NAPOLEONIC EDITOR'S NOTE The account of the Madrid Campaign played out in Birmingham, AL is described here as an ahistorical account using the narrative format indicative of standard histories. The campaign emphasized limited intelligence and the author felt that this approach would best give the article the feel of a real campaign. The units used, the commanders' names, and the maps and army organizations are all historical. The guys in Birmingham had the capability of fielding enough units to duplicate the campaign. French infantry on the march. Photo by Orv Hanasilk. Figures are 25mm Minifigs painted by the photographer. Most gamers will fall critically short of the required forces to duplicate a major campaign and thus must tailor a situation to the forces and scale that they can duplicate. Trip used the Empire Campaign System because it works fairly well and does not require an umpire. The use of a line of communications is a key element in this system because it ties an army to an axis of march and is the conduit of supply as well as message traffic. Spain, with its vicious guerilla war put an additional burden on the French line of communications. The ECS also provides commanders with old data on the opposition and friendly forces. For example, you may find out where your opponent was located two to five days ago. This leads to deductive and inductive reasoning exercises by both commanders as they grope about the countryside seeking or avoiding battle. Campaigns are also excellent tools for creating tactical encounters that are frequently unbalanced. These provide a range of tactical dilemmas which offer real challenges to the players. Campaign Recap The following is a recap of a Napoleonic Campaign recently played within our group. We used the Empire Campaign System (ECS) by Kip Trexel to handle the strategic aspects and 15mm figures with Empire IV by Scotty Bowden and Jim Getz to adjudicate the tactical. The following people participated in the Peninsular Campaign: Trip Alford, Ray Davis, Rick Byrd, Dennis Cook, Vince Solfronk, Dave Pruett, Bryan Patterson, Mike Pfanenstiel, Joey Miller, Wally Inman, Ken McCoy, John Bili and Greg Robitaille. The Peninsular Campaign scenario was based upon Wellington's Salamanca Campaign of 1812. An historical orderof battle was used and the units involved also started with their historical strengths. The deployment of the troops was also based upon the locations which they generally occupied around the 13th of June, 1812. Since we used the basic ECS system we did not need to use an umpire, because with ECS all movement is hidden. The map we used did not have hexes so all movement was converted to "miles per hour" and plotted with calipers. The strategical movement rates were used as the grand tactical movement rates and we therefore were able to avoid the usual conversion problems in going from the map to the table and vice versa. Supply trains were assigned to maneuver element and allocated in the manner of the ECS rules. Listed below are just a few of the scenario rules which were added in an attempt to recreate the flavor of this historical campaign: 1. The British LOC was more important than the French LOC. If severed it would trigger an automatic loss of 1% sick and 1% stragglers for the British, each day. 2. A broken French LOC would produce +1% sick and +1% stragglers only if there were already sick and stragglers generated by other factors. 3. There was a 35% chance each day that the British would discover the French headquarters locations three days earlier while the French had a 15% chance of finding out the British headquarters five days earlier. This represented information derived from the civilian population. 4. In order to have a secure line of communications (LOC) there had to be at least two castings of infantry stationed every 25 miles. The French messengers and daily dispatches, if moving on an unsecured LOC, had a 60% chance of being intercepted by guerrillas each day or portion of a day. If an escort of two castings of cavalry was sent along, the percentage dropped to 5%. The chances for interception on a secure LOC was 10% without an escort and 2% with an escort, (Believe it or not, the British intercepted 3 of these 2% chance dispatches much to the chagrin of the French.) 5. After 6 days of march or activity, without resting, a day of rest had to be taken. Failure to do so would result in a much heavier attrition rate. During this day of rest most of the troops would consume food from the supply trains, thus adding to the logistics problems. 6. After Salamanca fell, Silvera, Santocilides, Bonnet, Caffarelli and Joseph were eligible to begin moving. Bonnet had a 25% chance each day to begin moving while Caffarelli and Joseph each had a 10% chance to do likewise. Hill would enter at Miravete 10 to 14 days after Salamanca fell with a 20% chance each day. Bid for Commands Since none of our group is philanthropic in nature the cost of the campaign for maps and copying had to be paid by the players. Therefore, we decided that we would "bid" for our commands. This would serve a twofold purpose. The first was to generate the cash needed to cover our cost and the second was to tie the player more closely to his troops. The form was made up and each person presented a sealed bid with the dollar amount that he was prepared to pay for his role in the campaign. A minimum bid was established and if, at the conclusion of the campaign, there was any surplus of funds they would be put back into the kitty for the next campaign. The bids were then opened and the highest bid was awarded the command at $1.00 more than the next highest bid. We had some out of town players who opted to take "minor commands" and their bids were handled at the same time, in the same manner. Objective The object of the campaign was for the British to do better than Wellington did in his Salamanca Campaign of 1812. In order to win they had to take Salamanca, Madrid and Burgos while losing less than 25% of the British and Portuguese forces. They also had to be able to withdraw into Portugal via Ciudad Rodrigo. To draw they must take Salamanca plus Burgos or Madris with less than 35% losses while withdrawing either through Ciudad Rodrigo or Miravete. Any combination of events other than that described above would constitute a French Victory. The orders of battle for the campaign are listed in an abbreviated form below with player characters indicated by an "*": Campaign The Campaign went something like this - The Duke of Wellington crossed the Agueda in the early morning hours of the 13th of June, 1812 and headed