Introduction

War of Resistance is part of Game Research/Design's Glory games series. Glory covers World War II in the Pacific and Asia and is a companion game series to Europa. The Glory game system mechanics are derived directly from Europa with time, distance, and unit strength scales being compatible. In addition War of Resistance includes a number of special rules to cover the specific conditions in China.

The name War of Resistance is chosen as it is the manner by which the Chinese refer to that conflict which, starting in 1937 and eventually merging with the global world war, ended in 1945.

I have made every effort to minimize the quantity of special rules in War of Resistance. However, as with every Glory and Europa game, a number of special rules are essential to depict the peculiarities of the conflict being covered. In the case of China, the major non-standard additions are the guerrilla, Chinese factions, and puppets rules. The political quagmire that is the backdrop of all military activity in China demanded a number of special rules considerations.

The following is a synopsis of rules that are special to China and a rationale for their design.

Rules

Rule 3A3. Basic Game Concepts / Units / Regimental Equivalents. In general, Europa/Glory has presented divisions as 3 RE with rare deviation. The RE size of a division is due more to the supporting arms and ancillary equipment of the division than to the actual number of men enlisted. However, the early-war Japanese square division is almost a corps in structure and their component brigades essentially small divisions. Therefore, I felt that it is appropriate that the RE sizes of these units be increased accordingly.

Similarly, the Chinese provincial divisions are so undermanned and have virtually no supporting arms or ancillary equipment that they hardly deserve the designation of division. Therefore I have reduced their RE sizes accordingly.

Rule 3A5. Basic Game Concepts / Units / Japanese Square Divisions. As noted above, the early-war Japanese square division is almost a corps in structure and their component brigades essentially small divisions that often operated independently. For a while, I considered depicting the Japanese brigades as division groups (with the [XX] symbol) and not showing the square divisions at all. However, I finally decided to show them using their historical size designations and provide special rules to handle the situation as necessary. This proved more satisfying (to me, at least) and also gave the Japanese a greater capacity to mass strength in a hex, which is necessary in certain situations in the game.

Rule 3F. Basic Game Concepts / Isolation. After a long bout of indecision regarding how to implement isolation in China, I ultimately settled on the standard Europa/Glory rule with a special exception clause for communists and guerrillas. Since communist and guerrilla formations tended to operate autonomously, and often deep behind enemy lines, they required special conditions and I linked their isolation status into the rest of the guerrilla rules.

Rule 5. Zones of Control. The Japanese organic and independent brigades were very large units with a significant supporting arm. As noted above, they were virtually small divisions in their own right. Thus, to give them added punch over typical brigades, I have allowed them a reduced ZOC.

Conversely, the unsupported Chinese provincial divisions have very little capability to exert a ZOC, hence the reduced ZOC for unsupported divisions. Early in the playtesting, I gave the Chinese provincial divisions no ZOC at all, but time and again the Japanese rolled over Chinese defenses too easily. The reduced ZOC seems like a good compromise.

Rule 6A. Movement / Administrative Movement. The absolute lack of infrastructure in rural China, which is by far the bulk of China, compelled me to disallow administrative movement except on established roads. This has worked out well and I believe is the proper representation of the effect.

I have seen numerous aerial photographs of Chinese villages that are surrounded by rice paddies and have absolutely no access road. Captions often note that inhabitants of villages like these often never travel more than a few miles from their home village throughout their entire life. Other photos have shown roads and rail beds fading and disappearing into crop lands. From year to year, if a road is not protected and maintained, farmers will literally sow it. Last years maps are often of little value this year.

Rule 6E. Movement / Infiltration Movement. In order to allow the Chinese communist an ability to penetrate Japanese lines, I devised the concept of infiltration movement. This rule abstractly represents a seeping of communist political thought into remote areas behind enemy lines as much as it does a military maneuver. However, the latter is also a significant part of the process, as units of the 8th Route Army (the Communist army) would melt into the countryside and carry the communist message to new regions.

Rule 7A. Transportation Lines / Railroads. The Chinese railroad system was in the process of modernization when hostilities broke out in 1937. During the war years, each side laid thousands of miles of new rail tracks. I allow the players to construct both historically built rails and other lines that were surveyed and never built or were built long after the war. The provincial government built the narrow gauge Tungpu rail line in Shansi. It had just opened for use when the Japanese attacked, and it was never used at full capacity.

The following paragraphs outline my algorithm for determining Chinese rail capacity in terms of rail marshalling yards.

1. I identified the number of potential Chinese rail marshalling yards by date (Table 1). Potential yards are all full, partial, and dot cities located on the Chinese rail net and owned by the Chinese on the indicated date.

Table 1. City hexes under Chinese control
Date	Full	Partial	Dot
30 Jun 37	12	20	10
31 Dec 37	7	10	5
30 Jun 38	5	10	3
31 Dec 38	2	1	3
31 Dec 39	2	0	3

2. I averaged the number of potential rail marshalling yards over time periods (Table 2). This is simply the average of the number of historically Chinese-owned rail marshalling yards at the start and end of the time period (from Table 1).

