The principal opponents of the British in the Cape Frontier Wars were the Xhosa, a Bantu people who lived on the eastern border of Cape Colony. They were divided into two groups: the Gcaleka, who lived to the east of the Kei River; and the Ngqika (or Gaika),who inhabited the land between the Kei and Fish Rivers. This division was the result of a dispute in the early nineteenth century over the powers of the Xhosa paramount chief, which ended when those tribesmen who refused to accept his authority migrated to the land west of the Kei. It was this group, the Ngqika, who bore the brunt of the conflict with the British.

Under the Xhosa military system, every able bodied adult male was a warrior. Each man was armed with a bundle of seven or eight light throwing spears, and either a knobkerrie or wide-bladed assegai for use in hand-to-hand combat. John Shipp, then a private of the 22nd Foot, wrote:

"They are ... such expert marksmen with their darts (throwing spears) that they can be certain of their aim at sixty, or seventy, paces distance (50-60 yards) ... Before they deliver the darts .. . they run sideways for a little way, the left shoulder for-ward, and the right considerably lowered, with the right hand extended behind them, the dart lying flat in the palm of the hand, the point of it being near the right eye. When thrown it flies with such speed that you can scarcely see it." (1)

Large oval shields, made of cowhide, were carried as late as the 9th Cape Frontier War (1877-78), but were not common, for they could not stop British bullets and were an encumbrance in the bush. A warrior was far more likely to rely on his bullock hide cloak, wrapped round the left arm and held across the body, for protect ion in hand-to-hand combat.

Although, by the 1840s, the Xhosa were well supplied with muskets, which they obtained from gun-runners or dead white men, they had, as a British soldier observed:

"but very little knowledge of the use of firearms. Very few of them fired their gun from the shoulder but discharged it from the hip, with the muzzle elevated so much that their shots nearly all went over our heads. They had not the most remote idea what quantity of powder was necessary for one charge. They would empty the powder from a bullock horn into the palm of the hand and pour it into the barrel. They were equally ignorant in reference to shot. Anything that could be got into the barrel was satisfactory to them. It was evident that however well they might be off for powder, they were very short of ball, particularly lead. A great portion of their shot was made of zinc, with the casting nipple uncut, (and) chain links cut in pieces of various lengths." (2)

The Xhosa began to acquire horses in the 1830s, but they never developed a cavalry arm, for they considered it impractical in bush warfare. Chiefs and scouts, however, were often mounted for extra mobility.

Early Battles

In their early battles against the Europeans the Xhosa fought in the open, using a formation similar to the Zulu "beasts horns", though, unlike the Zulus, they did not usually attempt to close with the enemy. These traditional tactics were soon abandoned in the face of European firepower, and replaced by those of guerrillas. The terrain of the Cape frontier was well suited to guerrilla warfare: much of it consisted of thick bush, which greatly hindered the movements of conventional troops, while providing plentiful cover for their lightly equipped enemies.

Two areas, the Amatolaand Kroome Mountains, were of particular importance, for the Xhosa used them as "safe bases," and concealed in them their crops, cattle and families. The Amatola Mountains lay to the east of the Fish River, and consisted of a circular range of hills, about forty miles in circumference and thirteen or fourteen in diameter. These hills were "of no great elevation, but sufficiently prominent, in a country otherwise comparatively open, to be called mountains."

From the outer circle of hills, numerous spurs branched inwards towards the centre. Between these spurs lay deep, densely wooded ravines, or kloofs, which provided ideal hiding places for guerrillas. The tops of the hills and spurs, however, were generally free of woodland, which gave "the country a park like appearance." (3)

The second of these "safe bases," the Kroome Mountains, lay to the west of the Fish River, and consisted of a number of spurs separated by six or seven deep, densely wooded ravines. These were several miles in length, and radiated out in all directions from a central point. (4)

Xhosa Tactics

The most commonly used tactic in the Xhosa repertoire was the ambush, which invariably took the form of a sudden burst of firing from the bush. The long, slow moving trains of ox-wagons that the British used to supply their garrisons and field forces were particularly vulnerable to such attacks, and they inevitably became the object of the tribesmens attentions. One very successful ambush took place on 17 April 1846, at the commencement of the 7th Cape Frontier War: a train of 125 wagons, stretching for over three miles, but escorted by only 140 men of the 91st Foot and 7th Dragoon Guards, was wending its way along the banks of the Keiskama River, when the Xhosa suddenly opened fire from the bush on both sides of the track.

