The Importance of Will

The object of battle on land is not the destruction of the enemy. That may be a result of winning the battle, but it need not happen. The object of battle -- land battle -- is "to disorganize the enemy by disrupting the cohesion of the will of his fighting men. This disorganization can be achieved by either enveloping his flank or breaking his line. The art of battle consists in maintaining and strengthening the psychological cohesion of one's own troops while at the same time disrupting that of the enemy's." (Beautre) Thus battle has a psychological, not a physical, objective.

Sometimes, of course, the enemy can simply be overwhelmed and killed. If enough enemy soldiers die the battle is won. This kind of victory is both rare and costly.

Another means of achieving victory is through materiel: after the enemy expends his last round, he can no longer fight. This kind of victory most often resulta from siege operations. Sometimes it is forced on a commander of mobile forces when an isolated enemy refuses to panic: MacAuliffe at Bastogne forced the Germans to besiege him.

Although there are famous exceptions, the usual result of operations against the flanks and rear of an army is that very panic and disruption that took place after the Panzer breakthroughs at Sedan. Most battles, large or small, are won by breaking the enemy's will than by depriving him of the means to fight, or killing him.

ANY SIMULATION THAT DOES NOT RECOGNIZE THIS BASIC PHENOMENON IS A BAD SIMULATION.

There are exceptions to the psychological dominance over the material, and Jutland and Panzerblitz happen to have chosen two of them: but in general most campaigns cannot be simulated without a great deal more attention to morale factors than present designers are giving them.

Surprise!

Of all principles of war, I believe surprise to be the most important. The purpose of surprise is "to generate uncertainty in the mind of the opponent. Surprise may result from weapons or technology, but the actual surprise is not in the weapons system; it is in the mind of the staff being surprised.

The devastating effect of surprise in the past has been caused by the fact that members of a particular staff have for years conditioned their thinking according to firm expectations of enemy behavior [or capability] and have carried out all their calculations within that framework. Suddenly the basic assumptions are proved false. The result is a paralysis of will and thinking that often makes it impossible to carry out even those adaptations which should be accomplished within the time available." (S.T. Possony and J.E. Pournelle, THE STRATEGY OF TECHNOLOGY, Dunellen, 1970)

Now this is precisely what we cannot do in a war game. No matter what set of probabilistic options we give a player -- such as a rule that lets him airlift ten tank corps provided that he rolls a six on the die -- his opponent knows it is possible. He may not be very well prepared when it happens, but he always knew it could happen.

In 1940, the Allied High Command (and the German General Staff for that matter) were totally surprised by the Blitzkrieg. The impossible was happening, and they didn't understand it. We may call them "idiotic," but how rational would we be if, in a Napoleonic game, an opponent were suddenly allowed to introduce machine guns and aircraft?

In fact, the only war game I have ever seen in which there was real, mind-boggling, devastating surprise was a WW II armored miniatures game in which a Panzer Battallion commander suddenly found himself facing -- Godzilla. Complete with detailed rules for the monster's combat capabilities. The result was amusing -- and quite predictable, although later plays showed that the tanks could generally win.

Yet, if we want to simulate war and strategy we must have surprise. We can't accomplish it with "secret rules" and have a playable game although that will produce, sometimes, good simulations.

Therefore: we can have some good games without surprise, but not many simulations of campaigns and wars; and almost certainly not very good simulations of the more interesting campaigns and wars. Moreover, if surprise can be injected it improves the game as well as the simulation: simulation and gaming are not working at cross purposes at all.

PRINCIPLES OF WAR

• The Principle of the Objective
• The Principle of the Offensive
• The Principle of Mass
• The Principle of Economy of Forces
• The Principle of Maneuver
• The Principle of Surprise
• The Principle of Security
• The Principle of Simplicity
• The Principle of Unity of Command

(Bugle Notes USMA Cadet Handbook, 1952-53)

Operations

The relationship between operations and battle has changed through the centuries. At some times maneuver has been decisive; at others, materiel has dominated.

Whenever technology or tactics have brought about a shift in the decisive factors, the first strategist to understand that shffl has been victorious. His victories continue until his opponents learn the reasons for them. Victories of this kind have been the most spectacular in history, and the ones most often studied by historians, and the battles are generally the most interesting of all.

Unfortunately, these battles can almost never be fought in a war game! It is nearly impossible for a gamesplayer to fail to understand the relationship between operations and battle in the games he is playing. The relationships must be reflected in the rules; and the player can thus deduce them. Sometimes it happens. We find a new opponent, skilled in some former wargame but unfamiliar with the newest one. He reads the rulebook rapidly; perhaps too rapidly. The game begins, and we have the pleasure of a decisive victory brought about with few losses. The experience is fleeting, though, and it won't happen again with that opponent.

CONCLUSION

I think the conflict between simulation and gaming is fundamental: you can't design a playable game which simulates the eras when victory went to the general who knew that the art of war was changing -- and his opponents didn't. You can design a playable game for that era -- but both sides will know the key strategic factors. The battles won't at all resemble the real ones, and the more nearly the rules simulate the "real world" of that time, the less likely the outcomes are to be historically accurate.

On the other hand, we can design games which are both good simulations and playable games, provided that we stay with the right eras; in fact, the better the simulation, the better the game, if we try to simulate the correct factors. In particular we have to work on methods for building in surprise, and for simulating the all too decisive morale elements. I don't mean that we throw the dice to see if the troops are "shaken." This makes the outcome of the game too dependent on luck. It's a simple method, and one that the gamer is likely to turn to, but it's the wrong one.

What we really need is cooperation between simulators and gamesters. If the simulators would get busy and come up with a good study of what makes troops break and run; what the enemy can do to produce panic; then, perhaps, they and the gamesters can together design these factors into a war game that is both playable and a realistic simulation.

When that happens we'll have a hell of a war- game, and I want to play it.

"From the Far East I send you one single thought, one sole idea -- written in red on euery beachhead from Australia to Tokyo -- There is no substitute for victory!"

More Simulation and Psychology

Introduction
What Are We Trying to Simulate?
Strategy
What Can We Simulate?
A History of Operations
Panzerblitz and Jutland