by Brian Toelle, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia
The build up of B-17s in Europe basically took place in two phases. During early 1942 Air Force personnel began arriving in England to establish the 8th Air Force. The British, while still doubtful of the viability of daylight precision bombing proved to be gracious hosts helping the Americans in anyway possible. This assistance was greatly appreciated by the 8th's commander, Lieutenant General Ira Eaker, and was duly noted in his reports back to Washington. Since the B-24 Liberator had taken over the role of long range bomber in the Pacific, B-17s began arriving in England at a rapid pace. The changing priorities of the overall war forced the Allies to postpone the invasion of Europe and orders soon arrived diverting planes and men to the 12th Air Force in North Africa. This "siphoning off" of the 8th's strength continued until the spring of 1943 when, due to the successful campaign being fought in the Mediterranean, the requirements for B-17s and crews in that theater dropped off and the build up in Europe began again in earnest. Meanwhile Eaker didn't wait for full strength to begin flying missions, primarily small formation bombing raids against targets in occupied Europe The results were good but the British warned the Americans that they had yet to meet German opposition over the Reich itself. The debate between the two allies over daytime versus night-time bombing continued. In January of 1943 the debate reached the highest levels and Roosevelt decided to transfer the U.S. bombers to night time operations. Eaker refused to accept the decision without a fight and went to Prime Minister Winston Churchill. He presented the British leader with a written list of arguments for the continuation of daylight bombing. One of Eaker's points, round the clock bombing of the enemy, was enough to convince Churchill that daylight bombing was worth the risk and he reversed his opposition. The Combined Bomber Offensive was formalized at the Roosevelt-Churchill summit in Casablanca, leading to "the Americans by day, the British by night" formula used throughout the rest of the war. Through May 1943, the 8th Air Force continued its build up and increased its bombing not only of targets in the occupied countries but also within Germany. The 8th suffered losses of 5.6% per credited sortie. These were considered acceptable and the decision was made to take the next step. On July 10th the 8th began its second phase of operations: the destruction of industries directly connected with building and supplying of the Germany Luftwaffe. Targeting priorities shifted to factories, airfields, oil refineries and other strategic locales, including a number of targets deep within Germany. Two of these deep penetration missions into Germany were against the Kugelfisher ball bearing plant at Schweinfurt. The 8th suffered enormous losses, with over 60 B-17s lost per raid. During his de-briefing after the first raid one B-17 co-pilot reported that the route of the bomber stream was clearly marked by the smoke plumes from aircraft that had been shot down. Production of ball bearings after the first raid was disrupted for only 6 weeks which is why a second raid became necessary. This time over 60% of the plant's production was destroyed. The results of these raids are best described by the enemy himself. Nearly 20 years after the war, during an interview for The World at War documentary series, Albert Speer, the German Minister of Armaments and War Production said,
However, the losses were too great for a sustained program of that type. The 8th's attention was changed to lower risk targets for the next few months. These missions also had a significant effect in relieving pressure on the Russian, according to Speer.
In December 1943 General Carl Spaatz took command of all American strategic air forces in Europe which included the 8th and 15th Air Forces. Spaatz was an advocate of daylight, precision bombing and also knew that the destruction of the Luftwaffe was the highest priority to continue these raids. One of the problems facing the bombers was the lack of fighter escort. Spaatz' arrival coincided with the introduction of the extended range P-38 and the newly developed P-51 fighters. Spaatz ordered them to escort the B-17s to their targets and precede the formations often catching German fighters still on the ground. In March 1944, with the invasion of Europe looming, Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight Eisenhower ordered the heavy bombers to concentrate on targets which needed to be destroyed in preparation for the invasion of Normandy. Spaatz convinced Eisenhower that raids against Germany should continue whenever possible. The constant pressure resulted in the transfer of men and materiel from duty on the front lines to the defense of the German factories and cities. The B-17 / P-51 partnership developed into a devastating combination that wore down the enemy's defenses. The Fortresses destroyed fuel and transportation facilities, steadily decreasing the available aviation fuel. Less fuel meant fewer training hours for new German pilots. By the summer of 1944 a new German pilot had received only 110 hours of flight training compared to 360 for an American pilot. Inexperienced German pilots in out-classed, older fighters were shot down more and more frequently by the better trained Allied pilots in the newer, superior performing P-51s. As their losses mounted, the Luftwaffe was forced to pull more units back from the front. During the summer of 1942 about 17 percent of Luftwaffe was being used on the home front for bomber defense. By Normandy it had increased to near 40 percent, helping to give overwhelming advantage to the Allies for the invasion of France. John Keegan in The Second World War states that opposing the over 5000 Allied fighters "General Hugo Sperrle's Third Air Fleet had only 169 available on the Channel Coast on 6 June 1944." More B-17 Flying Fortress
B-17: The 299: Triumph and Disaster B-17: Y1B-17 B-17: The Fortress I B-17: The Pacific B-17: Europe B-17: Gotterdammerung Back to Cry Havoc #16 Table of Contents Back to Cry Havoc List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1996 by David W. Tschanz. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com |