Or, "Keep your Eye on the Ball" A term that gets used a great deal is "operational art." It is used regularly by the Soviets in explanation of their doctrine, and it is impossible to understand Soviet theories of mobile war without understanding what they mean by this term. Let's start by seeing what the US Army has to say about the Soviet use of this term. FM 100-2-1 The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics deals with the entire range of Soviet military theory, and its comments on operational art are worth quoting in full: "It is often difficult to separate Soviet tactics from what the Soviets call 'operational art' because the maneuver divisions that are the subject of tactics are the maneuver elements that achieve the 'operation' objectives of armies and fronts. Moreover, the two concepts are closely interrelated in Soviet military thinking and planning. A recurring theme in Soviet military writing is the need for the commander to keep the 'operational' goal in mind. The overriding objective of the combined arms success by a well orchestrated combination of massive fire, maneuver and deep violent strikes. "It is important to understand what the Soviets mean by 'tactics' and 'operations' as well as the various words and verbal formulas that they associate with each concept. To the Soviet officer, the word 'operation' informs him that the activity in question involves at least an army or a front that was probably tailored for the mission. 'Tactics' consist of combat operations at the division level and lower. Divisions have a set organizational structure that, except for combat support reinforcements, does not vary from mission to mission. "Divisions fight battles, whereas armies conduct operations. First-echelon divisions usually pursue tactical objectives in the enemy's tactical depth, whereas armies, normally using their second-echelon divisions, must achieve operational objectives in the enemy's operational depth." Now, I think this is a genuinely amazing piece of English prose, and one which I admire a great deal. Look at what it tells you. It tells you who conducts operations (armies and fronts); it tells you what operations are not (tactics or strategy); it tells you what operations seek to gain ("operational objectives") and where those are gained (in the enemy's "operational depth," wherever the hell that's supposed to be). The only thing it doesn't tell you is what operational means. This may seem like a small point—-everyone uses the word operation or operational, and we all have a reasonable idea of what we mean. True, but therein lies the danger. In the West, we give the term a rather broad meaning which sort of includes any activity undertaken to carry out a specific plan of action. A battalion assault on a town can be considered an operation. After all, every American battalion staff includes an "operations" officer, and that's true of Soviet regiments as well. The fact that the Soviets tend to view operational art generally as the province of armies and fronts is curious, perhaps, but little more. Little more, that is, until you understand that the Soviets chose these levels of actions for the term operational for a very specific reason, and one which I believe offers a genuine and original insight. Clearly the author of the above passage from FM 100-2-1 does not understand what that might be. Richard Simpkin in his book Red Armour offers a somewhat more enlightening discussion of the term than does FM 100-2-1. In it, he observes that operational is not merely another arbitrary layer sandwiched between tactics and strategy, but rather is the dynamic bond between them. That is, tactics relates to specific combat actions taken by a maneuver unit against the enemy. When the cumulative results of these tactical actions assume strategic dimensions, those actions become operational in nature. The example that he gives is the seizure of a bridge. The actual capture of the bridge is tactical. Pushing mechanized forces across the river is tactical as well (orperhaps administrative). Subsequent battles fought by those mechanized forces are tactical. But if the passage of these mechanized forces into the enemy rear has the strategic effect of dislocating the enemy's defensive array, then it has become operational in nature. This is much closer to the mark, and I would offer very little extra, except the following concise and (I hope) clear definition of an operation in the Soviet sense of the term. Operation: The sum of all tactical actions carried out by a single military force in pursuit of a single strategic aim. Notice that no mention is made of specific levels of units which undertake operations, as this is an artificial and unimportant distinction. The Soviets generally (but not exclusively) talk about operational art as being the province of armies and fronts because, given the scale of their armed forces and those of their opponents, only an army or front is sufficiently strong to pursue a strategic goal. It is significant, however, that the Soviets also believe that a tank division, once it breaks loose into the enemy's rear, is an operational unit, as is an airmobile brigade. Why this is the case will be covered in a later lesson, but the above definition should provide you with a pretty good idea of why this is the case. For our purposes in the game, it is sufficient to know that your regiments and armies will be the operational units. That is, each regiment will undertake an operation, either alone or in conjunction