Jena is frequently cited as demonstrating the superiority of column over linear tactics. Until the appearance of Foucart's work (Campagne de Prusse) in the 1880s, there was little written to cause anyone to believe otherwise. In the event, it turned out that there was nothing at all wrong either with the Prussian soldier or with his tactics. Foucart's study and that of his Prussian counterpart, Lettow-Vorbeck, showed that where the Prussian line was properly handled and met with the French, their tirailleurs were summarily pushed back and the formations behind them handled roughly. Jena and Auerstaedt ranked among Napoleon's more bloody battles. Prussian failure there was, but not in the ranks, not on the firing line!
The supporters of the linear system always point to the British and their successes. This is not a convincing argument as all the British proved was what everybody knew-that the linear order was the stronger defense and that (according also to Clausewitz) the defense was the stronger form of combat.
Whatever else one might say of the British, one could hardly say that they or Wellington waged an offensive war in the Peninsula. It's clear however, that Wellington understood the system and he wisely used the instrument in his hands, thereby gaining the truly deserved confidence of his soldiers. That, perhaps, must be regarded the Iron Duke's greatest military achievement!
It is not my intention to trace how the column and the skirmisher became part of the formal tactical system of the times. I am more interested in the aspects of troop psychology and man's behavior under fire, which gave rise to the new tactical system.
When revolution erupted in France, the army, like all else, was profoundly affected. The Ordinance of 1 Jan. 1791 had fixed the army at 101 regiments, including 12 German and Irish as well as 11 Swiss regiments (the foreign units did not survive the revolution). There were also 12 battalions of chasseurs.
The new formations which came after that date (not counting colonial units) amounted only to four line regiments and 9 battalions of chasseurs. To augment these, the National Volunteer battalions were ordered to be formed by the decree of 28 January 1791. The greatest part of these were eventually integrated with the existing line regiments which had for the most part shrunken to the size of single battalions.
By the time of the first formation of the demi-brigades (the very term 'regiment' was anathema to the ideals of the Revolution), there were not enough "white" battalions left to give backbone to the blue clad volunteer battalions on the basis of one white to two blue per demi-brigade. The great depletion of the old "white" regiments was due to several reasons, not the least of which was that many left the still rigid discipline of the regular army to join the volunteer battalions.
Life was much easier there, promotions came fast to anyone with military experience and, with luck, one might even be elected to become an officer. Of course, before long, efforts were made to bring the "blue" battalions up to the mark as well but that was to take quite a while and its effects would not long outlast the 1805/6 and 1807 campaigns.
Those who elected to remain behind in the "white" battalions, were ill served by the Revolution, the Consulate or the Empire. Life continued to go by the book and promotions came slowly.
Although most of the men who commanded the blue battalions themselves came from the "white" army and knew very well what was needed to bring their units up to the mark, how was one to institute and enforce the harsh discipline that was needed at a time when "liberte - egalite - fraternite" was the motto of the day?
When the blue battalions went into action, the men lacked the discipline and training to maintain the formations prescribed but had too much spirit to stand by while the skirmishers did their thing. it seemed foolish to stand there, receiving volley fire as though one were no better than a target on the firing range. So entire battalions dissolved into dense swarms of skirmishers, crowding into real estate that offered good cover while leaving bare that which did not.
Pressing forward, these swarms would soon feel emboldened to make a dash at the firing lines before them where they quickly came face to face with a hard truth. A swarm of a thousand tirailleurs quickly become a head- less monster, a mob, while a battalion with but 200 or so effectives, but in rank and file, were still a fighting machine, capable of responding to orders. This fact was already clearly understood during the linear era.
As a result, it was forbidden to execute any movement on the double or at a run, lest formation might be lost! Even during the Napoleonic era, battalion masses were not allowed to run unless a column had approached down to a range of some 20 yards and a "push of bayonet" was at hand.
