FIRE and FURY, a set of historical miniatures rules for the
American Civil War, was released in July, 1990. The scale is grand
tactical, with the unit of maneuver being a brigade of infantry or
cavalry. Using FIRE and FURY, the largest battles of the war can be
fought in a single gaming session.
FIRE and FURY also contains 5 scenarios for recreating the battle of Gettysburg. The designer plans to release a scenario book in 1991 containing most of the other major battles of the war. For your gaming pleasure we present the following scenario which recreates the the first major battle of the war, 1st Bull Run
In July 1861, the total Federal forces defending Washington numbered about 50,000 men. They were commanded by Brig. Gen. Irwin A. Mc Dowell, recently promoted from the rank of major. Three months had elapsed since President Lincoln had called out the Militia, whose terms of service were now about to expire. In the South, General Beauregard posted about 20,000 Confederates at Manassas, a road and rail junction some 30 miles southwest of the Federal capital. In the Shenandoah Valley Brig. Gen. Joseph E. Johnston commanded 11,000 Confederate soldiers. At Martinsburg, 18,000 Union troops under Brig. Gen. RobertE. Patterson were charged with responsibility for keeping Johnston in place. Other Federal and Confederate forces were holding various river crossings, road junctions, and mountain passes.
Training and organization.
At this point in the war neither side was well trained, although the Confederates held a slight edge over the Federals. McDowell had no chief of staff and not enough staff officers. Just before moving out, the Union army was organized into five divisions of two to four brigades each, except the 4th Division which had nine regiments that remained unbrigaded. The Confederate Army consisted of various brigade structures and detachments, each reporting and receiving orders directly from the senior local commander.
Union preparation
Northern public opinion demanded immediate action. General Scott warned against starting a campaign before the troops were fully trained. But President Lincoln, either bowing to popular pressure and anxious to use the militia before their terms expired wanted action. Scott was aware that the Confederates were far from seasoned and cherished the belief that one victory would end the war quickly, and therefore agreed. McDowell was directed to prepare a plan of operations. His plan, accepted in late June, called for Butler and Patterson to prevent the Confederate forces facing them from reinforcing Beauregard while McDowell, with about 39,000 troops, advanced against Manassas to outflank Beauregard's position.
The advance.
On July 16, 1861 McDowell moved out along the Warrention Turnpike. Everything depended on a rapid march, if the Union troops were to hit Beauregard before anyone could reinforce him. But the Federal troops took two days to cover the 20 miles to Centreville, Va. While McDowell's main body waited at Centreville for the Army wagon trains, he advanced against the fords South of Centerville, found them stoutly defended. and refired. Sure that his green troops could not force their way over Bull Run under fire, McDowell concentrated his forces for two more days while engineers reconnoitered the Confederate positions. When they found an undefended ford at Sudey Springs, northwest of the Stone Bridge, McDowell decided to envelop the Confederate left flank and destroy the Manassas Gap Railway. It was a good plan, but the Confederates were already moving to toil ft.
Confederate dispositions.
On July 17 spies in Washington told Beauregard of McDowell's move. He at once telegraphed the information to Richmond. Jefferson Davis, also using the telegraph, ordered up reinforcements from Richmond, and directed Johnston to proceed to Manassas from ft Valley at once. By adroit maneuvering, and the use of a cavalry screen led by Colonel J. E. B. Stuart, Johnston slipped away from Patterson, and began shipping troops by rail to Manassas. The majority arrived by July 20, the day before McDowell attacked. Beauregard had already deployed six and one-half brigades to defend the fords socross Bull Run, and the timely reinforcements gave him four more. Johnston ranked him, but since Beauregard had prepared the defense Johnston let him control the battle.
McDowell's plan.
Holding a division plus one brigiiek. and artillery at Centreville in reserve, McDowell planned a divers~_-)--y srzck by Tyler's division in the vicinity of the Stone Bridge. The mair. iw~i; 1_- be executed by two divisions, under McDowell's direct command, whi:h were to advance in column to the right, cross Bull Run at Sudley Springs, and envelop the enemy flank and rear. Once the main body forced the Confederates away from the Stone Bridge, the diversionary division would cross and join the attack on Manassas.
