1642
Battle of Sabden Brook
Prince Rupert's Campaign
by John Barratt
THE END OF 1642At the end of 1642 the Royalist garrison towns were generally governed by their Mayor, and the garrison consisted of the citizens, company supplemented by whatever forces had been raised among the tenants and friends of the local Royalist gentry. These units, probably the "freehold band" mentioned earlier, had replaced the local Trained Bands, disbanded by Derby because of their unreliability. The main effect of all this was, that
for all practical purposes, there was no
effective Royalist standing army in
Lancashire. At this stage, it is doubtful
whether Derby had any units approaching
regimental strength; the evidence suggests that
both sides followed the practice of the
Cheshire Parliamentary forces and made
the troop and the company the normal
operational unit.
(24)
Derby raised his field forces by three
main methods. Throughout the war, but
increasingly from early 1643, he had a small
number of "regulars", principally the horse
and foot of Tyldesley, Molyneux and
Girlington, plus a few Welsh troops. These
were supplemented by the "freehold bands",
sometimes resulting from a general attempt to
call out the gentry of a particular locality and
their tenants, and sometimes limited to reliable
Royalists.
Finally the Royalist forces would be
filled out by a general levy of the able-bodied
male population of a particular locality, often
called out to meet a particular threat; usually
Parliamentary Plundering was made the
reason. An example of how this system
operated occurred in March 1643, when the
Royalist Commissioners of Array ordered all
males aged between 16 and 60 in Fylde "upon
payne of death to be and applare before his
Honour (Derby) at Kirkhain the next morning
bv 8 of clock in their best weapons to attend
the King's service, which was obeyed of all
the Country."
(25)
Threats were used to coerce any
recalcitrants. It was no doubt the usual
practice, as on this occasion, to appoint
captains for these "clubmen" from among the
local yeomen. In this case two of them were
Hoole of Singleton and John Ambrose of
Plumpton.
Derby was never able to arm these
levies, who were frequently equipped only
with agricultural implements. Discipline and
enthusiasm were also low; in practice the
"clubmen's role was largely that of cannon-
fodder. At the storming of Bolton in 1643 the
levies, armed mainly with pitch forks, were
driven on by a line of regulars in their rear.
(26)
Pay was practically non-existent for
all the Royalist troops; in consequence
plunder was not only a driving force among them, but
an essential means of keeping Derby's forces
in the field. The clubmen who stormed
Lancaster in March 1643 "Plundered
unmercifully" and carried away "great
packets" of booty, (27) and were
later very ready to join Derby again. But
Plundering was not confined to the irregulars;
Tyldeslcy and his Major, Hugh Anderton,
were noted as leading plunderers at the
capture of Preston in March 1643.
(28)
By the spring of 1643 the Royalist
position had improved slightly. Tyldesley
and Molyneux had been recruiting throughout
the winter. Tyldesley's Dragoons were being
raised in December, when William Blundell of
Crosby was commissioned as a Captain.
(29)
All of these units seem to have
included a large proportion of Catholics; in
the case of Tyldesley's foot, a number of the
rank and file were raised in the Fylde. There
was however still a shortage of ammunition,
which was not eased until after the capture of
Preston in March.
(30)
The increased coherence of Royalist
operations during the early spring of 1643
was probably due to Ty1desley's presence.
His foot and dragoons seem to have been the
spearhead of the Royalist offensive, seeing
action at Lancaster and Preston.
But, though by early April the
Royalists seemed to be gaining the upper
hand, their success was laid on fragile
foundations. The survival of both sides in the
war in Lancashire depended upon the small
number of regular troops which each had; if
either sides were destroyed the results would
be serious; for the Royalists, whose ability to
raise new adequately armed and trained units
was non-existent, they would be a disaster.
Derby's regulars seem to have consisted of
Tyldesley's, Molyneux's and Girlington's
foot, all weak units, some troops of horse and
Tylelesley's dragoons.
The decisive encounter took place at Sabden Brook on April 20th. Derby had the largest force he had probably ever fielded; 11 troops of horse, 700 regular foot, and about 3,000 clubmen. The engagement ended in a chaotic Royalist rout; losses in men were light, but in their flight many of Derby's men threw away their arms, and this loss was irreplaceable. (31)
Though two days after the battle Tyldesley had mustered 9 troops of horse and
700 foot at Wigan, they were in no condition to fight. At this point Tyldesley, Girlington
and Molyneux abandoned any attempt to maintain the struggle in Lancashire, and,
despite pleas from Derby, withdrew the remains of their forces to join the Queen's
troops at York. It seems likely that they placed the blame for the debacle on Derby,
and that because Of this he was henceforth regarded with suspicion by the Royalist
leadership. (32)
Derby himself withdrew to Chester, leaving only his garrisons at Lathom and Greenhalgh to maintain the struggle in Lancashire. Never again during the First Civil War were the Lancashire Royalists able to raise a field force able to operate unsupported.
Prince Rupert's campaign of 1644 led to a
brief revival of Royalist fortunes in
Lancashire. His victories brought in some
recruits, and a greater number of pressed men.
These seem to have been enlisted in the
Regiments of Edward Chisenhall and Thomas
Tyldesley, which were largely destroyed at
Marston Moor.
(33)
A third Regiment, that of Cuthbert
Clifton, was raised in the Fylde, with hopes
of plunder proving a strong incentive to
recruitment, and spent its brief and inglorious
career as part of the garrison of Liverpool,
evidently being disbanded on the surrender in
November. Some horse were apparently also
recruited when Sir Robert Byron's Regiment
of Horse was raised.
(34)
Derby played no part in these events;
Prince Rupert had virtually packed him off to
the Isle of Man, giving key commands in
Lancashire to professional soldiers such as
Byron at Liverpool and Colonel Vere at
Lathom. (35)
These reforms had little time to bear
fruit, Tyldesley and Molyneux, sent back to
Lancashire after Marston Moor, proved
unable to raise any support, and for the
remainder of the war the only resistance to the
victorious Parliamentarians was provided by
the die-hard garrison of Lathom.
(36)
There were a number of reasons for
the Royalist defeat. Lack of arms and
ammunition was a crippling factor which
hindered the development of any coherent
plan, as did the lack of a central base in touch
with outside support, such as the
Parliamentarians possessed in Manchester.
The Royalists were less whole-
hearted in their commitment to the war in
Lancashire than their opponents, whose local
leaders, such as Assheton and Shuttleworth,
though not necessarily more capable than
some of their Royalist counterparts, unlike
them devoted their full attention to the local
struggle.
The strong Catholic element in
Derby's forces, coupled with their lack of
discipline, undoubtedly proved a valuable
weapon in whipping up support for the
Parliamentary cause.
The key factor in the Royalist defeat
however, was undoubtedly the drawing of
some 3,000 of their best men to fight with the
King in the autumn of 1642. It was a blow
from which Lancashire Royalism never
recovered.
(1) The war in
Lancashire is usually ignored, with the exception of
the Siege of Lathom and Rupert's Campaign of 1644.
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