Table 2. Average City hexes per Game Turn
Date	Full	Partial	Dot
Jul-Dec 37	9.5	15.0	7.5
Jan-Jun 38	6.0	10.0	4.0
Jul-Dec 38	3.5	4.5	3.0
1939	2.0	0.5	3.0

3. I found the actual historical rail usage in terms of number of people and tons of supply transported (Table 3).

Table 3. Actual Cargo Transported
Dates	People (millions)	Cargo (millions of tons)
Jul-Dec 37	4.47	1.24
Jan-Jun 38	4.34	1.15
Jul-Dec 38	2.65	0.49
1939	2.82	0.36

4. I made the following assumptions:

1 RE people = 9000 people / 2 wk. turn (Note 1)
1 RE supply = 2240 Tons / 2 wk. turn (Note 2)
Effective military rail usage ratio: 25% (Note 3)

Note 1: A typical military RE in Glory/Europa terms is about 1000 to 3000 soldiers. However, since at least 75% of the historical passengers in the data were civilian (and thus require much less space per passenger due to no equipment and ammunition), I tripled the ratio to 9000 / RE.

Note 2: 120 tons per day is often quoted as the number of tons of supply required to supply one division (3 REs) with general (not attack) supply for one day. Thus: 120 tons/day x 14 days/turn / 3 REs = 560 tons/RE/turn

Since one general supply point is itself 1/4 RE, then 560 tons is equivalent to 1/4 RE and therefore 2240 tons of supply requires about 1 RE of transport capacity.

Note 3: While the military tried to exercise better control of the rail lines, especially near the battle zones, countless narratives depict the throngs of refugees packing rail cars far beyond capacity. Several accounts detail skirmishes between military personnel and civilians over space on rail cars. I've found a single reference for a single year indicating that approximately 25% of the rail capacity used in China for that year was used for military purposes. Therefore, lacking any other hard data, I latched onto and used this number.

5) I calculated the REs of cargo carried in a time period from the historical cargo transported (Table 4).

E.g., For Jul-Dec 37 (12 turns)
25 % x (4.47 mil people / 9000 people/RE) / 12 turns = 10.3 RE/turn
25% x (1.24 mil tons / 2240 tons/RE) / 12 turns = 11.5 RE/turn

Table 4. REs of Cargo Transported
Dates	People	Cargo	Tootal
Jul-Dec 37	10.3	11.5	30.1
Jan-Jun 38	10.0	10.7	20.7
Jul-Dec 38	6.1	4.6	10.7
1939	6.6	3.3	9.9

6) Choosing rail marshalling yard capacities of 2 for full city hexes and 1 for partial city hexes (and none for dot cities) yields total rail net capacities for each time period that very closely approximate the actual quantities transported historically as shown in Table 5.

Table 5. REs of Capacity on the Chinese Railnet Average for time period
Dates	REs (historical)	REs (game)
Jul-Dec 37	30.1	34.0
Jan-Jun 38	20.7	22.0
Jul-Dec 38	10.7	11.5
1939	9.9	4.5

Rule 7A5a. Transportation Lines / Railroads / Rail Nets / Rail Net Segments. I deviated from the standard Europa/Glory regarding severed rail nets and created the concept of the rail net segment. I felt that this was particularly important in China since the scarcity of rail lines produces a number of critical rail choke points. When major portions of the rail net are severed from one another, it becomes very significant to keep track of how much rail capacity each portion of the rail net has. To allow use of all rail capacity on any rail segment allows for ahistoric flexibility.

Rule 11. Support. I picked up the concept of the unsupported division from For Whom the Bell Tolls. The bulk of the provincial Chinese armies, as well as the Communist's Red Army, had virtually no supporting arms. This deficiency went much deeper than just artillery and included a lack of logistical, communications, medical, and just about any other type of infrastructure one normally associates with a modern army. Thus, these units are unsupported divisions. Further, I slightly modified the rule as it appears in For Whom the Bell Tolls by giving unsupported divisions a reduced ZOC (rather than a normal ZOC).

Rule 12. Supply. Two elements controlled the armies involved in Sino-Japanese Conflict, supply difficulties and the political backdrop. The immediate effectiveness of the fighting units was, of course, directly dependent upon the logistic systems of the nations involved. Japan's initial drive into China didn't suffer substantially from supply problems since the supply lines were short and the infrastructure in the regions being fought over reasonable. This changed as the Japanese drove deeper into the Chinese hinterland. Movement along and protection of supply and communication routes became of paramount importance, particularly in the face of increasing guerrilla activity. Eventually, it was the inability to protect their supply lines and get supplies to front line troops that caused the Japanese to bog down. As the war dragged on, many Japanese military operations were little more than massive foraging expeditions.

The Chinese supply situation was debilitating to the effectiveness of their military operations. Moreover, as the war progressed, the various authorities in China, and the KMT itself, became increasingly corrupt, and the distribution of supply and equipment became more of a political activity than a military activity.

"Under combat conditions the Chinese soldier was weak from hunger and exhaustion. He was night-blind from deficiencies in his diet - no meat, almost no fats, few vegetables, and no sugar. He was badly clothed, often nearly in rags."

"Large quantities of small arms ammunition were wasted by poorly fed soldiers who removed bullets from cartridge cases to satisfy their craving for salt with the taste of gunpowder."

"On his first contact with the Chinese army in the field, a shocked American officer referred to what he saw as a 'goddam medieval mob' - a not too inaccurate description."

"The [Chinese] soldier knew from bitter experience that his own people scorned his lot, hated him for foraging to provide himself with the barest necessities, and despised him as a member of the lowest stratum of society, for Confucius had pronounced that good iron went into plowshares, poor iron into swords and spears."

