Absurd Behaviour

An action which took place sixteen years later, in the 8th Cape Frontier War, showed that the behaviour of these native auxiliaries was indeed absurd. A British column, consisting of a detachment of irregular cavalry in front, the 74th Foot in the centre, and some native levies (Fingoes) in the rear, was descending into a defile in the Kroome Mountains, when the Xhosa opened fire from the thick bush, wounding one soldier.

The 74th returned their fire, shooting at any clump of bush where powder smoke could be seen, and thus the troops continued their descent, with a desultory fire on both sides, till about half-way down, when the tribesmen showed in great force, filling the bush on both sides of the track. The Fingoes in the rear now began to waver, whereupon a party of Xhosa, encouraged by this, rushed in among them with their assegais.

This completed the Fingoes panic, and firing right and left, at random, they rushed down the narrow path with such force as to knock down and trample on many of the 74th, while by crushing through the ranks they hindered the remainder of the regiment from loading. Emboldened by this, the main body of Xhosa hurled a discharge of their light throwing spears, and then, with their assegais, threw themselves upon the 74th. Captain King wrote:

"Our steady fellows had little to depend on but their bayonets, to the use of which they had fortunately long been regularly trained, and now used most effectually ... The narrow road was crowded with a mass of troops, Levies and Kaffirs, the ringing yells of the latter heard above the din of the firing. Some wrestling with the men for their firelocks were blown almost in pieces, and many were felled and brained by the butt-ends of clubbed muskets.

Our gallant fellows fought most bravely; one man, with an assegai deeply buried between his shoulders, singled out its owner, and shot him through the head with the weapon nearly protruding through his chest; a grenadier killed four Kaffirs with his own hand. A huge (Kaffir) ... appeared suddenly among us, and seizing a soldier in his powerful grasp, hurled him to the ground; but the man jumping to his feet in a moment, buried his bayonet in'the fellow's back, and he fell dead on his face. Three Kaffirs had caught one of our men by the blanket folded on his back, and were dragging him into the bush, when the straps slipping over his shoulders released him, and he threw himself, unarmed, on the nearest, and wrestled with him for his assegai, both rolling over and over, scuffling on the ground, the well-greased body of the Kaffir giving him the advantage over the dressed and belted soldier, whose death wound was, however, amply avenged. The ground was soon thickly strewn with the black corpses of the enemy; a score lay on the path, and here and there the lifeless form of a dead or dying Highlander, eight of whom fell, while as many more were wounded. Fighting our way through hundreds of the infuriated savages, we effected the descent of the pass; by the time we had reached the foot the enemy's fire had almost ceased." (20)

The bayonet was equally important as a weapon of offense in the Cape Frontier Wars, for although even the most stringent precautions could not prevent the Xhosa from delivering an unexpected volley out of the bush, a prompt bayonet charge could prevent them from firing a second one. The 73rd Foot were therefore instructed that, if ambushed, they were not to stand up and shoot: instead, they were to rush straight at the tribesmen, who would seldom stand. (21)

Captain King's description of a skirmish in the Kroome Mountains provides further proof of the efficiency of a bayonet charge in the bush:

"They (the Xhosa) were almost hidden by the long grass in which they crouched to fire, and their numbers being overwhelming, the reply we made to their fire was but a temporary check, so that we were soon being gradually forced back, when Captain Duff came rapidly up with a company of the 74th, and reinforced our line of skirmishers; the whole fixed bayonets, charged the enemy's line with the Highland shout, and drove them back into the bush." (22)

For obvious reasons, maintaining tactical control was always a problem in bush warfare. During a sweep through the Kroome Mountains in March 1852, Colonel Eyre, 73rd Foot, solved the problem thus:

"The whole column worked through it (the forest) in every direction, guided by constant bugling; the company and regimental calls of the different corps, with 'advance,' 'retire,' 'right and left incline' etc - being all issued by Colonel Eyre, who, with a bugler of each regiment at his side, thus conducted in the most splendid style the movement of upwards of a thousand men in different bodies, unseen, through an extensive mountain forest." (23)

