The operational doctrine of the Bundeswehr, as with the AirLand Battle doctrine of the United States, is designed to take advantage of the centralized planning, with its inherent lack of subordinate initiative, that the Soviets are expected to use in any potential invasion. Ultimate success of this doctrine is dependent on getting inside the enemy's decision cycle. The German commander must think faster and react quicker than his Warsaw Pact counterpart. The key is to break the synchronization of the primary enemy attack and so disrupt the timetable for employment of the second echelon (follow-on) forces. NATO's perceived advantage in its flexibility and mobility, coupled with timely and accurate intelligence, are then used to counterattack into the flank and rear, cut off main thrusts, and ultimately blunt the enemy offensive.

The Bundeswehr has had a major dilemma when establishing its own defense doctrine. Historically, the German armies have used "defense in depth" operations, trading space for time, before striking back at the enemy's overextended flank and taking the initiative away. With the geographical vulnerability of the FRG, however, this type of defense won't work. A strong forward defense is needed. But a static defense is ineffective as well, given the Soviet's numerical superiority and ability to initiate multiple breakthroughs, so the Bundeswehr trains to be flexible.

The word used to describe the Bundeswehr doctrine is Beweglichkeit , which means mobility of armored troops on the battlefield and flexibility of all its leaders. The focal point of Beweglichkeit is rapid changes in the type of combat and defense shown the enemy: switching from positional defense to counterattack, delay actions to prepared defense. Such tactics will enforce a constant attrition on the Soviet's main advances, making them alter plans and commit their reserves early.

Achieving Beweglichkeit requires several factors. First, it requires that the armed force all have the same mobility and maneuver capability on the battlefield. The Leopard II MBT and the Marder IFV provide this mobility in 32 of the Field Army's 36 brigades. The doctrine demands a lot from its logistics and maintenance support units, which have to be able to keep up with the constant changes. More importantly, Beweglichkeit depends on the leaders, from brigade level down. An operational goal is defined from higher authorities and then left to subordinate commanders to implement. They have to be able to assess the situation, maneuver quickly and change tactics constantly. A 1982 discussion of Beweglichkeit described it this way

Company commanders and platoon leaders must transform Beweglichkeit in "command and control" into rapid an effective action. This requires the will for independent action, the courage to take risks, the ability to commit disengaged forces, to withdraw unengaged forces, and to concentrate at the main point of effort to defeat the enemy.

It demands a lot from its leaders.

Key Mission

With this basic philosophy, the Germans have a single key mission in the defense of their Republic: the enemy will be destroyed and key terrain will NOT be yielded. To achieve this mission, the bulk of the German forces will fight from prepared positions, established throughout the depth of their defensive area (Figure 8). The depth of a defensive area allows the German commanders to control a larger area, disperse units from artillery and reconnaissance, and provide additional room for maneuver. The panzers will be used everywhere, fighting from positions and shifting as required. The panzergrenadiers will fight dismounted on a front of one company per 500 meters, with their IFVs in support. The antitank defense will rely in large part on the engineers to establish obstacles that will channel the enemy through predetermined killing zones.

The other key to the forward defense is reserves. Each defensive area will keep a small mobile reserve in order to reinforce the forward positions if needed, and to intercept any enemy units that penetrate the area.

Once the enemy attack has been blunted and the enemy's main efforts located, the Germans can begin shifting to a more mobile, offensive role. The counterattacks will be used

1) to destroy halted enemy units before reinforcements can reach them;
2) to attack advanced enemy units and cut them off; and
3) to recapture terrain that must be in friendly hands.

As critical as the frontline combat units is their support, particularly the artillery. In the German tactical doctrine, artillery has six basic missions:

1. Hinder enemy armor and smash unarmored units during their approach;
2. Provide counterbattery fire against enemy artillery;
3. Support combat units with direct protective fire;
4. Watch barriers, gaps, and exposed flanks;
5. Disrupt penetrating enemy units and reserves;
6. Support counterattacks.

Although the brigades will bear the main brunt of the fighting, divisional and Corps assets will be used extensively in support. Corps headquarters will provide additional artillery and engineers to the various sectors as needed. It will plan air support and regulate cooperation between bordering divisions. It can also use its attached airborne brigade as either a defensive reserve or a strateeic offensive weapon.

The divisions support their brigades with heavy artillery and multiple launch rocket systems, air defense, and their organic reconnaissance battalions. Another divisional asset is the two light infantry battalions that will be available after mobilization. Although these non-armored units lack the protected mobility on the battlefield, they can prove tenacious in difficult terrain with their strong anti-tank and infantry assets which include 18 MILAN launchers, 60+ light anti-tank rockets, mortars, and machineguns.

Considering that nearly 40% of the German countryside is heavily forested or populated, these units will be able to perform their missions and free up the armored forces for maximum use else where. Under certain circumstances, it is even possible to create a kampfgruppe (battle group) for a limited period in the form of a reinforced infantry regiment, consisting of both light infantry battalions and the divisional armored reconnaissance battalion.

In conclusion, the Bundeswehr provides a modernized, heavily-armored, highly-mobile, aggressive force to man NATO's front line. Its Field Army, backed up by the reserves in the Territorial Army, has the tools and training to potentially stop the Soviets - as long as the other NATO allies do their share.

More Bundeswehr Mission, Organization, and Doctrine

Introduction
Organization
Territorial Army
Defense Doctrine: Beweglichkeit