ED NOTE: Last issue we looked at how cavalry fought cavalry. The
following examines some of the difficulties generals faced when they tried to
coordinate their three arms: cavalry, infantry, and artillery.
Two points: many of the author's opinions seem based on tactical occurrences at Waterloo. Waterloo was an exceptional battle in may ways. It was an extremely cramped battlefield with very limited opportunities for maneuver. Drawing tactical conclusions from Waterloo is a dicey proposition.
Second, Mr. Steenrod believes that cavalry and infantry experienced great difficulty when one tried to pass through the other. I'm not so sure. A soldier in the British 3rd Division at Salamanca reports that when a regiment of light dragoons hadto retreat before charging French cavalry, the 28th Regiment merely opened ranks, let the cavalry pass, formed line again, and repulsed the cavalry with musket volleys.
Regardless, Mr. Steenrod's provocative, thoughtful article focuses attention on an interesting tactical issue. I hope it stimulates some additional comments from our readers.
The, by now, classic account of the Napoleonic use of combined arms is presented by David Chandler in his Campaigns of Napoleon (p. 363-364): after a preliminary bombardment there would be a "... series of heavy cavalry and infantry attacks. The secret of these was careful timing and coordination. The first cavalry charges were designed to defeat the hostile cavalry and compel the enemy infantry to form squares rather than achieve an immediate breakthrough. This task was left to the hurrying infantry columns, which unde rideal circumstances would have moved up to close range before the horsemen fell back, and before, therefore, the enemy could resume his linear formation. Clearly, a unit drawn up in square or rectangular formation could only produce a greatly reduced output of fire in any one direction and this diminution of firepower enabled the French columns to get to close grips without suffering phenomena[ casualties -providing all went well. if the attack succeeded, the newly deployed French infantry would blaze a gap through the enemy lines; their accompanying batteries of horse artillery would unlimber and go straight into action at point blank range, and finally the French cavalry, after reforming, would sweep forward again to exploit the breakthrough."
The "secret" of timing was, evidently, in having the infantry columns get close enough (presumably within musket range of the enemy) before the cavalry fell back and "... before, therefore, the enemy could resume his linar "formation", thereby preventing the enemy from inflicting severe casualties on the infantry columns.
Unclear
But it is not clear from this account how the French obtained any immediate advantage from this situation. If the column deployed before their cavalry retired, they ran the risk of their own cavalry breaking the formation. And if the cavalry managed to "retire to the wings" of the line, it would certainly take an agonizing period of time for the line's front to be cleared of the now-disordered friendly cavalry, a period during which the opposing square could itself deploy. (There was a "company doubling" system that was used to allow for the passage of a unit through a line, but this rather delicate operation would also have consumed quite a bit of time, retreating cavalry not behaving as an ordered unit.) if the column remained undeployed and waited for the cavalry to retire, the cavalry would clear the front of the opposing infantry square before that of their own infantry, so that the French columns would have to wait longer before deploying into line than the enemy squares.
Since the time taken to deploy from square to line and from column to line was considered to be about the same, the infantry in square could effect their deployment before the French infantry. The French infantry are in effect being charged (past) by their own cavalry, and afterwards they would find themselves having to deploy under the fire of the now deployed enemy infantry, something that Chandler specifically states they did not want to do (p. 349-350), and when, by misadventure, a column was caught undeployed, disaster resulted as in the case of the attack of the Middle Guard at Waterloo. How did this system work then, even with "careful timing"?
Chandler in considering the countermoves to this system, discusses Wellington's relative success compared with his Prussian, Austrian or Russian allies. A reverse slope would be used to shield his troops from the preliminary bombardment. His artillery would fire on the attacking cavalry and then the artillerymen would seek shelter in the squares. (it is curious that Chandler chooses as his paradigm of Wellington's countermove to the French system, the single occurence at Waterloo of having the artillerymen retire into squares, it never having been done in the Peninsula and this one occurence at Waterloo was when the French system of combined arms was supposedly misapplied.) The French cavalry would "swirl vainly" around the squares, finally falling back and "...the British infantry would hastily reform their line and prepare to meet the advancing infantry..."
Here it is unclear how this countermeasure differs from the Austrian, Russian or Prussian system - wouldn't all infantry attempt to deploy from square when confronted by infantry? This deployment then occurred "...while the British cavalry harried the retiring horsemen." But when the British cavalry were in turn forced to retire, how did they get through the deployed British line without disordering it or at least severely hampering it, as with the retirement to the wings or the company-doubling system?
