One of the most interesting parts of the Coalition air campaign in Operation Desert Storm was the search for and destruction of, the Iraqi Scud missiles. Before the war, the Iraqis had acquired nearly 100 Soviet SS-10 (Scud B) ballistic missiles. These ground-to-ground missiles weighed about 14,000 pounds, had a maximum range of 180 miles, and carried a warhead of about 750 pounds.

Sufficient missiles and mobile MAZ 543 mobile launchers had been delivered for the Iraqis to form three Scud Brigades. Each brigade had 10 - 12 mobile launchers and was assigned an operational area in a different part of the country (Baghdad, Western Iraq, and Southern Iraq). Each brigade had three mobile missile battalions; but several of the battalions had settled into an area and constructed permanent launch sites.

A typical launch required the crew to fuel, set up, and prepare the missile for launch. The entire process took about one hour, and missiles fired after such detailed preparation usually hit within a mile of their intended targets.

The Iraqis were very familiar with the Scud missile. They had used them extensively in the "war of the cities" in 1988, when Iraq fired an average of 14.7 missiles per day at Iranian cities. In the eight month period between January and August 1988, Iraq fired 203 Scuds at Iran, and Iran retaliated with 46 launches.

When the United States and its Coalition allies began the air campaign, the Scuds were discounted as a major threat. Target planners had located the fixed Scud sites and targeted them for destruction. The planners assumed that their destruction, coupled with the air attacks on the communication nets and Iraqi command and control facilities, would effectively neutralize the launch of the missiles.

The Coalition air force began its attacks against the fixed Scud sites on the evenings of 16 and 17 January 1991, and the aircraft returned with dramatic "gun camera footage" of the destruction they had inflicted. The error in the air planning staff's intelligence was vividly evident when the Iraqis managed to launch 33 Scud missiles during the first week of the war. It was immediately obvious that these missiles were being launched from mobile launchers that were proving harder to locate than expected.

The Scuds that were launched were not particularly accurate because they were hurriedly launched with little regard for precision. However they were politically damaging to the Coalition, because the missiles were hitting Israel, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia.

Something had to be done to counter the Scuds, and by the end of the war almost every type of aircraft that could fly had tried its hand at "Scud Busting." F-117s, F-15Es, F16s, F-111s, and a dizzying array of other aircraft flew day and night missions trying to locate these elusive mobile launchers.

During the 43 days of Desert Storm, the Coalition air forces flew 2,500 strikes against Scud related targets - command and control, radar sites, fixed and mobile Scud sites, and suspected hiding places. During that time, anything that looked like a Scud launcher (tractor- trailer refueler trucks and mobile Scud launchers look much alike from the air) or a Scud hiding place was bombed. Coalition air crews reported destroying over 80 launchers. Despite their claims, however the Scud launches continued, with a total of 88 launched between January 17 and 26 February

The difficulty in finding the Scuds was due primarily to the ingenuity of the Iraqi crews. They modified the launch sequence to its bare minimum. Missiles were brought to the firing site (mostly at night), fueled, pointed in the direction of the target, and launched. Almost as soon as the missile was away the crew and launcher were headed for cover.

The whole sequence was so quick that on 42 occasions Scud launches were visually observed by Coalition strike aircraft, but the aircraft only managed to destroyed 8 launchers. Finally in desperation, Special Forces units were put on the ground to locate and destroy the sites, and the Patriot anti-aircraft units were deployed to destroy the Scud missiles in the air.

The Great Scud Hunt must be listed as one of the failures of the air campaign of Desert Storm (13 mobile launchers are known to have survived the war). The Coalition knew approximately how many missiles and launchers there were and approximately where they were when the war began. The failure of the Air Force planners to neutralize this threat resulted in the missiles' becoming a potent political weapon that struck at the very heart of the Coalition.

The implications of the campaign go far deeper. As one author points out, the failure to find the Scuds on the flat desert of Iraq when the Coalition had total air supremacy augers badly for B-2 Stealth bomber theory. Could the B-2 Stealth bomber - created to penetrate Soviet air space and locate mobile nuclear missile launchers - carry out its mission successfully against a determined and cunning enemy such as the Russians?

Battle Briefs

USN SEALs
The Prettiest Uniform
The M-198
The Armed Transport
The Great Scud Hunt