As everyone knows, the cavalry charges with saber and lance was somewhat obsolescent in the age of the rifled musket - let alone the breech loading rifle. Epic charges of the period are usually referred to in such cheerful terms as "Todes Ritt" (Death Ride -- usually referring to Bredow at Vionville) or "Chevauchee la Morte" (Death Ride -- Gallifet or similar). The British equivalent, of course, is summed up with reference to "The Valley of Death", while the most often quoted and somewhat disrespectful American expression for the same phenomenon was "here come them damn fools with the sabers." Professional cavalrymen in Europe were notably persistent in their desire to make close order charges with the arme blanche all the way up to 1914, in spite of accumulating evidence that such things can be hazardous to your health. The Imperial German approach to making cavalry more effective was to issue lances to all ranks below sergeant around 1887. Shortly before WWI, the French hastened to close the gap by issuing lances to all cavalry formed in divisions except the cuirassiers, who were above such things. A German manual translated in 1906 observed "neither the saber nor the lance can make anything of the cuirass," a discouraging thought if you were a German cuirassier deprived of cuirass and issued a lance. Not until around the turn of the century were French cuirassiers issued a carbine (robs cavalry of dash) but they were, for most of the years between 1871 and 1900, armed with one or more heavy caliber revolvers. The role of cavalry in the Age of Napoleon the Little and immediately thereafter is intriguing to the military historian, and perhaps even more so to the wargamer of the period. Cavalry was as beautiful as ever, and numerous, although reduced in proportion to the other arms. But it wasn't always much use. What was it for? What use could be made of it? Or, for the wargamer, what use can be made of it? The temptation is to either let cavalry function as they did in Uncle Napoleon's day, which is how they looked and would like to have been able to act, or to have them wiped out instantly when fired upon - which is how some people think it should have happened given the ballistic properties and rate of fire of contemporary weapons. Neither approach is quite right. Then, as now, most bullets missed most people. However, aside from the natural tendency not to advance to the last drop of blood, it was increasingly difficult to press home charges against the minie rifle, let alone against the needle gun or chassepot. And while the rifled cannon was in many ways inferior to the old smoothbore as a charge stopper, its much increased accurate range made it even more difficult to hang about waiting for a chance to charge. in fact, the increase fire fight zone of infantry and artillery created a great deal of space between engaged armies where the fire of both sides made loitering in formed bodies impossible. And formed bodies were definitely called for! if you should happen to have an old copy of the 1913 version of H.G. Wells' Little Wars, check the rules dealing with the effectiveness of close order cavalry against open order infantry - a 5 to 1 kill rate I believe, reversed when the infantry are formed. And the cavalry have no option. Ah, here it is (p. 113, Little Wars) "No body of less than eight cavalry may charge, and they must charge in proper formation." (italics my own). And this was not the "playable version", but Captain Sykes' "Kriegspiel" meant for military training. Proper Order Proper order, of course, was knee to knee. The 1911 Britannica article on cavalry is very instructive on this point. Once a charge was launched, it was preferred that the second rank keep close up, and that the troopers keep knee to knee. The risk was accepted that the front rank casualty would throw several second rank troopers into disorder, and possibly bring them down. If the second rank was kept back it was found that it became confused by dust raised by the first. Bad enough for supporting squadrons to be lost in the dust. As a result, a charge could be pretty badly discouraged without having an overwhelming proportion of the horses and men killed or wounded - not that the enemy would go out of their way to avoid that result. I should hasten to excuse my reference to manuals, wargame rules, and scholarly works of the fin-du-siecle to illustrate views of cavalry tactics of Napoleon III's era. Basically they had changed but little. Although infantry tactics, and to a degree views on the use of dismounted cavalry evolved to conform with magazine rifles and smokeless powder, a great deal of effort was spent on preparing to fight the Franco-Prussian War right up to 1914. There is a distinct gap between the manuals as written in 1916 and those written in 1914. Up to that time, late century examples were viewed with insufficient reflection. Perhaps "preparing to fight the Franco-Prussian War" isn't quite right. The 1872 German cavalry manual quoted extensively from that of 1757. Prussian Cuirassiers on the eve of the Austrian War. Mounted troopers with full dress helmet eagles are Gard du Corps and Garde Cuirassier. Most of us are familiar with the charge of the Light Brigade as an horrible example of technology against sword and lance, but in reality that affair was Napoleonic in its lethal technology. Essentially a brigade numbering little more than a strong regiment of cavalry attacked two batteries of smooth bore horse artillery frontally while under a flanking fire from several heavier smooth bore batteries in shell range. The supporting Chasseurs d'Afrique charged the flanking batteries as foragers (mounted skirmishers) and lost