for Salamanca. He split his force into three columns marching as follows: The left hand column, composed of Picton and De Espana, marched via Galzada de Diago. Graham and his force marched to the right via Tamames and crossed the Alagon. They by-passed the crossings of the Huebra and the Valmuza and were in a position to enter Salamanca from the South. Wellington, with the remainder of his army and the siege train, marched up the center road via San Munoz. Unbeknownst to Wellington, The Duc de Ragusa (Marmont) had come to the conclusion that he was not strong enough to fight Wellington's 50,000 men and, therefore, decided to withdraw. Marmont had but 37,000 troops in his field army without the garrisons and General Bonnet. He immediately recalled Bonnet from the Asturias and systematically stripped all his garrisons except Valladolid. The garrisons were distributed throughout his field army. He ordered all French forces to pull back behind the Cega which would put him strategically placed between Burgos and Madrid while he waited for General Bonnet's arrival. Although this position would open the way for a junction of Santocilides and his nearly 20,000 Galatians and Portuguese, Marmont felt it would put the Army of Portugal closer to both Joseph and Caffarelli, in the event they could be stirred from their positions. Additionally, it removed his army from harm's way until it could be consolidated. General Clausel, with his own division headed by Barbot, marched through Aravalo and took up a position at Cueller while General Foy marched through Segovia to Cantalejo. Clausel's last division, Linder General Ferey, marched to Aranda via Penafiel. General Thomieres' division and General Carrie's brigade of dragoons marched to Valdestillas. The Duc blew the bridges over the Valmuza River, which was approximately 10 miles south of Salamanca, and marched to Olmedo via Aravalo with General Maaucune and General Curto's 1st Brigade of light cavalry. General Brennier and Curto's 2d Brigade marched to Tuleda via Toro and Valladolid. General Sarrut also marched via Valladolid to Penefiel. By the 18th of June everyone had arrived at their positions behind the Cega and the wait for General Bonnet began. While marching on the 15th, Marmont penned several letters to Caffarelli, Soult and Joseph. The gist of all the communication was to ask for their immediate help since Wellington was on the move and his blow was being aimed at the Army of Portugal. The responses from Caffarelli and Joseph were hopeful, however, Marmont never received a reply from Soult. Direct communication between players was prohibited except when their forces or they themselves are co-located. All other communication was through dispatches. Wellington, anticipating the possible evacuation of Salamanca, was only delayed hours by the collapsed bridges across the Valmuza. He entered the city on the 17th as a conquering hero and the people lined the streets to welcome him. Perhaps it was this heady reception which finally tipped the balance in favor of a march upon Madrid. His exact thoughts are not known as he did not share his confidence with anyone. It must be remembered that the capture of Madrid the country's capitol which was in control of the French, would have sent shock waves throughout Europe. Regardless, he decided to march his entire army to Madrid via Avila after resting a day in Salamanca. Carlos de Espana was to hold Salamanca with a battalion while the rest of his division was to accompany Beresford in a march through Zamora to join with Santocilides. Wellington sent word to Santocilides to move south through Astorga and link with General Beresford. No one knew Marmont's intention about Astorga and Santocilides was therefore instructed to leave only a screening force if the French still held the fortress. Santocilides, however, had other ideas and was determined not to advance past Astorga if it was occupied. He consequently ordered Silvera to march to Benavente in an attempt to link with both himself and Beresford. Wellington, unsure of Santocilides' commitment, decided to send the siege train north but instructed them to only march as far as Zamora thereby luring the Galatian leader south. All this planning was for naught since Marmont decided to withdraw the garrison at Astorga. Wellington was toying with the idea of the combined forces of Santocilides, Silvera and Beresford, along with the British siege train, making a march to Burgos. Beresford was told to be prepared to move to Valladolid through Tordesillas after everyone concentrated around Zamora. Wellington also ordered General Hill, who was expected to arrive in Miravete around the end of June, to move to Salamanca via Banos. Hill's orders were dated on the 17th and it is quite probably that the Duke sent these orders before he had actually decided to march on Madrid. In an attempt to tie up the Army of the North, General Pomparn was dispatched with a fleet to divert Caffarelli's attention. General Caffarelli had probably intended to help the Army of Portugal but before he could send any troops General Pompam landed at Santender and all of a sudden Caffarelli had problems of his own. Being a man of his word he dispatched a brigade of cavalry numbering 720 sabers and a horse battery under General Merlin. They began marching on the 20th of June but the letter detailing their march was picked up by the guerrillas and delivered to Wellington. The situation for both sides was puzzling at best. Marmont was not aware that Merlin was marching whereas Wellington was aware of the march but didn't know the exact size of the force. This little confusion was to cause both parties some concern until the picture became clear towards the end of the month. On the 20th, the same day General Merlin marched, General Clausel was taking lunch at Tudela with the Duc. While eating, a dispatch from General Bonnet arrived stating that he had cleared Carrion and would be available at Tudela on the 22nd. Unfortunately for the French, this was the second dispatch sent by Bonnet, as the first had been intercepted. Wellington was now also aware that Bonnet was closing fast upon Marmont's position. Marmont was delighted with the news since it meant that he could now advance upon Wellington. Marching Orders At this time Marmont gave General Clausel his marching orders. He was to begin his advance on Salamanca, through Avila, on the 22nd. All his units were to march through Segovia and he was directed to probe Avila immediately. Although the Duc's orders spelled out the upcoming maneuvers very explicitly, the actions to take if Wellington had