Thus, I choose to use the step of attack supply system (as used in the War in the Desert and For Whom the Bell Tolls). This system correctly shows the increasing difficulty of getting supplies to the front lines as the lines of communication are stretched. It also allows me to severely limit the total volume of supply available to the Chinese player. Note that since almost all railroads in China are low volume, the Japanese player soon loses the ability to draw supply from his full supply sources. Moreover, it forces the Japanese player to huddle around the principle avenues of supply as was the historical case.

The supply rules were perhaps the most difficult rules to wrangle into place for War of Resistance. They at once needed to be Europa/Glory compliant and yet be playable. Many of the early playtests were efforts in supply management and quickly bogged down into the mundane. The final version of the supply rules still require a substantial effort (which is not unreasonable given the difficulty that the armies in China faced in supplying their forces). However, I believe that the complexity has been reduced to the point where it does not impinge on the enjoyment of playing the military aspects of the game.

Rule 12B. Supply / Tracing Supply. I reduced the length of the overland and road supply line elements from standard Europa/Glory to reflect the absolute lack of infrastructure in China. Moreover, the agrarian Chinese countryside can be even more inhibiting to a logistical system than its natural counterpart. For example, rice paddies and the various irrigation systems used extensively throughout China are logistics nightmares.

Rule 12C. Supply / General Supply Sources. To reflect Chinese supply problems, I don't allow the Chinese any full general supply sources. To model the distribution of supplies that they did have, and the scavenging of supplies from the countryside, I used created the concept of a Limited General Supply Net. The Limited General Supply Net is a compromise between the "look and feel" of a standard Europa/Glory supply system and playability. With no full supply sources, in early versions of War of Resistance, Chinese players were reduced to shuffling scads of general supply points (generated each turn at limited supply sources) about the map. The general flavor, while adhering to standard Europa/Glory, was cumbersome in its application to China.

The quantity of general supply yielded by each type of city (limited general supply source) is purely arbitrary and based loosely on previous Europa games. I have no solid data to determine "historical" quantities. I suspect that this data is not available, since much of this type of supply in China was acquired through illicit means such as plunder. The numbers used in War of Resistance have been determined from years of playtest and balancing and appear to provide the historically proper effect (or at least my interpretation of the proper historical effect).

In summary, I wanted the supply system to feel distinctly Europa/Glory, and yet avoid being overly awkward or complex.

Rule 12E. Supply / Supply Effects. For gaming simplicity I have abandoned the standard Europa supply effects system that counts number of turns out of supply. Under the standard rule, all Chinese units would always be U-4. The Japanese player, on the other hand, must begin counting the number of turns out of supply for every unit on every turn once he has out-distanced his regular supply lines beyond the low-volume rail supply line element length of 7 hexes. This quickly becomes unacceptably cumbersome.

So, for playability purposes, I simplified the supply effects rules (along the lines of Balkan Front; i.e., halved immediately upon being out of supply). The effects of isolation are wrapped in to the fold by simply halving unit strengths yet again. In addition to being simple, this mechanism has the added benefit of simulating the immediate lack of resistance often put forth by Chinese units (and particularly provincial units) once cut off from the main front. Although not necessarily appropriate for Japanese forces. The standard (Second Front style) Europa supply effects system should work in China if players are willing to invest the added effort required. If one does this, I would also ignore the clause that halves again isolated, unsupplied units.

Rule 12I. Supply / Chinese Supply Difficulties. The warlord and provincial armies were seldom well behaved and rarely acted in unison. This rule reflects their propensity to waste supply without regard for the overall tactical and strategic situation. The Chinese player must invest a substantial amount of effort just controlling his supply system.

Rule 12J. Supply / Foreign Aid / General Imports. After the outbreak of the conflict in 1937, It was the Soviet Union that quickly provided aid China. The Soviet Union had a vested interest in seeing the Japanese bogged down in an unending stalemate in China. China, Soviet leaders felt, was an easy way to enlist some 200 low quality divisions to help protect the Siberian frontier by siphoning of the bulk of Japanese units into the Chinese quagmire. Since Soviet leaders did not need to build domestic consensus or observe the legal trappings of international treaties, the Soviet military aid was forthcoming within a couple of months of the start of the war. By 1938, 60 thousand tons of supplies and war materials were leaving Odessa every month bound for Chinese ports. The ancient silk caravan routes that crossed Soviet territory from China to the middle east were employed to carry all sorts of Soviet equipment (tanks, artillery pieces, aircraft parts, etc...). The Japanese claimed that the Soviets were sending nearly 80 aircraft per month to the Chinese by early 1938. The Soviet air units that appear in War of Resistance were shipped to China complete with "volunteer" pilots. The Japanese were quite distressed when they first downed a plane to find a Soviet pilot emerge.

The fact that almost none of the Soviet aid made its way into Chinese Communist hands was the seed of great fissures that developed between the two parties in later years. Soviet leaders, rightly I think, assessed that in 1937 the Nationalists were the only power in China capable of embroiling the Japanese in a protracted conflict. Although its not clear, the Soviet Union may have played a significant role in the formation of the "united front" which joined the Communists and Nationalists in a tenuous alliance against the Japanese in the early war period.