Slow Infantry

Infantry were never able to catch the Xhosa or Hottentots, except when they retired into some stronghold like the Amatola or Kroome Mountains. For this reason, mounted troops were invaluable on the Cape frontier, though they had few opportunities for shock action, due to the thick bush. One such opportunity occurred on 7 June 1846, when Major-General Somerset, hoping to distract the Xhosa from any attempt upon a convoy of empty wagons returning from the frontier post of Fort Peddie, led a force of about 150 men of the Cape Mounted Rifles and 7th Dragoon Guards, as many mounted burghers and volunteers, and some native levies, to a raid upon a neighbouring chief's kraal. On the way back, he was fortunate enough to come upon a body of 500-600 Xhosa in the open, on the banks of the River Gwanga. Lieutenant Bisset, an officer on Somerset's staff, described what happened next:

"The Cavalry and guns advanced at the trot until we passed over the brow or knoll of ground before mentioned, when we came in full view of the column of Kaffirs . . . It was a grand sight, and the General gave the word to the 7th Dragoon Guards, who were in advance of the guns, to open out and fire two rounds: the 7th Dragoon Guards forming line on each flank of the guns and charging: the Cape Mounted Rifles forming line in extended order and charging in succession to the 7th Dragoon Guards.

The shot and shell did good execution, and the charge was the prettiest thing I have ever seen in real fighting. You might have placed a long table-cloth over each troop, they kept in such compact order, and the Cape Mounted Rifles went through the broken mass of Kaffirs in one long line. The Cavalry wheeled and came back, recharging the enemy ... for six or seven miles the troops were mixed with the running Kaffirs, and deadly slaughter ensued ... Next day, 270 dead warriors were counted on the field of battle ... This was the only time the British troops ever caught the Kaffirs really in the open, and it will doubtless be long before the Kaffirs give us such another opportunity of attacking them as was afforded at the Battle of the Gwanga." (24)

Gwanga

The battle of the Gwanga was, as Bisset pointed out, exceptional. Normally, the Xhosa remained in the bush, where cavalry could not act with effect. Of the two regular cavalry regiments that served at the Cape during this period, one, the 7th Dragoon Guards, adapted successfully to this situation. A private soldier of the 7th tells us that whenever "the bush was too thick for ... Cavalry to act with effect . . . we ... dismounted and two-thirds of the men acted as Infantry, while the remainder took charge of the horses." (25)

The other regiment, the 12th Lancers, could not fight in this way, partly because, like other lancer regiments at that time, they did not carry carbines, but also because the lance was an encumbrance while fighting on foot. They were therefore instructed to leave their lances in store and replace them with carbines. Sir Harry Smith, however, intended to use the regiment in the more open country across the Kei River, so two-thirds of them continued to carry lances. This led infantry officers to complain that their cavalry were useless, (26) and, in February 1853 Smith's successor, Major-General Sir George Cathcart, recommended "the withdrawal of the regiment of (Light) Dragoons, which description of force I consider, for many reasons, ill adapted for this particular service." (27)

Battle of Berea

The battle of Berea (20 March 1853) showed that these strictures were justified, there, Cathcart divided his army into three columns in order to sweep the top of the Berea plateau of Basotho cattle. One, under Cathcart himself, was to move round the southern and western bases of the plateau; another, under Colonel Eyre, was to climb it and sweep the summit; and the third, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Napier, Cape Mounted Rifles, and consisting of 114 and 119 strong detachments of the 12th Lancers and Cape Mounted Rifles respectively, was to move round the plateau's northern end and watch its northern and eastern bases.

Cathcart and Eyre clashed with the Basotho, but both achieved their objectives. Napier, however, found it impossible to sweep round the northern end of the plateau, as it extended further to the north-east than was shown on the map. He therefore mounted the plateau itself from the north, and detached a party to sweep it, while the rest of the column followed. The troops were heading down again with the captured cattle, when the rear-guard, consisting of a troop of the 12th and a few CMR, was charged by Basotho infantry, who, until then, had been hidden in dead ground.

