On March 22, 1861 Colonel Henry Hopkins Sibley was promoted to Commander of the U.S. troops in the territory of New Mexico. This came on the resignation of his Commanding Officer Colonel Loring, who opted to fight for the Confederacy. Unknown to the U.S. Army, Sibley was pro-south and only stayed long enough to have his troops seize arms, ammunition and supplies. Colonel Sibley loved the New Mexico territory, and was a born leader and soldier. He was later described as "perhaps the most brilliant General Officer in the Southern ranks, the only one of the glittery galaxy of Confederate warriors whose mind grasp the grand strategy necessary to win the war.
Among his other virtues Sibley was firmly committed to his friends and family. This would prove to be a minor part of his undoing in the Western Invasion. Col. Sibley's second in command, while still in the U.S. Army, was his best friend and brother in law Col. Edward R. S. Canby. They had both gone through West Point together, fought side by side during the war with Mexico, and against Indians. General Canby would become leader of the opposing force that would end Sibley's Western Campaign.
Colonel Sibley joined fellow officers at the San Antonio headquarters for the Army of Texas. He immediately proposed a strike by the Confederacy to capture the West. His fellow Officers encouraged him to seek a meeting with Jefferson Davis, and this was granted. At the meeting Colonel Sibley detailed his plan. Being fresh from the West he had a good idea about the token force left there by the United States. As the South was beginning to feel the initial effects of the blockade, he then proposed that the only way to continue a trade route with Europe was to seize the western U.S.
Sibley insisted that with a small army of 4-5,000 men, he would embark from Fort Bliss in El Paso, and move west on the Gila River Trail. By seizing this he would control the main route between Texas and California. The force would head north to Tucson, and then north along the Rio Grande River, seizing and occupying abandoned forts. They would then seize Fort Union, which is the key military outpost on the Santa Fe Trail, and prevent reinforcements entering from Kansas. The army would again head north and capture Denver, along with the Colorado goldfields. From Denver they would continue north and capture Fort Laramie, in the Nebraska territory. This would gain control of the Oregon Trail.
The South would effectively control all routes west. To keep control of the area Sibley advocated recruiting and training Indian Companies. This idea fascinated Jefferson Davis, and he later promoted Confederate General Albert Pike as "Indian Commissioner." Pike trained approximately 3,000 Indians to fight for the Confederacy. This is arguably the reason how the Indians utilized advanced military tactics during the later Indian wars.
Sibley then detailed how he would continue his campaign. With the Indians guarding the line from El Paso to Fort Laramie, the rest of the southwest would be virtually unprotected. He could then take California and Oregon. More gold would be obtained from California, and the south would have seaports unchallenged by the blockade. Sibley felt that as the people of New Mexico were of Mexican decent, old grudges would be held and they would oppose the U.S. The territories of Colorado and Nebraska were barely settled, and most of the settlers and miners were of southern descent. Utah was Mormon, and he felt that due to recent hostilities with the U.S., the Mormons would gladly assist the South. Kit Carson
He further felt that both California and Oregon were apolitical, and would rather not bother choosing sides. Sibley told Jefferson Davis that based on this, the conquest of the west would be quick and simple. Jefferson Davis was so impressed by this idea that he immediately promoted Sibley to the Rank of Brigadier General, and appointed him Commander of "The Western Expeditionary Force."
Preparations for Invasion
In August 1861, General Sibley was in San Antonio to recruit and train troops. On November 7, General Sibley had approximately 3,500 men ready for the invasion, departing the next day. The last of his troops departed San Antonio November 28, 1861. As the Confederate troops began to arrive in El Paso several hundred men had contracted measles and smallpox, threatening the effectiveness of the Army. At the upcoming battle of North Ford, General Sibley could field only two thirds of his men due to sickness.