Western nations, quick with rhetorical condemnation of Japan, were far less helpful when it came to tangible aid until after Pearl Harbor. A minor monetary grant was tendered by the U.S. in 1939 and some more substantial grants followed in the early 1940s. One of the more significant supporting actions by the U.S. was the extension of the early 1930's silver purchase policy to China during the war. This allowed the Chinese to remain financially solvent and forestalled the near collapse of the Chinese monetary system for half a decade. Hard military equipment aid was virtually non-existent until after the American entry into the war. The AVG ("flying tigers"), formed mid to late 1941, were purely voluntary and had no official U.S. sanction (although evidence to the contrary has surfaced). The Chinese had to purchase their 100 P-40B planes from U.S. surpluses which had been destine for but cancelled by Britain since they were obsolete by European standards.

Britain and France had all they could handle with Germany and simply could not afford to send significant quantities of aid to China at this time. Moreover, Britain in particular, was disinterested in the Chinese war effort and believed that the Chinese could not contribute substantially to the war effort from a global point of view. Some minor token loans were tendered by the British and the French underwrote the construction and improvement of a rail line to French Indo-China.

Rule 14E. Special Ground Units / Fortress Units. Allowing fortress units to be supported only if they occupy a fortress hex is a mechanism to show the effects of the essentially immobile, ancient artillery affixed to the fortresses.

Rule 14F. Special Ground Units / Guerrillas. The war in China started as a conventional war with two conventional armies squaring off against one another. As the Japanese quickly demonstrated their clear dominance in this endeavor, the Chinese searched for alternative ways to combat the enemy.

The concept of guerrilla warfare had been used by the communists to defend their strongholds against the Nationalist's Central Army in the early to mid 1930's. Thus, it became a natural metamorphosis for the Chinese armies, and particularly the communists, to convert to the familiar guerrilla warfare techniques against the Japanese. Both the Communists and Nationalists employed guerrilla units and converted conventional army units to guerrillas. By far, the Communists were more effective in promulgating the guerrilla war, owing in large part to communist popularity among the rural peasants (particularly in North China).

The guerrilla rule, combined with Rule 39 Guerrilla Bases, shows the ability of these non-conventional units to move quickly through difficult terrain, infiltrate behind enemy lines, strike suddenly at targets that are not well defended, and evaporate back into the wilderness.

The guerrilla's value is more due to its nuisance factor than its combat abilities. With guerrilla units, the Chinese player can cut supply and communication lines deep behind the Japanese player's front forcing him to siphon off valuable combat units from the action to perform rear guard duties.

Rule 14G. Special Ground Units / Japanese Reserve Divisions. The early war Japanese square division was a very large organization, nearly a corps by European standards. Organic to the divisional structure was a complete reserve unit. This unit was generally composed of second line troops (older men who were not on active duty, but called up for the war). Though its primary function was to keep the combat strength of the division at or near full strength despite combat losses, local commanders often used their reserve units for occupational duties and even at times for combat. The Japanese reserve division rule allows the Japanese player to duplicate his historical counterparts in this regard.

Rule 15. Breakdowns. The Japanese square division requires a unique breakdown structure to allow the Japanese player to simulate the historical employment of these units. The Japanese player can operate this division as separate brigades, as separate regiments, or even as separate battalions, as the situation requirements dictate. Moreover, each 9-11-6 square division has an 8-10-6 form, that is brought into play by extracting its line of communications brigade (as specified in the Japanese OB) for independent operations. This allows the Japanese player a nominal occupation capability while maintaining a complete division in play.

In the game, the Japanese player generally finds that he has too few units to cover all of the conquered territory against the menacing guerrillas and ends up stretching long strings of battalions to cover his lines of supply.

Rule 20G1c & 20G2i Air Missions / Bombing / Terror Bombing. In the event, the Japanese tended to behave far more ferociously, commit many more atrocities, and engage in non-military related bombings, if a Chinese city were vigorously defended. Thus, Chinese leaders were placed in the precarious position of deciding whether or not to defend a city knowing that the civilian population would suffer immensely before and after occupation. Linking terror bombing effects to defended cities only, attempts to simulate this ignoble aspect of the war.

Rule 21D. Air Combat / Fighter Pilot Superiority. Source after source indicates the clear superiority of Japanese naval (IJN) fighter pilots over their army (IJA) counterparts. They were better trained, disciplined and equipped. Chinese pilots, for the most part, were inadequate for the mission of defending China. Therefore, I implemented a tiered superiority system to show the dramatic variance in quality with the IJN pilots at the top (equivalent to Western European fighter pilots), followed by IJA and Soviet pilots and with Chinese pilots at the bottom.

Rule 23C. Special Air Rules / Extended Range. Very few Japanese fighters, and no Chinese fighters, were equipped with drop tanks at this early date. In fact, as the Japanese player will note, he has no fighters with extended range capability at the outset of the conflict. The "Claude" (A5M2) was the first aircraft to use drop tanks a in combat situation.

Rule 27-35. Naval Rules. The naval rules are derived from Second Front, with river flotilla/river transport rules overlaid. However, the Second Front naval system is far too complex for this game and so the War of Resistance system has been dramatically simplified. However, the general elements of the Second Front system are maintained for compatibility with the remainder of the Europa/Glory game series. Although I haven't tried it, it should be possible to use the full blown Second Front naval system in War of Resistance.

I changed task forces' (TF) naval gunnery strength when used in the ground support role (NGS) while on a river to siege artillery, instead of field artillery (which is standard in Europa). I allow the effect only on a river since this is the only time that the gunfire is stable enough to qualify; firing from the ocean is simply not as effective. Since TFs are very limited in terms of river movement, this ruling will not have broad sweeping effect. For the purposes of War of Resistance, this ruling shows the correct effect for the unique case of Japanese supporting naval gunfire in Shanghai (in 1937). Shanghai simply doesn't fall in an historical time frame unless the guns are considered siege artillery. Source after narrative source speaks to the devastation that the Japanese naval guns wrought upon Shanghai from their moorings in the Whangpoo River.