The Battle.
On the morning of July 21, Tyler's division moved out slowly along the Warrenton Pike delaying the movement of both Hunter's and Heintzelman's enveloping divisions. Tyler's diversionary attack against the Stone Bridge was feebly executed. The Confederates were not deceived. McDowell's enveloping column reached Sudley Springs at 9:00, rather than 7:00 as originally scheduled, and drove southeast. Beauregard, warned both by courier and by flag signaler, made ready. Evans, Bee, and Bartow's Brigades moved to meet the Union attack on Matthews Hill.
These troops hold against Hunter's Union Division, but the arrival shortly before noon of Heintzelman's Division to the west and Sherman's Brigade on the east forced the Confederates to retreat across the Warrenton Pike to the vicinity of the Henry and Robinson houses. Here on a flat-crested ridge they rallied behind the brigade of Jackson and Hampton. At 1:00 Union troops under Porter with Federal artillery occupied the key ground around the Henry House. Jackson, who that day won the nickname *Stonewall", countered by extending his line to the west.
In the confusion of battle Porter's forces mistook the advancing 33rd Virginia's blue uniforms for friendly troops and lost the position. Successive attacks by Franklin and Sherman each recaptured but could not hold Henry Hill. At 3:00 Confederate regiments sent by Cocke halted a promising flank attack by Willcox's Union Brigade. McDowell committed his reserve brigade under Howard in a final assault that once more carried but could not hold the Henry Hill position.
As fresh brigades under Kershaw, Smith and Early reached the field the Confederates took the offensive. By 5:00 the exhausted Union troops were driven across the Warrenton Pike. Federal units began to collapse; some fleeing until they reached Washington, giving rise to the notion that virtually the entire Army wasrouted. Except for some harassment by cavalry, the Confederate pursuit came apart when they neared Centreville. The Rebel Army was too disorganized and lacked the supplies and transportation to support a further advance on Washington. Additionally McDowell still had the equivalent of two fresh divisions which barred the way.
Summary.
The Battle of Bull Run highlights many of the problems and deficiencies that were typical of the first years of war. Large, ill-trained bodies of recruits and volunteers quickly became disorderly and confused. Plans called for envelopments, but most attacks were frontal. Security was frequently disregarded and reconnaissance was poorly carried out. Neither commander was able to employ his whole force effectively. Of McDowell's 39,000, only about 18,000 crossed Bull Run, to suffer about 3000 casualties. Beauregard, with about 32,000 men, got only 19,000 into action, including the aborted pursuit, losing about 2,000. Instead of placing himself in the army's rear where he could exercise effective control, McDowell led ft enveloping column, valorously leading individual regiments into the attack.
Likewise, other key Union commanders became involved in leading regiments while their own headquarters suffered. Similarly, Beauregard rode up and down the front, encouraging individual units and men. Some of his orders were vague while others was never delivered. The confusion that arose from the welter of uniforms on both sides, including the gaudy Zouaves, led to the adoption of gray for all Confederate troops, and blue for the Federals.
Further, since the Confederate flag, the "Stars and bars," looked dangerously like the Union's Stars and Stripes, the Rebel Army adopted a battle flag based on the Cross of St. Andrew. The combination of the telegraph and the railroad, coupled with skillful maneuvering and a cavalry screen, gave the Confederates the first major victory of the Civil War, but the campaign of First Bull Run had consequences that were felt far beyond the battlefield. Northern leaders, shocked into grasping the nature and scope of the oomming struggle redoubled their efforts. Conversely, the deceptively easy victory convinced some Southerners that little more would be required for the North to want peace. Neither side dreamed that four more years of war and thousands of battles, both large and small, lay ahead.
First Bull Run ACW
Back to Table of Contents -- Courier Vol. IX No. 5
Back to Courier List of Issues
Back to Master Magazine List
© Copyright 1990 by The Courier Publishing Company.
This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web.
Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com