The ground was most unsuitable for mounted action, but the troop of lancers could not dismount and fight on foot, for they had no carbines. They had, therefore, no option but to counter-charge the mass of Basothos. Altogether, the troop made three charges, two of which were rendered ineffectual by the broken ground. The third, directed against the Basotho centre, allowed the Basotho wings to close around the small group of horsemen, who had to cut their way out and gallop for their lives. But the rough ground made escape difficult, and many were pulled from their horses by the tribesmen.

The survivors, in headlong retreat, were checked at a stone wall, where they were reinforced by a few CMR sent up by Napier. A well directed fire from the riflemen's double-barrelled carbines drove off the Basothos, and Napier was now able to force a way to the bottom of the hill, where, the column being again attacked, a troop of the 12th made a charge to prevent the tribesmen from closing. As the column was crossing the Caledon River to the west, the Baotho made a final attempt to recapture the cattle, but were driven off by the fire of the 74th Foot.

The 12th Lancers lost 4 NCOs and 23 men killed and 1 NCO wounded in this vicious little action. The CMR, by contrast, lost only 5 riflemen killed and 1 NCO and 3 riflemen wounded. The 12th's higher casualty rate proved that their lances and flintlock pistols were much less effective weapons in this counter-guerrilla warfare than the CMRs double-barrelled carbines and muzzle-loading revolvers. (28)

Mounted Troops

On the Cape frontier, where the Army was dealing with guerrillas operating over a great extent of country, the need for mounted troops arose from the necessity of mobility, and therefore mounted infantry could be used as a substitute for cavalry. Mounted infantry fought on foot, but were mounted - on cobs, ponies, or camels to enable them to move rapidly from place to place. Units of this type had been raised since the 1780s, but always on an ad hoc basis, to fulfil specific local requirements: they were not yet a regular part of the Army. During the War of Independence, the 63rd, 76th and 82nd Foot all formed mounted infantry detachments for service in the southern American colonies; in 1825 the Governor of New South Wales, having no cavalry at his disposal, mounted a party of the 3rd Foot (Buffs) on government cart-horses, so that they could hunt down the gangs of bush rangers that plagued the colony (29); in Sind, Sir Charles Napier mounted 350 men of the 22nd Foot, two each, on camels for an expedition to the desert stronghold of Imamgarh (30); and in New South Wales, in 1851, 125 men of the 40th Foot were sworn in as special constables, and mounted and equipped as light cavalry for the purpose of escorting gold shipments from the Victoria goldfields to Melbourne. (31)

Regular mounted infantry first appeared at the Cape during the 3rd Frontier War (1799-1802), when a mounted rifle company was formed from men of the 8th Light Dragoons and 22nd, 34th, 65th, 81st and 91st Foot. They were dressed in green, and their rifles browned to prevent them being seen in the woods where the Caffres were cogregated." (32)

Another mounted infantry unit was formed at the beginning of the 6th Cape Frontier War, when the "want of a regiment of light dragoons was . . . very sensibly felt, among other purposes, to keep up the communications: it was therefore necessary to mount a number of the 75th regiment, and arm them with carbines." (33)

But although these infantrymen were, according to the Governor, Sir George Napier, the most efficient mounted force that he possessed, their return to normal duties was ordered at the end of 1838, on the grounds that too much training was required to turn a foot soldier into a cavalryman. In 1842, Napier, complaining about the resulting lack of cavalry, suggested the mounting of one company from each of the Cape garrison's infantry regiments to act as dragoons. Nothing was done about this at the time, but in 1846-47 and 1849-50, the Rifle Brigade and 45th Foot respectively did mount a company each for service in South Africa. And, in the 8th Cape Frontier War, several bodies of mounted infantry were formed, the 43rd and 74th Foot both contributing. (34)

All these units were modelled on the Cape Mounted Rifles, the only permanently embodied mounted infantry corps to be found in the British Army. Formed as an all mounted unit in 1827, the CMR was recruited from Hottentots and Cape Coloureds, but funded by the British Government, not the Colonial treasury, as had been the case with previous Cape Corps. Initial strength was 250 non-European rank and file, formed into three companies of mounted infantry, under the command of officers and sergeants transferred from British line regiments. European rank and file were introduced later: they were volunteers from line regiments, and had to have exemplary records. The Hottentots and Cape Coloureds were ideally suited to the task of patrolling and skirmishing over large areas of frontier, for they were not only excellent horsemen and fair shots, but also had the advantage of being accustomed to the bush.