already cleared Avila were ambiguous at best. This ambiguity was to come back later and haunt the French commander. He obviously thought it a very real possibility since his orders stated, "Hill can not be up before the 4th of July and any move past Avila, towards Madrid, by Wellington would place him in a most compromising position by a march upon his rear and LOC." General Sarrut was to take the same line of march as General Barbot's Division but would be about a half day behind. General Ferey was to follow General Foy's line of march and there would be overa day's march between them. Marmont also sent a letter to Joseph advising him of his intentions and requesting that the King march immediately and effect a junction through Villacastin. Because of the importance of the communique he sent the squadron of chasseures of Treillard's division as escort. They had arrived two days before bearing a letter from Joseph for Marmont. The Duc also ordered his line of communication changed from its current location, through Valladolid, to its new line through Burgos, Aranda and Segovia. General Clausel left shortly after receiving his written instructions with his squadron from the 13th Chasseurs. Before they had covered five miles the bottom fell out and a tremendous thundershower shattered the afternoon. After a few hours the roads turned to mush and the General had to ride nearly all night in order to return to his headquarters at Cuellar. The rain continued on through the next day making a shambles of the roads and all the fords in the area were flooded. General Clausel, after getting a few hours sleep, climbed back in the saddle and went to visit his other generals to explain the upcoming maneuver. That same evening of the 20th, Marmont received a dispatch saying that General Boyer's Dragoons, on the right bank of the Adaja atArevalo, had encountered enemy cavalry. The Duc immediately ordered General Curto, who was at Olmedo, to cross the Adaja and reconnoiter the west bank. The communique was waylaid and the message was delivered instead to General D'Urban at Arevalo on the evening of the 21st. That same evening Marmont received another dispatch from General Boyer asking why the Marshal had failed to respond to his earlier dispatch. The Duc, who was already exhausted from riding around in the rain all day, saddled up and rode out with the 28th Chasseurs towards Olmedo. He planned a difficult maneuver which had General Curto driving down the west bank supported by General Carrie while General Boyer attacked across the bridges from the east bank. General Curto received the Duc and shortly thereafter left for Arevalo. At 1200 hours the attack started. Surprisingly, everything went according to plan except for D'Urban, who, realizing he was about to be trapped, left in the wee morning hours of the 22nd and the blow fell on thin air. After directing Curto, the Duc de Ragusa returned to Tudela and crawled into bed wet and exhausted. Around 1200 hours, on the 22nd, both General Thomieres and General Bonnet arrived at Tudela and the Duc was roused from a much needed nap. His two generals were also given their orders and General Thomieres left for Valdestillas immediately. General Bonnet had been moving his division at a fast pace and his troops arrived at Tudela that evening but were in dire need of rest. Accordingly, it was decided that General Thomieres would begin moving on the 23d and General Bonnet on the 24th. They were to march to Avila through Olmedo and Belayos. General Carrie had already been given his orders to move with General Curto to Avila. Curto had been given the latitude to decide which route to take to Avila and he subsequently decided to stay on the west bank. Just before dark a civilian came into camp requesting to see one of the French generals as he had some information. At first it was assumed that he was a fanatic intent upon inflicting harm upon a person of rank, but finally he convinced everyone that this was not the case. The Marshal sent his Chief of Staff and he was told that on the 17th Marshal Beresford was seen south of Zamora and Wellington was rumored to be around Alba and Salamanca. Marshal Marmont decided to wait at Tudela with General Bonnet and the 28th Chasseurs until the 24th while he tried to digest this latest piece of information. Marmont correctly assumed that Beresford was moving north to prod the Galatians into a higher level of activity. He sent a note to Generals Clausel and Bonnet outlining his thoughts to them. He feltthatthe Spanish were making a move on Burgos and probably had Carlos de Espana's Division with them along with Silvera's Portuguese. He also surmised thatthe British siege train might be making the trip north. The Duc also ordered the garrison at Valladolid to fall back to Burgos if they were approached by Beresford. Approach The next morning, the 23rd, reports came flooding into the Valladolid garrison commander that Beresford was approaching on the Media del Rio Seco road. Following orders he abandoned Valladolid and headed for Burgos after sending a dispatch to Marmont. The troops approaching Valladolid were not, in fact, from Beresford's command at all hut were instead sent by D'Urban. He recalled them and shortly thereafter they rejoined the brigade. Wellington, aware of Marmont's position on the 20th, had decided to drive a wedge between the Duc and Joseph. To do this he felt it was paramount to move quickly on Madrid forcing Joseph back to Valence. Once Joseph was removed from the picture and Madrid was captured he could turn his attention upon Marmont. Beresford was now directed to Valladolid along with the Spanish in the hope that Marmont would be diverted and might reduce his strength with detachments. The stage had now been set. Both armies were marching. Wellington to Madrid through Avila and Marmont through Avila to Salamanca. Neither general was aware of the other's immediate position or intention. On the 24th of June, Clausel was strung out on the Avila road from Villacastin to Segovia while Maucine was 10 miles north of Avila on the road to Arevalo. Marmont, with his headquarters staff, had just secured lodgings in Arevalo when he received word that the 14th Chasseurs had contacted elements of De Espana's division at Avila and that Wellington was at El Escorial on the road across the Guadarrama Mountains. All hell broke loose as the headquarters became a flurry of activity. Maps were pulled out and thrown on tables. Books were used to hold down the edges as pins were quickly thrust into the maps to designate unit positions. New orders were written redirecting two columns