RUSSIAN INFANTRY

The Russian infantry again proved what the world already understood; that it was obstinately brave, blindly obedient, and possessed great physical endurance. However, these laudable qualities did not bring victory to the soldiers of the Tsar. It was not the Russian infantry that failed the leaders during the war, but it was the leaders that failed the infantry. The Russian soldier demonstrated time after time that he was the equal of his Japanese opponent.

For their war in Manchuria, the Russians employed four types of infantry units; European, Siberian, East Siberian, and Rifles. These units all shared the same battalion organization, each consisting of four rifle companies, a scout detachment, and a headquarters staff. The war strength of the East Siberian companies was normally 220 rifles, which differed from the other three types of units which had 235 rifles. The scout detachments varied in strength from 40-60 men. These detachments could either be mounted or dismounted infantry, normally depending on the availability of horses.

The regiments' differences were based on their place of origin. The East Siberian regiments were the regular troops stationed in the Far East at the war's outbreak. The Siberian regiments were formed from reservists recalled to the colors who lived in Siberia and the Maritime Provinces. The European and Rifle regiments that mobilized for the war were drawn from the regular army stationed in western Russia. The Rifle regiments, as their name implies, were trained and used as light infantry to support the European army corps. Though the Rifles were reputed to be better marksmen than the regular infantry, the reality was that there was little difference between the two.

These differences in origin also influenced the regimental organization of these units. The war found the East Siberian regiments in transition from a two to a three battalion organization. This was an attempt to increase the army's strength prior to the conflict without seeming to escalate the situation. The European and Siberian regiments each had four battalions, the normal number for a Russian regiment. The Rifle regiments were organized with only two battalions, reflecting their lineage from the Jager regiments of earlier periods.

The European, Siberian, and East Siberian regiments were formed into divisions. Two regiments comprised a brigade, with two brigades per division. The Rifle regiments formed independent brigades, with each brigade consisting of four regiments.

Many observers during the war stated that the Russian infantry man was inferior to his Japanese counterpart. The reality was that, in most cases, the Russian performed equally well. The difference between the two infantry's abilities reflected the quality of leadership. What the wargamer must understand is that the war was a total effort for Japan, while it was not for Russia. Japan sent her best soldiers (in fact, all of her soldiers) to her armies in Manchuria. Russia never fully mobilized her army during the war. Only nine corps, out of the 30 corps available in Europe, were sent to the Far East. Additionally, Russia did not mobilize her army in accordance to her prewar plans. Instead of mobilizing all her 1st class reservists across the nation to bring the regiments to war strength, the Tsar only mobilized selected provinces. To meet the total numbers required, the 2nd and 3rd class reservists in these provinces were also mobilized to fill the ranks of the regiments marching to war. So, instead of regiments filled with active soldiers and ones recently released from the colors, 40 year old men who had not handled a rifle for 20 years were sent to serve in Manchuria.

RUSSIAN CAVALRY

The Russians enjoyed a decisive advantage in cavalry throughout the war in Manchuria. The fact that their cavalry did not become the means of battlefield victory is explained by the ineffective Russian system of mobilization, the limitations of the Trans Siberian railway and the army's misplaced belief in the battlefield effectiveness of the Cossack cavalry. The better use of the Russian cavalry provides the period with many "what ifs".

The Russians employed two types of cavalry in Manchuria, dragoons and Cossacks. Each dragoon regiment consisted of six squadrons, with 145 sabers per squadron.

The Cossacks, the cavalry equivalent of the infantry reserve regiments, were similarly organized, with the squadrons called sotnias. As with her infantry, Russia did not deploy much of her excellent cavalry from Europe, but relied on the Cossacks to fight the war. Only three regiments of dragoons from the approximately Fifty cavalry regiments available were deployed to Manchuria.

It is interesting to note that these three regiments gave excellent service during the war, The Russian reliance on the Cossack cavalry did ease the logistical problem of supporting a large cavalry force 5,000 miles away in Manchuria. Unfortunately, the problem with this approach was that the Cossacks were poorly trained. Though the Russians possessed an incredible 6 to 1 superiority in cavalry, their cavalry achieved little on the battlefield.