Chandler continues: "Clinging onto the head of the advancing French columns, British Light Infantry in extended order would fight a slow withdrawal, trying to gain time for their red coated comrades to complete their evolutions." Where did this Light Infantry come from? Wouldn't the Light Infantry have been swept back with the first French cavalry charges? And if they did manage to emerge after the French cavalry withdrew, they would still have to wait until their own cavalry passed through them, after their cavalry had "harried the retiring French horsemen."
Also if the Light infantry clung too long to the heads of the columns, they would mask the fire of the line, as did happen on occasion in the Peninsula. But then the British cavalry and Light Infantry disappear and Chandler discusses the French infantry column's approach, the "ominous silence" from the British line, and the famous "murderous fire", (which is now thought not to have been that effective), the British cheer, bayonet charge (now thought to have been very effective), and the French are sent "reeling back".
It would seem that Chandler has taken the single instance from Waterloo of Ney's unsupported cavalry attacks, supposedly not an example of the French combined arms system, and grafted it onto Bugeaud's classic account of the repulse of a column by a British line where the use of combined arms is either not discussed or did not occur. Indeed Chandler's hypothetical account of Wellington's tactics doesn't appear to have ever been given a chance to occur.
It is not clear, then, why the system benefited the French when it worked, nor exactly how Wellington's countermeasures were themselves effective, particularly since it would seem that Wellington was never confronted with the proper combined arms technique in the
first place (battle cavalry having little or no role in the Peninsula).
Alternative
One alternative for the French with their system, instead of waiting for the cavalry to clear before deploying, would have been for the column to remain undeployed and simply "go in" and try to break the square before it had time to deploy. (There are many wargame rules that have "melee factors" for "columns attacking squares" all benefiting the columns.) But this doesn't seem to have occurred. While there is at least one clear instance of cavalry breaking a properly formed square (Garcia Hernandez, where the square held its fire too long and a wounded/dead horse was propelled into it and broke it), there seem to be no instances of an infantry column doing it.
And that perhaps is not that unexpected. An infantry column coming up behind attacking cavalry could not get that close to its cavalry without running the risk of being overthrown by its own retreating cavalry; some margin had to be given the cavalry in order for them to retire. Perhapsthis margin was enough so that the defender could deploy before the column could close. But even if the column could close with the square, it is not clear who would be the victor. An infantry column's "force" was one of morale (there being no actual crossing of bayonets in the open field [see Jomini, Art of War, p. 276]), coming from it being a compactly formed body, and it would be opposed by the, at least, equal morale force of the compactly formed square. A column would not have the same morale advantage over a square as it might over a line which could be "ruptured" due to its thinness.
Mysterious
So this whole process of combined arms for Chandler, at least the interaction of cavalry and infantry, seems mysterious. Additionally, when we look at actual battles, there don't seem to be any instances of this type of "close coordination" between infantry and cavalry. in the large cavalry actions on major Napoleonic battlefields, we do not find columns of infantry hurrying behind the charging cavalry in order to deploy before the enemy can "resume linear formation", presumably catching the enemy still in square. Austerlitz, Jena, Eylau, Friedland, Borodino, Liepzig do no appear to have had such occurrances, or at least they do not seem to be mentioned.
At Waterloo we have a different situation. It is stated by Chandler (and many other historians) that the famous French cavalry attacks failed because they were "unsupported by infantry". Ney "... noticed signs of allied troops falling back..." and with his "overheated brain" thought Wellington was retreating and ordered the cavalry in, supposedly to pursue. Ney, if he had been correct about Wellington retreating, would have wasted valuable time if he had waited for infantry to accompany the cavalry, and it was considered the role of cavalry to pursue a l'outrance. But Ney was wrong and the cavalry attacks degenerated.
What, then, should have been done, if Chandler's concept of combined arms appears unrealizable?
It was considered axiomatic that cavalry should not attempt to attack unshaken infantry and the process by which steady infantry could be shaken was through artillery and infantry fire. So in this sense, cavalry needed to be "supported", by infantry and artillery when confronted by unshaken opposing infantry and artillery; actually more than "supported", they needed to carry the brunt of the attack. Additionally, infantry could provide actual support for cavalry in that retreating/routing cavalry with enemy cavalry pursuing could rally behind the infantry while the infantry in square could in turn repel the pursuing enemy cavalry. But what was the role of cavalry in an attack against steady infantry?
