Bataan! The very sound of its name is enough to give tingles to those of us who grew up with Saturday afternoon B-Grade movies as staple entertainment. Bataan! What a glorious but hopeless fight. Who can forget the movie "Bataan" or its equally renowned sequel (set some years later) "Back to Bataan"? American regulars, Philippine conscripts, the elite Philippine Scouts, the Imperial Japanese Army - they were all there. What better period to run a campaign than this? Surprisingly, the campaign, at least on land, was more equally matched than the popular histories would have you believe. The Filamerican forces achieved some notable successes against the Japanese. They were more abandoned and overwhelmed than overmatched. The effects of this defeat are felt to this day. The archipelago fell to the United States with the defeat of the Spanish fleet at Manila during the "splendid little war" that closed out the Nineteenth Century. The Spanish-American War was in itself a minor affair brought about more by an American Jingoistic press than by any great causus belli on the part of Spain. It was by all criteria a foregone conclusion. In any event, the adolescent republic found itself counted among the great powers with a colonial empire to boot. Heady stuff fora nation that had just closed its continental frontier. It was soon realized, however, that the islands were in reality an expensive albatross that the nation had little desire to exploit and even less to defend (even if that were possible). Even with the completion of the Panama Canal and island way stations such as Wake, Midway, and Hawaii, the American Navy could barely maintain its stature as a first rate fleet, let alone defend both ocean marches. On the other side of the Pacific, the ancient empire of Japan was rapidly hurling itself into the Twentieth Century. Defeating both China and Imperial Russia, it was rapidly becoming a power to be reckoned with. Humiliating treaties and condescension on the part of the Europeans and their American cousins were bound to lead to a clash at some point. When that point came, America, Great Britain, and France would be hard pressed to defend and maintain their Far Eastern possessions. American has always been uncomfortable with the thought of being an exploitative colonial power, at least outside its North American possessions. We have always liked to think of ourselves as a bit more fairminded and moral than everyone else. As a liberal democracy we try very hard to hide our very real class and social differences with traditional values and platitudes. We have always wanted people to like us despite our failings. To some extent we have succeeded and it was this perception and attitude that planned for the eventual disposition of the Philippines. By the mid-1930s, American had taken significant steps to prepare the islands for independence in 1946. With the granting of Commonwealth status in 1935, autonomy was progressively granted in most domestic (and some foreign) affairs. America's second soldier, MG Douglas A. MacArthur, was allowed to retire from Active status with the U.S. Army and become the military advisor to the Commonwealth of the Philippines with the local rank of Field Marshal of the Philippine Army, the invention of which was among his first tasks. MacArthur chose his staff and began the work. The human material he had to work with was good and with time became formidable soldiers. Indeed, the U.S. Philippine Scouts (PS), Filipino regulars led by American officers, were among the best soldiers in the American Army. (The Scouts were carried on the American Regular Establishment.) To consider them to be veteran troops would only barely do them justice. But at the moment, MacArthur was not dealing with the Philippine Scouts! The General needed time - his plan called for a ten year program - but he was given less than half that time. Personnel were given six months of training and released from active duty. NCOs were given additional training as were the officers. Each year there were two call-ups of recruits. Theoretically, by 1946 this should have been able to provide a large pool of trained individuals. On paper the plan looked fine - in reality it was to have many shortcomings, mostly due to the limited funds available to the government. It was obvious that the United States would have to provide a significant military presence for the foreseeable future. AMERICAN AND FILIPINO FORCES The Philippines were defended by a mixed bag of troops as war clouds gathered in 1941. These ranged from the long-service veterans of the Philippine Scouts (PS) to the reserve divisions of the Philippine Army (PA) who in most cases were barely trained. This was truly a military backwater as far as the United States' Army was concerned, suitable for the soldier's "last post" before a dignified retirement (as in the case of Parker and King) or quiet rehabilitation without embarassment (Wainwright supposedly had a severe drinking problem). Equipment was for the most part obsolete, even by the standards of the contemporary American Army. New equipment was promised, some even shipped. Reinforcements from the United States had arrived and more were scheduled. Time was the biggest factor. It was a race between the Japanese plans and the transition of America to the "arsenal of democracy". Democracy lost. The United States' Army Forces, Far East (USAFFE) rapidly gained strength as 1941 waned. Artillery, anti-aircraft, tanks, and even self-propelled 75's made it to the islands. Over eighty