by Allen Ray Garbee
My first attempt at writing a miniature wargame scenario was The Big Night Attack, published in The Courier # 63. That scenario, an attempt to recreate a historical battle, pitted the US 5th Cavalry Regiment on Los Negros Island, defending their beachhead against a general counterattack by Japanese troops. Though the Big Night Attack is a good, balanced scenario, the actual landing operation is a great game in its own right, and provides an excellent introduction to the amphibious warfare rules in Command Decision.
In November of 1943, the New Guinea campaign was drawing to a close. New long range operational plans called for the invasion of the Admiralty Islands (previously known as the German ruled Bismarck Archipelago) on or around 1 April 1944. Over the next three months the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) intelligence staff continually reevaluated their threat estimates, and reduced the size and capability of the Imperial Japanese Army garrison in the Admiralties. Enemy shipping activities dwindled to nothing, and aircraft were transferred to Rabaul or the Caroline Islands.
In the first week of February, the SWPA intelligence staff believed that Japanese strength in the Admiralties had reached a low, and that the Japanese airfields in the Admiralty Islands would soon be operational. General MacArthur ordered the landing date for the Admiralties operation advanced to 29 February 1944. In light of intelligence estimates predicting light resistance, as well as the short planning time available, the Admiralties operation shifted from being a full scale invasion to a "reconnaissance in force" by the reinforced 2nd Squadron of the 5th Cavalry Regiment.
These troops designated BREWER RECONNAISSANCE FORCE were transported by a 3 high speed destroyers (APDs) and 6 other destroyers. Naval fire support provided by a task group centered on the light cruisers Nashville and Phoenix and additional destroyers. Fifth Air Force was to provide fighter cover and general support bombing missions.
The 2/5th Cavalry was to land and determine the extent of Japanese resistance. If light resistance was met, the beachhead would be held, otherwise the cavalry troopers would withdraw to the transports. The goal of this force was to land on Manus Island at Hyane Harbor, then rapidly advance to capture Momote airdrome adjacent to the harbor. On the morning of February 29th, 1944, the BREWER RECONNAISSANCE FORCE began boarding landing craft for the landing at Hyane harbor.
US BRIEFINGThe first wave of the BREWER RECONNAISSANCE FORCE (BRF) will land at Hyane Harbor at 0815 hours. The BRF is ordered to reconnoiter the Hyane Harbor (BEACH WHITE) area, determine enemy troop strength, and secure Momote airfield. In the event of heavy enemy opposition the troops of the BRF will withdraw to BEACH WHITE and re-embark landing craft for evacuation. US ORDER OF BATTLETask Group 76.2 Transport Group, with:
USS Brooks, with 1 LCP(R) APD USS Sands, with 1 LCVP APD USS Reid DD USS Stockton DD USS Stevenson DD Task Group 76.3 Transport Escort Group:
USS Mahan DD USS Drayton DD USS Smith DD USS Bush DD USS Welles DD Task Group 74.2 Fire Support Group, with:
USS Phoneix CL USS Daly DD USS Hutchins DD USS Bache DD USS Beale DD Ground Forces: Supreme Commander SWPA, with 1 command stand (General MacArthur) Brewer Recon Force
1 staff pack radio stand 2/5th Cavalry Squadron
1 JASCO stand 1 recon infantry stand 1 ANGAU stand 1 battalion aid station stand
3 infantry stands 1 weapons stand
1 81 mm mortar stand (ds) 2 MMG stands 1 bazooka stand Platoon, Battery B, 99th Field Artillery, with; 1 75mm pack gun (bat. gun) 1 gun crew stand 1 AAMG stand 673rd Antiaircraft Machinegun Battery
2 AAMG stands NOTESANGAU: This stand represents a section of the Australia-New Guinea Administration Unit. It includes governmental officials, native interpreters and the like. The ANGAU stand is treated as a support stand for fire and combat purposes. DD cargo capacity: Though not listed in the Command Decision data charts, destroyers often carried small parties of troops. Each US destroyer in the transport group and the transport escort group has a carrying capacity of 1 stand. Supreme Commander SWPA: It's him, the one and only General Douglas MacArthur. The SWPA command stand will remain afloat and out of the chain of command until 1300 hours. Starting with the 1300 hours turn the SWPA command stand may be landed on the beachhead by a small boat. This act constitutes the commitment of the BRF to hold the beachhead until reinforced. If the MacArthur stand is eliminated by Japanese fire the US player(s) lose the game. The presence of the MacArthur stand can influence the outcome of the scenario. Though every stand in the game is theoretically subordinate to the SWPA command stand, it may only issue orders to the Brewer Recon Force command stand (Brig. General Chase). TO&E