I suppose it must come to every military historian fortunate enough to make some sort of mark in his subject, but it does tend to make one feel a trifle old. To find even a contentious part of one's work dubbed (I quote Mr. Charles L. Steenrod's article in Vol. VII, No. 1 of THE COURIER) "The, by now, classic account of the Napoleonic use of combined arms... by David Chandler" is in a sense flattering. Lateron in the same article to find reference to "the Chandlerian tactic" of such-and-such makes me feel as old as Methuselah, relegated to the sidelines of History in Valhalla alongside such illustrious company asJomini and Clausewitz. Ah, well; no matter. It will be, after all, 20 years this October since The Campaigns of Napoleon was first published - and I never envisaged it having so long and prosperous a run. And if it is still having the effect of making readers think and analyse for themselves, then I am indeed well satisfied.
However, I feel there are certain flaws in Mr. Steenrod's arguments. I unfortunately do not have the time to take them apart (where they so deserve) line by line, but I will try to indicate my main points of variance with my critic.
First, I agree with the Editor that his analysis is overconcentrated on a single battle - namely Waterloo. Every battlefield contains unique features, and the small area which saw so much fighting on June 18,1815, cannot be regarded as typical. Take Austerlitz, for example: approximately the same number of French present but deployed over seven miles of battlefront (compared to barely the three miles of the Mont St. Jean position's front, which eventually grew to five miles when the Planchenoit "dog-leg" was added). Disregarding the extension, that meant an average density of 24,000 French troops per mile. including the extension, the figure becomes 14,500 per mile. At Austerlitz - a position of Napoleon's choosing (whereas Mont St. Jean was not) - the French average was only 10,400 to the mile. Only Borodino and Lutzen have greater densities of French troops present than was the case at Waterloo. On most major battlefields, therefore, there was considerably more room for cavalry manoeuvre around the infantrv formations.
However, I still believe that Mr. Steenrod misunderstands the nature of Waterloo in respect of inter-arm tactics. British and French infantry were more accustomed to having their own light cavalry working around and through them than he seems to imagine. Regiments were accustomed to swinging their flank companies to the rear to permit mounted troops to pass through--whether advancing or retiring. To this day the movement is carried out on Horseguards Parade in London on the Sovereign's Official Birthday to allow the Queen and her mounted entourage to enter from the Mall! In case of cavalry defeat, of course, the process would be to form square before the (presumably) pursuing enemy horsemen could come to grips - allowing even more room for the horsemen to pass through.
Forgetting the employment of the Heavy and Union Brigadeson June 18, the study of Wellington's and Uxbridge's use of their Light Cavalry Brigades to the West of the Brussels-Charleroi highroad is instructive. These charged, withdrew and reformed several times during the afternoon battle, particularly as each successive wave of Ney's attacks began to withdraw. Clearly the Allied Light Cavalry had room to do so. One other point Mr. Steenrod overlooks: the French cavalry were time and again in physical possession of the British and Allied batteries atop the ridge, pace Mercer's celebrated claim that well-handled guns could keep their frontage clear by their own fire alone. Furthermore, the French seem to have made no attempt to spike these guns whilst in their temporary possession.
British Light Cavalry officers' ceremonial dress to this day includes, on the crossbelt, two (today silver) spikes on light chains originally worn on service dress as well for this purpose, and the same is true of certain French cavalry officers of chasseurs and dragoons. However, the fact that they were not supported by closely-following infantry for reasons Mr. Steenrod discusses would seem to have discouraged French officers from dismounting to carry out this function -- to their disadvantage of course as they eventually fell back with the remanned cannon firing into their backs.
I suspect that the author of the interesting article is examining matters too much from the point of view of a war-gamer. He pays little attention to the effects of terrain. And who says "retreating cavalry" would not behave "as an ordered unit"? I sense rather inelastic "morale" rules there. But yes, I agree with him that the art of judging the timings correctly WAS difficult, but seasoned infantry -- and even second-line troops -- paid great attention to it. To this day, British drill-sergeants carry pace-sticks on parade-grounds to ensure the length of stride is just right -- vitally important in 1815 if these evolutions were to be correctly performed. A good fictional account of the British infantry system is to be found in C.S. Forester's Mr. Midshipman Hornblower, the story called "The Frogs and the Lobsters".
Lastly I would stress that in the passage Mr. Steenrod objects to I was concerned to give a generalised description of a non-historical operation of war. Furthermore, I was careful to add the phrase "providing all went well". God knows it seldom did, or does, in actual battle where Clausewitz's "friction" comes into play on every occasion. However, I feel that the British Army's habit (under Wellington) of using reverse slope positions was considerably at variance with Russian, Austrian or Prussian practice. Remember Blucher's remark at Ligny: "My troops are accustomed to fight where they can see the enemy!" But, as the visiting and hint dropping Wellington noted: "... they seemed to think they knew best, so I came away very shortly. it all turned out exactly as I had feared."
So, Mr. Steenrod, I suggest you study Salamanca, Albuera and Fuentes de Onoro before you claim that my view of Wellington's tactics "... doesn't appear to have ever been given a chance to occur." Rubbish! You will find yourself in deeper (and probably hotter) water than you anticipate. Above all you should appreciate that armies of the period had three categories of cavalry - heavy, medium and light - each with its appointed roles before, during and after set-piece combat. Neither Clausewitz nor Jomini had any experience -- save as staff officers -- of cavalry fighting, or not much. I refer you to Denison's (19th Century) and Lord Angelsey's (more recent) writings on the arme blanche.
All good clean fun. "History," Professor Geyl remarked, "is an argument without end." And long may it so remain.
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