The era preceding the Great War gave birth to a vast array of myths. Included in this grouping was the concept of the "Russian Steamroller," that unstoppable tide of Cossacks that would engulf Europe in an unceasing orgy of plunder and rape. In retrospect, nothing could have been further from the truth. The overwhelming fear of Germany, the last trump card of France, the Russian Army, was decisively defeated in a campaign of less than a month, by a force much smaller than the invaders of East Prussia. Without a Tannenberg and a Masurian Lakes, or the like, there could have been no continuation of a war already lost in the West; no hope for final victory, which was to keep Germany going for four years, could have ever developed.

This article will discuss why the "Russian Steamroller" failed to roll. By taking a look at the original Russian plan and why it took that shape, we intend to prove that a Russian disaster was the only possible consequence of the ill-planned, ill-lead, and ill-equipped invasion.

Just as the route of invasion in the West was dictated by topographic considerations (thru the Flanders Plain rather than the Vosges Mountains), so too was the invasion of East Prussia. Any invasion of Germany proper, without clearing East Prussia first, would be inviting an attack upon the lines of communication. Once East Prussia could be cleared, the Russian forces could begin to acquire secure flanks (the Baltic and the Carpathians) for an advance on Berlin, only 180 miles from the Polish border.

Chief Obstacle

The chief obstacle to any Russian advance would be the chain of the Masurian Lakes and the forts between them. Any invasion must not only allot masking forces against the lakes, but also consist of separate forces around each end of the lake to avoid either a flank attack or a total loss of the lines of communication. The army marching north of the lakes would have sufficient railroad communication, but the southern army would lack this means of quick support.

The territory of East Prussia would be ideal for defense, being an endless maze of irregular hills, topped by barren sandy soil, between which could be found alternating swamps, lakes, and forests. Roads and railroads could only be constructed in narrow areas between the obstacles, forcing an invading force to divide into columns, which could not only be slowed up by small groups of infantry and artillery, but would also be susceptible to attack by a defender capable of collecting his forces quickly over an intricate rail network. Compounding this problem would be three large fortresses (Thorn, Danzig, and Konigsberg) and several smaller ones, which would require a siege train and/or large masking forces.

Mobilization

The forces engaged would be as important as the terrain. The Schlieffen Plan was based on superior speed of mobilization and concentration. Ideally, each corps' district would mobilize not only the regular Army Corps (usually kept at 75% of strength), but also a Reserve Corps, four Ersatz Battalions, eight Landwehr Regiments, auxiliary troops for the Ersatz and Landwehr battalions, plus Landsturm troops to take over guard and administrative duties.

Thus, the 800,000 man peacetime army could be increased to over 5,000,000 men; all trained, all coming from the same area for quick mobilization, and all well equipped. The Russian mobilization was much different and quite slower. The regular army was kept at 50 percent of wartime strength, the rest of which was filled by ill-trained reservists upon mobilization. Russia planned to supplement her 79 Regular Divisions by 35 Reserve Divisions; but, since the average reservist had to travel 700 miles to reach his unit (the country was not divided into districts as was Germany), it would be at least a month before they could begin to take the field. Surplus reservists were formed into depot battalions, rather than formed into Ersatz divisions, a move caused by the scarcity of artillery.

The Opolchenie, 6,500,000 older and untrained men, was wisely not called out. In the first month, only 800,000 men could be added to the regular army of 1,400,000, of whom not all could even reach the front from the Urals, Siberia, and the Caucasus. Russia, to be sure, could mobilize 4,500,000 men, but it would take at least six weeks longer than either of their opponents. She was, therefore, forced to strike early with the best of her forces, and to accept casualties from her only means of rapid expansion.

Russian units, and individual soldiers, were inferior to their German opposition. The problem of securing officers and non-coms for the Russian army was never solved. (Only half of the troops could read or write.) Their units were composed of two-thirds Russians and one-third subject nationalities during peacetime. Upon mobilization these units were filled with local reservists, thus often increasing the proportion of subject races, since many of the units were stationed in areas of probable trouble.

The Germans had the best officers and N.C.O.'s on the continent, and the few Poles in the army were so well distributed as to virtually disappear. For these reasons, the German soldier displayed more initiative and independence than his more clumsy Russian enemy.