changes: The lack of shipping space and the recon nature of the landing meant that the Brewer Task Force took only man-portable weapons ashore. The 75mm gun must be manhandled by its crew. US SETUPThe US player(s) must devise a landing plan detailing the order in which the troops of the BREWER RECON FORCE will land. The initial landing wave begins 20" from the inlet to Hyane Harbor and consists of the 2 LCP(R) and 1 LCVP. Once clear of Hyane Harbor it takes 3 turns for the landing craft to return to the transport area, 1D6/2 turns to reload the landing craft and 3 turns for the landing craft to return to the harbor entrance. Naval gunfire support is provided in two ways: pre-landing bombardment and on-call fire support. Pre-landing bombardment is discussed in the referee's notes. On-call fire support is available from turn three onward, and consists of a light cruiser of the fire support group and 2 destroyers. An additional destroyer will provide close in fire support (at approximately 20" offshore) from turn three onward. This destroyer conducts its own spotting attempts and may engage any enemy stand detected. The cruiser has 1 OS2U FO plane available to direct its fire. Fifth Army Air Force will provide general support missions as part of the pre-landing bombardment. JAPANESE BRIEFINGBaba Force is ordered to defend the Hyane Harbor-Momote airfield area against landings by enemy forces. You have a strong infantry battalion, reinforced with antiaircraft and coast artillery at your disposal. Reinforcements may become available, additional troops are the Iwakami Force (2/1st Independent Infantry Regiment) to the north, and other soldiers of Col. Ezaki's Admiralties Island Garrison (51st Transportation Regiment) to the south and west. With the units at your disposal drive any invaders back into the sea. JAPANESE ORDER OF BATTLE1/229th Infantry Battalion
1 ammo cart 1 support stand 81mm mortar stand 1 20mm ATR stand
2 infantry stands 1 weapons stand
2 pillboxes
1 120L45 Type 3 (battalion gun) 1 weapons pit
1 gun crew stand 1 weapons pit
1 gun crew stand 1 weapons pit
1 weapons pit NOTESAA Machine Cannon Bn. - TO&E: Though never described as such in histories of the battle, the number of AA guns present is consistent with an antiaircraft machine cannon battalion, and has been represented as such. JAPANESE SETUPJapanese forces are deployed around the Hyane harbor-Momote airfield area. The Independent AA machine cannon battalion is deployed around the perimeter of Momote airfield as follows-the 1st battery is deployed on the interior side of the southern spit of Hyane harbor, 2nd battery along shore within 6" of the jetties (Beach White), third battery, anywhere within airfield complex. The 1/229th infantry is deployed as follows; the Headquarters and 1 company on the southern edge of the airfield complex. An infantry company on the northeast corner of the map (north side of harbor channel to Hyane harbor). A third company 6" north of the 'native skidway'. The machinegun company is divided between the north and south spits of Hyane Harbor. The remaining infantry company is located in the village of Porlaka. The coast gun battery is deployed at southeast point approximately 1,000 (20") yards south of the southern map edge along the beach. It has a line of sight to the ships in the transport area, as well as the ships in the fire support group. Initial deployment of stands should be done u sing hidden initial placement and map movement, or with the use of markers and dummy counters. In addition to the fortifications listed in the order of battle the Japanese player(s) have the following fortifications available: anywhere within the Momote airdrome complex-3 bunkers, 4 entrenchments, 1 weapons pit. Placed with any stands of the 1/229th battalion-4 entrenchments. All Japanese stands may begin the game emplaced (i.e. in cover no matter their position). The emplacement bonus applies to troops in bunkers and pillboxes and entrenchments, but is lost once the stands move. The Map
REFEREE'S NOTESPreliminary bombardment: Before the landing, Task Group 74.2 conducted a cursory bombardment of suspected Japanese positions. After all troops are deployed roll 1d6 for each Japanese fortification. The number rolled is the damage each structure takes. Any troops in destroyed structures are eliminated. Other troops are not effected. Game start and duration: The scenario begins with the 0745 turn and lasts for 18 turns. Each turn is scaled to represent 30 minutes of elapsed time. Air support: During the course of the scenario the United States players may receive air support. The aircraft operated under a general support mission as described in the rules and must either spot their own targets, or attack targets handed off from the JASCO stand. At the start of each turn roll 1D10, and check the air support table to determine what type of air support is available.
