The Fight on the Tanapag Plain
27th Division
6 July 1944

Introduction

by US War Department

The following article comes from Small Unit Actions, a study produced by the Historical Division of the US War Department as part of the American Forces in Action series published during and just after the war. It is a detailed account of the 27th Division's fight on Tanapag Plain on Saipan. The article describes the action of two regiments, the 105th and the 165th, generally at a platoon and Squad level. As you read it, there are several points to keep in mind.

One point is the inability of the Americans to spot Japanese positions. Despite the fact that the Japanese were producing a large volume of fire, including machine guns and anti-tank guns, the Americans could not identify the location of the firing positions.

Secondly, take note of the actions that involved the armor units. The Japanese infantry were capable of knocking out tanks using magnetic mines and Molotov Cocktails. When tanks found themselves being fired upon by antitank weapons or attacked by infantry, their most common response was to use descretion and fall back. .

A third point was the lack of command control. During the actions there was very little command control by anyone higher than platoon leader. Company commanders could at times instruct their platoorrs to retreat or advance, but were not able to direct the platoon's tactical actions or coordinate the action of the platoons. Platoon leaders often had control only of those men close by and were usually too involved with actions directly affecting them to give direction to the squads. Most of the leadership came from squad leaders and the men themselves. Solutions and tactics generally came as suggestions from the enlisted men, and sometimes the men simply did what was needed without requesting permission. When the leadership did act it was usually an order to a couple of men to "go there" and do something, rather than an organized plan using all of the platoon or company assets.

Finally, note the effect of casualties on the units' progress. As soon as a soldier was hit, the reaction of a unit tended to focus on getting the man to safety and not on countering the enemy fire. When forward movement stopped, casualties grew and the unit found it very difficult to regain its forward motion.

To sum up, the fighting tended to be done by small groups of men struggling on their own to counter a direct threat to themselves. The plans of the battalion and Company commanders never survived contact with the enemy. The most important jobs done by the officers were to dig up additional resources, such as armor support and to re-organize the men after the fighting.

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