The Germans were superior in artillery to the Russians (one gun to every 166 rifles compared to one gun for every 292 rifles) and in heavy artillery. Both had two machine-guns per battalion. The standard Rus.sian division, 16 battalions and 48 guns, was an inferior fighting instrument to the German division of 12 battalions and 72 guns.

Russian Command Ineffectiveness

Not only did the Russians have inferior transport and training, but, their commanders were far inferior to their German counterparts (with one exception: von Prittwitz). Jilinsky, Commander-in- Chief, Northwest Front, was a capable desk soldier. However, he was unpopular with his subordinates, who often ignored his orders, and did not possess the confidence of the army as a whole. Rennenkampf was the better of the two generals in command of the invading armies. Still, he failed to use his cavalry reconnaissance properly, but, at least in the eyes of the Russians, his personal courage made up for this. Samsonov had not even told his staff about his appointment to command the Second Army in case of war, so they could not have prepared plans for the initial advance. Over-confidence, lack of food and ammunition, and - disregard of reconnaissance made his defeat inevitable.

German Commanders

Von Prittwitz was the weakest of the German commanders. He did not have control over his corps commanders, and also was subject to panic when the decisions were his alone. Ludendorf was an ideal pick to head a German army. Believing in himself and the invincibility of the German army, he was not afraid to make the necessary decisions, especially when the responsibility for the decision was in Hindenburg's hands.

Hindenburg, called from a retirement (caused indirectly from defeating the Kaiser in the 1908 maneuvers) to command the Eighth Army, was also an ideal choice. Believed to be the bulwark behind Ludendorf's decisions, he had a strength of character all his own, which was to outlast even Ludendorf's brilliance.

The German war plan (Schlieffen Plan) called for one army in East Prussia, along with Landwehr and Landsturm troops in Silesia. Earlier German plans, up until the 1890's, had called for an initial attack in the East, but a series of fortresses, behind which a Russian army could be immune from disastrous defeat, had caused a shift in emphasis from East to West. The light forces in the East were to slow up the Russian advance, so that, in eight weeks or so, the victorious main army could be shifted from France to defeat the advancing Russians before they could reach Berlin.

Russian 1910 Plan

Under the 1910 Plan, the Russians had two variants, neither of which indicates any desire to concentrate a superiority of force against either the Germans or the Austrians, while holding the other with a minimum force. Under "Variant-A" the Russians dispose 30 divisions against a possible 16-25 German; 43 against a possible 43-47 Austrian; with 13 divisions in reserve and 28 in transit.

Under "Variant-G" the Russians dispose 41 divisions against a possible 67 German; 32 divisions against a possible 43-47 Austrian; with 13 in reserve and 28 in transit. On 8 August, 1914, the Russians had 21 divisions against 11 1/2 German and 35 divisions against 3 Austrian armies, which were just moving up into position, with reserves at Brest-Litovsk. (This plan, seemingly, having been a modified version of "Variant- A" of the Plan of 1910. ) Russian staff talks had called for a concentration of 800,000 men against Germany on the 15th day of mobilization, but a desire to reach this figure and to aid the hard pressed French caused them to disregard their plan and advance before they were ready.

Unlike the factors which are common to most battlefield decisions, there existed in 1914 a new factor which led to the eventual disaster of the Russian invasion: the radio. The armies of 1914 were all equipped with this new device, and used it to send orders in code. The Russian method of transmitting a message in code and then, due to a lack of operators, transmitting the same messages in clear, quickly led to the breaking of the code.

During the course of the month of August, for example, two important messages were, thus, decoded by the Germans, giving the positions and intent of the Russians. As the German Official History states, "Eighth Army was informed of their opponents' intentions in a way which seldom happens in war."

General Mobilization

After a period of indecisiveness, Russia ordered general mobilization on 31 July, 1914, thus, turning a Balkan War into a European one. Mobilization and war on the part of Germany followed quickly.

On 6 August, the Russians decided on a dual offensive against Germany and Austria. By the 10th, orders for the advance of the two Russian armies was ordered. The First Army; consisting of three corps, one rifle brigade, five cavalry divisions, and one cavalry brigade (fighting strength: 74,600 rifles, 19,250 satires, 208 machine guns, and 384 guns); was to advance north of the Masurian Lakes and cut the German left off from Konigsberg. Second Army; six corps, one rifle brigade, and three cavalry divisions (fighting strength: 143,500 rifles, 10,500 satires, 384 machine guns, and 348 guns); was to advance south of the Masurian Lakes to destroy the German corps between the Vistula and the Lakes.

