Gen. William T. Sherman had split his armies into three groups, intending to come at Atlanta from the North and Northeast. Hood's army was just south of Peachtree Creek , along the approach route of "Pap" Thomas and his Army of the Cumberland. Peachtree Creek was the last natural barrier before Atlanta's defenses. It was not a wide barrier, but its banks, covered in heavy undergrowth, were steep and difficult to traverse.

On July 19, Hood learned that Thomas was crossing Peachtree Creek, while the other parts of Sherman's army were not yet at Decatur, six miles away to the east. Having cut his military teeth taking part or in the vicinity of Lee and Jackson's great flanking attacks, Hood saw this as an ideal opportunity to destroy Sherman piecemeal.

Two corps, under Hardee and Stewart, would catch Thomas off guard before he had a chance to dig in, and drive him back along the creek, where, with his retreat blocked, he would be forced to either surrender or be destroyed. Cheatham's Corps would cover the right, in positiion to eventually join the Confederate cavalry in blocking McPherson and Schofield at Decatur. Once Thomas was defeated, Hood would march the rest of his army to join Cheatham, bringing about the destruction of the rest of the Federals. Atlanta would be saved and Hood vindicated.

Meanwhile, Sherman learned of the Rebel change of command by reading a captured newspaper. He immediately realized that the Rebels intended to fight him for Atlanta, but he thought that it was more likely that the wing of his army, Schofield and McPherson, would be attacked, rather than the stronger, Thomas. Sherman, as he had done before and as he would do again, had become complacent. Now, he wanted the gap between his forces closed.

At midnight on July 19, Hood explained his plan of attack for the next day to his generals, hoping to leave no room for mistakes. He constantly went over every detail, reiterating time and time again that their men must charge home at the "point of the bayonet.*

On July 20, as the heat of the day built up, Yankees continued to cross the creek, knowing there were Rebels in their front but are not really expecting a full-scale assault. Nevertheless, Newton's advanced force stopped and dug in astride the Peachtree Road leading to Atlanta. Ward's division hafted just behind and to the right of Newton. Thomas now had three corps in line: the Fourth on the left the Twentieth in the center, and the Fourteenth on the right. While the veterans of the Fourteenth had dug in, as had Newton's men, the rest of the army remained unprotected by works.

Unfortunately, Hood's plan began to unravel. About 10 a.m., he learned that the Yankees had finally passed Decatur, and were advancing toward Atlanta. With only 2,500 Rebel cavalry to stop the Federals, Hood had no choice but to immediately send Cheatham to the east The attack had to be delayed while the Army of Tennessee realigned itself. Cheatham, commanding a corps for the first time, moved too far. Hardee, ordered to keep in contact also advanced too far, while Stewart stayed where he was. Informed of what was happening, Hood refused to intercede, and trusted Hardee's experience. Meanwhile, Thomas's Yankees tentatively moved forward.

Three hours late, at 4 p.m., Hardee eventually stopped moving to the right and finally moved to attack. His rightward shift although it has taken considerable time, had fortuitously put the Confederates in a better position to assault the Yankee line. This was not the case for Bates! division, which could not find the Federal line due to the close terrain, and subsequently, took almost no part in the battle. Walker's division surprised Newton's troops, and a bitter struggle ensued in which the Yankee's fought tooth and nail to halt the Rebel advance. Federal infantry reserves and artillery, one battery being led by General Thomas himself, managed to secure the Union left, preventing Walker from rolling up the Federal flank.

It was now Maney's (Cheatham's) division's turn to go forward. However, they did so only after carefully adjusting their battleline. To the left, Loring's division mistakenly took this adjustment as their cue to go forward. At first, they did well, exploiting the terrain and routing two Union brigades of Gearys division. However, Maney's slow advance allowed the Federals; to recover, and they eventually forced Loring back. Walthall was the next Rebel unit to go in, and although the Federals were now expecting him, he achieved success. Soon Walthall attacked both - flanks of William's blue division, managing to also hit the left flank of the supine Fourteenth Corps.

As so often before, just as success seemed within their grasp, the Rebels were halted by concentrated Union artillery fire. Walthall was forced to withdraw. Despite the setbacks, Loring was willing to attack again if property supported by Hardee. Eventually, Hardee ordered the best division in the Confederate army, Cleburne's, to attack. However, before the Irishman could advance, orders arrived from Hood that reinforcements were needed to the east as Yankee General McPherson was only two and a half miles from the center of Atlanta. Night fell, and the battle petered out Hoods first gambit had failed.

Union losses at Peachtree Creek were concentrated almost entirely in Twentieth Corps, which lost around 1,700 men. The overall total of Federals killed, wounded, or missing came to approximately 1,900. Confederate returns do not give a complete picture as they only exist for Stewart's Corps, but informed sources put the number at 2,500.

Hood at Atlanta 1864

Background
The Campaign
Battle of Peachtree Creek
Peachtree Creek Wargame
Peachtree Creek Order of Battle: Union
Peachtree Creek Order of Battle: Confederate
Peachtree Creek Map (114K)