The leading wagons were so well protected that they got through safely, but those in the centre were less fortunate; their escort was driven back onto the advance-guard at the front of the column, and the Xhosa, emerging from the bush, immobilised them by cutting loose the draught oxen. Since the road was now blocked, the fifteen dragoons who constituted the rear-guard had no option but to abandon the wagons in their care and fight their way to the head of the column. This they did, but although the combined forces were able to hold their own until help arrived, fifty-two wagons and their loads were lost as a result of this ambush. (5)

Another ploy favoured by the Xhosa was the employment of individual warriors or herds of cattle as decoys to lure detachments of British troops into the bush, where they could be cutoff and surrounded by superior numbers of warriors. A private of the 7th Dragoon Guards described how this stratagem was used to draw a detachment of his fellow dragoons into a trap:

"A great number of cattle having been seen passing over a ridge within sight of our Camp, a party of Dragoons and C.M. Rifles were ordered off in pursuit under the command of Captain Bambrick, 7th Dragoon Guards.

They had not proceeded far when they perceived the enemy approaching on all sides. The cattle had only been driven over the ridge as a decoy. The Officer gave the order for the Troops to retire a short distance as the bush was too thick for the movements of mounted men and I have no doubt intended to get on more open ground, thinking perhaps he might induce the enemy to come somewhat more into the open.

He had scarcely given the order when he was shot and fell head foremost over the front of the saddle ... An attempt was made to recover the body, but they were not successful. The bush was too thick and the number of the enemy was increasing, and the party thought it advisable to return to camp." (6)

Although the Xhosa never attacked at night, they were much given to marauding and petty harassment during the hours of darkness, when they would crawl "forward on ... hands and knees, and keeping touch ... by imitating the cries of animals which are well understood by them. At the smallest noise they will flatten themselves on the ground, so that you can pass close by without seeing them; and then the first indication you have of such dangerous neighbours is the thrust of a spear, or the blow of a club ... We kept a smart watch, but even then it was nothing unusual to see a spear lodged in the top of a wagon next morning, close to the place where a look- out man had stood." (7)

8th Frontier War

During the 8th Cape Frontier War, the Xhosa had a number of disaffected Hottentots from Cape Colony as allies. Many were trained and disciplined deserters from the Cape Mounted Rifles, a locally raised mounted infantry unit, for the Hottentots had hitherto been staunch allies of the British. Well armed and mounted, they now became the terror of the colony well within the border. In mixed bands 50-100 strong, they and their Xhosa allies issued forth from secure haunts on raids, plundering the flocks and herds in the surrounding districts, and, in spite of all precautions, and some severe encounters and loss of life, more often than not made off with their booty to a place of safety. (8)

In June 1851 and December 1852, the British dispatched military expeditions against the Basotho, who lived 100 miles beyond the Orange River, the northern boundary of Cape Colony. The Basotho were descended from a Sotho clan, which had been driven from it's lands during the Mfecane, (the series of wars that accompanied the rise of the Zulu empire in the 1820s), and which eventually settled on a large flat-topped hill called Thaba Bosiu in the Drakens berg Mountains.

The Basotho military system resembled that of the Zulus in that their army was divided into named regiments, each formed from men of the same age group. Armament consisted of light throwing spears, battle axes, curiously shaped cowhide shields with two projecting wings and, by the 1850s, a large number of guns. These, however, were often obsolete and of the poorest quality. The Basotho, moreover, had little idea of how to use firearms, and were short of both powder and shot.

The Basotho were unique amongst the black peoples of southern Africa in that they possessed a cavalry arm. The latter were armed in the same way as the infantry, and mounted on small, sure footed "Basotho" ponies, which were ideally suited to a hilly environment. (9)

The British had fought guerrilla-type raiders e.g. the Pindaris of west and central India, before, and they knew that the only way to inflict serious loss upon them was to surprise them in their camps. Since irregular warriors seldom protected themselves with outposts during the hours of darkness, a night march, followed by an attack at daybreak, was the most effectual means of achieving surprise. But in the thick bush and dense forests of the Cape frontier, night marches were frequently impractical, and always difficult to execute, as the 74th Foot found when they attempted to surprise a Hottentot kraal (village) in June 1851. The ground which the regiment had to traverse en route was, one officer wrote:

"Most difficult, abounding for the first few miles in deep holes and innumerable ant-hills; after which, it became, if possible, worse; entering a narrow rugged descending defile, a succession of deep steps or ledges cut through a thick bush, and intersected by sluits or dry watercourses (large and deep enough, as we very soon found, to contain three or four men at once), and thickly strewn with large stones and loose rocks, over which we stumbled and fell at almost every step, five or six being frequently down at once, and often sustaining severe cuts or bruises.

As we were descending a very steep path ... the forces got separated in the darkness of the night, and being unacquainted with the country, one company was completely lost in the bush; while another wandered so far out of the way as to cause great delay in commencing operations.