The two armies would then combine and cross the Vistula to advance "towards Berlin." The First Army was to reach its concentration area in three days, and advance on a 40 mile front. The Second Army had two days to reach the concentration area and advance in a 30 mile front.

On the 14th, von Prittwitz decided to attack the First Army first, and therefore concentrated all his forces (except the XX Corps) to the north of the Lakes.. Three days later the advance guard of the First Army crossed the frontier and met the German I Corps at Stalluponen. The Russian 27th Division tried to outflank the position, but was caught in flank and rear by the Germans and suffered a loss of 3,000 prisoners. The Germans, under orders from von Prittwitz, withdrew to Gumbinnen. The Russians then advanced for the next two days, despite minor efforts by the Germans to slow them up. The Russian Cavalry Corps engaged Landwehr units on the 19th with some success, but expended their ammunition, and were not able to aid Rennenkampf on the 20th.

Gumbinnen

The Germans had decided to hold the line of the River Angerapp to the left of Gumbinnen. They then moved up into the gap that was left open by the Cavalry Corps during the late hours of the 19th. At 3 A.M. on the 20th, the I German Corps attacked the XX Russian Corps in the flank. The Russian 28th Division broke by mid-morning, but the 29th Division adjusted their front to hold their position, at least temporarily. To the south, the German XVII Corps collided with the Russian III Corps, which was coming up piecemeal. The German attack pushed back the Russian center, but the flanks held, forming a salient.

The Germans were pummelled by artillery from all sides, and finally broke and fled to the west, taking with it even a part of the victorious I Corps. Despite the still- strong position of the I Corps, panic gripped von Prittwitz, who spoke of retreating behind the Vistula. To him, it seemed that he had not only been defeated by a superior foe at Gumbinnen, but also that he was about to be eneveloped by the great host of the First Army. Unknown to him, though, was the poor state of Rennenkampf's army and the fact that it had suffered 17,000 casualties.

So, von Prittwitz, letting his panic override him, ordered a withdrawal.

Two members of von Prittwitz's staff, General Grunert and Lt.-Col. Hoffman, did not believe that (1) Samsonov should be allowed to advance without a fight and (2) the advantage of the I Corps should not be thrown away. In any case, Hoffman argued, the Russian's Second Army was closer to the Vistula and would be able to cut any retreat in that direction. Von Prittwitz stood firm for the retreat and the Germans pulled back.

To his surprise, there was no follow-up by the First Army on the 21st. On the 22nd, a message arrived telling von Prittwitz he and his Chief-of-Staff had been sacked, by orders of von Moltke, and replaced by Generals von Hindenburg and Ludendorf. A legend was about to be born.

Beginnings of the Legend

The beginnings of the legend had already been settled by Hoffman. He had proposed a reshuffling of Eighth Army's deployment by reinforcing XX Corps, already facing the Second Army, with I Corps. When Ludendorf arrived on the 23rd, he realized that the only logical step had already been taken.

Rennenkampf, in the meanwhile, did not advance until the afternoon of the 22nd because of inadequate supplies and the difficulties of advancing in a hostile country. He was now under orders to cut the enemy off from Konigsberg, invest it with two corps, and advance with the rest of his army (one corps!) as the northern pincer in a two-pronged envelopment. The risk was great, but it was justifiable as long as Samsonov could tie down the major German forces. Samsonov had so far been advancing 15 miles a day through hostile, sandy country. His communications were stretched, but Jilinsky sent him yet another corps for the advance. From now on, Samsonov was in grave danger of every corps commander taking over individual control of his troops in lieu of orders from headquarters. By the 24th, the Second Army had fanned out into a 60 mile front, and communications had all but broken down.

During the evening of 24/25 August, the German wireless intercepted two Russian messages, giving the position and the orders for the corps of both the First and the Second Russian Armies. With this knowledge, the Germans stripped the front opposite the First Army and sent down every man they could spare. It was not until the 27th that Jilinsky realized that the gap between the two armies should be filled and the order to advance towards Konigsberg was the opposite of cooperation between the two forces. It was too late. The Germans had already stripped off the XVII and I Reserve Corps and sent them against the right flank of the Russians.