Movies, novels and pop-histories notwithstanding, these occasions were exceedingly rare. "The troops levelled bayonets and advanced" is a common metaphor, to be found even in regimental histories. But all this really meant was that the troops advanced at the pas-de-charge, without fire. It did not mean that the enemy would stand to cross bayonets with the attacker. It was a "rule of thumb", even during the times of Marlborough and Frederick that if a unit was able to penetrate deeply enough into the small arms fire zone to mount such a charge, the moral ascendancy was already on its side and that the defender would break before contact took place. If they stood until the attacker approached to less than twenty yards, bayonet wounds might occur (usually in the back) as the men were wounded by their compatriots to the rear while trying to fall back.
Thus when the tirailleur swarms ran up against a solid formation, we might read that they were hurled back at point of bayonet or some such rhetoric. What it really meant was that the attackers, perceiving that the defender wasn't about to give way, came to a screeching halt. If this moment's hesitation was accompanied by a volley of musketry, the dice had fallen, showing snake eyes! This basic process accounts for both the successes and the failures of the French during the Coalition Wars for, if a white battalion, still in hand, was on the scene to follow up the rush of the skirmishers, the story would have a different ending.
The process by which the uncontrolled dissolution of entire formations into tirailleur swarms was transformed into the planned and controlled commitment and recall of a fixed proportion of troops, operating in direct support of their back-up formations, took place in several, distinct phases. During the first stage, we see massive swarms of tirailleurs, backed by few (white) battalions.
The second stage brings a reduction of the tirailleurs and an increase in the number of supporting columns, these usually in two lines "en chequeur," that is, the second line of columns forming on the intervals of the first. The third phase is the result of the long encampments along the Channel Coast, the only occasion when the bulk of the French army was ever subjected to prolonged periods of formal drill and training.
Thus, the army of 1805, the best Napoleon ever had, operated on the doctrine that the tirailleur action was to be conducted by the light regiment assigned to each division (as the 5th regiment). This was to be supported by the remaining two infantry brigades, placed side by side, each ranked in two echelons.
Of these, the first was to be deployed in line and was to advance in this formation to conduct the actual fire fight, while the battalions of the second echelon were to remain "en colonne" to execute the breakthrough. This represented the new system at the peak of its efficiency.
During the final phase, the light infantry loses its specialized nature and is assimilated to the line, merely retaining its title and specialized uniforms. Concurrent with this comes the reorganization of the battalion into six companies. This does not alter the size of the battalions a great deal, because the small companies of the older organization are put together, two by two, to form the new companies, with a concommitant increase in the number of grenadiers and voltigeurs.
However, the number of officers and noncoms is reduced by nearly half, freeing many for new formations yet to be raised. What was positive about this reorganization, was that each battalion now had its own constituent companies (grenadiers and voltigeurs) which could be employed without touching the battalion mass represented by the four fusilier companies or they might attach themselves to one flank (generally the right) to form a column three platoons wide. In theory, this represented a gain. In practice, however, other changes tended to negate much of the system.
After 1806/7, the deployment and advance "in line" of the first echelon disappears almost entirely. At the same time, a trend toward a standard infantry, capable of all forms of combat, comes to the fore. This process is accelerated by the Prussians due to their method of obtaining skirmishers from the third rank instead of from specialized companies. The presence of these specialists in every platoon "rubs off" on the rest of the men.
This general trend and its timing points up clearly that after the bloodlettings of 1805 and 1806/7, the cadre of thoroughly trained soldiers shrinks and is further diluted by massive new formations. From 1808 onward, this process accelerate further. As a result, the training standards and quality of the French infantry declines steadily. And the first thing to go was the capacity of all but a few formations which, by dint of circumstance, had avoided these drains and dilutions, to execute any movements "in line."
The "ordre mixte" had become as much an illusion for the Napoleonic armies as platoon fire had for Frederick's armies after the first Silesian Wars. And it is within this context that one can understand Marmont's jubilation when the marines are assigned to him in 1813. "They can execute all maneuvers in line!" he exults. Small wonder.
These old troopers had vegetated as artillerymen in the French ports while the army marched and bled. They knew all the evolutions by the book. Unfortunately, by then, it was not possible to staff them with experienced infantry officers. They ended up suffering horrendous casualties and more were burned up in the house to house fighting in Moeckern, where they had no opportunity to show their stuff.