The role of the cavalry in a combined attack would appear to have been sixfold: remove the enemy skirmisher cover, screen the columns from defensive artillery fire (the artillery would be forced to concentrate on the cavalry and would effect only random hits on the concealed columns), protect the flanks of the infantry columns against enemy cavalry (which Travers' brigade failed to do for D'Erlon at Waterloo) and enemy infantry (another Waterloo failure in that Adam's brigade was allowed to outflank the column of the Middle Guard), to take advantage (by their speed) of opportunities to fall on exposed enemy flanks (Kellerman at Marengo), to provide a cover for the infantry in case of defeat (also a failure at Waterloo, D'Erlon's troops were overrun by the British heavy cavalry before any cavalry could help them - but in this case it may have been thought that D'Erlon could resist cavalry longer than he did, as a result of his clumsy divisional formations, and that the French cavalry was caught by surprise), and finally, to take advantage of the infantry's success by charging the disordered, retreating or routing enemy.
This is Jomini's summary of the role of cavalry: "Its chief duty is to open the way for gaining a victory, or to render it complete by carrying off prisoners and trophies, pursuing the enemy, overthrowing disordered infantry, covering retreats of infantry and artillery" (Art of War, p. 278). And "A general cavalry charge is made to carry batteries of artillery and enable the infantry to take the position more easily..." (p. 279). Neither Jomini nor Clauswitz mentions the Chandlerian tactic of forcing enemy infantry into square in order to reduce the firepower against hurrying infantry columns.
Ney Should Have...
At Waterloo, then, Ney should have brought up infantry behind the cavalry, the columns being shielded from artillery and Light Infantry fire, had the cavalry retired and reformed behind it while squares of French infantry repulsed the pursuing British cavalry. Then the infantry would either reform column or deploy into line and attack the British infantry. This would not necessarily have insured victory, particularly if Wellington had not required his artillery to abandon their guns, because it is not at all clear that the artillery if properly manned (as Mercer's battery was), couldn't have kept their front clear of the French with or without the French employing a properly coordinated combined arms attack. Wellington may not have needed to lose his artillery even temporarily. (It is, though, an interesting, ironic possibility that perhaps Ney was misled by the retreating artillerymen and his apparent success with the capture of the guns - into thinking that "maybe just one more attack" with the cavalry or with fresh cavalry and he would have victory, that the infantry weren't needed.)
At Waterloo, there was a series of events involving Ompteda's brigade which illustrates some of the aspects of the relationship between infantry and cavalry (and in part the improbability of Chandler's special tactic): Advancing to support La Haye Sainte during the first major French offensive, the 8th line (of Ompteda's brigade), forced the French back but "... a mass of cavalry advanced, wholly hidden hitherto behind some rising ground, and fell on the men of the two battalions... and treated them to a sanguinary encounter..." (Ompteda C., A Hanoverian English Officer a Hundred Years Ago... London: 1892, p. 307). Here is an example of cavalry taking advantage, by their speed, of an exposed flank. Later, after the series of French cavalry attacks, the 5th battalion received orders to advance against the enemy infantry around La Haye Sainte. The battalion deployed and "went to the front. But the battalion had scarcely crossed the space between it and the hollow leading to the farm, and was about to ascend it, when the enemy's cavalry, behind the same height on the other side, broke in on the right wing of the battalion, which must undoubtedly have been doubled up had not the English Life Guards from the rear charged in and cut their enemy's cavalry to pieces" (Ompteda, p. 308). Here is an example of the British cavalry, though somewhat tardily, covering the flank of infantry, advancing in this case in line.
Once more the 5th Battalion was ordered to advance against enemy infantry around La Haye Sainte. Ompteda protested due to the presence of the enemy cavalry, even suggesting an advance in square until he was close to the enemy infantry before deploying into line, but he was overruled and the battalion deployed and advanced. it was then attacked by the cavalry concealed by the rising ground, the battalion should have been covered in its advance by a new Hanoverian regiment but it had "... unhappily left its place" (p. 309), a nice euphemism, but "... this time, however the square was reformed before the enemy came within striking distance." Even with a failure of cavalry support, an infantry unit in line had a chance of forming a square in time.
There followed a period in which the Allied infantry in this sector remained on the defensive. The Battalion Journal states: "The enemy made many cavalry attacks on the position of our Division, wherefore the battalions were formed in square. Only the 5th, owing to the nature of the ground, had to be always on the move, and alternately deploy and form square owing to its exposure to both arms. The battalion beat off three cavalry attacks, in one of which the square was not quite formed when the enemy was eight (sic) paces off" (Ompteda, p. 309). Clearly then exposure to both arms did not necessarily compromise an infantry unit; it could when attacked frontally, respond according to the arm attacking. Cavalry and infantry did not under normal circumstances attack simultaneously along the same frontage (the Scots Greys and the Highlanders at Waterloo being an abnormal, unauthorized, exuberant exception), so that between attacks by the respective arms, infantry could make appropriate responses. When outflanked, where an infantry unit had to conform to two frontages, it normally formed square (and not necessarily when it was threatened by cavalry), and in such a condition it could be subjected to deployed infantry fire while having to maintain a square formation (perhaps it is because of such occurances, usually in advance or rear guard operations, that Chandler was led to devise his combined arms theory).
