The last year has seen the publication of three semi-fictional treatments of World War 3, set in 1957 1983 and 1985 respectively.
OPERATION: WORLD WAR III
Edited by Anthony Cave Brown.
Published by Arms and Armour Press at £
5.95.1 SBN 0-85368-123-6.
This is an edited edition with comments of the actual U.S. contingency plan produced in 1949 envisaging war breaking out in January 1957 and declassified in 1977 through the U.S. Freedom of Information Act. The editor has provided hindsight comments using information available since then.
In Europe, the Joint Chiefs of Staff hoped to be able to hold the Rhine and Italy south of the Appenines but thought it more likely that they would be pushed back to the Pyrenees and lose all of Italy. There was thought to be no significant chance of holding Scandinavia, and Britain was expected to be totally neutralised by nuclear bombing within 60 days, but it was thought that the mountains of south-east Turkey gave a good chance of halting a Russian drive towards the Arabian oil fields.
Strategic bombing of Russia with roughly one- third nuclear fission bombs and two-thirds HE was expected to cripple military production, transportation and fuel supply, but not in time to halt the initial expansion on the ground. Bomber losses were expected to be heavy.
Soviet strategic bombing was expected to be much less effective, partly due to having an even smaller nuclear stockpile than the U.S. at that time, but mostly because their aircraft could only reach the U.S. on one-way missions.
Neither side was envisaged using fusion weapons or rocket delivery systems or using fission weapons against tactical targets. Soviet naval power was considered to be largely of nuisance value only.
The final phase of the war was seen as a slow bitter ground slog to reconquer lost territory and occupy Russia. However, the manpower considered to be needed for this would have scraped the American and Canadian barrels and brought industry to a near halt.
The impact of the study at the time was to produce a realisation that much improvement was needed. By the time 1957 had really arrived, the overall situation was much better than had been envisaged.
The most important thing to emerge from hindsight is the appalling standard of the intelligence on which the Chiefs of Staff had to base their plan. It overestimated existing Soviet military capability, but greatly underestimated their research and development capability. It failed to consider probable changes in political alignment among nations, but greatly overestimated the effect of internal subversion. It even failed to forecast the aircraft that the USAF would be using in 1957 correctly. The fighter types mentioned are the F.90, F.91 and F.93, none of which saw service.
The book concludes with the editor's own scenario for war in 1957. Some bits I'll argue with. A few powerful British trade unions may have men of the far left at the top, but that doesn't mean they could call a general strike to interfere with national defense. Not without risking a stretched neck from their own members!
WORLD WAR 3
Edited by Shelford Bidwell.
Published by
Hamlyn at £ 5.95. ISBN 0-600-394166.
Edited by one of the most entertaining and original military thinkers of today from contributions by a number of respected specialists, this is a series of articles on aspects of modern war and crisis management, followed by a fictitious account of a World War breaking out 5 years from now, before any improvements from new NATO policies could take effect.
It is a worst-case scenario. Germany has lost faith in the American will to defend its allies at the cost of a nuclear exchange, and has set up its own nuclear weapons development program. The Russians launch a ground attack to take out the research establishment, first using the hot line to tell the other NATO nations that if they do not stand back as neutrals, nuclear war against them will follow.
An indecisive American president and left wing British and French governments agree. British troops in Germany at their alert positions are ordered to return to barracks, but they are reluctant to do so and clashes occur with the advancing Soviets. Out of position, with no reservists called up to fill out their ranks and war reserves of ammunition undrawn, the British troops are overwhelmed. The Germans are conducting a successful fighting withdrawal, and a war is obviously on.
American troops are ordered to intervene, and plough into the flank of the narrow Russian advance to their north. Air power is brought into play, A.10s and TOW helicopters start taking their toll. The Russians are suffering badly, shaken and touchy. The cut-off British in desperate straits use tactical nukes, the Russians respond with nuclear rockets on American airbases in Britain, and a full nuclear exchange commences, with disasterous results for both sides.
THE THIRD WORLD WAR -- AUGUST 1985.
By General Sir John Hackett and others. Published by Sidgwick & Jackson at £ 7.95. ISBN 0-283-98449-X.
This to my mind is the most interesting and useful of the three. General Hackett is an ex-Commanderin-Chief of the British Army of the Rhine, and it is an open secret that he was assisted in the writing of this book by very senior American, British and other NATO commanders who have to remain annonymous. It is a best-case scenario. Its assumption is that a new Conservative government taking office in 1979 increases defence spending by the minimum amount to enable the British army defending the North German plain to hold long enough against Russian attack for successes elsewhere to have their effect.
The book is entirely written as if a popular history of the war written shortly afterwards, with many first person ''Eye witness'' descriptions of sample events, and illustrated with suitably re-titled photographs. The result is very convincing.
The spark that starts the war is the assassination of Tito and rival Soviet invasion and U.S. Marine landings in support of opposed parties in Yugoslavia. An initial defeat in a small clash shakes Soviet prestige, and escalating sabre rattling ends in an invasion of West Germany without the use of nuclear weapons.
The attack is more or less held in the southern sector, slowed in the north. Denmark, much of north Germany and Holland are overrun. NATO establishes a measure of air superiority over the battlefield. F.15 fighters outclass the opposing fighters, F16s are at least equal. Tornado's and cruise missiles penetrate defenses successfully to severely damage Soviet airfields and communications. The UK air defenses are stretched by the scale of conventional attack, but keep the airfields open.
The Atlantic air bridge is flying in a constant stream of reinforcements and a series of large convoys battles its way across in face of missile attack from aircraft and submarines, getting through with heavy losses. The scale of air attack is cut down by ADV Tornados from the UK and many Russian submarines are lost to attacks by convoy escorts and their helicopters or in passing the Iceland gap. A Russian amphibious attack on Iceland is smashed. Norway holds out, slowing the Russians attacking through mountain country.
Enough reinforcements get through so that the American commander in Germany can afford a counterattack. The initial Soviet divisions have been used up by heavy losses from defending tanks, missiles, helicopters, guided artillery shells and cluster weapons, and have been withdrawn and replaced by fresh. These mount an attack across the Rhine at Venlo. As this is being held, the American counterattack gets under way towards Bremen. The Soviets realise the vulnerability of their long flank and withdraw in reasonable order to the frontier.
They have lost much face, and an attempt is made to recover it by a 5 megaton missile on Birmingham (England, not Alabama) accompanied with an ultimatum. The response is two American and British missiles on Minsk, following which there is an argument at a Supreme Soviet meeting from which the head of the KGB emerges with a smoking pistol as the new peaceable president.
The tactical side of this book is especially well done and presents some interesting ideas for modern gainers. One is that while special armour makes the latest modern tanks much less vulnerable to missiles, this does not apply to APC to the same extent, so that tactics aimed to separate tanks from their infantry support can work again. Another is that the single command tank of a Russian company is easily identified by its movements and makes an exceptionally profitable target.
I wish he hadn't nuked Birmingham though. I live there!
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