On December 20, 1861 General Sibley issued a proclamation to the citizens of New Mexico to denounce the United States, and then himself departed for El Paso. It is unclear as to whether he realized that rumors of an invasion had been circulating throughout the West, and that any fears of invasion were now confirmed. General Canby, in the meantime, put out a call for assistance to Colorado Governor Gilpin when rumors of invasion began to circulate. The rumors were so accurate that they even included the invasion of Colorado. Governor Gilpin then met with gold miners, trappers, and ranchers who were inclined to join the U.S. Army, and persuaded them to join the "Colorado Volunteers." He promised horses, arms, equipment, and service in the U.S. Army for doing their part for Colorado.
The Fighting Preacher
Governor Gilpin then approached his friend John Chivington, a preacher and circuit rider in the Methodist-Episcopal church, in an attempt to further gain men. for his volunteer army. He also asked him to become the army's chaplain. Chivington declined the offer, stating that if he became involved he wanted to fight. He was then made a Major in the Colorado Volunteer Army. Needless to say the ranks swelled with members of his church.
Governor Gilpin now found himself with a large army, and no funds to pay them with. He believed the Federal Government would ultimately pay his troops, and decided to have a Denver printer make $355,000 worth of U.S. Treasury notes. He believed that the U.S. government would see the error of their ways, and ultimately back the notes. This proved to be the cause of his downfall, when bogus notes started arriving in Washington. It was not hard for the U.S. Government to trace the bills back to him. When news of the counterfeit bills reached Denver, panic set in. Several troops departed, however John Chivington spoke to the remnants, and persuaded them to stay.
In December of 1861, General Sibley was posed to invade New Mexico. General Sibley had approximately 3, 500 men, 15 artillery pieces, and over one hundred wagons filled with supplies. The Colorado Volunteers were also ready, and headed for New Mexico at the end of December. As General Sibley's forces headed north, problems other than illness started. Horses and mules would break away, usually at night, in search of water. Indians would gather these up and sell them to Union forces.
Sibley's men took over three abandoned forts, then headed for Fort Union. General Canby was alerted of this, and Kit Carson proposed an ambush on the main trail between Santa Fe and Albuquerque. On February 15, 1862 the battle of North Ford began. Kit Carson had occupied an area 3 miles south of the crossing, where a small rise was surrounded by trees and boulders.
Approximately two hours later the Confederate troops arrived. Carson's New Mexico volunteers were not battle proven soldiers, and shots were fired early. The Texans were battle proven, and immediately returned fire with rifles and artillery. The battle raged for two hours and had surprisingly light casualties. There was one Texan wounded, and one Union soldier killed. General
Canby had the troops pulled back to Camp Craig, to rest that night, and the Texans believed that they had won.
The Union initiated a new sabotage plan against Sibley's forces. Captain James Graydon, retired, was reinstated in the U.S. Army to spy on and harass Sibley's troops. This could be seen as a predecessor to the OSS of World War II. They spied on Sibleys' progress through New Mexico, dressing and acting like locals. On the night of February 16, Graydon initiated a sabotage plan designed to inflict massive damage to Sibley's force. Mules were loaded with artillery shells, and fuses set. The mules were then led toward the Confederate lines, and released. The mules had grown fond of Union hay, and followed Graydon's men. The mules would not go away, no matter what the endangered Union soldiers tried. The booby trapped mules finally started exploding near the troops. Fortunately there were no casualties, other than the mules.
First Skirmishes
On February 20, General Sibley had a cannon fire on the fort. He then sent a note to his brother-in-law, and advised him to retreat. General Canby declined, however as the weather turned bad, and Sibley's troops advanced. General Canby returned to North Ford for battle, and on February 21st the battle resumed. The New Mexican Volunteers again fired early, and the Texans brought in expert fire with rifles and artillery. Several Union troops deserted, and Union artillery pieces were lost. General Canby ordered a hasty retreat back to Fort Craig, and the fleeing soldiers left behind food, and canteens filled with whiskey. The Confederates were the victors, however at a higher cost.