with other regiments under the control of the army. All of these operations will be integral elements of the strategic plan formulated by the Western Strategic Front. Now, why is this so important? The Soviets' heavy emphasis on operational art is probably what most distinguishes their doctrine of mobile warfare from that of the German and Israelis (the only other important practitioners of mobile warfare) and is also what enabled them to win World War II. Although the Germans talk a great deal about how to fight the operational battle as well, the German manner of fighting a battle in the last war was fundamentally different from that of the Soviets. The German corps and army commander thought for the most part in strategic terms, then set tactical objectives for their division commanders. The orders explained the situation and told the unit what results were expected, but left the course of the action up to the commander of the subordinate unit. (This approach, called Auftragstaktic, was viewed by the Germans as one of the essential pillars of their military system.) The divisions then fought the tactical battle in some isolation from each other. Each division was, in effect, its own sort of mini-army, fighting its own little war. Make no mistake about it, the Germans fought that little war better than any other army in the world. German tactics at the division level and below were absolutely superb. But while they were winning that small detailed battle, the Soviets were winning the operational battle by default. Here is an example of what I mean by that, drawn from a more enlightened (but unfortunately less widely disseminated) army document: "One of the most influential postwar German war critiques was General von Mellenthin's Panzer Battles, which was published in 1956. "Mellenthin's work...tended to treat tactical cases without fully describing their operational context. Opposing Soviet units, as in Guderian's work, were faceless. Mellenthin's classic account of XLVII Panzer Corps operations along the Chir River after the encirclement of the German 6th Army at Stalingrad stands as an example of the weakness of his book. In it he describes the brilliant operations of that panzer corps in fending off assaults by the Soviet 5th Tank Army's units which included first the 1st Tank Corps and later 5th Mechanized Corps. On 7-8 December 1942, 11th Panzer Division parried a thrust of 1st Tank Corps at State Farm 79, while on 19 December, 11th Panzer checked the advance of 5th Mechanized Corps. Despite the vivid accounts of these tactical successes Mellinthin only in passing describes the operational disaster that provided a context for those fleeting tactical success. For, in fact, while Soviet 5th Tank Army occupied XLVII Panzer Corps attention, to the northwest Soviet forces overwhelmed and destroyed the Italian 8th Army and severely damaged Army Detachment Hollidt." --Colonel David M. Glantz. American Perspectives on Eastern Front Operations in World War II, Soviet Army Studies Office, US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS. April 1987. The operational battle was fought by the Soviet Army and front commanders who, like their German corps and army commander counterparts, pursued an objective of strategic significance. Unlike their German counterparts, they were intimately involved with setting the tactical missions for all their subordinate units, often down to battalion level. All assets available were used to their best advantage, and all were integrated into a coherent plan with the single-minded purpose of achieving that one strategic objective. To me, German offensives in World War II usually look good at the tactical level. Post-war accounts by the Germans tend to reinforce this feeling, and even making allowances for all the breast-beating the Germans love to do. their achievements at the tactical levels are impressive. But the battle almost always goes wrong, somehow, and it's always as a result of some failure "somewhere else." The higher you go in looking at a German offensive, the less focused it seems to be, the more vague in purpose and execution. By contrast, Soviet tactics often seem crude and stereotyped, and at the regimental and division level their attacks don't always seem to make a lot of sense. On the other hand, each step back you take from the tactical battle, the clearer the pattern of the offensive becomes, until at the front or theater level, it becomes, to me at least, almost chilling in its clarity of purpose. That, my friends, is the meaning of operational art. That is why the Soviets were able to stop the Germans in 1941, when the Germans were stronger then they were, inflict severe checks on the Germans in 1942 when the numbers were about even, and beat the holy hell out of them from 1943 on once they had superiority. Every modern army includes "maintenance of the objective" or something similar in its list of fundamental principles of war. The Soviets do so as well, but I think it means a great deal more to them than it does to others. Operational art consists of a framework for evaluating every tactical decision against the yardstick of the strategic objective. Once the strategic objective is defined, every tactical asset must be directed toward achieving that objective. Every decision must be checked by asking the following two questions: "What contribution does this unit make toward attaining the objective?" "Can it make a stronger contribution if employed in some other way?" That is how you, as