US Evacuation Plans: In the event of a catastrophe, US plans called for a fast transport (APD) to enter the harbor and embark as many men as possible. If all US landing craft are lost, one APD is permitted to attempt to enter the harbor to extract the landing force. Troop capacity is doubled for this purpose, as the troops only need to travel the short distance back to the task force. Weather: The climate in the Bismarck Islands is classified as wet tropical. Heavy rains fall throughout the year, and on most days. Reflecting the influence of weather, roll on the weather table at the start of the third turn and implement the effect (if any).
Further details of the effect of weather on visibility and movement can be found in the Command Decision II rulebook. VICTORY CONDITIONSVictory is measured by the efforts of the US player in reconnoitering the airdrome and harbor and creating a defensive beachhead and the success of the Japanese player in preventing the US player from accomplishing his objectives. The US wins a decisive victory, if at the end of the scenario there are no Japanese troops within the Momote airfield perimeter (defined by the taxiway around the main runway) and the 2/5th possesses a continuous defensive perimeter around the landing beaches. To count as a continuous perimeter, stands in the defensive line must be able to see adjacent stands. The US wins a marginal victory if they only possess a secure beachhead perimeter as defined above. The Japanese win by avoiding the United States conditions. The degree of the Japanese victory is determined by the number of stands the US player loses. For every 8 stands the US player loses increase the Japanese victory by one level. (For example, the US only possess a beachhead perimeter at the end of the game. This would normally be a marginal US victory, but since the US lost 8 stands, the victory level is shifted one level in the Japanese favor resulting in a marginal Japanese victory.) Lastly, the SWPA command stand (representing Gen. Douglas MacArthur) may be landed on the beachhead by the US players. If the SWPA command stand is landed, shift the level of victory one level in favor of the US players (i.e. marginal victory becomes major). However, if the SWPA command stand is eliminated by enemy action the US automatically lose the scenario. The propaganda value alone of MacArthur's capture or death will boost Japanese morale, while negatively affecting Allied morale and 'public opinion'. HISTORICAL OUTCOMEThe initial US landing waves met moderate fire from AA guns and machineguns emplaced on the spits flanking the harbor entrance causing several casualties, but resulting in minimal damage to the landing boats. The first troops ashore dashed into the edge of the woods lining the beach and established the beachhead with no losses. Throughout the morning the 2/5th Cav advanced through the coconut trees and across the airfield meeting only scattered resistance, and disposing of most of the anti-aircraft guns defending the airfield. General MacArthur came ashore around 1400 hours and instructed General Chase to hold what he had taken, reinforcements were on the way. After exploring the entire airdrome the 2/5th Cavalry pulled back and established a beachhead perimeter approximately 1000 yards long centered on the jetties at BEACH WHITE. The relative inactivity of the Japanese remains a mystery. Though communications between various units on Los Negros was wretched, the 1/229th Infantry failed to mount any serious immediate opposition to the landing of the BREWER RECONNAISSANCE FORCE. Though the 1/229th began mounting counterattacks the night of 29 February - 1 March, these were small disjointed uncoordinated company sized attacks that accomplished little except to waste valuable manpower. Though the 229th and the Iwakami Force continued to harass the US beachhead, it was not until the night of 3 - 4 March, 1944 that a large scale counterattack was mounted by the Japanese. By this time the US beachhead had grown to include the entire 5th Cavalry Regiment, plus supporting artillery and engineers, and though a close run affair the United States troops held on and crushed the Japanese attack. The role of naval gunfire support should be mentioned as a key ingredient in the US victory. Starting with the initial landings Allied warships engaged coastal guns, and provided close in fire support for the assault waves. Some of the inactivity of the Iwakami Force can be attributed to the devastating impact of gunfire from destroyers called onto the narrow bottleneck at the native skidway north of the harbor. BIBLIOGRAPHYChadwick, Frank. 1992. Armies of the Second World War: Volume 1. Game Designers' Workshop, Bloomington, IL. Related Back to Table of Contents -- Courier #70 To Courier List of Issues To MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1996 by The Courier Publishing Company. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. |