by Scott Mingus
On the 29th of November 1864, about 3:00 PM, the divisions of Brown, Cleburne, and Bate arrived at Spring Hill, Tennessee, with orders to cut the Columbia & Nashville turnpike and thereby sever John Schofield's line of retreat toward the heavily fortified town of Franklin. Their orders were, at the best, confusing. At the worst, they were downright idiotic. After supposedly issuing these orders, Hood simply went to bed. He never made any attempt to see that the plan was executed or even went to the field of battle. In a pitiful display of poor planning, the army failed to deliver an all-out attack. Instead, it made a poorly coordinated and piecemeal attack on David Sloan Stanley's Fourth Corps in and around Spring Hill. The Union Army was able to escape with all of its supply wagons and make its way to the works at Franklin. Hood placed blame for failure on corps commander Gen. Benjamin Franklin Cheatham and his divisional commanders, accusing them of failing to carry out his orders and deliver the coup de main. They in turn pointed to the laudanum-induced stupor under which Hood functioned as the principle cause. Hood had indeed displayed poor judgment during the entire campaign. For whatever reason, Schofield escaped to Franklin and the attack never materialized. Although both Cleburne and Brown made some display, the Federal Army simply marched past the Army of Tennessee and planted itself behind the extensive field works in Franklin. What was about to happen in Franklin would turn the so-called "Spring Hill affair" into a raging debate for years after. When Hood awoke the next day, he was astounded to find out that no real attack was ever made. This put him into a raging frenzy. His staff officers said that Hood was "as ill as a rattlesnake" during the march to Franklin. The outcome of this battle sealed the fate of the Army of Tennessee. It was virtually eliminated as an effective combat force at Franklin on November 30th Terrain The original Johnny Reb article describes the terrain around Spring Hill as "rolling hills'. Instead of attempting to describe the terrain, I elected to draw a new map, which follows this article. The players may determine which terrain features they wish to represent. I prefer to re-create the terrain in as much detail as possible. This can be done in many ways. You can take advantage of the superb pre-made terrain pieces created by Doug Kline's Battlefield Terrain Concepts or similar companies. You may also create custom terrain tables for the specific battle you wish to represent. I am working on another article that describes my methodology. I also use some of Doug's items such as fences, corn stalks, and other nice terrain pieces in combination with my foam boards. Deployment The scenario starts at 3:00 PM and ends at 10:00 PM. If you have the original scenario, there is an entire section on the deployment of troops in a textual format. I prefer to use the game map to show deployment. There are also a great number of dice rolls involved in the Johnny Reb scenario. Rather than duplicating this text, a troop arrival table is included below. You may dice for delay using a four-sided or six-sided die depending on your own desire for randomness. Troops not listed on the chart below are already deployed and are indicated as such on the map.
Scenario Special Rules1. Supply Trains There are three supply train markers on the game map, which may be represented by horse or mule-drawn wagons. If any Confederate unit that is not both "Demoralized AND Fatigued" makes contact with these trains at any time, a victory point is awarded to the Confederate player. 2. Dusk Dusk begins at 5:30PM and ends at 6:30PM. All firing, movement, and command radii are at 50% of normal during dusk turns. 3. Darkness Beginning at the 6:30PM game turn, darkness limits all ranges and command radii to 25% of normal. On a roll of 3 or less, a unit fails to fire as they have mistaken the enemy unit for their own. Certain Special Rules in JR 3 regarding exhaustion are covered by a different mechanism in Fire & Fury Regimental. Those units begin the game with a less effective troop condition known as "demoralized & fatigued. " They are marked with faster strength reduction on the order of battle. Victory Points
Each Worn Regiment 1 Each Spent Regiment 2 Each Eliminated Regiment 4 Each Damaged Gun Stand 1 Each Captured or Wrecked Gun Stand 2 Each Captured or Fallen Leader 1 Spring Hill 4 Unspent CS Bdes in Zone F End of Game 2 EDITOR'S NOTE - As John Hill's published scenario is for JR2, I have first converted his troop strengths to JR3, and then used Bill Moreno's Excel calculator to convert these to Regimental Fire & Fury. This is a slight modification from Bill's submitted OOB, which used John's JR2 numbers. In an upcoming issue of CHARGE, I may the same thing for my Gettysburg scenarios found in "Enduring Valor: Gettysburg in Miniature". - S. L. Mingus Official Records: JB HoodAbout 4 p.m. our infantry forces, Major-General Cheatham in the advance, commenced to come in contact with the enemy about two miles from Spring Hill, through which place the Columbia and Franklin pike runs. The enemy was at this time moving rapidly along the pike, with some of his troops formed on the flank of his column to protect it. Major-General Cheatham was ordered to attack the enemy at once vigorously and get possession of this pike, and, although these orders were frequently and earnestly repeated, he made but a feeble and partial attack, failing to reach the point indicated. Had my instructions been carried out there is no doubt that we should have possessed ourselves of this road. Stewart's corps and Johnson's division were arriving upon the field to support the attack. Though the golden opportunity had passed with daylight, I did not at dark abandon the hope of dealing the enemy a heavy blow.... About 12 p.m., ascertaining that the enemy was moving in great confusion, artillery, wagons, and troops intermixed, I sent instructions to General Cheatham to advance a heavy line of skirmishers against him and still further impede and confuse his march. This was not accomplished. The enemy continued to move along the road in hurry and confusion, within hearing nearly all the night. Thus was lost a great opportunity of striking the enemy for which we had labored so long--the greatest this campaign had offered, and one of the greatest during the war. -- J. B. Hood, Official Records Battle of Spring Hill 1864 Back to Table of Contents -- Charge! # 6 Back to Charge! List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 2005 by Scott Mingus. This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com |