I recently had the good fortune to visit several
Napoleonic battle sites in Spain and Portugal. This was
my first opportunity to see the fields of which I have read
so much, and I set out in a rented mini-compact for a
whirlwind tour of Barossa, Albuera, Badajoz, Elvas,
Campo Maior, Salamanca, Cuidad Rodrigo, Fuentes de Onoro, and Almeida.
The spring weather was ideal, my shoes were comfortable, and I had memorized the terrain maps from Oman's history. Despite a fumbling command of the Spanish language, I managed to locate several battlefields and to gain a new appreciation of the terrain over which France and her Peninsula opponents fought nearly 175 years ago.
Perhaps I naively expected to find at each battlefield a commanding ridgeline behind which the thin red line calmly awaited attack, but I was quickly uncleceived. At only 2 sites could I locate terrain features capable of seriously hindering troop movement. The Arapiles at Salamanca were one such and the descent to the river Coa was the second (where Craufurd's Light Division was neatly trapped by Ney).
The Arapiles are steepsided, flat topped mounds which left me breathless at the summit. I marveled at the spectre of troops hauling field guns to the top while under enemy fire. Horses certainly would have been of little help in making the final ascent. And it is no wonder that the assault of Pack's Portuguese Brigade on the French Arapile was bloodily repulsed. The wonder is that the assault was made at all.
The descent to the Coa is similarly rugged. These (the Arapiles and the Coa) are definitely obstacles to give a melee bonus to the defender, or perhaps more accurately, some sort of disorder penalty to troops moving on them.
Yet the majority of the terrain at the various battlefields is gently rolling, cultivated hills, among which it is difficult to locate the ridgelines so prominant on battle maps. Each row of gentle hills is succeeded by another, or crossed by a shallow depression, seemingly designed to frustrate any attempt to create the orderly terrain so often found on the game table.
The Anglo-Allied positions on the San Cristobal heights north of Salmanca and between Elvas and Campo Maior behind the River Caia were locations so strong that Soult and Marmont refused to attack them. Yet these "ridgelines" are so unassuming that one would scarcely notice them were they not of historical significance.
While walking over several of these sites, I soon realized that my conception of battlefield terrain was seriously in error. These gentle hills could not have been serious military obstacles and could have given little direct benefit to a defending force. And yet, why do they figure so prominently in battle histories? Why was so much blood shed to control these trivial terrain features?
Limit Visibility
The answer is ridiculously simple. The hills neither obstruct movement nor create disorder. They limit visibility.
From a depression only a few meters below the general ground level, one's view is severely restricted. A force in such a position could be completely isolated from battle raging only a few hundred meters to either side and lose all contact with friends. And yet by simply ascending an adjacent rise, one's horizons increase immensely. From a well chosen hill top, a force could observe the enemy and prepare to oppose its movement, although the hill top was only marginally above the general ground level.
From this perspective, a "commanding ridgeline" assumes a different character. Such a position is chosen not simply to obstruct the enemy's advance, but rather to afford a clear view of enemy movement while preventing the enemy from obtaining a similar advantage.
Hand in hand with a clear field of view go good fields of
fire for artillery, which, when properly sited, could dominate
the battleground. But locating such a position is no trivial
matter. Minor folds and depression of terrain can work
deceptive wonders with visibility. The ability to visualize
fields of view along several miles of friendly and enemy
positions must have been an important skill of the
successful Napoleonic commander.
<> This finally brings us to
the central question of this article. How should the subtle
interplay between visibility and a force's capabilities be
simulated on the gametable?
I have no good answer. But perhaps a brief discussion
of the problem can point us in a direction for improvement.
The problem is most acute in 2 aspects of gaming:
one is the accurate determination of the fields of fire and
casualty rates for field guns; the second lies in simulating
the advantages afforded by dominant terrain in discerning
the positions and movements of enemy and friendly
troops.
The problem is caused simply by the nature of the
gametable, where terrain is frequently a few hills or raised
contours placed on a flat surface over which all gamers
occupy dominant positions.
The effects of visibility on artillery is typically
simulated by one of two methods. Visibility restrictions
can be factored into the casualty tables themselves, so
that guns inflict fewer casualties than hypothetically
possible. This allows penalties due to visibility to be
simulated without extremely complex terrain appearing on
the table. However, such an approach immediately
negates the value of guns sited in dominant positions.
We can improve this approach by giving bonuses to
guns located on raised contours, etc. But this solution
really begs the issue, for the terrain producing bonuses
must be defined beforehand. Thus the skill of a gamer with
a superior "eye for terrain" is negated, a skill which was
apparently an important factor in Napoleonic command.
The second approach is to allow artillery its full
potential to inflict casualties and utilize complex terrain
and sighting rules to penalize guns unable to clearly view
the target. This approach seems appealing, for it allows
the skilled gamer to use his ability. But complex terrain is
difficult to create on the table and sighting rules are often
cumbersome and a drag on the speed of play. Thus we
often choose to ignore the complexities of terrain and find
the game reduced to a long range firefight between
opposing batteries.
Neither of these approaches is fully satisfactory. In
one case, the skilled commander is not rewarded and
terrain loses its impact; in the other, the game may
become unplayable or artillery become disproportionately
dominant. Perhaps a gamer cleverer than I can combine
the two to produce acceptable realism in a playable
format.
Problem of Visibility and Control
The problem of simulating the visibility and control
restrictions of opposing commanders may be less
resolvable. The position of all gamers towering above the
table-top is inherent to miniatures gaming. No amount of
complex terrain and concealed movement can change that
condition. Perhaps nothing short of a double-blind map for
grand tactical movement with several referees and complex
sighting rules can approach a solution.
Such simulations are rarely attempted and are then
seldom successful. They involve a tremendous amount of
work for the designer/referee and can hardly be played in
one's backroom or garage. Yet the difficulty of the problem
should not prevent our awareness of its effects. It is
possible that the effects of limited visibility could
beclefined and abstractly related to specific visibility
situations. Penalties or bonuses might then be applied to
a commander's capabilities based on his visibility
situation.
In any case, an accurate simulation of terrain effects
requires some sort of command and control rules in
addition to an accurate depiction of the terrain itself.
Related
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