about 35 out of 250 or so, while the British cavalry charged in several lines knee to knee as recommended by the 1911 Britannica and Col. Mark Sykes' Kriegspiel of 1913. in so doing, they lost 247 men and 497 horses. Lest we be too harsh on our later sources, they did not recommend that mode of attack against guns. Other Examples Other examples more appropriate to the period show the kinds of results that could occur when cavalry charged infantry and artillery in the days of Napoleon the Little. At Montabello, General Sonnaz, with a brigade of Sardinian cavalry, sometimes supported by squadrons of Chasseurs d'Afrique, repeatedly charged a larger Austrian force, keeping it off balance until Forey's French infantry division could defeat its brigades in detail. Thetotal allied loss was 105 killed, 549 wounded, 69 missing; mostof it Forey's division. One of the killed was an Italian Colonel who took seven lancers into an Austrian square and is reported to have led three charges after being mortally wounded. The more numerous Austrians lost twice as many, but there is no report of heavy losses being inflicted by the Sardinian lances (1859). The Austrians were using Lorenz rifled muskets and smooth bore artillery. At Cedarville the 6th Virginia Cavalry under Major Flournoy, some 250 sabers and revolvers, overtook the retreating 1st Maryland infantry which, with other detachments, numbered over 1,000 men. The Federals formed and delivered a volley "emptying many a saddle", but were broken. Attempting to rally in a nearby orchard they were again charged and broken. Over 900 prisoners were taken (1862). Member of the Guard Cuirassier Division, Russia in the 1850's. From the showy beginning the Czar's Cavalry had become proficient exponents of dismounted firepower by the Turkish War of 1877. A few years later, in the pursuit after Koennigratz, the 1st Brandenburg Cuirassiers attacked elements of a retreating Austrian battalion which reportedly formed square, but more likely went into battalion mass. According to the Prussian official history the cuirassiers charged by squadron and were received by "a volley at 100 yds and another at 40 yds and therafter by file fire." They pressed on and made a fight of it with saber against bayonet, forcing the square into two halves - likely the result of two Austrian companies or divisions stepping to the center. After a futile effort to break in the cuirassiers retreated - reportedly after being fired on by Austrian reinforcements. In both cases the cavalry units involved made only one serious charge on the day - which makes it more likely that the casualties attributed to that action are discreet. After some scrounging I have been able to determine that the 6th Virginia Cavalry reported 10 killed and 16 wounded at Cedarville. If none were inflicted by officers' revolvers or infantry bayonets, that represents roughly 2.6% hits to rounds ordered to be fired. There is less certainty about the number of Austrians. Austrian sources claim only two companies of the 64th (Saxe-Weimar) Regiment were present. That would make for a maximum of 500 rifles. Also, Austrian bayonets definitely came into play. The 1st Cuirassiers reported 7 killed, 12 wounded, and an officer captured when his horse was killed alongside the enemy. At Tobitschau during the same retreat (15 July 1966) Col. Bredow led his 5th Prussian Cuirassiers against the Austrian rearguard artillery. He attacked with 3 squadrons in more or less open line, with a formed squadron in support, at least part of his force coming from the flank. He overran the guns, dispersed supporting cavalry, and took possession of 18 guns, 15 limbers, 7 caissons, 2 officers, 168 men, and 157 horses. The attack involved a feint in front and a charge in the flank. The 5th Cuirassiers lost 10 men. I mention these incidents to show that the advent of the rifled musket did not automatically eliminate the cavalry charge from the tactical battlefield. However, cavalry service was not without its hazards. Some charges resulted in devastating losses. Curiously the highest loss rate I have been able to identify for any large cavalry formation was suffered against Italian muzzle loaders at Custozza in 1866. The Austrian Pulz Cavalry Brigade consisting of the 13th Uhlans and the 2nd Hussars, roughly 1400 troopers, were sent against the Italian 16th Infantry Division. Balke's tactics reports the Italian strength as about 3,000 in the forward squares. However, nominally the Italian division would number at least 10,000 infantry supported by 400 cavalry and 12-18 guns. The Austrian uhlans overran thick skirmish lines (two Bersaglieri battalions) and bounced off several squares. The hussars attacked the Italian cavalry. Only 14 Italian infantry were killed or wounded and 108 cavalry, but the 16th Division subsequently retreated. The Austrians made other charges later in the same day. A total of 360 casualties were reported among the 600 uhlans, with 40 hussars lost. The loss among the uhlans, whose normal strength would have been less than Balke credits (550) is respectable even by light brigade standards. At Vionville the French Guard Cuirassiers are variously credited with three charges or one charge in three lines. As they retreated they, and the 3rd Lancers, who also charged, were attacked by a brigade of Prussian hussars. In the course of all this they lost 208 men and 260 horses out of around 600. We may assume that when each wave attacked that it came within effective range of over a battalion of Prussians for at least a minute at 5 rounds per minute. Since the odd horseless trooper and riderless horse were later remounted (unless separated by Prussian hussars), the net loss