Operation Zaunkonig was the codenarne for the German attack on the railway net in southern Russia during World War Two. The operation began on 27 March 1944, and involved a series of night bombing raids against key points on the Soviet rail net. It was intended to stop the movement of Russian troops to the front and to reduce the efficiency of the Soviet war machine.

In late 1943, the Luftwaffe gathered a large force of bombers in southern Russia to conduct a raid against Soviet electrical generating plants. However, the raid was canceled, and the Germans were left with a well-trained bomber force and no mission. General Korten, the commander of the bomber force, realized that the Luftwaffe now had the means and opportunity to conduct a strategic bombing campaign against the Russians. Luftwaffe intelligence had already drawn up a list of key Soviet targets, and Korten believed that his bombers could influence the course of the war in the east by destroying those targets.

However, in mid-March the Russians were threatening to launch their spring offensive, and the Luftwaffe High Command was told to send the bombers to support the army. General Korten was faced with the prospect that his carefully assembled and trained forced would be shot to ribbons while acting as close air support for the Wehrmacht.

The army had been most cooperative when the Luftwaffe withdrew the medium bombers from the front to create the new bomber force. It was done during the winter, when the weather on the Russian front made major ground operations all but impossible and air support was not vital. However, now that the Soviets were preparing to launch a major offensive, the Wehrmacht generals wanted their air support back.

German intelligence predicted that the Soviet spring offensive was aimed at liberating the Ukraine and southern Russia from the yoke of German oppression. The offensive was going to occur directly in front of the bases of the newly created strategic bombing force.

The Luftwaffe planners, and General Korten in particular, realized that conducting a strategic bombing campaign while the Russians destroyed the German Army in the Ukraine was out of the question. However, he was quick to propose a compromise. He would use his new force to attack the Russian railway grid, focusing on railroad stations, track, choke points, and rolling stock.

The attacks were certain to interdict the movement of Russian troops and supplies to their staging areas and, with a little luck, he could throw off the whole schedule of the spring offensive. Once the attack was neutralized, General Korten would begin his strategic bombing campaign against other targets in Russia.

Hitler was presented with the plan and believed that the bomber force, Fliegerkorps IV, was so strong that it could destroy the Soviet rail net in the Ukraine in ten days. General Korten's plan was quickly accepted by the High Command, and Luftwaffe planners went to work to find crucial targets on the Soviet southern railroad net.

The new Soviet offensive appeared to be centered on the rail lines linking Kiev, Korosten, Sarny, and Rovno. German intelligence believed some thirty new large enemy units were already in the area and that a further twenty were moving forward. These units belonged to the Russian 1st (Polish) and 8th Guards and to the 69th, 70th, and 2nd tank armies.

The Luftwaffe began an intense reconnaissance campaign to find the choke points along the railroads. Bridges, tunnels, repair shops, and large stations were all photographed and placed on a target list. The intelligence experts determined that if the main rail arteries between Kursk-Sheptovka and Briansk-Sarny could be cut, the Russian offensive would be stalled. Key targets such as Samy, Korosten, Kiev, Gomel, Bakhmach, and others were marked for destruction.

The new campaign against the Russian railroad in the Ukraine, christened Operation Zaunkonig involved ten Gruppen of well trained bombers. The units involved were I, II, III, and IV of KG I (Heinkel He-111s but later converted to Heinkel He-177s); one Staffel of KG 3 (Junkers Ju-88s); II, III, and IV of KG 4 (Heinkel He-111s); I, III, of KG 27 (Heinkel He-111s); I, II, III, of KG 53 (Heinkel He-111s); and I, II, III, of KG 55 (Heinkel He-111s). Reconnaissance was provided by FAGr. 11, 14, 100, and 2. Nachtaf Staffel.

On the night of 27-28 March 1944, the Germans launched Operation Zaunkeinig with a fifty-bomber attack on Samy. The main attack was preceeded by pathfinder aircraft that marked the path to the target and the target itself The pathfinders arrived over the target about thirty minutes before the main force, marked the target, and then orbited Sarny until the rest of the bombers reached their aiming points. Russian flak was heavy, but the bombing results were good, and losses were light. The bomber force then swung into high gear and was soon attacking two or three targets each evening with a force of eighty to one hundred bombers.

The Germans realized that one raid on a station would not destroy the rail net and developed a unique plan of attack. The bombers would launch two or three big raids to cut and isolate a section of track. After the section was isolated, the smaller stations and rolling stock along the line would be destroyed.

Next, the Germans searched for the railway stations that supplied the isolated section of the front. These stations were easy to find because they quickly became jammed with equipment and supplies that could not be moved forward. Once the trains and rolling stock piled up, the Luftwaffe attacked and destroyed these stations. After these attacks were completed, another section of track would be cut, and the whole process repeated.

As the raids intensified, the Russians developed new defensive measures. Rolling stock was left coupled to engine ties so they could be moved quickly, and valuable supplies were given priority on sidings. When the pathfinder squadrons arrived over a Russian railyard or station, the Soviets knew they had thirty minutes before the main force arrived and they moved as much cargo out of the area as possible. Daytime reconnaissance photos revealed this practice, however, and the Germans began to shorten the time between the arrival of the pathfinders and the main force.

Operation Zaunkonig consisted of 20 major raids launched between 27 March and June 22nd. The Luftwaffe bombed seventeen different targets, destroying miles of railroad track and hundreds of engines and cars. The Germans only suffered 110 plane losses during the raids.

The Russians were well aware that German intelligence had gotten into the habit of watching the railroads to determine when and where the next Soviet offensive would be. In a brilliant piece of operational deception, the Soviets showed the Germans just what they expected to see. The Russians routed sufficient trains to the Ukraine to make the Germans believe that this movement was the beginning of a massive offensive. While this ploy was going on, the Russians were secretly massing in another sector. On June 22nd, three Russian Army Fronts opened the offensive around Smolensk, several hundred miles from southern Russia.

Operation Zaunkonig was a successful if misguided effort. Even though the operation did not stop the offensive, the use of the strategic bombers to destroy the rail net was similar to the operation carried out by the allied air forces before the Normandy invasion.

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