By Bob Marshall
Illustrations by Alan Archambault
The United States land forces of the period were divided into three main branches; the infantry, the dragoons, and the artillery. During the time of military conflict, the regular military establishment was augmented by volunteer forces enlisted from the various states of the union. These volunteer forces were divided also into the same three categories. US Marine DragoonsAt the start of the war with Mexico the regular U.S. Army consisted of two regiments of Dragoons, four regiments of artillery and eight regiments of infantry. Later, during the course of the war, this was expanded by two additional regiments of mounted troops (the 3rd U.S. Dragoons and the U.S. Mounted Rifles) and eight regiments of infantry. The Dragoons of the United States Army were well mounted on large horses and were well trained for the frontier duties to which their main use was confined. Lacking in the polished abilities of field cavalry employed by European powers, the U.S. Dragoons did sterling service in dealing with the Indians of the frontier. The Dragoons made the most of their limited numbers over far reaching expanses of American territory. The two regiments were spread out in small company size posts over the Western lands of the United States. The earlier statement concerning the inability of the regimental commanders to have under their direct control large portions of their troops for drilling purposes, applies also to the mounted branch of the service. Of the two regiments, the First Dragoons were probably the most efficient in the traditional role of battle cavalry. This distinction is due to the regimental commander, Stephen Watts Kearny. Kearny, who is frequently described as a martinet, realized and understood the difficulty of maintaining an effective battle cavalry force under the trying conditions that existed. Kearny always maintained four companies of troops under his direct control. The various companies were rotated through this position so that Kearny was able to insure that each of the various companies in his command had some direct contact with him. When these companies were under Kearny's command, they were drilled and taught the fundamentals of field cavalry tactics. In this way all of the companies of the First Dragoons were familiar with the role they would be expected to perform on the battlefields of Mexico. However, both regiments were tough, hardened combat troops and equally efficient in light cavalry tactics used against the Indian nations. Organizationally, the Regiments of mounted troops serving with the regular U.S. military establishment were composed of ten companies. Each company had an established strength of 50 privates per company but this number was seldom realized and was more often found to be approximately 40% below authorized strength. These companies served as administration and tactical units. Although there was no set squadron organization in the dragoon regiments, ad hoc squadrons were established as needed. The Regiment of Mounted Rifles shared the same organization as the regular dragoon regiments. However, when the Mounted Rifles landed at Vera Cruz with Scott in 1847, the majority of mounts for the unit were lost. This loss enabled only two of the ten companies to serve as mounted troops. The remaining Rifles saw service on foot. ArtilleryThe regiments of artillery saw active service during the war and is often credited with being instrumental in gaining the victory for American forces in a number of battles. Although the proportion of artillery regiments to infantry regiments appears high, the artillery troops were spread out just as thinly as were their brothers in the other branches. The four regiments of artillery were responsible for not only field artillery units, but also coastal defenses and shore batteries throughout the United States territories. The artillery regiments also consisted of ten companies per regiment. Authorized strength per company was set at 42 privates per company. Actual strength was close to two-thirds the authorized strength. Of these ten artillery companies, one per regiment was designated as horse artillery or light artillery. Called by contemporary newspapers "Flying Artillery", these companies found every member of the battery (a term used interchangeably with company) mounted. Company "K" of the First Artillery (Taylor's), Company "A of the Second Artillery (Duncan's), Company "C" of the Third Artillery (Ringgold's) and Company "D" of the Fourth Artillery (Washington's) made up these four elite companies. Ideally, officers of the entire regiment were to rotate through these companies to insure that they acquired a working knowledge of field artillery and not just coastal defense works. Later, in 1847, one additional company per regiment was authorized the distinction of light artillery. Only three such companies made that conversion. Those additional three companies were; Company "I" of the First Artillery (Magruder's), Company "E" of the Third Artillery (Bragg's) and Company "C" of the Fourth Artillery (Drum's). A distinction is made between light artillery and horse artillery. In the light artillery, the artillerymen were mounted or rode on the limber chests of the battery. In the horse artillery, all of the company personnel were mounted on horseback. Ringgold's battery is apparently the only battery given the distinction of Horse Artillery in the U.S. Army at that time. Batteries usually were made up of six guns per battery. In the light and horse batteries these guns were usually bronze smoothbore, six pounders. However, additional guns were sometimes added as they were captured or abandoned. Those of the artillery regiments that did not actually serve guns in the field were utilized as infantry. This practice was begun during earlier Indian conflicts when the artillery troops were removed from their coastal defense positions and used to augment the regular infantry. So frequently did these