Reviewing other peoples' wargame rules as well as studying books that come my way has uncovered some new information on formations employed during the wars of the third quarter of the 19th Century. One formation which occurs commonly in wargame rules but never in historical accounts is the Flying Column. First known to us from Dave Waxtel's They Died For Glory, it recently came to my attention in Partizan Press' Les Braves Gens. In each case the Flying Column has the density of a skirmish line, the speed of a greyhound, and various other properties. In at least the first case it has the capacity to turn into an attack column at the end of its move, and, depending on the umpire, may be able to fire while in route as a series of company firing lines. In appearance the Flying Column looks like an open column of march.
Regrettably it is apochryphal. Not the column of route or column of march the Flying Column. In Dave Waxtel's rules anyone can use it, but in Les Braves Gens its use is restricted to the Prussians. The latter may tend to force the French commander playing the game to behave in as cautious and clumsy a manner as his historical examples. However, the flying column, as I understand the term, refers to a detached force usually sent on a particular mission which relies on the supplies it can carry and does not concern itself with keeping supply lines open. In that sense General Grant's Army in the last (and successful) Vicksburg campaign, or Sherman's on the March to the sea were large flying columns.
Tactically, the Prussians ran the gamut of available formations. In the story of the two brigades, Hoenig remarked that for some reason the 1870 Brigade's 5 battalions each formed in a different formation to cross the same ground. At 2500 meters the II-16th was in company columns, the 3rd and 2nd companies of the I-16th were in company columns, 1st and 4th in the rear in a half battalion column (company column doubled on the center). F-16th was in the same fashion. The I-57th had two companies deployed as skirmishers with a half battalion column in their rear which deployed to company columns at 1500 meters. F-57th deployed in double column on the center (whole battalion) deploying to half battalion columns after crossing the Mars-La-Tour road.
The company column was known to the French but did not amount to unwritten tactical doctrine. In fact, most accounts of French tactical advances suggest loose double lines or skirmisher swarms. This may account for the reservation in Les Braves Gens of the "Flying Column" to Prussia. The latter work also requires the Republican French Mobiles et. al. to fight in line because of their lack of training. Actually, fighting in line took more training and discipline than any formation -- unless the line could remain stationery. The unfortunate Republican rabble often attacked in column!
Of the French offensive formation, Hoenig remarks on it in passing since after the massacre of the 38th Brigade, they came down off the hill and advanced for some distance, overrunning the position of the Brigade: "First came a skirmish line in which everybody comingled in which everybody yelled, in which there was no tactical order, and which, moreover, halted repeatedly even though there was no resistance. It was followed by a second skirmish line, and later by battalions in line with their eagles. The first skirmish line fired, mostly from the hip, without aiming. Both skirmish lines passed over us and the battalions halted in line where most of our dead and wounded were lying."
When the 1st Guard Dragoons attacked skirmishers fled, lay down, or formed in groups. The formed lines were disordered by the attack and part of the French force had become exposed to fire from the flank and rear by the II-57th. However, the advance resumed and several wounded or horseless dragoons were captured along with men of the F-16th, I-57th, and F57th.
Maneuvering Speeds
One popular misimpression concerning maneuvering speeds is the concept that skirmishers have maximum mobility. Logically, it is true, a man who doesn't have to worry about keeping in formation can advance more rapidly than one who has to worry about dress and cover. That is especially true in cross country work where some of the people you are trying to align with may be held up by obstacles. The study of the two brigade actions noted that when the attacking Prussians entered the woods being vacated by the Saxons the column was held up somewhat, but the skirmishers were little hindered. In the opinions of Prussian theorists, however, the skirmisher had little forward mobility.
To the Prussian, and probably other professional military thinkers at the time, the key feature of the Problus woods action was not that the skirmishers were unhindered by the woods. It was more important that they were closely followed by an advancing friendly column, and the enemy appeared to be in full retreat. Lacking either circumstance, the popular presumption was that skirmishers' forward mobility could not be counted on. In fact, in the case of the French regulars noted above, their advance kept pace with the line. At Problus when the Prussian advance was slowed by the sudden appearance of cavalrywhich caused the infantry to go to ground or form square, the brigadier's first concern was to rush a column forward through the skirmish line "knowing the difficulty of moving the line after they had stopped to shoot". With the Republican French it was worse. Professional officers who found themselves commanding the levee en masse complained that they found themselves with their soldiers behind every tree for miles around, but that the soldiers had no inclination to advance or give away their positions by firing.