to descend upon Madrid. One route of march was through Villacastin and the Guadarrama pass while the other was through El Escorial on the road from Avila. Both routes had to be utilized to cross the Guadarrama Mountains since some units would already be past Segovia and Villacastin by the time the orders reached them. Marmont was beside himself since he would have to suffer a delay caused by changing everyone's line of march from Avila to Madrid. Even though the Duc was distressed he took solace in the fact that the veil had now been torn and Wellington's objectives were clear. General Maucune had already passed through Blasco Sanchoand Belayos and was told to continue on to Avila and bag the garrison there. The 28th Chasseurs and the headquarters squadron of gendarmes were directed to move to Talavera and sever any communication between Hill and Wellington. They were also to maintain a close watch for Hill so that any attempt by him to link with Wellington could be thwarted. General Clausel's cavalry was directed to move immediately to El Escorial in the hopes that they would pick up the rear of the English column. General Clausel also received the information from the chasseurs about Wellington and without a clear definition of Marmont's intention marched around the mountains placing himself between Avila and Espinar. Generals Thomieres and Bonnet were redirected to march through Villacastin as were Generals Ferey and Sarrut. Each column was supported with cavalry, however, the march soon slowed to a snail's pace as the troops started over the Guadarrama pass. Bridge Crossing On the morning of the 25th Generals Curto and Carrie arrived at the bridge at Avila and finding Spanish troops on guard decided to force the issue. They drove the Spanish troops back into the city and barely missed capturing a British officer who was attempting to cross at the same time. The officer crossed and fled up the road towards El Escorial. The French cavalry pursued him for a few hours before giving up the chase. They had better luck the next day as they captured a dispatch rider from Lisbon on the 26th. Wellington meanwhile, had received no additional information about Marmont's position and still assumed that he was at Tudela. On the 24th he attempted to cross the bridge outside Las Rosas. King Joseph, however, was forewarned and gathering his forces around him marched out to do battle. General Stapleton-Cotton was leading the British column with Anson's brigade. They drove Treillard's 1st Dragoon Brigade off the bridge and then foolishly followed up. Once across the bridge they saw the entire French cavalry division of Treillard charging down upon them. The engagement was quick and decisive for within 15 minutes Anson and Stapleton-Cotton were riding back across the bridge. The action was a disaster of the first order with only 240 men of the 960 that crossed, returning. Nearly 250 men were put "hors de combat" and almost 500 were taken prisoner. Three guns were captured and half the battery was butchered when it was overturned. Wellington reeled in Stapleton Cotton and decided to wait until the next morning to force a crossing when he could bring up the infantry. Although there was cause for celebration in the French camp that evening it would be the last cause for celebration by Joseph's troops for several days to come. This action played out on the table and the British player was over confident and forced an ill-advised bridge crossing fully expecting the French to flee before them. This little action could have been abstracted but by playing it, the tactical skills of the various commanders came into play. These types of actions make for nice afternoon games and are a major reason to consider a campaign. A brief cannonade erupted the next morning but Joseph, realizing that he was facing the entire British Army, withdrew. He sent a dispatch to Marmont at Avila advising him of the current situation and ordering the Duc to immediately march upon Madrid. Joseph then pulled his forces back to Aravaca and blew the bridge. He then sent his engineers to the main bridge southwest of Madrid and repeated the procedure. Feeling relatively safe, Joseph moved his Army south of Madrid and waited to see what the British commander would do next. Wellington dispatched Stapleton- Cotton to El Pardo to see if that bridge was still standing. Much to everyone's surprise it was found intact and the British Army moved forward after blowing the bridge behind them at Las Rosas. They began crossing the Mauzanares River in the early evening. An interesting story developed on this oversight by Joseph. Earlier, engineers had been dispatched to blow this bridge, however, they were disrupted by guerrilla activity and the bridge was not blown. A dispatch was sent to the King but it was not delivered and he therefore assumed the bridge had been dropped. Some events were programmed into the campaign while others were executed by a die roll. That was the case with this engineer action. These sorts of events add a great deal to the campaign because events are often beyond the control of the players. it is difficult to pull surprises on the players "without letting the cat out of the bag". Wellington spent the evening of the 26th on the east bank of the Mauzanares River surrounded by his army and the smell of victory was upon him. He sent a letter to Hill and told him of his situation and redirected Hill's force to Avila from Salamanca. The Duke anticipated a junction with Hill somewhere in the triangle of Avila, Madrid and Segovia. Hill received this dispatch just before reaching Banos and veered to his right towards Bejar. Joseph had not sent any patrols as far north as El Pardo. He was, therefore, completely surprised when at 1000 hours on the 27th he received a report from the Guadalajara Hussars, stationed north of Madrid, stating that approximately eight British divisions were marching on the Capitol. He immediately dispatched Treillard to slow up the advance while he hastily marched to the Jarama River bridge on the road to Arganda. Since Joseph was outnumbered by over three to one there were not rash thoughts of fighting, only those of escape. Fortunately for Joseph, his forces were south of Madrid and closer to the bridge than the British. Wellington, realizing that Joseph was present at Madrid and would probably bolt for Arganda, ordered Graham to the bridge while he moved into Madrid with the rest of the army. Graham marched him columns as fast as possible but Joseph had too much of a head start. Joseph subsequently was able to extract his entire force but lost nearly