the Soviet team, must arrive at your operational plans. Now a word about the nature of objectives. The Soviets excel in their ability to focus their undivided attention on the objective at hand, but also have achieved an impressive unanimity in determining what constitutes a worthwhile objective. In the Soviet view, geographic objectives serve only as signposts or phase lines in an operation. There is only one worthwhile objective, and that is the destruction of the enemy force opposing it. Although the victory conditions in the game are expressed in the number of city hexes taken, the Soviet team must always remember that the true measure of success lies in the destruction of theNATO Armies. If the NATO Armies are destroyed, the cities will fall like ripe fruit. If the NATO Armies are not destroyed, they will counterattack and retake the cities. Therefore, do not let the presence of the cities on the map draw your eyes from the presence of NATO units. These are the genuine objectives, and to the extent that NATO does not realize this, you have an additional advantage. They will maneuver their forces to defend the cities. Armed with this knowledge, you must maneuver to destroy their forces. Let me conclude with a couple of analogies that will help you in further understanding the nature of Soviet operational art and what distinguishes it from some of the military philosophies of Western armies, particularly those of the Americans and the British. First, consider the case of McClellan and Grant in the ACW. McClellan was well educated and very intelligent. He had a good grasp of leadership and a firm understanding of the principles of war. It is very difficult to argue that he was incompetent in any objective sense. McClellan approached war as an elaborate chess game in which victory went to the commander who succeeded in outsmarting his opponent. Thus, McClellan was always trying to decide what Bobby Lee would do and then come up with some really clever counterstroke that would confound him. Of course, if he (McClellan) could think of the counterstroke, then might not Bobby Lee as well? And then Lee might have his own counterstroke that would catch McClellan unawares, so he would instead plan to counterstroke Lee's counterstroke of his counterstroke...and so on ad infinitum. This way lead to indecision and muddle no clear pursuit of a single objective. Grant, by contrast, always knew exactly what he had to do to win a campaign, and set about to do it. Although he considered what the enemy might be able to do to upset his plans and made provision accordingly, he never based an entire operation on his ability to second guess the enemy, or read their minds, or lull them into a misstep. Instead, he identified the objective and went after it with a single-minded, relentless determination and never let go until he had it. Zhukov would have approved. McClellan's style of command is one the British might describe as "too clever by half" but is also very typical of the worst excesses of US and British commanders. Commanders who become so involved in these dramatic psychological tests of wit and will usually lose sight of what they are after and get their butts handed to them. As a second analogy, consider the difference between boxing and karate. In boxing, the contestant carefully probes the defenses of his opponent with jabs and pokes, wears him down with flurries of harder punches, waits for an opening, then goes for a knockout, preferably delivered as a riposte to one of his punches. Quite often, however, the match is won on points. Karate, on the other hand, is always won on points, and the number required to win a match is exactly one. The first person to get one point wins. One point is received for landing one correctly delivered blow. Why just one? Because "a correctly delivered blow" is defined as one sufficient to kill or incapacitate your opponent. That is why boxers bounce around on the balls of their feet, while karate contestants are almost always braced with their feet flat on the canvas. All correctly delivered karate techniques are delivered from flat feet. Movies don't emphasize this very much, but you have to remember that a movie's job is to entertain, not necessarily inform. The movie wouldn't be nearly as entertaining if every time Chuck Norris kicked someone they went down and stayed down, period. American and British doctrine reminds me of boxing. There's a lot of poke-poke-poking and jab-jab-jabbing, a lot of dancing around the other guy on the balls of the feet, and a lot of waiting for the other guy to make a mistake. A Soviet operation, on the other hand, plants its feet, gathers its strength, hauls back, and just decks its opponent. Which one sounds most effective to you? Lesson 2 All assets at the disposal of each commander must be constantly, efficiently and ruthlessly directed toward the single-minded pursuit of the strategic objective, which is always the destruction of the opposing army. Assignment Instead of a written assignment, there will be a practical problem conducted in the field. Please assemble promptly at the Inter-German border. Frunze Academy Staff College and Home Study Guide Lesson 1: The Myth of Russian Military Ineptitude Lesson 2: Soviet Operational Art: Blueprint for Victory? Back to Table of Contents -- Command Post Quarterly # 9 To Command Post Quarterly List of Issues To MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1995 by Greg Novak. This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com