Tannenburg

The battle of Tannenberg got under way on the 26th, with an attack by Sansonov's VI Corps, which blundered into the German XVII Corps. Toward the day's end, the German I Reserve Corps came to support the XVII Corps. The Russians were mauled and fell back, exposing Samsonov's center. On the 27th, the German I Corps arrived and drove back the Russian left with a heavy artillery bombardment. Samsonov still persisted in his attacks, despite the worsening of his position.

On the 28th, the German I Corps continued to press back the Russian left while the XVII and I Reserve Corps thrust through the hole opened two days previously. On the same day, Samsonov abandoned his headquarters in a hopeless attempt to personally rally his troops. It was too late. The Germans surrounded the two Russian center corps and one the 29th and 30th both units, and their commanders, surrendered. The remnants of the Second Army fled east and south, from whence they had come; the Russian plan had failed. Then the Germans fumed the Eighth Army north to deal with Rennenkampf, who was just getting under way again.

Earlier in the battle -- on the 21st -- the Germans had decided to reinforce their eastern army at the expense of the right wing of the western front. The two new corps -- I Guards Reserve and XI Corps -- had just arrived and were sent into the line protecting Konigsberg while the I Reserve, XX, XVII, and I Corps came into the line against Rennenkampf in the south. Jilinsky had ordered the First Army, on the 31st, to maintain its position north of the Masurian Lakes.

Second Army, covered by its cavalry, was to retreat slowly to the southeast. A new formation, Tenth Army (3 corps) was to be formed between the First and Second Armies. The staff of the First Army desired to withdraw northwards, since they feared an attack through Lotzen (a major fortress between two of the Masurian Lakes), still in German hands due to a lack of Russian heavy artillery. Rennenkampf vetoed this, because he took the view that his frontal position was strong due to the rivers Omet, Alle, and Deilne.

The main attack by the Germans began on the 7th of September. Reports to Rennenkampf spoke of identification of a new corps, just arrived from France. Jilinsky spoke of entraining the remnants of the Second Army and using them along with the Tenth Army for a flank attack on the Germans. It was too late. German I Corps had broken through at the junction between the First and Tenth Armies.

To the north of this, German XVII Corps was experiencing difficulties in an attack through the Lotzen Gap. The remainder of the German forces were in a frontal attack, to pin down the First Army. On the 9th, German I Corps turned north to Lotzen and helped XVII Corps break through Russian II Corps. By nightfall, Rennenkampf's flank was turned, with no chance of rescue by Jilinsky.

On the 10th, Rennenkampf ordered a deliberate withdrawal 30 miles east of Gumbinnen. The Germans, unfortunately for the Russians, pursued, causing serious rear-guard actions and costly counter-attacks. Control began to fail, and Jilinsky was sacked on the 13th. The next four days found Nicholas (the Grand Duke of Russia) in direct control of the three armies, attempting to stabilize the front. The battle died tamely, with the loss of contact between the two sides. Thus ended the First Battle of the Masurian Lakes.

Cleared of Invaders

East Prussia had been cleared of the invaders. A lasting reputation had been made for Hindenburg and Ludendorf. But the war was not to be won or lost in the east -- the Schlieffen Plan called for a decision in the west only. True, the publicity of the victories in the east took the sting out of the defeat at the Marne -- but they were to mean only four more years of conflict. Had the Russians crossed the Vistula, the result would have been little different.

A long supply line would have meant a weakened front and eventual defeat by an ever-growing enemy. Only a fraction of the total Russian forces had been destroyed -- the east was to tie down more forces than any other single front for the next two-and-a-half years (by the spring of 1917, almost 45% of the strength of the Central Powers was in the east). Seldom, if ever, had so great a victory meant, in the long run, so disastrous a defeat.

More Anatomy of a Failure

Russian Invasion 1914
Analysis
Russian and German Losses
Large Maps Tannenburg and Masurian Lakes (very slow: 319K)
Jumbo Maps Tannenburg and Masurian Lakes (extremely slow: 711K)