La Haye Sainte fell and the pressure on the Allied line increased. "Infantry and cavalry columns made attacks in force alternately, supported by their artillery, which were repulsed..." (Ompteda, p. 310). Again it should be clear that an infantry unit could maintain itself against the frontal attacks of infantry and cavalry. At around six, a large force of infantry appeared to the left rear of La Haye Sainte. Ompteda was ordered, by an adjutant, to repel this body of infantry. Ompteda replied that "it was impossible because the English cavalry of the Guard, hitherto in the rear of the battalion, had been ordered to the left wing, so that the French cuirassiers whose helmets could be plainly discerned in the low ground, would attack the battalion as soon as it deployed and moved from its present secure position" (Ompteda, p. 311).
Ompteda's objection to the attack was not just that there were cuirassiers threatening his flank but that there were no cavalry available to support his flank as had been done earlier. The Prince of Orange appeared along with Alten (Ompteda's divisional commander), and The Prince repeated the order to deploy and attack with the bayonet. Ompteda again stated his opinion: "... we ought to be supported by cavalry." (Ompteda, p. 311). The Prince insisted and Ompteda obeyed. The battalion, already reduced to only 200 men, deployed, advanced and overthrew some infantry but then the cuirassiers took them in flank and rear and they were "cut to pieces".
Frequently, in accounts of the battle, this last instance is confused with earlier ones. Also several authors (Becke among them) present it as an instance of what could have been accomplished by the French if they had properly coordinated their attacks during the day. But far from it being a simple case of the correct use of combined arms, it was a case of an infantry line advancing, presenting an unsupported flank to cavalry, and being destroyed, a result that had been fully anticipated. This is considerably different from infantry awaiting an attack and remaining in square or deploying accordingly. Earlier it had advanced without cavalry support and it had been attacked by the cuirassiers (see above), but the cavalry had attacked before the line had engaged any infantry (and thereby becoming disordered as occurred in the last fatal instance), and the infantry was able to form square, but only just in time.
Perhaps it was the previous success of the unsupported infantry against the cavalry that contributed to the Prince of Orange's rash insistence and which may have in turn caused Alten not to intervene on behalf of Ompteda. (Alten was an experienced soldier, unlike the Prince, and must have felt that the attack was not completely hopeless or he would have joined Ompteda in protesting the order. Unless of course he was simply reluctant to contradict a superior, no matter who he was, and no matter what the cost, in which case he deserves more censure than the headstrong, ignorant, Prince.)
Intracasies
These various episodes show some of the intricacies of the cooperation between infantry and cavalry, and also that infantry, if it kept to a defensive posture (rather than advancing or attacking), could maintain itself against the frontal attacks of infantry and cavalry by alternately deploying or forming square. Infantry, attacked frontally, did not need to fear being forced into square by cavalry and thereby compromised in its defense against infantry. The constraints on the interaction between infantry and cavalry attacking on a limited front provided enough time for well-ordered defending infantry to respond with the appropriate formation. (Chandler, in his later books on Napoleonic warfare, Dictionary of Napoleonic Wars, and Waterloo, does not appear to specifically mention this tactic of cavalry reducing enemy firepower on attacking infantry.)
If, as has been argued, the real strength of the British line lay not in its firepower, but in its willingness to charge French infantry columns, then it can be seen that the British only needed time enough to deliver one or two volleys to halt the column before charging it. French columns could and did get up to very close range before British lines fired on, and then charged, them. French columns do not need to suffer "phenomenal casualties' from the British line in order to be overthrown.
This is not to say that cavalry was never to charge infantry which was not immediately retreating. Poorly trained infantry that could not get into square fast enough, or that had no confidence in the formation could easily break and turn their backs to charging cavalry. Similarly good infantry encumbered by wounded or disordered by the gaps in their ranks, or unfamiliar with the reorganization upon closing those gaps (not knowing the voice of a new company or even battalion officer), or tired by long combat and formation changes, or simply unable to see the attacking cavalry due to dense smoke or a defect in the ground, could fail to perform the evolution in time, or even upon gaining square, abandon it. it was one of the many arts of the cavalry commander to determine when infantry could be charged with success.
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