Rule 36. Weather. War of Resistance, of course, uses the Glory standard weather system that includes a number of new and interesting weather conditions as compared to Europa.

Rule 36F. Weather / Floods. Of unique note in China is the summer flooding of Central China. This is the flooding that is the impetus for the modern day 3-gorges damming effort to control the water flow. Much of the river region of Central China, and particularly the Yangtzé River basin floods annually. This is a major problem in low-lying regions and severe flooding can result in extensive famine. From a military point of view, it is essentially a given that the rivers will be flooded sufficiently to effect operations.

Rule 37A1. Special Rules / The Great Wall. The modern combat effectiveness of the great wall is a matter of debate, but its perceived value by military commanders of the time probably outweighed its actual value. Chinese units often anchored their defensive lines along the great wall. Thus, to simulate the perceived value and thereby simulate the historical use of the great wall, I give it a small possibly to affect combat results. This is not completely arbitrary, as the condition of the great wall varies widely from place to place. Military commanders could never be exactly sure at to how well forces might be able to employ a particular stretch of the wall for defensive purposes.

Rule 37B4. Special Rules / Holding Boxes / Burma Road Holding Box. One of the more amazing engineering feats accomplished in the China Theater was the construction and maintenance of the Burma Road. This thread of a lifeline became one of the only connections the Chinese had with the outside world. It ran from Kunming in the southwestern province of Yunnan to Mandalay in Burma. In July 1940, as they stood alone against the German aggressor, Britain closed the Burma Road in the face of Japanese pressure. As the German threat of a cross channel invasion of England abated later in the year, the British re-opened the Burma Road. This event widened the already suspicious rift between the Chinese and the British.

Rule 37D1a. Special Rules / Garrisons / Chinese Garrisons / West China. This garrison depicts forces required for the occupation of the Chinese far western hinterlands. A number of rebellious groups and governments occupied this region including Tibet and Sikiang.

Rule 37D1b. Special Rules / Chinese Garrisons / Southern Shensi. To the detriment of the Chinese war effort in general and to the chagrin of western advisors (particularly later in the war) the Chinese Nationalists maintained a significant garrison to blockade and prevent a southward Communist infiltration from their northern bases into the heartland of Nationalist China. The garrison was rather modest in the early years, but was increased dramatically as the war progressed. Most of the garrison expansion occurred during the years from 1941 to 1945 and thus is not shown by this rule. This rule will fall apart after 1941 and not be sufficient to depict the actual garrison requirements in the later war years. However, it is sufficient for purposes of War of Resistance.

Rule 37D1c. Special Rules / Chinese Garrisons / Major and Dot Cities. The local warlords and provincial leaders, while generally cooperating with the central government, were far from completely loyal or completely subservient. When requested to send forth their army, they usually did so in part only, keeping a substantial garrison to protect their own cities and "borders." This garrison rule requires the Chinese player to adhere to the historical realities. Many of the forces retained in garrison fall below the scale depicted by War of Resistance. Typically they might rate as 0-3 Police, Security, and Border units and would have been used to garrison provincial border crossings and maintain internal provincial security in general. (And no… they don't even rate highly enough to warrant an effect against Japanese overruns; thus they don't deserve to be shown by counters and are ignored for game purposes.)

Rule 37E. Special Rules / Factories. Immediately following the outbreak of hostilities, the Chinese government embarked on a massive program of moving industry from the industrial lowlands, such as the Yangtzé River Valley, to the deep interior. While this effort pales in comparison to the Soviet effort in the face of German onslaught, it occurred nearly 5 years previous and was accomplished with a far more primitive infrastructure. Many factories' equipment was literally carried thousands of miles via mule cart and ox barge.

In total, the Chinese moved about 120 thousand tons of factory equipment and 42 thousand workers that accounted for approximately 750 factories. About 75% of these were successfully re-established in the inner provinces of Szechwan, Kweichow, and Yunnan.

Since these factories represent the light industry found in China (there was virtually no heavy industry), they only cost 5 REs of transport to move. This is contrasted with the 30 REs required to evacuate a Soviet factory in Scorched Earth where the factories represent various heavy industries and produce armor and artillery points.

Rule 37F. Special Rules / Hwang Ho Dikes. On June 20, 1938, the nationalist government demonstrated that it understood the meaning of total war. In an unprecedented sacrifice of civilian and military life and incalculable damage to property and country side, the KMT had the Hwang Ho dikes destroyed just north of Kaifeng. From a military point of view, the strategy worked brilliantly. The Japanese advance was stopped cold in the face of the onrushing flood waters and the assault on Wuhan (the Hankow, Hanyang, Wuchang tri-city area) was delayed for three months while the Japanese re-planned their advance to circumnavigate the new river course. Throughout the war, the Japanese never advanced beyond the new course of the Hwang Ho and were forced to trek hundreds of miles north or south to move further west.

However, the destruction of the dikes has been bitterly criticized for its blatant disregard of life. In fact, the nationalist government for many years denied any prior knowledge of the event. The flood waters wrought more suffering on the Chinese peasants of the area than the Japanese ever did. Some 4 to 5 thousand villages and 11 towns were washed away. Over 2 million Chinese were left homeless and destitute. Some estimates of the number of deaths range as high as 440,000. A number of military units, both Japanese and Chinese, were also caught and destroyed in the floodwaters.

