It got beyond all orders an' it got beyond all 'ope;
It got to shammin' wounded an' retirin' from the 'alt.
'Ole companies was lookin' for the nearest road to slope;
It were just a bloomin' knock-out - an' our fault!
The feeling of utter despair and hopelessness evoked by Kipling's poem was familiar to the US Army in late December of 1950 as the Korean War entered its sixth month. Only it wasn't just 'ole companies looking for a way out -- it was the was the 'ole army fleeing from the recent Chinese onslaughts.
The situation in the winter of 1950 was an unmitigated disaster. Chased down the Korean Peninsula US forces were disorganized, demoralized, and humiliated in a way that had never occurred before. But the new, seemly inexhaustible Chinese enemy was not the only problem US forces had to contend with. There were internal ones as well. At the highest levels, command and coordination was a shambles. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, in his capacity as Supreme Allied Commander, Far East (SACFE), was in overall command but headquartered in Tokyo. Theater command was fragmented. Eighth Army operated on the west coast, but had no control of X Corps operating in the center and east coast of the peninsula. Further complicating the situation, the X Corps commander, Major General Edward M. Almond was also MacArthur's Chief of Staff and reported directly to SACFE, rarely if ever cooperating with Eighth Army. Hence both forces acted out of concert and in absolute ignorance of what each other was doing.
At divisional, regimental, and battalion levels the Chinese attacks had exposed officers that were unsuited, overage, incompetent, and incapable of leading men into battle. In the ranks, morale was at an all time low. First reeling before the North Korean invasion in the summer, the men had recovered and successfully invaded Inchon sweeping away North Korean forces in a brilliant offensive. By Thanksgiving they believed MacArthur's promise of "Home for Christmas" -- they were in control of virtually all of the Korean peninsula. Inside of a week they were sent reeling back, overwhelmed by a Chinese "Volunteer" Army with a seemingly inexhaustible supply of manpower.
At the very highest levels confidence was shaken. President Harry S. Truman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff listened with growing dismay at the choice they were given by MacArthur, either expand the war to China by bringing in the Nationalist Chinese and using nuclear weapons -- or abandon Korea to the Reds. Orders for the evacuation of Korea were on the verge of being issued. To complicate matters further, Eighth Army commander Lt. General William Walker died in a traffic accident on December 23, 1950.
Walker's death lead the JCS to seek out a new commander. It was an unenviable position being offered. The army was without direction or confidence, its only strategy to retreat, its only tactic, to fall back. But within fifty-four days this defeated command was transformed into a cohesive attacking force that turned back the Chinese, and established a strategic plan for ending the war. For this, the credit belongs to the man appointed to take over Eighth Army, Lt. General Matthew B. Ridgway.
The selection of Ridgway was auspicious. His combat experience in WWII, the confidence which senior army and defense officials had in him, his familiarity with the war to date, and his army track record as a winner made him the ideal choice.
Ridgway had been a successful combat commander in WWII, especially during the Battle of the Bulge, in a situation similar to the command he was assuming. His political connections were impeccable, being a protégé of then Secretary of Defense, former Army Chief of Staff, George C. Marshall. Until his assignment Ridgway worked for Joseph L. Collins, the Army Chief of Staff, as manager of the Korean War.
All this gave Ridgway an incredible advantage. He was aware of and alert to all the political considerations, problems, personalities, and agendas of those involved. It also allowed him the freedom to demand, and be given, almost carte blanche from the JCS as his price for accepting the assignment. Just as important, Ridgway was a winner, with supreme self-confidence born of a pattern of success, not arrogance. Ridgway would never have accepted the command had he not believed in his ultimate success. Having watched from the side lines for the prior six months Ridgway knew what was wrong, how to fix it and, he did.
MacArthur Gives Away the Store
His freedom of command was the first issue Ridgway planned to address on meeting MacArthur in Tokyo. Incredibly he didn't have to, for after asking MacArthur, "If I find the situation to my liking would you have any objection to my attacking?" MacArthur's reply was "The Eighth Army is yours, Matt. Do what you think best."
With these words MacArthur relinquished command in Korea to Ridgway and Ridgway was granted the freedom of action he needed to forge a plan for victory.
To solve the divided command problem with Almond, Ridgway had already arranged for the JCS to give Almond a choice, either return to Tokyo as MacArthur's Chief of Staff or MacArthur would appoint a new one. Almond chose Korea and lost his independence. Only later would Ridgway realize that he never should have offered the X Corps commander a choice.