All ranks of the CMR were dressed in serviceable dark green uniforms. They were mounted on Cape ponies, which had an average height of 14 hands and 2 inches, and which could carry a load of 300 pounds when ridden in full marching order.

The CMRs principal weapon was a double-barrelled flintlock carbine, with a barrel length of 26 inches, a calibre of .733 inches, and a weight of 10 pounds. This weapon was lethal at ranges up to 100 yards, and the two barrels, one of which was always loaded wi th ball and the other with buckshot, were a great advantage in closequarter fighting. The flintlocks were replaced by smoothbore percussion weapons, also double-barrelled, in the 1830s, and, in 1854, the regiment was issued with the Victoria rifled carbine. Sabres were issued, but rarely used, for the CMR normally fought on foot, with one man in three holding the horses. Their conduct at the re-capture of Fort Armstrong in February 1851 was typical: they

"galloped up the face of the hill and jumped into the midst of the enemy; then dismounting from their horses they attacked the enemy, who continued firing from huts and concealed positions, and drove them from every point." (35)

The strength of the CMR increased over the years, reaching a peak of 900 all ranks in 1847. The European element, too, tended to increase with time, until, by 1850, they constituted one-third of the corps. The desertion, to the enemy, of fifty native riflemen from the garrison of King Williamstown in December 1850, and the subsequent dismissal of the other 300 Coloured and African soldiers at the base, led to the recruitment of yet more Europeans, and, by 1853, they made up two-thirds of the regiment. (36)

On the Cape frontier, ox or mule drawn guns were generally employed by half-batteries, divisions, or occasionally singly. (37) As the following accounts show, they functioned as infantry support weapons, either spraying the bush with canister or shrapnel, or driving the Xhosa away from hill- tops and other places where they might be dangerous.

"The woods were known to be full of Kaffirs; the six pounders awoke echoes among the trees and rocks until then unknown; and rounds of spherical case, smoking and hissing through the air, and loudly bursting and scattering two score bullets, were fired into the hollows. The third round was followed by a far off death scream; and we after-wards found that the chief Eno there narrowly escaped destruction, seven of his men falling dead by his side." (38)

"The artillery, posted on a rising ground, about a quarter ofa mile in our rear, opened on the bush, wherever the Kaffirs showed themselves in parties, and sent round shot and 'spherical case' right in amongst them, whirring and hurtling over our heads with an astounding, and, at first, rather startling noise, splintering the trees and killing all within their deadly range." (39)

"Armed Kaffirs were seen on the craggy summits high above us; they brandished their assegais, and apparently dared us to reach them: but a round shot or two, 'with rush of anger,' crashing against and splintering the rocks, caused them speedily to conceal themselves." (40)

". . . the artillery of the 2nd Brigade opened fire on the Krantz (cliff): the Kaffirs, however, maintained their ground, and greatly annoyed the 6th (Foot) by a dropping fire from invisible marksmen. Shortly after, the howitzers of the other column were brought round to the south front of the position, all the guns were going at once, and in a few minutes completely drove the enemy from their stand in the rocky cover, scattering and killing the groups that kept appearing in front." (41)

" . . from the very bush we had just left apparently totally deserted, some fifteen or twenty Kaffirs issued; and running for ward, fired half-a-dozen shots after us, which fell some two or three hundred yards short. In less than a minute one of the guns was unlimbered and a shell sent among them, killing several, and so alarming the rest, that they fled in every direction, and disappeared in the bush." (42)

Notes