Lord Derby's Army The Lancashire Royalist Forces, 1642-45 Introduction and Organization

Lord Derby's Army

The Lancashire Royalist Forces
1642-45

Introduction and Organization

by John Barratt

The operations of Lord Derby's forces in Lancashire during the First Civil War have been largely ignored or dismissed in most general accounts. (1) The following article is an attempt to Outline the background of the Royalist war effort in Lancashire.

In 1642 Lancashire had a population of about 150,000, the majority of whom were to be found in the more economically advanced eastern portion of the county, including the towns of Bolton, Blackburn and Manchester, and were predominantly Parliamentarian in sympathy. The Royalists, despite repeated efforts, were never to succeed in establishing a foothold here, and were forced to depend upon the basically agricultural and more economically backward Hundreds of West Derby, Leyland and Amounderness for their main Support. Here were to be found a larger proportion of minor, less prosperous, gentry than in most other counties, (2) whose alienation from the more prosperous eastcrn Hundreds was increased by the high proportion of Roman Catholics among them. (3)

Although many of the minor gentry undoubtedly remained neutral for as long as possible, of those who were activists, many more (a proportion of about 2:1) were Royalist than Parliamcntarian. (4)

Most of the local gentry were linked by marriage, and, of critical importance in the semi-feudal situation of South Lancashire, the three leading peers, who held most of the area's wealth, were all Royalist. Their powers of patronage, family connections, and ability to employ any necessary pressure, ensured that the majority (though not all) of their retainers, neighbours and tenants would follow their lead.

JAMES, 7th EARL OF DERBY

Derby (5) is usually regarded as being the leading Royalist activist in Lancashire. The Stanleys held a position of vast power, especially in West Derby Hundred, where they were "esteemed with little less respect than kinges", (6) and the huge Derby estates were an obvious major source of recruits.

The Earl has received a bad press, being depicted as a narrow-minded, superstitious and cruel incompetent, who lost the war in Lancashire as a result of his bungling. (7) However this viewpoint should be treated with caution. Derby appears to have been a good landlord, reasonably well liked by most of his tenants. (8) His personal bravery is well-attested, and allegations in Parliamentary propaganda of his cruelty are not independently supported. As will be seen, accusations of his incompetence tended to be from enemies, rivals, or those with an axe to grind.

There is a suggestion that Derby was a somewhat reluctant participant in the conflict. During the summer of 1642 Parliamentary sources depicted the Roman Catholic Thomas Tyldesley of Myerscough as the leading Royalist activist in the county, and it is noticeable that Royalist activities in Lancashire increased and became more coherent whenever Tyldesley and the other leading activists, Lord Molyneux and Sir John Girlington, were present, and then declined in their absence.

RECRUITMENT and SUPPLY

However Derby's support, as Lord Lieutenant, was vital to Royalist hopes, and during the summer of 1642, as war approached, he had an important role to play in securing control of the Trained Bands (reputed to be 20,000 strong) and their arms and magazines. (9)

Prior to the outbreak of war, Derby had established small magazines at Preston, Warrington, Manchester and Liverpool. The first two and possibly the last of these fell into Royalist hands, but an unsuccessful attempt to secure the magazine at Manchester precipitated open conflict. (10)

Derby appears initially to have relied upon the usual Royalist tactic of the Commission of Array to raise forces from the Trained Band. This was in practice successful only in South Lancashire, and even here the majority of the Trained Bands were unenthusiastic and ill-armed. (11)

The Royalist leaders in Lancashire apparently shared the majority opinion that the issue would be decided by one battle between the King and the Earl of Essex, and in consequence concentrated their efforts on raising the Foot Regiments of Charles and Gilbert Gerrard and Lord Molyneux, which, after the abortive siege of Manchester, marched away to join the main field army in time for Edgehill. Derby's partisans complained of the injustice of this, but in reality, the intention, borne out by Derby's boasts of the strength which he could raise for the Mug, had always been that these units should serve with the main field army wherever it was. (12) Problems arose later because of the unexpected prolongation of the war beyond one campaign.

The Garrard and Molyneux units were raised in several ways. The Lancashire elements of them (Charles Gerrard's Regiment included a number of men from North Wales) were probably recruited mainly from Derby's tenants in South West Lancashire. It has been said that no actual impressment was used at this stage, and that many recruits were probably volunteers obtained by "beat of drum". (13)

There is however evidence that a considerable degree of coercion was employed. Thomas Tyldesley, as Lieutenant Colonel of Lord Molyneux's Regiment, filled up the ranks from his own contingent of the Trained Band, and "would not suffer any of them to return home, but compelled and forced them to march with him after the King". (14)

This caused a near mutiny, with the contingent from Amounderness Hundred threatening to shoot Tyldesley. (15) The regiments probably included a large number of tenants brought along by their landlords, who were mainly minor gentry. In their case also, coercion was probably a major factor.