all of his trains. Graham tried to force the bridge late in the day with the 42nd Highlanders and this unit was decimated by the guns which Joseph had ordered collected on the east bank. The next morning Stapleton-Cottor led Marchant's brigade across the bridge in a second attempt to force the issue but was repulsed by Treillard's dragoons led by Joseph himself. During the fracas as the bridge Joseph took a sabre thrust in his leg and was almost captured when he fell from his horse. Only the quick thinking of his chief of staff, Marshal Jordan, saved the King this embarrassment. He rode in front of the Hussars of the Guard and while drawing his sword shouted, "To the King!". Their spirited charge drove off the final remnants of the British attack and thus was the King of Spain saved. Joseph's participation in this charge was critical to its success, the small advantage that he added to the skirmish was more than the margin of victory. His wounds were also generated per the Empire IV rules. Madrid Entered Meanwhile, Wellington entered Madrid at the head of his victorious army. The capitol of Spain had a fortress, however, much of it had been dismantled and it was not considered a strong position. Prior to launching an assault on the fortress, Wellington asked the garrison to surrender. The garrison commander acquiesced providing the forces nearly 2500 men, and was allowed to withdraw with Joseph. After several hours of negotiation Wellington agreed and the garrison walked out. Wellington has been criticized for this maneuver, however, it must be taken into consideration that his army was low on food, his line of communication had been cut at Avila and Marmont's current position was unknown. An unbeaten French Army located within the vicinity probably had as much to do with his decision as anything. If there was anything for which Wellington could be censured it would have to be the execution of his timely maneuver over the Mauzanares River at El Pardo. Had Wellington moved Graham towards the Jarama River bridge immediately, instead of marching directly on Madrid, the outcome of the action, and possibly the campaign, might have been different. His impatience and lack of foresight got him Joseph's supplies but lost him the Army of the Center. Joseph continued to withdraw support from the bridge until StapletonCotton was finally able to force a crossing. He pursued for only a few hours before deciding that Joseph must be scurrying to Valence and any further advance on his part would only serve to draw him further away from the main army at Madrid. He, therefore, recrossed the Jarama and Clinton blew the bridge. After breaking contact with Joseph, Graham moved back to Madrid and replenished his supplies before continuing on to El Pardo. Wellington, on the other hand, had filled all the captured trains with supplies and sent them north to Burgos through Buitrago escorted by Pack's Portuguese. He then marched to El Pardo and waited on Graham. On the morning of the 30th Wellington threw out a heavy screen on the west bank of the Mauzanares River and began crossing his army. He also sent strong patrols south to check for any activity from Marmont. Shortly after noon, Wellington was surprised when his patrols returned in haste and his screen was driven in. Upon crossing the Mauzanares, Wellington had deployed his force facing south. Although he was not overly concerned it was a little unsettling to see seven French cavalry regiments deployed to his front. Wellington had been corntemplating a move to Segovia but did not feel comfortable with the advance until he had secured his left. The strong French cavalry force indicated that Marmont was moving up from the south and the possibility of a battle began to take shape. Wellington ordered Generals Cole, Parkenham and Alten forward supported by Stapleton-Cotton on their right. The French cavalry fell back to Aravaca and Wellington returned to his original position, about a mile south of El Pardo, before dusk. That evening Wellington penned a letter to Lord Bathurst clearly spelling out his decision to offer battle to Marmont the next day. "Since Marmont has cut my line of communication and now lies between me and Portugal I have decided to give battle. I seriously doubt that Marmont will fall back based upon the aggressive cavalry action I witnessed today. Although, I would prefer for him to come to me, I must advance since I do not particularly care for the position I currently hold. My back is to the Guadarrama Mountains and if my left were turned, and El Pardo was lost, the army would beat risk. To refuse battle, after taking Madrid and narrowly missing Joseph, would not bode well for the morale of the army. I must give battle, if not here, then somewhere else. I shall not be able to maneuver Marmont to a position where I can link comfortably with Hill. StapIeton- Cotton's failure to maintain contact with Joseph is perplexing at best and Joseph may even now be returning!" Meanwhile back on the 28th General Merlin joined General Boyer at Navalcarnero. Although Marmont was disappointed that Caffarelli had not sent more troops, he was happy to get any additional cavalry which helped to bolster his weakest arm. The Duc posted strong patrols in the area surrounding Navalcarnero an Mostales. During the waning hours of daylight on the 29th Marshal Jourdan arrived with an escort at Navalcarnero. The Duc de Ragusa at last learned the details of Wellington's capture of Madrid and pursuit of the King. It appears that upon breaking contact with Graham the King, now confined to a carriage because of his wound, decided to send Marshal Jourclan with Treillard's dragoons and the divisions of Darmagnac and Polombini to support Marmont. Joseph was going to fall back towards Valence with his guard and the reformed division of Hugo. With outtrains his journey was expected to be the more arduous of the two. Based upon Marmont's dispatch of the 20th Joseph knew that the head of the Army of Portugal would arrive in Avila by the evening of the 25th. He had also advised Marmont of Wellington's advance and ordered the Duc to immediately march upon Madrid. The only way Marmont would be able to advance upon Madrid, since he was so far west, would be over the Guadarrama Mountains. Once he passed the mountains he would have to cross the Guadarrama River at either Las Rosas or Navalcarnero. Jourdan was ordered to march via Aranjuezand to cross the Guadarrama below Navalcarnero in an attempt to link up with Marmont. Jourclan was instructed to move the cavalry quickly and not wait around for the infantry. When Jourdan arrived