artillerists now serve as infantry that they became proficient in this service (although it did nothing to improve their abilities as artillery troops). The term "red legged infantry" refers to these artillery troops in infantry service. InfantryThe final branch of service is the infantry. Each of the sixteen regiments which saw service during the war with Mexico was composed of ten companies. Each company had an authorized strength of 42 privates per company at the start of the war (this authorized strength was later increased to 100 per company) but once again the actual number of troops present was far below the authorized strength. Of these ten companies, eight were designated battalion companies. American regiments only had one battalion per regiment so the terms regiment and battalion are synonymous when dealing with American military organization at this time. The remaining two companies per battalion were designated as a grenadier company and a light company. Although the designation was present, in actual practice the differences were largely ignored. There were instances, however, where various light companies were converged to perform special tasks such as at Resca de la Palma. One special regiment of the sixteen eventually authorized, was the Regiment of Voltigeurs. Authorized in 1847, this regiment was supposed to act as a highly mobile light infantry force. In fact, however, its role was little different from that of any other infantry regiment employed in the war. In total, the amount of troops allowed the U.S. regular military establishment by Congressional authorization was limited to 7 ' 883 at the start of 1846. Of this authorized strength, official army returns show that only 5,304 troops including sergeants and corporals were present throughout the country. It is interesting to note that when Zachary Taylor established his base camp at Corpus Christi at the beginning of the war with Mexico, his total force, including sick, numbered 3,593 troops. Not only did this force represent over half of all troops currently under arms in the regular U.S. Army, but this force also represented the single largest U.S. operational organization since the end of the War of 1812. To reinforce this small professional army, the U.S. government relied, as they had since the time of the American Revolution, upon the troops raised as volunteers from the various states. These troops that were called up for service by the states, enlisted for periods from six months up to the duration of the war. Initial enlistments were for a mere six month period which proved to be of little value as the volunteers seldom saw action and frequently did not even see a hostile Mexican. At the urging of certain legislators and higher ranking officers of the regular military, enlistments were extended out to be more useful lengths of time. Attempts to enlist volunteers for the duration of the conflict proved unpopular, so the more common term served was for the period of one year. Even with these relatively short periods of service, volunteers seldom reenlisted after their terms of service had expired. The majority of state volunteers believed that their obligation to their nation had been met with the conclusion of their service period. Later, as the public became disgruntled at the inability of the U.S. command to quickly end the war within a few months, enthusiasm waned. What began as a mad rush to recruitment sites by eager volunteers became a slow, uninspiring trickle of half-hearted individuals who were unsure if they wanted to undertake hardships in a war quickly becoming unpopular in nature. It is quite likely that had the war with Mexico endured for a period much longer than the two years it did actually cover, the U.S. command would have possibly been faced with the necessity of a draft to fill the needed enlistments. Despite the obvious advantage of volunteers fleshing out the field forces that the regulars were unable to fill, there existed a very intense rivalry between the regulars and volunteers. Contests of honor were sometimes engaged in on the battlefields of Mexico by various regular and volunteer units. Contemporary accounts of actions may be read that sometimes debate if an important point of assault was first reached by volunteers or regular troops. Indeed, Taylor faced some pressure from his officers who wanted to engage Mexican forces and bring about a victory before volunteer troops became attached to Taylor's Army of Occupation. The regular troops wanted to insure that any victory that they were a part of would not be given to volunteers. It does, however, appear as if at least a portion of the hostility of the volunteers towards the regulars may have been envy. John Kenly, Captain in the Washington-Baltimore Volunteers frequently cites in his memoirs of the war with Mexico admiration for the regulars and their efficiency. Kenly even goes so far as to take pride in the fact that the Washington-Baltimore Volunteers were uniformed exactly like the regular U.S. army troops and that they eventually were brigaded with regular regiments of infantry rather than volunteer units. Although it would appear that the battle tactics used by the U.S. forces in Mexico were very similar in style to Napoleonic tactics, there was apparently more flexibility in application. Scott's INFANTRY TACTICS describes meticulously various aspects of drill and maneuver in combat. Lines and attack columns were used by American forces with accompanying screens of skirmishers. And although various sources detail formations of U.S. troops in these assorted formations, it appears that the formations were more fluid in nature, similar in application to those of the American Civil War. US Army During the Mexican-American War Back to Table of Contents -- Courier Vol. IX No. 2 Back to Courier List of Issues Back to Master Magazine List © Copyright 1989 by The Courier Publishing Company. This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com |