modern fighters (P-40Es) were in position. Almost forty heavy bombers (B-1 7 D/Es) were based at Clark Field. Second-line aircraft were also available (P-35 and 36s). The major American ground unit was the unnumbered Philippine Division (Wainwright's original command) which consisted of the 31 st U.S. Infantry, the 45th and 57th PS Regiments as its backbone with artillery support provided by the 23rd and 24th Field Artillery. Also included were the usual combat support and service support elements. The title "Division" was more an administrative convenience rather than a tactical designator. Further artillery support was provided by the 86th and 88th FA battalions of the Philippine Scouts. In 1941, the 192nd and 194th Tank Battalions with 108 M3 light tanks manned by mobilized National Guardsmen landed. Soon came some fifty self- propelled 75mms (SPM), coast artillery and anti-aircraft units and the personnel to use them. From Shanghai came the evacuated 4th Marines, tough fighters and veterans who would make a significant contribution to the gallant defense. ARMS AND ORGANIZATION The U.S. 31st Infantry was the closest equivalent to a Foreign Legion the American Army had. Assigned to the Philippine Division, itself a regular formation on the Army List, the regiment never served on the North American continent. Raised for the Siberian Expedition in 1919, its regimental insignia was a polar bear, hence their nickname "The Polar Bears". The officers and NCOs were all American Regulars as were about a third of the enlisted. By 1941, about two-thirds of the soldiers were recent draftees with less than six months training. The 31st was a triangular regiment with a Headquarters and a Headquarters Company, Regimental AT Company, Service Company, medical, signal, and other support units. The combat power lay in its three infantry battalions, each organized into a Headquarters and a Headquarters Company, three Rifle Companies, and a Weapons Company (3-81 mm/ 75mm mortars, 12-30 calibre water-cooled medium machine guns). Companies also followed this pattern: Headquarters Section, three Rifle Platoons, and a Weapons Platoon (3-60mm motrars, 4-.30 calibre aircooled light machine guns). The 31 st was in the process of modernizing its equipment prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Each rifle squad (a rifle platoon had three) of eleven men had a BAR with the rest armed with M1 Garand rifles. Small arms ammunition was adequate, although there was a shortage throughout the campaign of hand grenades. 60mm ammunition was rarely available so a significant asset of the company and battalion commanders was absent. Although the MTOE called for 81mm mortars at the battalion level, ammunition was often in short supply and husbanded carefully. There was good amounts available of 75mm Stokes mortar (WWI) ammo on the islands and this was fired instead, with understandably, a great loss of accuracy. The fact that this Great War ammunition (most recent lot dates were 1919) had a 60% dud rate due to the deterioration of the fuses also did not contribute to a high degree of confidence among the men as to the effectiveness of their barrages. Regimental assets included an ATCompany with six 37mm AT guns of the latest type. The 45th and 57th PS Regiments were similarly organized and equipped although there is some question as to whether they too had M1s or were stilled equipped with M1903 Springfields. It also appears that they had fewer automatic weapons, machine guns, and mortars. AT weapons in the Scouts were older models for the most part, notably the M1916 37mm gun. These deficiencies in equipment were greatly overcome however by the exceedingly high quality of the Scouts themselves - all were long-service regulars that must be at least considered veterans and possibly elites. Artillery support for the Philippine Division was a happier story. Both the two battalion 24th FA and the one battalion 23rd FA were well-trained and equipped although the guns were \WWI (or earlier) vintage. The battalions were organized traditionally into a number of firing batteries: the 23rd had four4-gun batteries of 75s and two batteries of 2.95" mountain howitzers (model 1903). Each battery had four howitzers The 23rd also was organized into four-gun batteries: two of 75s and one of 2.95" howitzers. The vast majority of the Japanese combat casualties were from artillery fire! Although not part of the Philippine Division, the 26th PS Cavalry was another veteran unit. Unlike its counterparts back in the United States, it was organized into two squadrons of three troops each. The regimental Headquarters included a motorized reconnaisannce troop with White Scout Cars. Each squadron had three mounted troops. The heaviest weapons carried by the mounted troops was two or three .30 cal. LMG. Training and discipline was extremely high in this organization and their delaying actions during the retreat to Bataan were classics of the genre. The last mounted cavalry charge by American forces involved the Scouts and it scattered a large Japanese force, buying time for the retiring Filamerican Army. At the other end of the spectrum was the Philippine Army (PA). This was the national army of the Commonwealth, and though officered by local Filipinos they were "advised" by American officers and NCOs. First planned by MacArthur in the mid-thirties, the army was designed to be suitable to both the economy and terrain of the Philippines. It was essentially a light infantry force based on a triangular division structure