Jacky Fisher

Father of Dreadnought

German Reaction

by David W. Tschanz, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia

Fisher's fleet had been built with a wary eye on Germany, the rising naval power which he was most concerned about. The German navy initially counted for little beside the consistently triumphant German army -- victor in the brilliant abrupt campaigns of 1866 and 1870 against Austria and France. In fact it was initially commanded by generals, who like General Stosch, the first imperial admiral, regarded the navy as a "living coastal defense."

In 1888 Germany was still no more than a second class sea power, then Kaiser Wilhelm II acceded to the throne and brought with him a keen interest in naval affairs. The grandson of Victoria, the Kaiser had been brought up in the shadow of the Royal Navy. Admiring its traditions and jealous of its reputations, he envied the power its still predominant strength conferred on Britain.

His goal, his mother wrote to her mother, Queen Victoria, "is to have a navy which shall be larger and stronger than the Royal Navy." The first tentative steps had been taken on 1891 with the launching of Germany's first true battleship -- the Brandenburg. By 1897, the Germans had eight such ships -- but they counted little besides the Royal Navy's sixty-two. Then in 1897 Rear Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz was named State Secretary for the Navy. Tirpitz brought with him an ordered program on naval construction and a coherent plan for the deployment of fleet.

Tirpitz and his seminal role in the development of German seapower are beyond the scope of this article, but it is important to realize that under Tirpitz a German High Seas Fleet was born that was perceived and was a threat to Britain. Also, Germany had, in Tirpitz, as far-thinking and competent a naval strategist as Britain had in Fisher. Tirpitz had a number of other advantages over Fisher -- in the Kaiser he had a committed naval expansionist. And, whereas Fisher had to continuously overcome the inertia a venerable institution of hidebound tradition with no inclination to change, Tirpitz was creating a navy where none existed.

From 1897 to 1904 Tirpitz had conducted a program of building a German navy without conducting an open naval race. His plan was to make ground on Britain by stealth -- increasing the size of the German battle fleet and its component ships by barely perceptible stages. "The patient laying of brick on brick," he described. But British hypersensitivity to challenges at sea from any direction, but particularly from a point as close as the North Sea, and a loss of caution on Tirpitz' part in 1904 meant that Britain became aware of what Germany was up to.

The appearance of Dreadnought essentially nullified everything that Tirpitz had done with he German fleet. To his credit he bit the bullet of supersession, forced the German parliament to appropriate money for one ships (by threatening to resign) and decided to accept open confrontation with Royal Navy -- thus throwing both country's into a naval arms race.

Tirpitz had recognized one important thing that Fisher had not quite understood -- Dreadnought also made the Royal Navy obsolete. In terms of modern warships, both Britain and Germany were starting from the same line -- if Germany were committed enough, she could catch and pass the Royal Navy.

In July 1909 Tirpitz unveiled the 18,900 ton Nassau, the first of the German dreadnoughts. Originally a pre-dreadnought she had been converted to a quasi-dreadnought. The ship had 12 11" guns but they lacked the careful arrangement of the Dreadnought. The ship also carried a cumbersome mix of ordnance including 5.9 inch and 3.4 inch guns. The crew was larger, the Nassau needed 963 men versus 773 for Dreadnought and she had a top speed of 19 knots. In short the first German dreadnought was overgunned, overweight and underpowered. German critics made much of the one inch smaller guns (effectively not important) and overlooked some of her other design features that made her, in some respects, clearly superior to the Dreadnought. Part of the reason the Nassau was slower was that she was equipped with 11 3/4 inch belt armor and deck armor that was 4" thick. By contrast the Dreadnought had thinner belt armor and deck armor of 3" -- which thinned out to one inch at her bow and stern. The Nassau also incorporated the "torpedo bulkhead" -- an interior steel wall that ran without interruption the whole length of the vital parts of the ship from the keel to the top deck. Together with the coal bunker running the length of both sides of the ship, these bulkheads acted as stunningly effective shock absorbers when the German ships met enemy fire. The Germans also provided individual life jackets for the crew in the event lifeboat failure. The British did not.

The reply to the Invincible was the Von der Tann. Similar in armament to the Invincible, the German cruiser also had the now standard torpedo bulkhead and an armor belt 3 3/4" thicker than Invincible. In destroyers, the Germans showed less ingenuity and built virtual copies of the British ships with 107 completed by 1913. In the area of submarines, the British were quickly overshadowed by the Germans who demonstrated an appreciation for the craft and a skill in understanding their tactical and strategic potential.

Despite German inventiveness, Britain had a lead, albeit a bare one, that could not be matched. Fisher had, in one sense plunged both nations into a naval arms race, but had assured that Britain would maintain superiority vis-a-vis the High Seas Fleet. Careful diplomacy would effectively negate the possible effect of France and Russia by allying them (and their fleets) with Britain. The last change Fisher made is often overlooked or considered less important than it was. Geography gave Britain command of the sea approaches to Germany. Rather than maintain the fleet in its main bases along the Channel, they moved it to Scapa Flow in the Orkney Islands some 600 miles, or thirty hours steaming distance from Germany's naval bases. Now Germany's High Seas Fleet, though presented with the opportunity of bringing Britain's east coast towns under attack would have to voyage a whole day's steaming from its safe havens, under threat of submarine and surface torpedo attack, before bringing the British Fleet to battle.

If such a battle supervened the High Seas Fleet could not determine beforehand where the Royal Navy would appear -- as it could when Harwich, the Thames and the Channel Narrows were the Royal Navy's only sally ports. Furthermore, if action went awry, the High Seas Fleet faced the ordeal of a retreat in disarray for many hours, perhaps at night or in bad weather, to reach safe haven. And the time factor is pitiless in sea warfare. A heavily damaged fleet cannot count on topography to shield its retreat, unnavigable areas are few and offer nothing like the opportunity for effective rearguard action that rivers, mountains and swamps provide to a stricken military force on land.

Fisher's scheme for fleet reorganization resulted in his undoing. The internal politics of the issue -- including conspiring subordinates, long held grudges and unbelievable savagery by all concerned -- have no place here. Fisher's abrasive, high-handed manner had earned him some powerful enemies and the fact that he was right helped little. Eventually he was given a peerage and on his 69th birthday compelled to retire. When the word reach Singapore, the Commander in Chief of the Fleet summed up the attitude of the Royal Navy to the man they had come to love, respect and fear failing in front of. "So Jacky is growing roses is he? Well all I've got to say is that those roses damned well had better grow."

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© Copyright 1996 by David W. Tschanz.
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