at Navalcarnero his dragoons were located a few miles south and were severely fatigued. Darmagnac and Polombini were only just arriving at Aranjuez but they were probably in better shape. Jourdan ordered his dragoons to rest the 30th and he rode on to Mostoles with Marmont and the headquarters staff. On the morning of the 30th Marmont expanded the patrol area on the right bank of the Guadarrama while backing them up with Boyer's division of dragoons. Marmont was growing somewhat concerned about his failure to contact the British around Madrid or at Talavera. The concern that he felt was short lived, however, since as soon as Curto's patrols started advancing they contacted a heavy concentration of British and Portuguese cavalry covering the area between the Guadarrama and the Mauzanares. Marmont was advised of this situation just before 1000 hours and immediately ordered his army to begin crossing to the right bank of the Guadarrama. General Clausel, who had one brigade already deployed on the right bank, wasto move on to Aravaca. General Barbot's division was the first to begin moving and his second brigade crossed at 1300 hours quickly followed by Foy and Ferey. The Duc's troops, who were to occupy the center, crossed next with the divisions of Maucune and Brennier. General Bonnet's divisions were to take up the position of the left and Thomieres began crossing after the divisions of the Duc. General Sarrut, who was located about 5 miles south of Navalcarnero, would cross the river between Thomieres and Gauthier. General Gauthier's division, due to his late start, was at the very tail end of the column and was the last infantry division to cross. The trains followed the infantry and moved well into the evening. Generals Boyer and Curto had been ordered to probe aggressively and find the British infantry but not to become entangled with them. Marmont now advised them of his maneuvers and ordered them to press home if the infantry could be taken with little risk otherwise they were to give ground while making every attempt to hold the bridge to Madrid at Arvaca. Marshal Jourdan sent an order to Darniagnac and Polonibini to march north through Valdemoro rather than along the same route the cavalry had taken. He also ordered his cavalry to he prepared to move out at daylight the next morning and march to Majalahonda. That evening a dispatch rider from the 28th Chasseurs arrived giving the details of the action at Talaveraon the 29th. General Morillo had taken Lip a position during the morning overlooking the city. Colonel Gerard of the 28th Chasseurs moved out to attack and drove in the Spanish cavalry. They continued to drive the Spanish cavalry before them and by day's end had taken up a position approximately 8 miles west of Talavera. Casualties for the Imperial forces had been light but riot so for Morillo or his cavalry. The General had been Wounded earlier in the afternoon hut continued to lead his regiments forward. His second Wound of the day was much more serious and he died during the night. There was no contact, however, with the rest of Hill's force. The Duc ordered Colonel Gerard to fall back to Talavera. If he failed to contact any additional troops of Hill by the 1st of July he was to rejoin the Army of Portugal. When news reached Hill of the contact at Talavera he stopped and deployed his force. Hill was totally in the dark as to Marmont's position and he viewed the strong cavalry action as a prerequisite for an assault directed at him. Although the deployment delayed his march fora time it was not too costly since the messenger arrived shortly thereafter from Wellington redirecting his move to Avila. Decision Point At this point the campaign has reached the point of the decisive battle and action is moved to the table. Often, as in real history, campaigns degenerate into a series of small indecisive battles with no real winner. In this case the players were fortunate that Marmont cut the British line of communications and that Wellington was aggressive enough to attack. Had he remembered his objectives he could have withdrawn or sidestepped the French. Marmont had drawn up his forces pretty much based upon the lines of march taken. Foy was redirected, in route, too occupy Arvaca and Barhot's division was shifted to Foy's left. Ferey was not moved into the front line hut took up a position in reserve at Hacienda Hernandez. Clausel's cavalry was placed 500 yards to the rear of the gap left between Foy and Barbot. Maucune continued his advance and now wound up on Barbot's left. Thornieres came in along side of Maucune and all the infantry of the first line was in place. Both Curto and Carrie were positioned on the extreme left with Carrie tucked in behind the infantry. Behind the crest of the Majalahonda heights in the second line were, from left to right, Boyer's dragoons, Sarrut and Merlin's light cavalry. In the third line behind Boyer was Gauthier and to his right was Jourdan and Brennier. Only Brennier was there initially as Gauthier and Jourdan did not arrive until around 1300 hours. In a conversation between General Clausel and the Duc on the 20th at Tudela, the general asked about the Duc's plans for a battle with Wellington. The Duc had replied, "I will endeavor to place myself in a strategical position wherein Wellington must attack. If this can be accomplished I think we have an excellent chance forvictory." Perhaps this is why Marmont only placed four divisions in the first line, albeit they were his strongest. General Maucune, in his memoirs, said that the Duc joined him shortly after noon and said "Wellington appears to be intent upon overwhelming us in an all out attack. If he is unsuccessful I will immediately swing the entire weight of my reserves upon his right and drive him from this place." Wellington's plan was in fact to smash Marmont's four divisions with strong cavalry support on his right. The French cavalry was good but Wellington had extreme confidence in Stapleton-Cotton and felt that his horsemen had the upper hand. Although he was still concerned about Joseph, he felt that an immediate attack would probably preclude any intervention by that force. As the British columns came into sight Marmont continued to allow his troops to rest in place. And so it was that around 1300 hours the Imperial forces in the frontlines stood toand shortly thereafter the British engaged the French. The British cavalry started the action by attacking the French left. Marchant and Anson drove Curto from the field and then turned upon Carrie and his dragoons. The green clad dragoons counterattacked and after successfully