"Torpedoes" was probably the only branch of naval warfare in which the United States Navy was markedly inferior to the Japanese. The reason for this inferiority lies deep in the
organization of the US Government and the psychology of its people. It certainly cannot be shifted off as solely the responsibility of a small group of technicians.... Undoubtedly torpedo inferiority added months to the war and thus cost the US thousands of lives and billions of dollars of treasure."
Fizzling fish, wrong tactics and incompetent commanders -- ingredients for disaster simmering below the waves aboard American submarines -- how many years did they add to World War II?
A strong case has been made, by authors as varied as Jim Dunnigan, John Keegan and George Friedman, that the leading cause of the eventual defeat of the Japanese in World War II was the choke hold on its commercial shipping achieved by Allies. Friedman, in his thought provoking The Coming War With Japan, argues that aerial strategic bombing had little effect on Japanese production capacity. But production capacity is useless without raw materials. US submarines, ranging on the north-south routes from the Indies and along the Japanese coast, systematically interdicted the flow of strategic materials. By the end of the war Japanese imports of bulk commodities such as iron ore and oil had plunged almost 90% from prewar levels.
Unable to get the supplies it needed to maintain its armed forces the Japanese were forced to submit to the demand for unconditional surrender. As Friedman points out, the lesson was driven home -- the bulk of modern Japan's Maritime Self Defense Force is devoted to antisubmarine warfare. For World War II's submariners it was not a one-sided battle. While American submarines claimed 201 Japanese warships and 1013 merchant vessels (roughly 55% of all tonnage sunk), fifty four American submarines made their final to the floor of the Pacific, taking 3500 sailors to a watery grave. The loss rate -- 22% -- suffered by the Submarine Service was the highest experienced by any force of their size in the war. But the blood and iron lost in the shallows and deeps of the Pacific destroyed Japanese war making ability. It almost didn't happen that way.
Run Silent, Run Deep
While salvage crews rescued what they could from the twisted wreckage of the Pacific Fleet in the aftermath of the raid on Pearl Harbor, the American Navy scrambled to strike back. Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ernest J. King turned to the only branch of the service with the ability to damage the Japanese without risking the precious carriers -- the submarine service. Before December was out, American submarines had struck back with a ferocity born out of desperation and a grim sense of revenge. One boat alone carried out attacks on six Japanese ships putting 13 "fish" (naval slang for torpedoes) in the water. Overall there were forty-six separate attacks on Japanese shipping, both civilian and military, involving the launching of 96 torpedoes. The scope and number of operations were a tribute to the determination and hunting skills of the submariners. The one problem, from the naval warfare point of view, was that all this activity resulted in the loss of exactly five freighters.
Ironically, the Atlantic German submarine commander Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz was complaining to his captains that it took them took 816 torpedoes to sink 404 ships. Something was terribly wrong in the Pacific.
Fizzling Fish US WWII Torpedoes
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Fizzling Fish: Introduction
Fizzling Fish: Commanders, Tactics & Torpedoes
Fizzling Fish: Rear Admiral Charles Lockwood
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© Copyright 1996 by David W. Tschanz.
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