"Where Are Your Plans For Attack?"
Arriving the day after Christmas, 1950 at his Korean headquarters, Ridgway received a briefing on the situation from a senior officer. When the officer told him, in response to a question that there were plans for three successive retreat plans, but none for attack, Ridgway sacked him. Word of the new boss' action spread through all commands. The message was clear "Be ready to attack or you're out".
To assess the dependability of the South Korean Army and Government, Ridgway met Korean President Syngman Rhee. Ridgway reassured Rhee fears regarding the evacuation rumors. "We are here to stay and fight". The following morning Rhee sent Ridgway 30,000 laborers for constructing defense works to show his own commitment.
Restoring Confidence
Knowing that his immediate task was restoring the army's confidence and self esteem, Ridgway embarked on a three day inspection. Every corps commander received the same instruction, command from the field. Ridgway reinstituted the WWII position of deputy corps commander and ordered three flown out immediately. Their job would be to man the command post while the corps commanders were at the front. There would be no REMF's at command levels in HIS army.
The commanders were given unequivocal instructions -- take care of your men, institute night training, get off the roads and into the hills and, actively patrol your sectors. On the subject of artillery he drew the line, in six months of action 238 pieces had been lost the enemy, enough to equip thirteen artillery battalions. Ridgway had had enough of supplying the Chinese. "Lose any artillery," he warned, "And you WILL be court martialed."
Ridgway reset the strategy from one of retreat, retreat, retreat to an aggressive defense with limited attacks. The entry of the Chinese had changed the character of the war Ridgway explained. Our strategy is no longer taking real estate, our strategy is now killing Chinese in numbers even they can't accept. When that point is reached we will then force them to negotiate a cease fire. Ridgway then told them how to do it.
The Chinese have manpower but we have technology, use it. Coordinated artillery, air power, quad fifty antiaircraft machine guns, and tanks against massed troops would kill enough Chinese to do the job. He then gave his commanders a simple plan for success. Find the Chinese, fix them against a solid defensive position, and kill them with all the weapons available. His troops would give it a name "the meat grinder".
In order to deal with the problem of incompetent commanders, Ridgway introduced a new army rotation policy for Korea. Senior commanders with six months service in Korea could be rotated out, those chosen to stay would serve at Ridgway's pleasure. Ridgway would be very selective about who he retained.
The Almond Problem
Visiting the Marines, under the command of Almond's X Corps, Ridgway discovered the senior Marine commanders hated Almond. They held him responsible for unnecessary Marine casualties both at Seoul and Chosin and did not wish to serve under him. Ridgway had previously heard complaints from other corps commanders that Almond continued to receive preferential treatment from Tokyo headquarters in requests for material, transportation, and manpower.
Ridgway met with General Almond privately to resolve the issues. Almond left the meeting a very chastened man. Ridgway promise Marine Commander O.P. Smith, that his men would never be placed under Almond again. From then on Almond's X Corps was firmly under Eighth Army.
Completing his three day tour on December 30th, Ridgway declared complete confidence in his magnificent team. Privately he had decided a house cleaning of a magnitude never before seen in an American army of its top divisional, regimental commanders, and, staff was the only answer. He felt the defeatist attitude of Eighth Army resulted from poor leadership at corps and division and that the lack of aggressiveness was such he could not execute his plans with his present leaders and had to have young vigorous divisional commanders.
The replacement of commanders started immediately,
The Chinese Third Offensive
Suspecting that the Communist Chinese Forces (CCF) would launch a major offensive on New Year's Day Ridgway did all he could to prepare for it. Platoon and company size operations were initiated to find the enemy. Commanding 365,000 Ridgway thought he faced an estimated 174,000 Chinese based on intelligence reports. The facts, he was about to discover, were different. Close to 400,000 Chinese and 100,00 North Koreans stood poised to attack.
Believing that artillery was the key to destroying the CCF manpower advantage. Ridgway's review of what was on hand dismayed him. Summoning his artillery commanders he ordered they improve their unit's now, commanders not meeting his expectations would be replaced. In lieu of sufficient army artillery he called on the Navy for assistance. They promised him all the support their ship's guns could give him. To obtain the artillery he required to fight this new war Ridgway cabled the JCS requesting they deploy the ten reactivated National Guard and Army Reserve artillery battalions directly to Korea instead of Japan as originally planned.
