The conclusion of World War II saw the emergence of two superpowers: the United States and the Soviet Union. Both had been major powers before the war, but 1945 found the Soviet Army as the largest in Europe and the United States Navy and Army Air Force as the most dominant strategic forces in the world. This initial difference in each country's forces influenced the developments in each nation's doctrine.

The Soviet Union has as a major military objective the prevention of any invasion of its homeland. The Soviets suffered an unimaginable loss of twenty million men, women, and children during World War II. These losses and the damage done to European Russia during the war are at the heart of all Soviet strategic considerations. The pre-war Soviet policy of maintaining a large standing army has been reinforced by this objective. The result is that the Soviet Union has maintained a large peacetime army during the post-war period.

The Soviet Army's basic doctrine has remained primarily offensive-oriented since World War II. Its view is that if war in Europe breaks out, the interests of the Soviet Union would best be served by immediately seizing the offensive and maintaining it until the forces of the West are defeated. This is viewed as the shortest method of ending the war and reducing the losses, at least when compared to a longer conflict. The doctrine is designed to prevent any reoccurrence of the losses of World War II.

The size and offensive doctrine of the Soviet Army, the continued occupation of Eastern Europe, and the Soviet's self-avowed goal of achieving world Communism are perceived as a serious threat by the Western Allies. It is this perceived threat that has shaped U.S. doctrine since the end of World War II.

The United States' national military objectives since the forties have been primarily defensive. The U.S. and her allies formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 to establish a common defense against Soviet aggression. Due to the nature of the organization, NATO's military objective has been the defense of Western Europe. The U.S. objective is to support this effort.

The national objectives and military doctrines of both armies easily lead to the most commonly examined scenario of a U.S.Soviet conflict: the Soviet invasion of Western Europe. The prospect of facing a Soviet Army many times its size has been instrumental in shaping American doctrine for four decades. U.S. doctrine has been modified several times in that period. Some of the changes have been evolutionary and made minor adjustments to the established doctrine. However, three revolutionary overhauls of American doctrine for the conduct of combat operations have been effected. Two of these were developed directly to counter a Soviet invasion of Europe.

US Doctrine History

Unlike the relatively static Soviet doctrine, U.S. doctrine has had an interesting history.

In the initial years after World War II, the U.S. Army suffered a major reduction in strength, role, and training. The Army's role was one of occupation. Its strength limited any other capabilities. Due to political considerations, no simulated exercises were conducted. The U.S. leadership saw no need for any defensive strategy other than to rely on strategic bombers carrying atomic bombs. As a result, the U.S. Army was totally unprepared for the war that erupted in Korea.

After a mobilization was conducted and experience gained, the Army acquitted itself well in Korea. Despite the performance, however, the Army was reduced again after the ceasefire. The Korean War had succeeded in bringing about a renewed sense of purpose and need for the Army. Washington realized that the threat of atomic attack by strategic bombers had failed to deter China from intervening in the war. There was obviously a need for strong conventional forces in the atomic age.

Despite being reduced in strength and neglected in budget, the Army was active in developing a new doctrine. With the introduction of tactical atomic weapons in the early fifties, serious consideration was given to the changing battlefield environment. In the mid-fifties, a revolutionary new doctrine was adopted.

Up to that point, all divisions featured a triangular organization: three regiments, each with three battalions made up of three companies. The new doctrine created a pentomic organization. Each division would have five battlegroups, each composed of five companies. Contemporary thought held that the pentomic division would be able to form a five-sided defensive perimeter to support itself when isolated on the atomic battlefield. Subsequent maneuvers proved the doctrine was sound only for strongpoint defense. It was woefully inadequate for offensive operations. The five-company battlegroup was too small to be effective in an aggressive role.

During the early sixties, the Army again revised its doctrine. The new doctrine, centered around the Reorganization Objectives Army Division (ROAD), was a return to the triangular structure and its capabilities. Each division had three brigades, but each brigade was no longer a rigid structure. It would consist of as many battalions as the situation required. Additionally, the brigade would contain a mixture of battalions. For example, a brigade in a mechanized infantry division would contain both armor and infantry battalions. The previous triangular organization limited infantry divisions to infantry regiments.

This new doctrine focused on the concept of combined arms. Armor, infantry, artillery, aviation, air defense, and engineering support would all be integrated to produce a stronger whole product. This concept had been in existence to some degree in combat commands of armored divisions since World War II, but now it became army-wide doctrine.

This organization remains roughly in place today. There have been many revisions of this structure as doctrine has continued to evolve since the sixties. These changes usually involved reorganizations at the battalion level and below, with modifications to the support elements. Most of the changes have been the result of shifts in doctrinal thinking about the execution of combat arms operations.

During the 1960's, the U.S. involvement in Vietnam led to the introduction and deployment of airmobile units. The use of the helicopter as a transport for infantry and as a weapons platform would have a major impact on the Army's doctrine in the seventies and eighties. During the Vietnam conflict, Army doctrine in Europe remained unchanged from the original ROAD concepts. As the war ended, however, attention shifted back to a potential U.S. - Soviet conflict and produced another revolutionary doctrine.

The combat arms realized that a war in Europe would find the U.S. Army having to fight outnumbered and win. Plans were developed for fighting a "come as you are" war. Soviet tactics and strategies were analyzed in an attempt to design a tailored doctrine that would attain the kill ratios needed to overcome the disparity in land force strength. From squad level to battalion operations, basic tactics were restructured.

The emphasis of the new doctrine was on achieving a maximum number of kills while preserving the U.S. force. Destroying the enemy and trading space for kills formed the basis of all operations. The concept of operating with an overwatch element even at the lowest level was introduced. An overwatch element is a portion of the maneuvering unit that is observing the maneuver from a vantage point, able to maneuver or provide covering fire as needed. This, it was felt, would minimize losses in an engagement.

At higher levels, the concept of an active defense became the watchword. A unit would defend in a zone moving from battle position to assigned battle position as the situation developed. An innovative concept, the active defense governed the training of the army for a decade. The doctrine was modified and replaced due to two primary shortcomings: a lack of addressing the offensive and problems with operational depth. The solution to these problems led directly to the current Army doctrine, called AirLand Battle.

More Modern Battle Doctrine

Introduction
Objectives and Doctrine
Weapons and Doctrine
Terrain and Doctrine
Soviet Army Doctrine
US Doctrine: AirLand Battle