RUSSIAN ARTILLERY

When the war began, the entire Russian artillery arm was re-arming with a new field piece. The East Siberian artillery was changing from the 1892 model breechloader to the 1900 model Putilow at the start of the war, while the units arriving from Europe were already equipped with the new gun. The Putilow was a great equipment improvement for the Russian gunners. It fired a larger round, had greater range, and doubled the rate of fire of the model 1892. The effectiveness of the new gun was not realized in the First battles due to the lack of training. Despite the fact the gun was not a true quick-firer, the Putilow came to dominate the Japanese artillery during the course of the war.

A Russian field battery consisted of eight guns. These batteries were organized into artillery brigades, with one brigade assigned to each infantry division. Here the organization becomes confusing. The number of batteries in each artillery brigade varied, based on whether the division was European, Siberian, East Siberian or a Rifle brigade. The organization of the European artillery was dictated at the corps level and will be discussed below. A Siberian or East Siberian division had four batteries in its artillery brigade while a Rifle artillery brigade possessed three batteries. The artillery brigades were numbered as their assigned parent units.

Horse artillery accompanied the cavalry during the Russo-Japanese War. The horse artillery was equipped with the same gun as the field artillery. A horse battery was assigned six guns, and, normally, two batteries (totaling twelve guns) were assigned to each cavalry division.

The Russians, like the Japanese, employed many makes of 12 heavy artillery. The number of guns in each battery varied, depending on the make of the guns, and their availability. The Russians entered the war lacking modern, heavy artillery (a problem that continued to plague them in the First World War). Most of their heavy artillery was converted naval ordnance and outdated pieces left over from earlier wars. The Russians never felt the need to change to artillery capable of blasting a defending enemy's fortifications due to the Japanese propensity of constant aggressive offense. Hence, the number of heavy batteries was limited, and the field gun was the most numerous artillery weapon on the battlefield.

HIGHER ORGANIZATIONS

The Russian infantry division lacked many of the refinements of the Japanese organization. A Russian infantry division consisted of two infantry brigades, an artillery brigade and four supply columns. It lacked many of the refinements that its Japanese counterpart possessed, and depended on its parent corps for support. The infantry corps was the basic fighting unit of the Russian army.

A corps consisted of two infantry divisions, a sapper battalion, a pontoon company, and a signal company. The corps normally possessed a cavalry division, but in Manchuria the cavalry component varied in size from nothing to a division. The sapper battalions provided support to the corps to construction of field fortifications and for the assault on enemy positions. The pontoon company provided the bridging capability and heavy construction for the corps. Some divisions were assigned a machine gun company. This company was organized like an artillery battery and had four machine guns.

Three Rifle Brigades were sent from Russia to reinforce the Manchurian Army. These brigades were formed into a composite Rifle Corps that fought at San-de-Pu and Mukden. Lacking the support structure of a regular corps, the Rifle Corps did not prove to be a robust organization. After the war, the Russian Commander in Chief, GEN. Kuropatkin, wrote, "If I had kept them as independent brigades, it would have been unnecessary to take brigades away from army corps whenever independent brigades were required". [4]

Remember the aforementioned artillery organization for the European divisions? For the European divisions, it was the corps structure that guided the artillery organization. In a European corps, the rule of thumb was that the corps would have fourteen batteries. This meant that one artillery brigade in one division would have eight batteries and the other artillery brigade in the other division would have six. One must use an OB to determine which European division had what size artillery brigade. This difference tended to disappear as artillery losses caused the Russians to cross-level pieces between brigades. By the Battle of San-de-Pu in January, 1905 , all the artillery brigades of the European divisions consisted of six batteries.

The cavalry was formed into brigades, with two regiments in a brigade. This could, and often did, vary with the Cossack regiments, with up to four regiments in one brigade. Two brigades would form a division, with two attached horse batteries. A cavalry corps could be formed, normally consisting of two divisions.

During the first part of the war, the Russian Manchurian Army was divided into a Eastern and Western Detachment. After the Battle of Liaoyang, the Tsar recognized that the army was too large for one man to command effectively. He directed the formation of the 1st and 2nd Manchurian Armies, both under the Commander in Chief, Russian Forces. As the Russian army increased in strength, the 3rd Manchurian Army was formed in January, 1905. All these armies varied in size, based on mission and the commander.

Russo-Japanese War

Historical Analysis
The War at a Glance (Chronology)
Books and Other Research Material
Army Organization: Japan
Tactical Doctrine
Uniforms and Standards: Japan
Uniforms and Standards: Russia
Miniature Figures


Russian Colors During the Russo-Japanese War