Aware that close air support missions would be critical in stopping the Chinese, Ridgway asked for support from the Navy and Air Force. The Navy promised to use their carrier aircraft for close support. The Air Force balked, claiming their pilots weren't trained for close air support but committed only to interdiction campaigns behind enemy lines. Initially disappointed, Ridgway was to discover that while Air Force pilots were uninterested in combat support, the Air Force's flexibility of mission type, including air dropping supplies, turning night into day on battlefields, and evacuating the wounded contributed significantly to his ultimate success.
On January 1st the Chinese, with nine divisions, bypassed Seoul on both sides, and struck. Five days later the South Korean capital fell into their hands. In the two week long offensive the Chinese advanced fifty to sixty miles across the peninsula. It looked like another Allied disaster. But the Chinese began to recognize that they were fighting a revitalized American army, one that didn't flee on hearing their bugles and whistles, but made them pay for their gains in blood. The orderly pull back of the Americans even denied the Chinese the food supplies they expected to capture to sustain their advance. Their third campaign petered out. Then the unexpected occurred, the Americans attacked!!
Counterattack
After losing contact with the CCF, Ridgway, on January 15th, ordered a small task force to move out on the west coast to find the enemy. Operation Wolfhound was halfway to Seoul before hitting strong Chinese positions. Aerial reconnaissance then reported the enemy heading north and on the 25th Operation Thunderbolt was launched. Its purpose, drive the Chinese back to the Han River.
Inchon and Kimpo airport were retaken. Then Almond's units in the center of the peninsula were ordered, on February 5th, to kick off Operation Roundup. Unknown to either the Chinese or Ridgway, Roundup coincided with the CCF's Fourth Offensive. When the dust settled, the CCF had suffered its first major defeat and Almond had come within inches of a court martial for incompetence.
Intelligence had reported that the CCF were shifting forces to the center of Korea for a new thrust to Pusan. Almond was briefed but chose to ignore this information. Instead he aggressively scattered his forces and, after the CCF attack began, compounded his error, by fragmenting his command to meet the attack. The result was a debacle. Thirty four howitzers and over 120 trucks were lost. Casualties numbered 1800.
Incensed, Ridgway ordered an investigation of Almond's orders during the action, looking for grounds for a court martial. While no court was convened, other commanders got the point: "if MacArthur's fair-haired boy can come this close to a court martial for losing artillery, God help us.".
Eighth Army Holds
On the 13th, while the Fourth Offensive continued, the CCF surrounded and attacked the town of Chipyong. On the 14th Wonju in central Korea was targeted. Both attacks failed, with horrendous losses to the Chinese. UN forces held Chipyong by utilizing air strikes, artillery barrages, and a bayonet charge by French Foreign Legionaries. A tank column sealed the defeat of the Chinese costing them at least 5000 casualties. At Wonju the CCF columns advanced at dawn and for hours were subjected to continuous artillery and air strikes which decimated them, over 5,000 were reported dead, probably another 15,000 wounded. Four CCF divisions were wiped out.
On the western side of the peninsula two other major assaults were turned back on the same day, again with heavy losses to the attackers. Ridgway's "meat grinder" was working. His troops were killing Chinese and driving them back. By the 18th, fourteen Chinese division had been rendered combat ineffective, the offensive was routed and the Chinese and North Korean forces sent headlong across the 38th Parallel.
The Key To Success
A magnificent accomplishment for any army, but incredible for an army that only 54 days ago was an ill led and defeated army. General of the Army and Chief of Staff, Omar Bradley summarized it best "It is not often in war time that a single battlefield commander can make a decisive difference. But in Korea, Ridgway [proved] to be the exception. His brilliant, driving uncompromising leadership [turned] the tide of battle as no other general's in our military history."
How did Ridgway do it? While there may be a lot of explanations -- ranging from brilliance, charisma and inspiration in the operational art, I think the answer is a bit more prosaic.
As a systems analyst I detect in Ridgway's actions clear signs of basic, solid management skills. Entering into the situation he observed the problems, identified possible solutions and implemented them. He had supreme confidence in his ability to get the job done and let nothing -- from the nay-saying hand-wringing of MacArthur's headquarters staff to the "go easy" advice he received from his less confident supporters stand in his way. He also maintained flexibility in his planning and implementing. When it didn't work he tossed it. He identified what of his past experience would work and ignored what wouldn't. Ridgway's success was a result of his willingness to do the job and his ability to adapt.
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© Copyright 1994 by David W. Tschanz.
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