It has been previously pointed out that the "Big Five" were at war simultaneously during the period 1809-1815 only in 1813 and 1814. These years should probably be rejected as choices on the grounds that they were atypical years for the French Army. The Grand Army has been virtually destroyed in Russia in 1812.
The French units which fought the German campaign in 1813 and particularly the final campaign in 1814 tended to be substantially smaller than normal for French units, in the field. This was particularly so for cavalry units, which had great difficulty in securing mounts because of the tremendous loss of horses during the 1812 campaign. Generally only the units which had not actually gone into Russia were at anything like atypical strengths during the earlier years of the period under consideration.
One could attempt to depict average field strengths by applying some sort of percentile reduction to establishment strengths. This reduction may be the same for all nations, or may vary from nation-to-nation, according to historical variables established by the gamer or his group. If a common percentile reduction is used, the most discernable problem will be that finding one that produces manageable war-game units.
Seven figures on a single stand is awkward from a number of points of view; not the least of which is aesthetically. This problem could be alleviated somewhat by the figure-to-strength ratio chosen. But varying the ratio may unbalance the game by destroying built in time-distance features of the game rules. All in all, the more this approach is considered, the more problems.
Still another option is to go back to "square one". All nations have the same size infantry battalions, regiments or cavalry squadrons, and one games happily away, ignoring the jibes of the historian-player who wants to open Pandora's box. It's simple.
The gamer or group controls the investment of cash and paintingtime, which would probably make everyone happy if the units are kept small. It may not be accurate; it may not be historical, but those who are unhappy can always be sent on "detached service." The big disadvantage would seem to be that "carbon copy" organization will not be satisfying for long to the serious wargamer before he starts looking for something which seems to be preferable to everyone having a 24 figure infantry battalion and which looks more like historical reality. Nothing can break up a wargame group faster than that sort of thing.
Roster Systems
There are, of course, more options available. Roster systems and the like spring to mind. Setting a high figure-to-strength ratio and reducing infantry battalions and cavalry squadrons to single stand units with no differentation of types of soldiers included in the battalion/squadron also could be considered.
Perhaps the gamer, who by now in this article is saying to himself: "who cares" or is thoroughly confused by all of the problems involved, should simply pick a set of rules which are satisfying to him, organize his units as the rules provide and enjoy himself without worrying. A goodly wise man once said: "a wargame is a game which looks like war, but doesn't always play like war, or turn out like war."
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