We approached the enemy's position just as the day began to dawn, and found our advance retarded by a large barricade of newly felled trees, thrown across the narrow path at a point where the bush on either hand was perfectly impenetrable. This obstruction again delayed us a considerable time, as all were obliged to file through an opening cut through the close thorny bushes . . ." (10)

Delays

These delays had a serious effect on the outcome of the action which followed, as the British had intended to station some mounted troops across one of the enemy's escape routes, "which they were to reach by riding noiselessly along the inner margin of the bush; but as the day was approaching there was every chance of their being discovered, consequently the plan was abandoned, and they remained with the infantry . . ." Thus, the Hottentots, after making only a brief stand, were able to escape "by the very outlet which was to have been held by the mounted force. Had it been so occupied scarcely a man would have escaped them. As it was, the dense and extensive bush rendered all pursuit hopeless." (11)

Since there was little chance of bringing the Xhosa to battle in their native terrain, the British concentrated, from the 7*,h Cape Frontier War onwards, on depriving them of food and shelter. The chosen means of achieving this objective was the concentric attack, in which several columns converged on the Amatola or Kroome Mountains from different directions, meeting at some pre- arranged point. Although the very difficult nature of the wooded ridges and ravines was such as to prevent heavy loss being inflicted on the Xhosa themselves, they were always totally dispersed, their kraals burnt, their crops destroyed, and large numbers of their cattle driven off. (12)

In the thick bush and dense forest of the Cape frontier, all infantry fought as light infantry, as they did in the mountains of Afghanistan during the First Afghan War. During the above mentioned attack on the Hottentot kraal, the 74th Foot, a line battalion, "on gaining the open space took 'skirmishing order;' two companies extended, two in support, and the remainder in reserve;" (13) and in another action, we hear of "two companies of the 74th and two of the 74th advancing in skirmishing order." (14)

The Xhosa, however, seem to have regarded properly constituted light infantry as more formidable opponents than line infantry acting as such. The Rifle Brigade, for example, "were the very terror of all Kaffirs, who dreaded the sight of a Zwart Badjie- Black Jacket." (15)

On the Cape frontier, it was always necessary for a column to be protected by flanking parties while on the march, for the Xhosa rarely engaged a body of troops frontally, preferring instead to operate against their flanks and rear. Long range sniping was not a problem in the bush, so these flanking parties were posted close in to the main column, not several hundred yards out, as would have been the case in mountain warfare. They could be stationary, in which case they were detached from the advance-guard as it moved for-ward; or they could move parallel to the column if the bush was not too thick.

This was the procedure adopted by the 73rd Foot, whose flankers usually moved on either side of the path, looking up into trees and down into thickets. Where the bush was too thick to admit of mobile flankers, the regiment moved in single file and, at every halt, the men moved a few paces into the bush, turning outward, the leading man to the right, the next to the left etc. (16)

As in all counterguerrilla campaigns, tactical success in the Cape Frontier Wars was obtained by turning the enemy's own tactics, e.g. the ambush, against him. This some regiments were able to do. The 73rd Foot, for example, evolved their own drill for an ambush: a few men, preferably positioned at a bend in the track, would fire a single volley as soon as the enemy were at pointblank range. Then, the remainder of the troops, disposed along one side of the track and parallel to it, would charge. (17) The 74th Foot, too, were capable of playing the Xhosa at their own game, as Captain King relates:

"Some of our men lying flat on the large slabs of stone, and peering down into the deep forest on the sloping mountain side, made signs to me, pointing below, and quietly reaching their position, I had an opportunity rarely afforded of watching a party of Kaff irs cautiously advancing along the bottom of the thicket immediately below us, creeping stealthily through the under-wood, perfectly naked and armed with assegais and guns.

Stopping every few feet to listen, they peered into the bush before them, their well greased bodies shining in the occasional gleams of sunshine that streamed down through the thick foliage of the trees, and again moved on, avoiding every rotten twig, and preserving a noiselessness perfectly marvellous ... Our men waiting the moment to fire, had gradually brought the muzzles of their arms to bear; and without moving their heads, and hardly drawing breath, silently indicated to each other the whereabouts of fresh comers.

With rifles pointed through the creepers at the edge of the rock on which we lay stretched, we waited with fingers on the trigger for a fair shot, and I fancied I could hear my heart beating. At a signal, bang went twenty muskets, echoing from crag to crag in the silent wood, and the treacherous savages met the death they had been plotting for us." (18)

In thick bush or forest, where fighting almost always took place at comparatively close quarters, the bayonet was an important weapon of defence, as Sir James Alexander pointed out in the 6th Cape Frontier War (1835):

"It is certainly no child's-play tracking through the dense bush by a narrow path in Indian file, having a volley of musquetry suddenly poured on the party from above, and stalwart and naked warriors rushing with yells and stabbing assegais from the elephant grass around; and though one is constantly liable to this in Kaffir warfare, yet, strange to say, neither the sword nor short lance had been thought necessary for troops liable to be exposed to these emergencies, and very few of the arme blanche were found in the Cape armoury. Though all the musquets issued to the Hottentots had bayonets, yet they absurdly threw them aside as useless encumbrances." (19)

Section 2: More British Tactics