70.
(27) Robinson, p.29.
(28) ibid, p.30; Anderton would no doubt have used his being Derby's Commissary-General as his justification.
(29) Hutton, p.55; Reid, p.5.
(30) "Mercurius Aulicus", March 26-April 2, 1643, p. 159.
(31) See Broxap, pp8l-83.
(32) See Scacombe, p.205 (a highly inaccurate account!); Hutton, p.57.
(33) Young, "Marston Moor", p.54; Hutton, pp58-59.
(34) Reid, Stuart, "Officers and Regiments of the Royalist Army", vol.1, pp22-30; 43.
(35) Hutton, pp58-59.
(36) See The Leaguer at Lathom, ECW N&Q 43

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