The Defenders
When it was finally established in the late thirties that a military presence on Wake would be advisable it followed on the heels of civilian aviation. Pan American World Airway had created, first, a refueling stop for its trans-Pacific Clippers. Further facilities, including a modest hotel, soon followed. The airline could never have foreseen how this would foreshadow the massive construction efforts which would go on throughout 1940 and 1941.
In the initial study authorized by Admiral Kimmel, plans called for the installation to accommodate a full strength Marine Defense Battalion of some 1,100 men at the minimum. Since at this point the military did not have combat construction engineers (Sea Bees for short), all fortifications, barracks, roads and similar items would be erected by hundreds of civilian contractors.
Defense Battalion
The Defense Battalion was a relatively new concept. Designed to defend the far-flung outposts of the American presence in the Pacific, it was given the specific mission and organization to defend against raids by enemy naval elements such as the German raiders of World War I.
The 1,095 officers and men were divided by their part in that defensive mission. Ships were to be engaged by the first section which was to man six 5" naval guns which had been salvaged from World War I vintage battleships. Enemy landing parties were to be repelled by the machine gun section armed with up to 60 .50 caliber and 48 .30 caliber machine guns. These efforts were to be supported by four mobile artillery pieces of between .37 and .75 caliber. Anti-aircraft protection was to be provided by 16 3" AA guns. Radar, searchlights, and various administrative troops filled out the TOE.
Seemingly well conceived, the organization concealed several flaws which would prove fatal in the defense of Wake. Manpower was always short in the pre-war Corps. Although each Marine was highly trained, less than half the actual force due to be committed to Wake's defense actually arrived. If the 65 or so pilots and ground crew of VMF-211 (the twelve plane squadron of Wildcats assigned to Wake) are included, there still were only 447 Marines available to defend some ten miles of perimeter.
As a direct result only six of the twelve 3" AA guns had crews and only half the machine guns. The TOE provided no infantry reserve at all (But every Marine was a trained infantry man) and this lack plagued the defense of Wake throughout the battle. By reducing gun crews, utilizing available civilians to replace Marines where possible, and arming the cooks, clerks, unarmed sailors and soldiers on the island, 85 infantry were freed up - a woefully inadequate number given the length of the perimeter.
A second flaw endemic to the concept of the defense battalion was that, with the exception of the Marine's raid on Makin several months later, raids of the kind was designed to repel simply didn't occur. Both sides eschewed raids in favor of more decisive, large scale invasions in which the isolated defenders would be overwhelmed.
This failure of "vision" was matched by a failure to commit to Wake Island the defenses which would make it more likely to stand up in the face of large numbers of the enemy. Technology was inadequate radar was left undelivered, searchlights worked poorly if at all, and the 3" guns were inadequate. So too were other critical elements - no fire control, land mines or barbed wire.
Kimmel's study had advocated the placement of at least three dozen fighters, 15 dive bombers and 4 "utility" aircraft, with a force of 80 officers and 397 flight crew. Obviously the planes would eventually be revetted for protection. A Naval Air Station of 66 officers and men would be constructed as well as a submarine tending station with 105 servicemen. The 12 Wildcats that were actually delivered to form up VMF-211 proved inadequate to control the airspace over Wake. In the face of the potentially overwhelming land and carrier based air available to the US, this was hardly unexpected.
In fact, a certain fatalism seemed to be at work throughout the planning stages for the defense of Wake. When Major Devereaux, the hard-nosed professional chosen to command the defense battalion, asked what he was to do if faced with a full-scale invasion, the reply was not particularly encouraging. "Do the best you can." Although their best wasn't enough to perform miracles, it certainly must have exceeded the greatest expectations of the Naval planners in Washington.
The Attackers
The outbreak of war saw the UN prepared to strike at those areas it considered critical. In their assessment, Japanese planners saw Wake as a, target but not one which would require very large scale commitments of naval, air, or amphibious attack forces. At least as far as actual naval forces were concerned, light, locally available forces were deemed sufficient. In light of the large force packages committed to Pearl Harbor, the Philippines, and Malaya, this was, indeed, the second string.
These forces initially consisted of one light cruiser, the Yubari, a destroyer division of six older destroyers, two supporting light cruisers, the Tatsuta and Tenryu, two old destroyers converted into supply ships, and two merchant "Marus" which were to bring 450 Special Naval Landing Force troops and a garrison force to assault Wake. Air support was to be provided by land-based bombers flying from the Mandates.
SNLF Troops
A brief word should be made about the SNLF troops involved in both amphibious efforts. Militarily they were not an elite nor did they receive special training for amphibious operations. These had been raised from naval drafts and given equipment similar to that given to the Japanese Army. In fact, the only distinguishing feature on their uniform was a small anchor on the helmet they wore in place of the traditional Army star.
Led by naval officers who were simply assigned to this duty with no training, many Japanese military men considered them somewhat inferior to the Army in most respects. The two battalion elements committed to Wake numbered about 1500 men and were to be reinforced by armed bluejackets if necessary. Whatever the deficiencies of this force, they would serve in the opening days of the war at Guam, Wake, and Indonesia. It was the SNLF which delivered the decisive attack in the morning hours of December 23, 1941.
Wake Island An Epic Battle Its Defenders Couldn't Win
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© Copyright 1996 by Mike Vogell and Phoenix Military Simulations.
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