driving off the British 3rd Dragoons they were themselves routed by the 5th Dragoon Guards. Wellington, who had joined Leith's division, was delighted to see the French cavalry fleeing the field but unfortunately for him the feeling was short lived. Stapleton-Cotton had given orders to his brigades to attack the French cavalry and the British horsemen impetuously continued their pursuit. Anson and Alten's brigades continued up the Majalahonda heights while Marchant, still tied up with Thomieres, stopped and reformed. Bock's KGL heavy dragoons now added their weight to the attack on Thomieres' division by charging into their midst. They were repuIsed after a devastating volley by the hastily formed squares of the 23d ligne, which emptied many saddles. General Marchant, seeing Bock's difficulty, returned to the fray only to see the rest of his brigade broken by the squares and supporting artillery fire. Thomieres, even though Marchant had been driven off, was still being hammered by a brigade from Leith, Hope's entire division and Bock's dragoons. The situation appeared critical and both Bonnet and Thornieres joined the eagles of the 1st and 101st lignes respectively. Facing these odds the Imperial troops started receiving casualties at an alarming rate. Their tenacity, however, was beyond belief as they continued to inflict heavy losses on the British. Stapleton-Cotton withdrew Bock, as his cavalry was having little or no effect on the solid French squares, and Hope rushed forward to attack the infantry before they could reform. Collins' Portuguese brigade led the assault and swept towards the 101st ligne which was constantly being steadied personally by Thomieres. The French fire was murderous and then the 4 lb battery opened up with canister into the moving mass at under a hundred yards. The Portuguese brigade stopped, then recoiled and finally threw down their weapons and fled. The Brunswickers were the next to go and before long almost the entire division was in shambles, Hope, riding across to rally the Portuguese, was hit by a cannon ball and killed instantly. Marmont, who had joined Maucune, saw the pursuit of the British cavalry up the Majalahoncla heights and immediately set out for his headquarters located on the opposite side of the elevation. He arrived there around 1500 hours and saw that Boyer had only one regiment of dragoons left and it appeared as if Boyer's artillery had been overturned. The British cavalry was reforming and from his position Marmont could see Hope's division falter and then recoil. Feeling that the time had come, Marmont ordered Merlin, Sarrut Jourdan and Bonnet to attack on the left flank. Brennier was ordered to attack through the area between Thomieres' right and Maucune's left. Clausel was ordered to attack on the right with his divisions and drive all before him. Having issued orders to everyone Marmont joined Sarrut as they moved out on the left towards Majalahonda. Meanwhile, Wellington also saw Hope's division recoil and moments later learned that their valiant leader had been killed. Pushing his personal feelings aside, he ordered Clinton to move from his position on the left to attack Majalahonda on the right. Graham withdrew Hope's shaken division and sent in Campbell against Thomieres. Thomieres, who was still reeling from the lashing he had taken, was unable to make any advance and requested reinforcements. The battle around Majalahonda became chaotic as Sarrut unlimbered his artillery and sent enfilading fire into Aften's cavalry on the ridge. Merlin poured forth fire from his horse battery and then charged. Since they were caught with Imperial forces to the front, as well as both flanks, Anson'sand Aften's brigades broke. General Anson was killed from a well-placed artillery shot while trying to stem the tide. Below the Majalahonda heights General Thomieres could see the British light cavalry fleeing back through his division trying to regain their own lines but he could take little joy as he was being severely pressed by Campbell. The inevitable finally happened. The French troops wavered and then started to break up as the men tried to escape the blistering British fire. Thomieres had just ordered his troops to start giving ground to Campbell when he was killed from a volley of the foot guards which swept the 101st ligne. General Bonnet, still with the 1st ligne, ordered Thomieres' division to break off and fall back behind Majalahonda. He also ordered his own division under General Gauthier to advance and cover Thomieres' retreat. In the center of the field General Picton grew impatient, as was his nature, and led forward Wallace's brigade in an attempt to rupture the French lines at the junction of Maucune's and Barbot's divisions. He drove the 66th ligne from the field and moved towards the rest of Arnaud's brigade while Clausel's 12 pounder was redirected to intercept the advancing British columns. As the battery came into play Picton's advance ground to a halt and Picton himself was carried away by a cannon ball which also killed one of his aides. General Alten, with the Light Division, saw Picton's plight and ordered Bandeleur's brigade forward. Bandeleur led his men into the withering fire and was wounded when his horse was killed under him. Moments later, while leading the 95th on foot, he was mortally wounded when a discharge of canister from Maucune's 12 pounder raked the regiment. The Light Division's attack also ground to a halt as the 52nd light infantry fled the field. At this point the French reserves began cresting the Majalahonda heights. Wellington, from his position with Clinton, saw the blue columns descend upon the valley and realized the battle was lost. He ordered all forces to begin an immediate retreat to El Pardo. Hoping to slow the French advance he told Clinton to continue on and attack Majalahonda while the Duke rode to Hacienda Juarez and tried to establish a rearguard from the various elements of Stapleton-Cotton and Hope. Marshal Jourdan and General Treillard swung wide of Majalahonda while General Boyer swept through D'Urban's Portuguese forcing several battalions in Clinton's division to form square. Although Boyer was unsuccessful in charging the infantry, he was able to withdraw unmolested and joined in the pursuit a few hours later. General Hinde joined the square of the 1/32nd and repulsed first a charge by Boyer's dragoons and then four subsequent charges of the 2nd leger before finally being plowed under by General Sarrut leading the 36th ligne. General Hinde was killed instantly when a musket ball pierced his chest. This maneuver finally