OFFICERS

The departure of these regiments, together with at least one troop of horse in Sir Thomas Aston's Regiment, was a major and ultimately fatal loss to the Royalist cause in Lancashire. The manpower they represented could be replaced; more serious was the loss of their officers. It has been estimated that between 41% and 50% of the Lancashire Royalist officers saw service outside the county, compared with only 17% of the opponents. (16)

Whilst some of this service represented the activities of Royalist "exiles" after the cause in Lancashire was lost, the drainage of leadership which it caused was made more serious, particularly as the minor gentry from whom they were mainly drawn had been less active and enthusiastic than their Parliamentarian counterparts. (17) The departure of so many of the activists not only made it less easy to enlist their remaining tenants, but also led to a serious shortage of suitable officer material. It was probably because of this that Derby's forces included a higher proportion of "plebeian" officers than was usual in the Royalist armies. It has been reckoned that 54% of Derby's officers were drawn from the upper class, whilst the remainder were of plebeian or doubtful origins. (18)

Unlike the Oxford Army, these officers of more humble origin served with horse as well as foot, though none rose above the rank of captain. Though some of these men, such as Captain William Kay (yeoman) and Lieutenant Robert Walthew (yeoman and moneylender), both in the Lathom garrison, were competent and active, they generally lacked the previous military experience which would have been invaluable in shaping Derby's raw levies. Derby does seem to have made some attempt to remedy this lack by importing a few professional soldiers from elsewhere. One such was Major - General Blair, a Scots professional who was Governor of Wigan in March 1643, and Captain (later Major) William Farmer, military adviser to the Countess of Derby during the first siege of Lathom.

The departure of the "Edgehill" regiments left Derby with a handful of "volunteers", probably some of the two companies of foot and the "good troop of horse" raised during the summer, initially for the defence of Lathom, (19) plus a force described as the "freehold band", probably consisting of local gentry and their tenants from that part of West Derby Hundred which was under Royalist control.

The main Royalist objective during the early autumn was to seize control of the stores of confiscated Roman Catholic arms, and to establish garrisons in the key towns of Central and South Lancashire. In October the Parliamentarians estimated that the Royalists had a total of 1,000 men in 6 garrisons; 400 at Warrington, 300 in Preston, 200 at Wigan and the remainder at Ormskirk, Eccleston and Prcscot (around Derby's headquarters at Lathom. (20)

RE-ORGANISATION

In November Royalist efforts received a marked impetus when Tyndesley and Molyneux returned to raise new regiments. The first fruits of their more professional approach were seen on 10th December, when the Royalists published a scheme for re-organising their war effort. The establishment of the Lancashire forces was fixed at 2,000 foot and 400 horse, and £ 8,000 was to be raised to support them, with collectors appointed for each hundred, and a co-ordinating committee set up in Preston. Rates of pay were set as follows (figures in brackets are comparable rates in the Oxford Army) (21)

Foot:

Captain 10/- per day (7/4d),
Lieutenant 4/- (4/-),
Ensign 3/(3/-),
Sergeant 18d (18d),
Drummer 15d (12d),
Common Soldier 9d (10d).

Horse:

Dragoons:

This system never operated very well; by the end of the year the actual Royalist forces seem to have consisted of 900 foot, 300 dragoons and a troop of horse, divided up between the garrisons of Warrington, Wigan and Preston. They included two Welsh companies, possibly of Sir Thomas Salisbury's Denbighshire Regiment (later part of the Liverpool garrison). The Wigan garrison was weak, whilst that of Warrington lacked arms. (22)

Shortage of arms and powder seems to have been a constant problem for Derby's forces. It is unlikely that any supplies from Royalist forces elsewhere ever reached them, and there is evidence to suggest that the proportion of musketeers in even the best of Derby's units was on the low side. In March 1643, of Girlington's and Tyldesley's 600 men (who had been partly raised in Yorkshire) only about 50% were musketeers.

In the rest of Derby's foot, the proportion was probably lower. Some weapons were manufactured locally. In February 1643 some of the Royalists in the assault on Bolton were armed with a weapon new to their opponents; "All head of about a quarter of a yard long, a staffe of two yards long or more, put into that head, twelve iron pikes round about, and one in the end to stab with. This fierce weapon (to double their scorn) they called a Roundheaad." (23)

More Derby: 1642, Battle of Sabden Brook, Prince Rupert's Campaign