The Chinese people of the area never forgave the Nationalist government for what they viewed as irresponsible and unconscionable actions. After the conclusion of the war with Japan, this area, remembering the events of the spring of 1938, was one of the first regions to go staunchly communist.

Rule 38A. Nations / Japan. The Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) and Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) were at constant odds with one another and inter-service rivalry was intense (dwarfing the inter-service rivalry experienced by their US counterparts). The entire grand strategy of Japan was never settled; the IJA wanting to strike into China and ultimately Siberia, and the IJN wanting to strike to Southeast Asia.

As China was considered an IJA theater, the IJN involvement was limited and this rule puts restraint on the ahistoric use of IJN ground forces in the Chinese hinterland.

Rule 38B. Nations / China. The capture of the KMT government, although causing huge political ripples, would probably not have spelled the end of Chinese resistance, despite Japanese beliefs to that effect. In all likelihood, an alternate form of government would quickly have filled the power vacuum and established itself within the existing political power infrastructure. So numerous were the alternate political bodies within China, that it is difficult to predict what political entity would emerge in such a situation. The later the KMT collapse, the more likely the communists could have formed a stable alternate régime, at least in the north.

Since such political issues are far beyond the scope of this game, and for gaming and rules simplicity, I allow for a possible return of the KMT government in the event that it has been captured. This game mechanic actually represents the return of some alternate form of government within the existing bureaucratic machinery and not necessarily a reincarnation of the KMT. This event is fundamentally different than a wholesale collapse of the Chinese political power structure, which was the ultimate Japanese goal and is the Japanese player's goal in the game.

Rule 38F. Nations / France. After the fall of France in June 1940, the French Indo-Chinese supply routes were no longer available to the Chinese. Further, in September of that year, the Japanese finally had pressured the Vichy government into allowing Japanese forces to occupy Indo-China. Despite some minor clashes between Japanese and French troops, the Japanese quickly occupied the region and began using it as a base of military operation and in particular air raids on southwest China. Finally the Japanese had bases in reach of the Burma Road.

Rule 39. Guerrillas Bases. The CCP's concept of guerrilla warfare was rooted in their experiences during the Nationalist's anti-Communist suppression campaigns of the early 1930s. By the time of the Sino-Japanese Conflict, the guerrilla theory had evolved into a three-tiered, cyclical philosophy of warfare. The three levels were the conventional army, the local defense force and the village militia.

In practice, the Communist Red Army, officially designated as the 8th Route Army by the central government, filled the roll of the CCP's conventional army. Following the onset of the Sino-Japanese Conflict, the three divisions of the 8th Route Army (the 115th, 120th and 129th) infiltrated behind Japanese lines in the rural hinterlands of northern China. They spun off cadres who began to form Communist bases across North China. A Communist base was typically a complete social, economic, political and military entity. Infiltration was enacted at all levels including education, local politics and local defense and touched Chinese society at the root level. The Red Army cadre would then form local militia. Militiamen were marginally trained men who maintained their civil functions and were available for military duty on an as-need basis. They were poorly equipped and used whatever weapons were at hand. They remained economically productive members of the local society and thereby avoided the usual loss of desperately needed manpower normally associated with military conscription in China. This made the militia easier for the local populous to accept favorably.

As a Communist base became more economically stable and could support a full time army, the best of the militiamen were formed into local defense forces. Also, stray Chinese Army units caught behind enemy lines, semi-bandit para-military groups and existing local defense associations were recruited to form local defense forces. Local defense forces were full-time military units that operated geographically near their point of origin. Their training and equipment were somewhat better than that of the militia. Their numbers could be temporarily augmented by militiamen on an as need basis. The CCP was very careful to balance the size of the local defense force with the economic capability of the base area to support a non-productive, full time army. Ultimately, to complete the three-tiered cycle, local defense forces were used as a source of recruits for the conventional Red Army and occasionally entire local defense units would be promoted to Red Army units en-masse.

Typically, Communist bases were formed in the rural hinterland beyond the reach of the Japanese who could only effectively secure urban areas and strips of territory along principle communications routes. Due to the CCP's relatively benign recruitment policies, their suppression of bandit groups in base areas, and their generally professional treatment of the local population, they became very popular among the peasantry in North China. The War of Resistance guerrilla rules reflect the effect of CCP bases from a military point of view. The sabotage points represent militiamen, armed bandit groups and other semi-organized units that caused indiscriminate damage in Japanese occupied regions, guerrillas units represent local-defense forces that straddled the line between underground resistance and conventional warfare, and, of course, the CCP light infantry units represent the conventional warfare capability of the Red Army.

The Nationalists also organized guerrilla units behind Japanese lines. Their effort was far less systematic than the CCP's and did not embody the philosophical, political and economic content of the CCP bases. In general, Nationalist guerrilla units were disorganized formations of units that found themselves caught behind enemy lines. They, like the CCP, enlisted local manpower to augment their numbers, but usually in the more traditional manner of gang conscription of all able-bodied males in a village. This activity proved economically devastating to those left behind, since all the manpower (to work the fields, etc.) was taken away with no form of subsidy.

