TACTICS AND OPERATIONAL ART

The conflict was fought during a time when, after 200 years of little technological improvement, massive change was occurring in the technology of war. While Wellington would have been very comfortable commanding at the Battle of the Alama in 1854, the battlefield was remarkably different at Mars-la-Tour in 1870. Military leaders were struggling to understand the new relationships between mass, maneuver, and firepower that technology had created. The Russo-Japanese War was indecisive because the military leaders failed to master those relationships.

Tactically, the two armies entered the war with a similar doctrine. [5] Both trained to use firepower to close with the enemy, but believed that shock action was still the decisive act of the fight. [6]

Because of the importance of closing with the enemy, both armies employed denser firing lines than was in vogue in Europe. The normal sequence of an attack was to approach the enemy using battalion columns. Once the regiments entered effective artillery range, the lead battalions would deploy into company firing lines, while the following battalions would use company columns. Using fire and maneuver, the lead companies would move to within charge distance and rush the enemy. The Japanese stressed that the attacker must gain fire superiority prior to the charge, while the Russians didn't address the idea in their manuals. [7]

In practice, the difference was that the Japanese infantry would enter into a fire fight with the defender, and would not charge until the defender's fire slackened. The Russians, on. the other hand, would attempt to charge regardless of the defender's fire. The trailing companies of both armies would either reinforce the attack or help consolidate the objective once the enemy was defeated. Artillery was used to suppress the enemy during the approach and the assault.

Remarkably, 18 months of war did little to change the doctrine of either army. In all the battles during the war, both armies persisted in trying to frontally close with the enemy. The result was a predictably high casualty rate for both armies with no decisive success. The problem lay in the rigid discipline exercised by each army. Fire and maneuver were employed to close with the enemy, not to bypass him to gain an advantage on the flank or rear. The need to have mass during the charge required that fire lines maintain their alignment, slowing the forward movement. The concept of defeating an enemy by fire and infiltration tactics had to wait until 1918.

Under these conditions, how did the Japanese manage to succeed while the Russians failed? The answer seems to lie at the operational level of war. The Japanese army was more effective than the Russian army in executing operational level maneuvers. Additionally, the Japanese possessed the better intelligence service, providing them with a clear view of Russian plans and dispositions. Their Japanese leaders consistently displayed more initiative and cooperation, and were willing to take risks. The Russians suffered from divided command, poorly trained senior leadership, little intelligence, and weak staff work. While the Japanese plans were not brilliant, the Japanese leaders were able to aggressively and competently execute those plans.

Operationally and tactically, the Japanese preferred to attack. Early during the war on the tactical level, the Japanese began to combine a flanking maneuver with their normal frontal assaults. The frontal assault would pin the Russian forward line and force the commitment of their reserves, while a flanking maneuver would turn the Russian flank and cause them to retreat. Unfortunately for the Japanese infantry, the frontal assault was seen as the primary means of forcing the position, the flanking maneuver providing an alternate means of success.

On the battlefield, the Japanese infantry would needlessly take casualties trying to frontally overrun a Russian position, only to watch as the Russian infantry slip away once the Japanese flanking move threaten their position. Operationally, through maneuver, the Japanese would attempt to secure key points that threatened the Russian lines of communications, forcing the Russians to abandon their prepared positions.

A problem with this approach was that the Japanese considered gaining ground the decisive act that would lead to victory. Destruction of part of the Russian army while gaining this decisive ground was a hoped for side effect, but never the main objective. Additionally, the Russian defense was so strong that the Japanese normally would commit all their available forces to succeed, leaving the Japanese without fresh troops to gather the fruits of their victory. The result was that the Russians always possessed the strength to react to these moves and remove their army from danger. [8]

The Russians looked towards attrition to win the battles in Manchuria. A strong defense would weaken the Japanese attack, allowing a large reserve to counterattack and complete the destruction of the Japanese. Although the Russians recognized that tile enemy's defeat was the decisive objective, their surrendering of the initiative by adopting the defense, combined with their inability to sense the decisive moment to launch the counterattack, prevented them from winning the battles.

The Russians employed their large reserves poorly, normally deploying small numbers of troops to stabilize a situation rather than large numbers to master it. Russian attacks normally ended in failure because of the lack of reserves forward to consolidate the gains of their front-line units against Japanese counterattacks. Both of these situations forced a greater commitment of the army reserves, creating a cycle that would exhaust their reserves until the Russian position collapsed. The Russians often found themselves trying to extract their army from the jaws of a Japanese envelopment, their reserves piecemealed away during the previous days' fighting.

Russo-Japanese War

Historical Analysis
The War at a Glance (Chronology)
Books and Other Research Material
Army Organization: Japan
Army Organization: Russia
Uniforms and Standards: Japan
Uniforms and Standards: Russia
Miniature Figures


Russian Colors During the Russo-Japanese War