That Morand, for example, might have been able to produce two battalions capable of advancing in line on the Great Redoubt at Borodino in 1812, seems doubtful in my opinion. And I wish to emphasize that I am, at this point, expressing an opinion. The scheme shown by Chandler (Campaigns of Napoleon, page 349) may indeed depict his starting position. Far more likely, however, these battalions were meant to dissolve into a massive swarm of skirmishers--to my mind a far more sensible move when going against breastworks.
Besides, the regiments in Morand's Division had all been recently expanded by one or two field battalions and were bloated with conscripts. Even the scheme shown for MacDonald's Corps at Wagram, with two leading echelons, each consisting of four battalions deployed into line, is questionable. The year may still be 1809, but we are already well on the downhill side of the French tactical performance curve.
Were the British better at the linear game? Their army was relatively small and well drilled. This makes it possible but not likely. At any rate, they never had much chance to prove it. Wellington's stock in trade was to deploy his firing lines on the high ground and to stand pat, letting the French bang their heads against the wall. Of course, the latter, with overwhelming overconfidence, generally obliged him.
Mamont, the consummate tactician once threatened to upset the apple cart but, unfortunately for the French, he was not around long enough to see it through at Salamanca. In the Penninsula, in order to bring maximum firepower to bear, Wellington had taken to deploying his infantry in two ranks. But at Quatre Bras where, for once, the British were forced to fight on ground not of their choosing, their thin infantry lines were mauled. As a result, Wellington went to four ranks at Waterloo.
In summation, it can be said that the "levee en masse" had opened great manpower resources to the French. These new means behaved entirely within the dictates of Parkinson's Laws. As the means grew so did the appetite for their employment. Larger manpower resources begat larger armies. These were employed in ever expanding objectives which brought about a corresponding increase in wear and tear.
Concurrently with this, the new tactical system at first facilitated and finally enforced lower training standards bringing in its wake the downgrading of an otherwise effective tactical system. To compensate, ever increasing numbers of troops were brought onto the battlefield. Aggravating all this, was the fact that Napoleon and his officers operated on empirical experience, never rationalizing their system of warfare in a set of instructions or manuals which would have been binding on everyone.
All this was possible only because, for all its negative points, the French colonne d'attaque in its final form offered several important advantages.
- (A) It required less time and effort to train recruits to
function ' even if only in rudimentary fashion, in the column
formation.
(B) Because the columns were more compact, it was easier to handle them and they could be moved at greater speed.
(C) Where linear tactics sought the plain, the column could operate effectively in broken terrain.
(D) It was able to accommodate quick changes in front.
(E) With its constituent elite companies, the battalion became a self-reliant tactical unit which could, by itself or in concert with others, conduct all forms of combat.
(F) Finally, the massed formations better fortified the morale, particularly of young and indifferently trained soldiers, by being more compatible with man's herd- instinct.
This was, in summation, the ideal. The failure of the system was that at the very time the column had reached what might be called the perfect state, training standards had declined making movements in line, which were the only way to combine offensive movement with the full firepower of the battalion impossible.
In practice, it was sought to compensate through the use of skirmishers. That is to say that the initially preparatory role of the skirmisher was expanded to take the place of fire from the line-at least to a point where the column could come well into musket range and deploy without undue difficulty rather than attempt to enter the firezone already deployed and relying on its own firepower. However, we have abundant evidence, and not only from the Peninsula, that this rarely worked.
A problem with the skirmishers was that if the other side had skirmishers deployed as well, they would spend most of their time shooting at each other. At best, the skirmisher could confuse and, perhaps, create some disorder. One of his primary functions was to screen and obscure (keep in mind the amount of smoke a blackpowder discharge would create).
Returning to the arguments quoted by Chandler, it is fairly obvious that in the light of the total picture, both the Oman/Fortesque and the Colin/Hilaire Belloc schools are correct to a point where there should be little argument between them. Most of the French officers, from battalion commander upward had long years of service, a great deal of combat experience and many had even experienced the drill of the Ancien Regime. They knew very well what a deployed firing line could do to a column.