For gaming simplicity, despite the fact that the Nationalists didn't have bases in the sense that the CCP did, I treat guerrillas from both factions in the same manner. The difference from a military point of view during the Sino-Japanese Conflict is not very significant and is represented by the different rates of guerrilla recruitment. During the 1946-49 civil war, the difference becomes paramount, but this is beyond the scope of War of Resistance.

CCP bases in Central China are less efficient than North China due to the fact that Central China was the heart of the KMT controlled region. As a result, CCP recruitment and operations in this area suffered direct interference from the KMT.

Rule 40B. Replacements. The conscription system in China was abysmal and this has been factored into the Chinese replacement rates. The typical Chinese conscription method was to enter a village and round up all able-bodied males and march them off to combat. The village left behind suffered immensely having no manpower to work fields and perform other chores. The local government rarely paid any form of subsidy to the devastated village. This practice magnified the traditional hatred of their army held by most common Chinese. And, amazingly, the conscripted soldier suffered more than the villagers he left behind!

Often gang marched, chained to fellow villagers, the conscript would be corralled at local conscription centers. He was given virtually no training and little equipment. Stripped of clothing during the night to prevent escape, many froze. A meager food allotment was a rare treat. In the Chinese system, conscripts were not part of the army until they reached their assigned units. As such, they were not paid and generally not fed.

Long marches to their destination units, often hundreds of miles, led to mass desertion and death. It is estimated that fully 40% of conscripted men never reached their assigned units. The Chinese standing army at the start of the Sino-Japanese Conflict was 1.7 million men with 500 thousand reservists. After dipping to a low of 1 million men (following the heavy casualties of the 1937 disasters), the size of the Chinese army steadily increased throughout the war. By the end of 1941, the Chinese army numbered 5.7 million including about 3 million front-line combat troops. By the end of the war in 1945, the number had swelled to over 8 million men in arms.

To maintain this army, the Chinese conscripted about 14 million men during the 8-year war period (1937-45). During this time the front line replacement rate never dipped below 60% annually, and occasionally peaked as high as 120%. During the war, China determined that she needed to draft between 2.5 and 4 men for every man on the front lines. This represented the high percentage of wounded, sick, deserters, and general mismanagement of military administration. Over 8 million of the 14 million conscripted, can not be accounted for. With the typical desertion rate estimated at between 10 and 40% annually, many of the 14 million may have been the same men, repeatedly conscripted.

While China's mobilization index (the average number of men conscripted as compared with the nation's total population per annum), at 0.4%, remained well behind that of Japan and western nations (Japan: 1.3%, UK: 1.4%, US: 2.4%, USSR: 3.0%, and Germany: 3.8%) she never had trouble filling the gaps in her lines. Manpower was always far more plentiful than equipment. Proposals for a Chinese army of 50 million were tendered, but were unrealistic given the utter lack of equipment and infrastructure necessary to support so many men in the field. In fact, General Stilwell and other American advisors repeatedly suggested that the Chinese should reduce the size of their army to about 100 higher quality divisions (rather than the 300+ ineffective divisions that existed in the mid to late war period).

Rule 40B1 Replacements / Production. The Chinese had no domestic heavy industry to produce armor or artillery. However, they did produce small arms and ammunition. The equipment RP received by the Chinese at Hupei (per the Chinese OB), represents what little domestic production the Chinese did have. The armor and equipment RPs received at Kansu represent equipment sent to China by the Soviet Union. This equipment was generally sent via the ancient caravan routes from Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan to Lanchow.

Rule 41A2. Preparing for Play / 1937-41 Campaign Scenario / Opening Turns. The Sino-Japanese Conflict was not born out of any master plan or coordinated effort on the parts of the participants. Over exuberance on the part of local Japanese commanders in China led to local conflicts throughout the 1930's. Finally, on July 7, 1937, an incident at Lucaochao Bridge (Marco Polo Bridge) sparked a conflict from which the diplomats could not extricate their nations.

The Chinese Nationalist government, seen for years as appeasing the aggressive Japanese military leaders, could no longer back down in the face of surging Chinese patriotism. The Japanese diplomats, for their part, often had little control over local military commanders, who would operate at the edge of Tokyo's intent or, in the extreme, ignore the command of Tokyo outright.

By the end of July, the inertia of the situation had thrust the participants into full-scale conflict. Assured that it would be a short campaign to settle the situation in north China, Tokyo half-heartedly sanctioned a limited offensive and allowed reinforcements to be sent.

Central China, on the other hand, had been relatively quiet since the 1932 battle of Shanghai. During this engagement, the Chinese 19th Route Army (of Cantonese origin) stood toe to toe with the Japanese for several months in Shanghai street fighting. Losing international face, the Japanese finally poured in reinforcements in an amphibious assault at the Chinese shores of the mouth of the Yangtzé River north of Shanghai. This force swept behind the 19th Route Army threatening to cut it off completely from the rest of China. The Chinese army then retreated about 20 miles and took up new defensive positions. The Japanese took this opportunity to declare victory and sue for negotiated terms.

The 1932 terms provided that Japanese units return to and remain in the International Concession and that Shanghai be occupied by only Chinese peace preservation units. The regular Chinese army was to remain at a distance of 20 miles for a short period until tensions had settled.

In fact, the Chinese armies never reoccupied the 20-mile band encircling Shanghai and it, to the constant objection of the Chinese government, became referred to as the demilitarized zone. While there was no legal basis for the zone to be considered demilitarized, it became a defacto demilitarized zone due to the Chinese decision not to reoccupy it.

