Campaign for California:
Mexican-American War

Battle of San Pasqual and Los Angeles

By Grant Sigsworth

The Californios were a force of 72 lancers under the command of Andres Pico, brother to former California Governor Pio Pico. Pico assumed Gillespie and his men were a foraging party and paid them no need, thinking that they would not return for several days. He did not know of the return of Kearny's force.

On the night of the 5th Kearny sent out a scouting detachment under Lt. T. C. Hammond, who successfully penetrated Pico's camp. The Californians were alerted by the clanking of sabres and the baying of dogs. The Dragoons hastily returned to their camp and Pico sent out a quick scouting patrol. They found a Dragoon jacket and an army blanket. Certain of the presence of American troops, Pico had his men round up their horses, which had been let out to graze. He barely had his men collected when the Dragoon attack came.

Many have questioned why this attack ever took place. Kearny's force was larger than the Californians. He had artillery and the enemy had none; indeed, the Californians had few firearms of any sort. Had Kearny proceeded to San Diego without attacking Pico he could easily have beat off an attack. This would seem to have been the logical path, especially considering the tired and ill-trained nature of both man and beast in Kearny's little army.

But often war and the men who fight it are not logical. From a tactical standpoint, Kearny would probably never have another chance to take the better mounted Californians by surprise. This was his only opportunity to choose when and where to fight. Once the lancers knew of Kearny's location, their superior mobility would put the initiative permanently in the hands of the Californians. Undoubtedly Kearny, who was appointed 2nd Lt. in 1812, preferred the Napoleonic doctrine of the "clash of arms" for the decision of wars. He must have thought that a surprise attack now would help win the war sooner.

One can be relatively sure that after the arduous march Kearny's men had just performed there would be many disgruntled individuals, and that morale would be flagging. Kearny probably thought that an attack would serve to enhance the morale of his men. The thought of action, the picking up of adrenaline, does wonders towards dispelling fatigue and soothing aching bodies. Finally, it is known that Gillespie and Carson urged Kearny to attack.

Kearny's men mounted for the attack at 2:00 AM the morning of the 6th of December. It was extremely cold and damp. An advance guard of 12 men under Cpt. A.R. Johnston came within three fourths of a mile of Pico's camp. Kearny ordered an advance at the trot but Johnston misinterpreted the signal and charged the enemy. Pico, unprepared, barely forced backthe outnumbered Dragoons of Johnston's contingent.

Then, seeing the rest of Kearny's force coming up, Pico withdrew about half a mile to more level ground. Seeingthis, Captain Moore, commandingthe main force of Dragoons, ordered a charge. Because of the widely varied quality of the American mounts, the charge spread out all over the battlefield. The Californians counter-charged and meleed with the Americans for 10 to 15 minutes. Captain Johnston was killed in the initial charge. Spread out as they were the Americans fared quite badly in this battle. Sabres against lances proved an uneven battle, the Americans suffered 18 killed and 13 wounded. Among the wounded were Kearny and Gillespie. The lancers did not press their attack because of their fear of the American artillery, but they did manage to seize one of the mountain howitzers whose mule team had spooked and run into the Californian lines. Of Pico's 72 men, twelve had been wounded and one captured.

The Americans, encumbered by wounded and out of food, were now in no condition to continue the advance. Capt. H.S. Turner, acting as Commanding Officer, sent to Stockton in San Diego for help. Receiving the message on the evening of the 6th, Stockton determined to send out a large relief force. Because of a confusing sequence of messages, the actual relief force, under Lt. A.V.F. Gray, did not leave until the 8th. Meanwhile, on the night of the 6th, Kearny set up camp and had his dead buried under a willow tree south of the San Bernardo River. On the 7th he set out again with his wounded on horse and mule drawn litters. The Dragoons encountered Pico about four miles down the road on a small hill near Rancho San Bernardo. Moving in a tighter formation and taking advantage of his greater firepower, Kearny took the hill and chased off

Pico and his men. Unfortunately he lost his few remaining beef cattle. Out of food and slowed by wounded, Kearny decided to remain on the hill and wait for the relief force from San Diego. The lancers besieged the hungry Americans, who had named theirrefuge Mule Hill, aftertheirmain source of food. On the morning of the 8th Pico captured a messenger returning to Kearny from San Diego. Pico exchanged him for the one Californian that had been captured. This messenger told Kearny that Stockton was not going to send sufficient help, so Kearny sent Midshipman Edward Beale, Kit Carson and an Indian guide to San Diego with a more urgent plea. One account has Pico stampeding horses through the American camp on the 10th in an effort to rout the Americans from their defensive positions. The attempt failed, and the relief column arrived on the night of the 10th. Being totally outnumbered now, Pico and his men withdrew from the field and Kearny reached San Diego safely on December 12th.

RETAKING LOS ANGELES

With the Dragoon's arrival in California, Stockton decided he had enough men to take back Los Angeles. As one might imagine, a power struggle took place between Stockton and Kearny. Stockton won out, but Kearny did not let the matter rest. Together they put together a force for the march north. This force departed San Diego on the 28th and 29th of December. Its composition was as below. In it one can see the organizational influence of Kearny.

    Commander-in-Chief: Commodore R.F. Stockton

    Division Commander: Brig. Gen. S.W. Kearny*

    First Division:
    Lt. J. Zeilin, USMC, Commanding C Co., USS Portsmouth musketeers E Co., USS Cyane carbineers G Co., USS Congress carbineers

    Second Division:
    Cpt. H.S. Turner, USA, Commanding C Co., 1st U.S. Dragoons D Co., USS Cyane musketeers K Co., 1st U.S. Dragoons Artillery battery, 6 cannon, Army and Navy cannoneers

    Third Division:
    Lt. W. Renshaw, USN, Commanding A Co., USS Congress musketeers B Co., USS Savannah musketeers

    Fourth Division:
    Bvt. Cpt. A.H. Gillespie, USMC, Commanding California Battalion, mtd. riflemen (50) Californios (30) 3 Officers, Corps of Topographical Engineers 46 men from different units

    TOTAL: 607 personnel
    *Word of Kearny's permanent promotion had recently come through.