They lost approximately 200 dead, to the north's 64. The Confederates demanded the surrender of Fort Craig then advanced and bypassed it. General Canby, on the advance of Sibley's troops, slipped out the Forts rear and took his troops to Fort Union. On February 26, as the Confederate troops again headed north smoke was seen. General Canby had utilized a scorched earth policy to keep them from gaining supplies, or feed for their horses.
Santa Fe and Albuquerque were occupied without incident, on March second and March tenth respectively. The Confederates had a stroke of luck in Albuquerque, seizing one quarter million in gold bullion. A Wells Fargo shipment had been trapped there due to weather. General Sibley sent this back to San Antonio as proof of his victories. Food was scarce in the area, and the Confederate force was losing approximately 100 horses per day. Two thirds of the Confederates were without horses when they finally departed Santa Fe.
While the battle for North Ford had raged, the Colorado Volunteers were stuck in Denver. On February 22nd news of the battle had reached Denver, however decisions could not be made until Governor John Evans replaced Governor Gilpin. On March 1, 1862 the Colorado Volunteers headed for New Mexico. Despite severe weather conditions the volunteers reached Fort Union on March 11th. The troops were exhausted from the trip. Despite suffering from fatigue, Major Chivington advocated heading immediately for Santa Fe, by the shortest route possible, Glorietta Pass. General Canby and his Officers agreed with the plan, and on March 22nd they headed out. The troops totaled approximately 1600, with only 400 mounted.
Escaped Confederate prisoners advised General Sibley of these events. He was initially surprised, as he thought that the Colorado Volunteers were still in Colorado. On March 22nd he departed Albuquerque for Santa Fe to reunite his forces, and march on Fort Union. Sibley's original plan was to follow the main trail from Santa Fe to Las Vegas, however the arrival of the Colorado Volunteers altered his plans. He then decided to use the most direct route, and decided to cut over Glorietta Pass -- the route taken by Major Chivington.
On March 22nd Major Chivingtons' troops camped at the Kozlowski ranch, at the top of Glorietta canyon. Confederate scouts had been seen in the area approximately one hour earlier. The Volunteers then captured four scouts who boasted of a large Confederate force headed that way. Major Chivington dispatched a rider back to General Canby, who was with the infantry, advising of this.
On March 25th Sibley's army of approximately 3,500 to 4,000 camped at the base of Apache Canyon. General Sibley was a stickler for military order, and insisted that his camp be set up according to army regulations. The tents were neatly lined up, wagons set side by side, and equipment properly laid out. He did not know it, but this would prove to be his downfall.
On March 26th, at approximately 8 am, Major Chivington set out with a group of cavalry and infantrymen down Glorietta Pass. At 2pm that afternoon his advance scouts took several Confederate scouts prisoner. The scouts were not afraid; boasting that a thousand men followed them. The march up the pass had been difficult for the southerners, as they were approaching 10,000 feet. At 2 PM, after 3 hours of marching they reached a wide place in the canyon, which had a deep arroyo cutting across the middle. There was a bridge on the East Side, and the exhausted troops took a break before continuing on.
The higher altitude that the Confederate troops had reached possibly caused effects that would have diminished the troops fighting ability. The Texans were used to sea level and had steadily been climbing up in altitude as they progressed north. A then unheard of affliction known as altitude sickness, recently renamed Acute Mountain Sickness (AMS) could very well have affected many of General Sibley's troops. While the Confederate troops were in top physical conditioning from hard work at sea level, the Colorado Volunteers were acclimated to generally above 6,000 feet. The Colorado Volunteers were used to hard work at high altitudes, and the minor difference on the Pass would have virtually no effect. Some of the symptoms of AMS are fatigue or weakness, dizziness or lightheadedness, and confusion. These same symptoms are seen on the battlefield, and could have been passed off as illness.
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© Copyright 2000 by David W. Tschanz.
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