It is an American tradition to regard open order fighting with careful regard for moving from cover to cover as a sign of the citizen soldier, and to some extent that is true - if he is not hard pressed, and/or if there is formed support nearby. During the Siege of Paris, however, it was the citizen soldiers of France who were forced, in the trading of outposts, to suffer the casualties inherent in column attacks - because the columns could be brought forward. On the other side, it was the Prussian Guard that on at least one occasion was used to recover lost outposts by attacking in open order -- veteran elite infantry might be counted on to move forward from cover to cover in open order.
In fairness to the skirmisher, my own rules perhaps more than others have tended to exaggerate just how close the formed supports had to be to encourage skirmishers to advance. French tactical manuals of the 19th Century encouraged sending skirmishers out as much as 200 to 400 yards ahead of the column - when not threatened with cavalry orwithin close range of the enemy line.
But back to the use of columns of route, flying, or whatever. A key feature of 19th Century wargames involved the strategic and grand tactical maneuver of troops. It was in this area that the Prussians excelled - not in capacity but in execution, in 1870. By 1914 the formidable French infantry had become tactically inept - but the staff could shuffle and deal masses with the best of them - doubtless as a result of 40 years of wargames. If going from column of maneuver to line of battle remained a tactical consideration, trying to get all the troops to the battlefield received additional emphasis as numbers increased along with weapon range.
A pre-eminient proponent of Kriegspiel was one Verdy du Vernois, long president of the Imperial German Kriegspiel Society. During a recent re-reading of his classic study of Custozza (Italy, 1866) I stumbled over some notes which forced me to rethink the details of my own road column rules. (Warfare in the Age of Napoleon III- The Courier V/1-5, page 29 - ED.)
Notably, the battalion of 900-1,000 Austrians was assumed to take up 400 paces of road. In the footnotes the translator's notes indicated that approximately the same was required by 800-900 British troops in a battalion. The frontage was not specified, but it seems that a combination of what seemed to be a comfortable width and a reasonable spacing between the men on a road had become an international standard.
Thus an Austrian column at Custozza is described as follows:
- 3 battalions 400 paces each = 1,200 paces
1 battery of 8 guns 600 paces
2 sections of a hospital detachment 400 paces
"If these troops were English, the exact calculation would read thus: 3 battalions (800 rifles each) would each occuply 300 yards, with 2 small arms ammunition carts, a tool cart, 2 ammunition mules, and 1 with medical panniers, 300=(10x3)+(4x4) distances between troops and carts, carts and mules, +4 for mules abreast = 350 yards, add the distance between battalions and we have a total of:
- 350x3x50= 1,100 yards
Interval 25
8 guns and wagons 296
Interval 25
Add 20 perent for opening out 300
Total 1,850 yards
1,800 yards is 2,200 paces so the length of the column would be the same as that given in the text (i.e. the Austrian column). By Sir George Colley's rule, allowing 1 yard forevery 2 infantry soldiers and 20 yards for a vehicle, a total of 1,835 yards is arrived at."
Any way, the moral of the story is, if you should happen to be using my old rules, the road column should not only occupy the base width of road, but 50% more as well.
In my own "Grand Tactical" (Warfare in the Age of Napoleon III) game I had assumed a battalion frontage for a large battalion in triple line or smaller one in double line to be approximately 200 yds. - perhaps a bit narrow, but close. And since the front would be upwards of 200 men, turned sideways a battalion base with 200 yd. frontage should be adequate for a road column with a minimum of 3 abreast and 200 deep, right? NO WAY! While a close order line could be reckoned at 22 inches to the file, both Verdy du Vernois and his English commentator accepted a yard, more or less, as required per two men (not per rank) on the march. Thus a battalion that might form a close order firing line 200-300 yards wide would take up to half again that strung out on a road.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
PRINCIPLE WORKS CITED
Wise and Rossignoli, Military Flags of The World in Color, Arco, 1978.
Hoenig, Towards the Tactics of the Future, 1906.
Wagner, The Koeniggraetz Campaign, West Point.
Verdi du Vernois, Custozza - 1866, West Point.
Flags and Formations in the Age of Napoleon the Little by by Pat Condray with Flags by Michael A. Tyson
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