to mounted strength was 260, or one casualty per 58 rounds ordered to be fired, one per 11.6 infantrymen charged. of course, somewhat fewer rounds or rifles were needed to put a horseman out of a charge (either horse or man hit) and given the confusion caused by casualties to close ranks of horsemen no amount of fanaticism could be expected to overcome a triple line of rifles bringing down a man for every 6-8 rifles and upsetting 2-3 others in the process. Death Ride Factors Several factors confuse the analysis of von Bredow's celebrated "death ride". Our colonel of Tobitschau had by 1870 been promoted to brigadier general and placed in charge of three regiments. One, of dragoons, was sent off to clear a wood on the flank, while the 7th (Madgeburg) Cuirassiers and the 16th (Altmark) Uhlans were launched at a strong French gun line that was terrorizing the local Prussian infantry. The horsemen overran the line of cannons and machineguns, dispersing supporting infantry and capturing the eagle of the 105th Infantry. Based on this and his 1866 performance, it doesn't seem to have been safe to leave guns around where Bredow could get at them, regardless of supports. However, there happened to be several French cavalry divisions standing idle nearby who rode over and clobbered the audacious Prussians, retaking all guns and flags. One obvious complication is that we don't know for sure how many Prussians were brought down by infantry and artillery. They were doing pretty well until half the cavalry in the French Army fell on them. Another is the rumor that the French artillery was under orders not to change targets except by higher command. If that was the case, with the artillery cheerfully blazing away and the infantry confused by all the smoke, the ability of 800 or so Prussian horsemen to reach the line with reasonable force is understandable, as is the net loss of over 60% when the roof fell in. On balance, since Bredow saved the infantry and put several batteries of artillery out of action for the day, his charge may be considered militarily "cost-effective". The moral of the story is, cavalry success against formed infantry with rifled muskets was fairly unusual, very unusual against breach loaders, but not especially rare against unsupported batteries of artillery, especially rifled artillery. It was not uncommon for cavalry to make the effort to confuse or distract larger infantry forces, or in hopes of catching the enemy off balance, launching sudden charges. However, depending on the number, armament, and skill of those charged, and the determination of those charging, this could be quite expensive. Due to increasing numbers of infantry and guns, and the difficulty involved in keeping large bodies of cavalry close to the action, massed cavalry could rarely play a decisive role on the battlefield. Curiously, while we are in the habit of regarding our own cavalry and that of the Yankee enemy as a band of mounted rifles, useful mainly for the dismounted value of their Enfields and Spencers, no European charges with the arme blanche were as tactically decisive as those made by Sheridan's numerous horsemen in 1864. Early complained bitterly that cavalry fighting on foot with rifles could not stand up to cavalry fighting mounted with the saber in the rolling country of the Shenandoah Valley. Legends Persist But legends persist. Col. Freemantle, of Her Majesty's Coldstream Guards, was shocked to find that Confederate cavalry in the west used pistols and shotguns, and he even related that Stuart's troopers, although they carried sabers, would not use them. instead they would hang back, like their Federal opponents, and pop away at one another at 40 yds "at which point only the saber should be used". By odd coincidence he wrote thus of Gettysburg, where an enormous saber fight took place. He did not see it, nor apparently credit it, although he noted that "General Hampton was suffering from a saber cut on the head and a pistol shot in the leg, but was in good spirits." It did not occur to Freemantle, critical military observer that he was, that saber cuts can only with great difficulty be exchanged by horsemen 40 yards apart. On the subject of casualties inflicted with cold steel, very small numbers are commonly reported from surgical records. However, the records usually address "saber and clubbed musket" casualties as opposed to penetrating wounds caused by bayonet, lance, or even saber point. At the great cavalry battle of Acres sur Yron (Mars la Tour) the French Guard Lancers are said to have inflicted 27% loss on the Oldenburg Dragoons. This was cited by German authorities as reason for arming their dragoons, hussars, and cuirassiers with the lance in 1887. French lancers and cuirassiers at the time carried no shoulder arm and nobody has ever accused the Guard Lancers of resorting to their single shot pistols in the heat of battle. The Austrian cuirassiers and uhlans at Koneiggratz inflicted over 400 casualties on the Prussian cavalry - without firing a shot. At least in conflict with others similarly armed, the white weapon could still do some damage. On the whole, cavalry was finding it increasingly difficult to intervene decisively on the battlefield - but there was still enough of it around to lend tone to the brawl, and to offer a challenge to the conniving wargamer. Related Napoleon III: Warfare in the Age of Napoleon the Little The French and Prussian Armies 1870: Equipment and Organization Back to Table of Contents -- Courier Vol. VII #1 To Courier List of Issues To MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1986 by The Courier Publishing Company. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com