Height, in linear warfare, imparts many advantages on
the possessor over one's opponents. The physical act of traversing a slope (ascending, descending, or moving laterally across a slope) is more difficult than crossing level ground and can be extremely fatiguing. Cavalry cannot cross any but the shallowest slope at speed
and cannot charge down a slope greater than about 10% with the retention of any established order.
A mounted formation attacking up a slope must do so at a greatly reduced rate, lessening the physical and morale impact on the target. Steeper slopes prevent the transit of artillery. Even steeper slopes will prevent infantry from firing their weapons as both hands are required for balance and assistance in climbing the grade.
The maneuver of units in the Napoleonic period were rehearsed under
parade ground conditions - flat, extensive, and without intervening
obstacles. The primary weapon of the infantry being the very inaccurate
smooth bore musket, dense massed formations are required to produce
any substantive casualties on enemy formations. These formations
require precise control at all times under the best of conditions,
and are difficult to manage under any adverse conditions, such as
moving across a slope.
The extra time required to retain order, while
maneuvering on difficult terrain, is substantial and detracts from
the amount of time that can be appropriated for actually moving up
a slope or firing at the enemy upon the slope. This hardship is further
complicated by the vulnerability of the flanks of linear formations.
A formation cannot advance, exposing its flank, ahead of supporting
formations for fear of the enemy employing a flank attack and routing
the ascending formations. Therefore, the uphill assault must be conducted
in a location where security of flank is assured - or the pace of
the attack must be that of the slowest unit, allowing the defenders
to react to the deployed attacking troops at their convenience.
With the exception of a few tactically less efficient weapons, such
as howitzers and mortars, all major weapons on the linear battlefield
are direct fire weapons - to fire upon a target the firing crew must
be able to see the target.
Intervening Terrain
The presence of any intervening terrain, buildings, trees, hills . . . will block the line-of-sight and protect the target formation from casualties due to fire power. Natural positions
of defense on slopes tend to be on the flattened sections of the slope where positions have been developed, including walls, fences, and buildings. The physical positioning of these terrain features will provide greater protection to the defending forces as they will be shielded to a greater degree. The ascending troops will be less protected (i.e. an attacking infantry formation that is twenty feet from a wall, will gain little protec tion from the wall to descending fire, because more of the target is visible and vulnerable to direct fire weapons).
Artillery firing in support of the attack will be less effective than
usual as round shot fired against the slope bury themselves on first
impact. One of the advantages of round shot - the multiple bounce
- which makes it less sensitive to errors in elevation of the gun
barrel is lost when the ball sinks on first graze.
There is an innate morale ascendancy given by the advantage of height
in many animals. The perception of the inferiority of the ascending
position is evident throughout human history. A classic example being
the physical and emotional disadvantage of a dismounted man versus
a mounted man in single hand-to-hand combat; evolutionists may say
that this is a result of our primate ancestry and the security we
have always found at being high in the trees when threatened. What
ever the cause, men are emotionally more secure when in the elevated
position and this applies to single combat, hand-to-hand combat, and
fire combat.
Command and control of the attacking forces increases in difficulty
when the terrain is closed or elevated. The more irregular the terrain,
the greater the differences in its effect on the individual advancing
formations, and the more disjointed the attack will become, unless
closely and successfully monitored. The broken nature of the battlefield
will take some parts of the advance out of the line-of-sight of the
attacking commander. This may prohibit him from adequately supporting
a successful breach of the defenses, or forestall the arrival of any
reserves to shore up a routed segment of the line. Even if the line-of-sight
is clear to the friendly forma tions, the broken terrain will delay
or prevent the arrival of messengers (the pri mary means of communication
in linear warfare). This delay can inhibit any change of plan to take
advantage of an enemy failure in deployment or action, or may prevent
a friendly formation from taking proper defensive action, failing
to prepare for an unseen counter-attack.
Defensive Formations
One of the more significant effects of broken terrain and the advantage
of height in deployment is the inability to see the placement of the
defensive formations. This failure of intelligence as to the enemy
dispositions will lead to massive attacks against unheld, or lightly
held, enemy positions, removing large numbers of forces from the main
arena.
As equally significant will be the assignment of an insufficient
number of troops to attack a strongly held position, which can lead
to devas tating counterattacks. The lack of preparation can be evident
in the composition of the attacking forces as well as the numerical
comparison of combatants (i.e. the French Ist Corps at Waterloo was
not prepared for the emergence of the British reserve cavalry in the
early stages of the battle and the British charge effectively removed
the 1st Corp as an effective force for the remainder of the day).
The nature of the fog-of-war is further complicated by the lack of
accurate maps, and the significance of features than would not even
be on a good map, missing roads, poor road conditions, sunken roads,
soft ground . . . The inadequacy of contemporary maps made the individual
selection of the site of the battlefield very important. The commander
that had the strategic foresight to steer a campaign toward the terrain
of his choice had a considerable advantage once battle began.
The foreknowledge of the intricacies of a field, the placement of gullies,
hills, build ings, walls, sunken roads (as at Waterloo) can have a
decisive effect on the halting of an attack with the assistance of
favorable terrain. This information is denied to the attacker by the
very nature for which it was selected by the defender - the height
and broken nature of the field.
Continental Europe preferred to deploy for battle on the forward slope
of a defensive position, taking advantage of the slope to protect
the troops from artillery fire and allowing the friendly formations
to see the advancing enemy. It was also intended to intimidate the
individual attacking soldier by letting him see the imposing sta ture
of the defense. This system demands less training and courage on the
part of the individual soldier as he is not required to maneuver and
deploy in the last few moments prior to the deadly firefight.
Wellington is known for his endorsement of the deployment on the reverse
slope of a ridge. Preferably this ridge had a lateral road to allow
his reserves freedom of action, while denying this ability to the
enemy. The reverse slope has the advantage of concealing friendly
dispositions and protecting them from direct fire casual ties, but
it requires a greater degree of training and morale, for these troops
must be able to maneuver and advance into combat at the ridge line
at the moment of the enemy arriving at the summit.
To advance in this situation demands more from the troops than the Continental system
of deploying the troops prior to battle and let ting the enemy advance
towards you. The continental system also lets the defend ers stand
and fire upon the arrival of enemy forces, instead of advancing to
meet and exchange musket fire.
Linear Warfare
The advantage of height can be substantial in linear warfare when
the circum stances are controlled by the defender to maximize his
situation, while protecting himself from the same traps that he has
laid for his opponent. Regardless of the desirability of reverse or
forward deployment, both can lead to successful engage ments when
properly coordinated.
The attacker must be led into a position whereby his plans are disrupted by the terrain itself and this disorder must be taken as an opportunity for successful counterattacks, where possible. The possession of height, however, does not bestow upon the defender the
control of the lower ground. The defender controls only such ground
as his weapons can effective engage. The attacker must have a reason
for the scaling of the heights for the engagement to take place, but
once motivated to attack the considerable advantages of a properly
se lected battlefield and correctly deployed formations can do much
to counter either a qualitative or quantitative disparity.
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