Each Dragoon company had about 50 troopers. If we estimate 50 cannoneers, then each Naval company is about 54 sailors strong. The crew of the Congress totalled 450-500 men. Since a "G" company is listed forthat vessel, we know there must have been at least 7 companies on the ship, more likely 8 or 9, depending on whether the ship had two watch sections orthree. The organization shows that the Congress only fielded two of her companies Theoretically a much larger force could have been fielded had Stockton wished to strip more crewmen off the ships of the squadron. That he did not implies that he felt the force alloted was sufficient forthe task, orit might indicate that there were insufficient weapons to arm a larger landing party.

Note that some companies are called musketeers while others are cryptically termed "carbineers". These companies might well have been armed with the flintlock Jenks carbine. This .54 caliber breechloading weapon was patented in 1839 and was made for Navy and Coast Guard use. The ships of the squadron were certainly under no threat of attack from Mexican forces, although there may have been vague fears of a British Squadron also cruising the Pacific. What seems most likely is that Stockton and Kearny felt that the force they had was large enough to get the job done and yet not so large that supply would be a problem.

The force proceeded north and finally encountered the Californios on the night of January 7th. Flores, the Californian commander, had laid an ambush at La Jaboneria Ford on the San Gabriel River. Stockton's scouts (the California Volunteers) discovered the ambush and Stockton ordered a crossing at Bartolo Ford, higher on the river. The faster moving Californios also moved to the Bartolo Ford and were able to take up positions before the Americans could cross the river But now, because of the terrain, an ambush was out of the question.

The ford was about 50 yards wide and only knee deep. The bottom was medium hard sand. The approach from the south was flat, but about 600 yards from the river on the north side was a range of low hills, about fifty feet high. Flores positioned 200 men and two small cannon on these hills opposite the ford, and put mounted detachments of about 150 each to either flank, about 300 yards away. Stockton approached the ford in a square formation, surrounding the baggage and cattle.

A quarter mile from the river he stopped and reorganized his force, sending some mounted riflemen forward as skirmishers.

Flores tried to break the American formation by stampeding horses through it, but failed. The Californian cannon fired repeatedly at the advancing Americans, but inexperience and poor equipment led to inaccuracy, and no hits were scored. Against Kearny's will, Stockton had the entire force cross the river at once. Kearny wished to set up the guns to cover the infantry during its most vulnerable time. Stockton had the guns put across first, and while the infantry labored with the baggage, Stockton himself directed counter battery fire against the Californians. His gunnery experience paid off, and soon both Californian guns were silenced. Sheltered by the fourfoot high river bank, the infantry took no casualties.

Stockton formed up on the north side of the river and sent his mounted riflemen against the Californian left flank. The Californians were driven from the hill. Since the Californians outnumbered the Americans two or three to one it could only have been because of superior firepower that the Americans won the skirmish. Stockton recalled the riflemen, probably because he did not want his only mounted contingent to become separated from the main force and overwhelmed by the more mobile enemy (the Dragoons apparently were dismounted for this campaign, which is logical considering most of their mounts were devoured on "Mule Hill"). Seeingthe Americans retreat, Flores ordered his left wingto counterattack, but the order was confused and the left only retreated more. Flores then attacked with his right wing, but again superior American firepower beat off the attack.

Stockton then ordered an advance. The American square lumbered forward and easily took the Californian central position. Flores fell back and sent his cavalry on the right to attack the American rear but the hail of bullets from sailors and Dragoons kept the horsemen at a distance. Flores attempted a stand half a mile back but accurate American artillery fire drove the Californians back for the final time. Flores and his men retreated towards Los Angeles, stopping at Canada de los Alisos for the night. The Americans spent the night on the hill originally occupied by the Californian right wing. Each side had suffered minimal losses with only a handful killed between them.

The next morning Stockton sent out scouts, but failed to find the Californians. He resumed his march towards Los Angeles. Six miles down the road he encountered Flores with about 300 men and several cannon. Flores anchored his left on the Canada, where he placed his artillery. His line stretched out to the right, almost to the American line of march. The Americans, still in square, altered their march to the left, to increase the range. As the Americans came close enough the Californians began to fire their cannon. Stockton responded with rifle from the cannon at the forward corners of the square. The Californians stretched out their line to get in front of the Americans and Flores brought up two more guns.

For fifteen minutes the adversaries exchanged cannon fire. The result was predictable. The superior equipment and accuracy of the Americans drove the Californian artillery from the field.. Having wasted all his powder, Flores sent the rest of his force against the American left. Gallantly the cavalry charged in, but the concentrated fire of the Americans proved too much for them and they fell back. Disenheartened after repeated failures, the bulk of the Californian force left the field. Again, casualties were negligible on each side.

The war for California, except for some very minor skirmishes involving Fremont as he came south from Monterey, was over. Fremont, with some adroit political maneuvering, negotiated a fairand generous peace treaty with the Californians; something he was not empowered to do. Stockton, however, presented with a fait accompli, had no choice but to ratify the treaty. Kearny would later bring charges against Fremont for this and other acts of insubordination, for which he was found guilty. But he who laughs last, laughs the longest: Kearny died in 1848, Commodore Stockton died in 1866, and Fremont went on to become a MajorGeneral in the Civil War.

Campaign for California Mexican-American War

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