succeeded in turning Clinton's flank and he was driven from the field. While the British right was being turned General Bonnet withdrew Thomiere's shattered division as Gauthier advanced. On his right General Brennier, who moved a little quicker, advanced into Campbell and cut off the foot guards who were then charged by Merlin's chasseurs. The volley leveled from the guards broke up the charge and Marmont ordered Merlin to break off lest additional unnecessary damage be inflicted upon this overly aggressive general. Graham began withdrawing Campbell's division upon receiving orders from Wellington but the foot guards were too far forward. Gauthier's division advanced upon the guards and to their credit the British elite force closed ranks and stood their ground. General Bonnet, however, was not impressed as he had watched his companion, General Thomieres, die a few short hours ago and he directed Gauthier to quicken the pace. The guards were systematically surrounded and destroyed by Gauthier's division but they brought Wellington an hour which allowed him to break contact with the French infantry. In the center General Maucune was beginning to waver but took fresh heart with the arrival of Brennier. In one massive and powerful stroke Alten and Leith were thrown back. Leith was able to take up a new position east of Hacienda Juarez with the 1/43rd, the only regiment left of Aften's division. General Clausel, at Aravaca, ordered Ferey into the position previously occupied by his cavalry. Parkenham's division was barely hanging on and the fresh troops inserted into the line completed his destruction. Within minutes J. Campbell's brigade was driven from the field and their valiant general lay dead. The remainder of the division began falling back upon Villa Rica and the British line was now totally ruptured. Foy also received attack orders and advanced upon Cole. Menne's brigade, as part of Ferey's division, was advancing next to Foy and contacted Cole's extreme right. Cole was probably the least damaged division of the British army at this time but he was forced to commit his reserves to meet this new threat and Foy turned his left. The situation on the right was totally hopeless as both divisions were driven back to Villa Rica. It was now 1800 hours and Wellington's forces were in shambles. Only the infantry of Hope, Leith and part of Campbell still remained with their colors. Bock and a few hundred of Marchant's men tried to harass the French pursuit but the march to the bridge was a continuation of the nightmare. Wellington ordered his supply trains, which were in El Pardo, to begin moving north and he ordered the bridge held until the remnants of his army could cross. The French pursuit was tenacious and even after darkness fell they continued pushing towards the bridge across the Mauzanares. Marmont knew that he must gain the bridge at El Pardo or contact would be broken and the victory left unfinished. General Clausel was working on the bridge at Aravaca and its repair would be completed by morning. The 3/65th and a company of engineers with supplies had been dispatched around 1500 to repair the bridge at Los Rosas. The bridge repair was important, however, if he could not take the bridge at El Pardo, Wellington would escape. Wellington tried to hold the bridge long enough for it to be mined but General Boyer cleared the bridge of engineers and the French infantry moved up to support his effort. Wellington left Bock and the horse batteries but was unable to stop the French crossing the next morning. The French pursued aggressively to Buitrago but the bridge was dropped in front of them, finally stopping the pursuit. The battle of Madrid was costly for Wellington. His losses from the battle and subsequent retreat exceeded 26,000 men. He also lost Generals Picton, Anson, Hope, J. Campbell, Bandeleur and Hinde. Generals Aften, Barnard, Wallace and Ellis were wounded. Marmont on the other hand Suffered losses of only 7,000 men and General Thomieres. After a few weeks, 4,000 of these troops rejoined their eagles. Wellington was in no position, even with the addition of Hill and Santocilides, to risk a battle with Marmont. Wellington, therefore, ordered Hill to move immediately to Valladolid and link with Beresford who was at Tordesillas. The British army was going to march over the Guadarrama Mountains at the Somosiarre Pass and then march through Cantalejo and Tudela. Wellington had decided that the only route of retreat that lay open to him now would be through Valladolid and Astorga. Marmont continued his pursuit but was unable to inflict any further damage upon Wellington. On the 22nd of July 1812, Wellington passed through Astorga and it was the beginning of the end for the British involvement in the Peninsula. Campaign End The campaign ended at this point with the French claiming a clear victory. The British and Portuguese losses were 38.8% of their entire force and they were unable to withdraw either through Ciudad Rodrigo or Miravete. NAPOLEONIC EDITOR'S CLOSING COMMENT Wellington's failure to locate or anticipate the French intentions contributed directly to the British defeat at Madrid. This occurred despite the clear intelligence advantages he possessed. The French, for their part, benefitted from a clear understanding of the British player's victory conditions which made the deductions on British intentions much easier. This is difficult to overcome in the duplication of an historical campaign. I recommend that both sides have a series of possible victory conditions, objectives and orders. One set of these could be assigned per side. In this campaign the French were remarkably free from Imperial "guidance". Care must also be taken to ensure that the mechanics of the campaign do not cloud the play. This system seemed to do that. The campaign system should be limited to those factors with which commander would normally contend for the period played. These factors include the condition of the LOC, disposition of major units, and conditions of his forces. I recommend that those interested in a campaign consider the use of an umpire who can play a minor tactical command or play the role of an absent player in tactical situations. In any case, an extended campaign is more realistic than "balanced" tournament style play. Campaigning in the Peninsula The Campaign Order of Battle Jumbo Maps (monstrously slow: 1.37MB) Back to Table of Contents -- Courier Vol. IX No. 2 Back to Courier List of Issues Back to Master Magazine List © Copyright 1989 by The Courier Publishing Company. This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com