with about 7,500 men. This was about half the size of the American Infantry Division at that time. Established by the National Defense Act of 1936, it consisted of a regular force of 10,000. This number included the 6,000 man paramilitary Philippine Constabulary and the remaining 4,000 forming the cadre for two regular divisions (the 1st and 2nd) and eleven reserve divisions (numbered 11th, 21st, 31st, 41st, 51st, 61st, 71st, 81st, 91st, 101st, 102nd). The individuals to man these forces were to be drawn from the ten military districts within the Islands. Training within the divisions emphasized the usual military subjects (the tasks complicated by the numerous languages spoken by the recruits and the fact that few of the American instructors spoke Tagalog) with tactical training in the areas of defense (both linear and in depth) scouting, patrolling, and counterattack. Though each recruit was given but 51/2 months training, it was envisioned that there would be time upon mobilization to complete the training before deployment. Division organization mirrored the triangular American model with three infantry regiments, an artillery regiment, and the usual supporting elements such as engineers, medical, quartermaster, signal, MP, and ordnance. There were some notable differences in weapons and equipment when compared to the standard American division, mostly brought about by shortages in key items of equipment. For example, 81 mm mortars were held at the regimental level instead of battalion (3" or 75mm Stokes mortars were often substituted). The heaviest weapons at the battalion level was the MG Company (2 platoons each with 4-30 calibre medium machineguns). Artillery was mainly British 75mm field guns with wooden wheels or the 2.95" mountain howitzer. Fire control equipment was mostly missing so that the use of direct fire was common (with devastating effect). Unfortunately, the lack of so many pieces of equipment necessary for the successful prosecution of modern warfare seriously hampered the operations of the Allied forces in the Philippines. THE JAPANESE FORCES The Imperial Japanese forces that invaded the Philippines have been often denigrated as fanatical, poorly armed peasants who were less than fully civilized and enjoyed inflicting pain and terror on their victims. Even today, these stereotypes exist though their focus is somewhat altered. Unfortunately, our perspective is Western and Eurocentric and thus Japanese culture was and continues to be alien. The Imperial Army was primarily an infantry force that was suited to the needs of a nation that controlled a far-flung empire of great area but only of limited development in the modern sense. For that it was wellequipped. The weapons were light with good hitting power (save fo the 6.5mm small arms which were comparatively weak). The soldier himself was well-trained and hardy, capable of living off the land by forage as necessary. Highly disciplined and motivated, he was led by competent and brave officers who knew the importance of leading from the front. (Unfortunately, their distinctive armament, a sword, caused them to become easily identified targets.) Although the Japanese organized their forces in conventional triangular units (divisions, regiments, battalions, etc., the use of "mixed brigades" or Dokuritsu Kensai Ryofan was often substituted for a division-sized unit. The initial battles for Bataan were fought with the Japanese 65th Brigade which had originally been planned as a garrison or mopping-up unit. It was composed of older men and reservists who were not considered to be fully fit for front line service. As the Imperial High Command held both the American and Filipino forces in contempt, this element was thought to be sufficient to reduce the Bataan Garrison to proper submission. It was essentially decimated by the defenders. A division was generally triangular in organization. Each of its three regiments was self-contained in that it had its own artillery, antitank, and support units. Engineer, reconnaissance, and additional support units were attached. The divisional reconnaissance regiment was usually retained under the division's control. Two divisions were initially assigned to the reduction of the Philippines, the 16th and 48th. Both however were withdrawn before the initial Bataan battles and were only re-committed after the stunning defeat of the 65th Brigade. Japanese armored units were used primarily in the infantry support role. Prior to the success of the German blitzkrieg. this was accepted as their primary role by most of the great powers. The vehicles were light but welldesigned, evenly matched to the American M3s that they would face. Two models were found in the Philippines, the Type 95 with a short 37mm Pun of limited value and the Type 97 with a more modern design and short, low-velocity 57mm gun. Both however were useful weapons in the infantry support role. Only one Tank Regiment, the 7th, was assigned to the Philippines. Its record was mixed, in part due to its obsolete doctrine but also due to the heavily vegetated terrain over which it was forced to operate. WWII Philippine Campaign Historical Introduction Wargame Organization: Fila American Wargame Organization: Japanese Scenario: Scouts at Mabatang Back to Table of Contents -- Courier #56 To Courier List of Issues To MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1991 by The Courier Publishing Company. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. 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