If a commander of an Old Guard battalion insisted on running it into the firezone in column, he was certainly guilty of misjudgement if he failed because he could have deployed and moved forward in line-they knew how! An ordinary chef de bataillon, on the other hand, who not only questioned his outfit's ability to execute the maneuver, but knew that they would foul it up, was apt to give it "the old college try" and run his column in there. Maybe it would be the other side who would drop the ball. Either way, if he succeeded, alI welI and good. But he knew that if he failed, it would be adjudged an error. In other words: he took a calculated risk! C'est la vie! C'est la guerre!
Now what happened when a colonne d'attaque went into action? Bringing up the grenadier and voltigeur companies, the voltigeurs would send one of their platoons forward, leaving the other in support. The forward platoon might at first only deploy half of its number into a skirmish line. The enemy would, of course, reply with his own skirmishers. if the action got lively, the supports of the voltigeurs and, ultimately, the grenadiers, would be sucked into the tirailleur action as well. If the skirmishers do well and succeed in pushing back their opposite numbers, the battalion mass will press forward into its own skirmishing lines.
At this point, the discharge of hundreds of muskets will have laid down a curtain of smoke, the density of which is determined by the amount of wind present. If the skirmishers succeed in moving on, they may creep into the firezone of the deployed battalion and cause ' some damage or confusion. This may facilitate their own column's entry into the firezone. Now, the question facing the battalion commander (unless he has orders) is: "Do I deploy and start a standing firefight or do I take a chance and bluff?"
At this point, a substantial variety of local conditions may come into play. A lack of air movement may have created a dense curtain of smoke. At the same time, a sudden gust of wind can part that curtain, exposing the unit. An otherwise hardly noticeable dip in the ground may enable the column to eke out an extra fifty yards in comparative safety. A slope may be far worse close up than it looked from a distance (a common occurrence). A meadow may be unexpectedly wet, also impeding speedy progress (frequently the undoing particularly of cavalry).
The presence of cavalry or artillery may also influence what both attacker and defender may do. A farmhouse, a stone wall, a sunken road and dozens of similar obstacles can become the object of hot combats because its possession may facilitate the unmolested approach of the columns. Any or all of these, in any combination, can come into play in the course of a single combat.
Battalion Numbers
Now let's look at our battalion in terms of numbers. Assuming both attacker and defender to be organized similarly, say 900 men in six companies, with the attacker 200 men shy. This means that the defender's companies number an average 150 men, those of the attacker only about 120. Assuming both deploy skirmishers to about equal proportions, we have the defender's two companies with 300 men versus the attackers with but 240 men.
Before you have done counting the other side's men, be you attacker of defender, to satisfy yourself as to who packs more clout, the action may have very well run its course. Besides, if the attackers perform well, the difference may never come into play. By the time you discount the misfires and the amount of lead that will poke the ground or perforate the air, the disparity of 60 muskets seems less and less awesome. Of course, if such a combat is prolonged and casualties begin to mount on both sides, the unit on the short side may reach critical mass sooner.
Now to the battalion mass in column. At full strength, this would have a front of two platoons (in accordance with the scheme shown above), each with about 25 f i les, three deep, for a total of 150 men. The total depth of the column would be 12 ranks, not counting the closing rank, generally consisting of from two to three officers and noncoms behind each position. To this might be added a musician (drummer or bugler) by the side of each officer.
If a company was under strength (such as our's are here), it would still maintain its frontage of 25 men in each platoon. But since each platoon would be 15 men short, the third rank would have only 10 instead of 25 men. With smoke and musketry, one would have to look long and hard to determine that the reality lacked a Iittle of the punch of the impression.
The bottom line is that so long as a battalion maintains its critical mass at a level to function in the necessary formations, performance, rather than numbers will tell the story. This will be subject to constant and infinite mutations which are frequently of such fleeting nature that they rarely find an echo in historical writings.
For the most part, they remain the exclusive property of those who were there. Altogether too often that which seems the most obvious is merely superficial and tends to obscure more than it explains. Often as not, pure luck, accidents or unforeseen and, at times, seemingly unrelated circumstances could determine success or failure, leaving the men who fought and died on both sides buffeted by events which were completely beyond their control. The battlefield may very well be the arena of the brave but it is also the eminent domain of chance, as fickle as a ball bouncing around the roulette wheel.
More Column vs. Line
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