This was the situation when hostilities erupted in North China. The Nationalist government then immediately undertook to reoccupy the "demilitarized zone," and began moving troops into the area and into Shanghai proper. The Japanese, of course, saw this as a direct affront to the defacto situation that had existed, and a number of incidents ensued.

Finally, on August 13, 1937, the Chinese government launched a wholesale offensive against the Japanese Naval marine (SNLF) garrison in the International Concession. Bitter fighting ensued and the Japanese units were pushed to the brink with their backs to the Whangpoo River, fighting from the docks. Unable to turn the tide with the small SNLF garrison, the Japanese diverted forces earmarked for North China and formed the Shanghai Expeditionary Force (SEF) to relieve the beleaguered marines. The SEF amphibiously assaulted in a manner very similar to the relief assault of 1932. To reflect this curious opening balance and the increasing momentum of conflict, I developed the opening turn rules. The North China rules reflect the existing military infrastructure enjoyed by the Japanese (due to the Boxer protocols of 1901). The Central China rules simulate the difficult decision on the part of the Chinese as to when and whether to attack the international concession and the Japanese reluctance to open up additional conflict there unless necessary.

Rule 42. Victory Conditions. The KMT government and Chinese national "unity" was perpetually under the threat of collapse. Each disaster undermined the stability and authority of the national government. The Japanese's primary goal was to force the KMT into submission so that China would fall into a divided state of anarchy in which the Japanese could dominate the various local authorities and ultimately form a puppet régime favorable to the Japanese.

This rule shows the ever-present chance of Chinese national collapse. If the game follows a historical course, the Chinese resistance stands about a 50% chance of surviving until the end of 1941. The first 4 1/2 years of the conflict are by far the most militarily active, and in my opinion, present the greatest risk of KMT collapse resulting from the Japanese effort. Later in the war, internal risks such as unchecked inflation, communist expansion, and so on, dominate the threat to KMT stability. I chose 50% arbitrarily, but I don't think its unjustifiable and the value is also a convenient number for playability, since if all goes per history, there is an even chance that either player will win the game. In the event, a collapse of resistance per this rule probably wouldn't have spelled the end of the war against Japan. Various resistance pockets and guerrilla groups (in particular the CCP) would surely have continued the fight. But this is far beyond the scope of the game and enters the realm of wild speculation. The fact remains that the Japanese goal was the collapse of Chinese nationalist unity and resistance and they viewed the demise of the KMT as a major component of that collapse. Therefore, to drive the game along historical lines without resorting to "strait-jacket" rules, these victory conditions are based, in part, on the perceptions of the national and military leaders of the time.

National collapse is fundamentally different than the mere capture of the government. While the capture of prominent political figures is a great blow, it pales when compared to the erosion and collapse of political infrastructure and popular support for the war. Rule 38 outlines the effects of the capture of the top level of government while this rule simulates the utter collapse of the functioning of government on a broad base.

The basic mechanic of this rule has two components; the stability level and stability number. The stability level represents the overall state of the political power and infrastructure of the Chinese nation. The stability number reflects immediate events and how they might affect the national stability. Some events affect the stability number immediately, while others only after the stability roll has been performed. The effects of traumatic events are immediately posted and take a definite and immediate toll on the Chinese national stability number. This shows the government's propaganda time lag and it's inability to prevent the immediate effects of those disasters.

Other events modify the stability number after the stability roll thereby simulating the government's ability to politically ameliorate political perception of these events and forestall the immediate effects. These events (such as the existence of CCP bases) erode the KMT's ability to maintain stability without having immediate catastrophic effects.

Rule 44F Urban Pacification Garrison. Of my own volition, I would not have included this rule. However, I yielded to the democratic process, as a survey on lysator's Europa e-mail list resoundingly called for its inclusion. The general gist of the arguments made was that any event that has military implications at the Europa/Glory scale should be modeled in the game. Well, here you have it. With the help of the folks on the Europa e-mail list, this rule may be the first published, official rule co-designed via the Internet.

Rule 45. Chinese Factions. We must not think of China as a single unified entity in the way we think of western nations. It was, at best, a loose coalition of semi-autonomous regional authorities each maintaining their own armies and swearing a wide range of allegiances to the central government (the Koumintang or KMT). The KMT used many techniques for keeping regional forces loyal, both internal and external. Internal techniques included infiltration of regional units by politically reliable officers, a call to Chinese patriotism, and spreading out and intermingling of units of various factions among each other to destroy their command cohesion. External techniques included withholding or delivering supplies and equipment based upon performance and loyalty, bribery of leaders, political promotions for reliable leaders, land grants, and so on. The KMT spent as much energy keeping units loyal and under control as it did fighting the Japanese. Chén Chéng, a prominent KMT general, had stressed in 1938 the need "to eliminate the concept of private interests, to convert all armies into genuine national armies, and to thoroughly eliminate the erroneous notion of self-preservation and self-protection." His goal was never realized, however.

Since the balance of political power in China hinged upon the military strength of the factional leaders, each faction was loath to commit forces to combat. To lose military strength was to lose political clout. Therefore, factional leaders were reluctant to defend territory since they could rarely expect neighboring units to come to their rescue at the critical moment. Units were even less likely to take the offensive. Aleksander Kalyagin, a Russian advisor, remarked that a commander "might receive an order to attack, but would withdraw his troops to the rear, surrender a city, and not even receive the slightest punishment. What can one make of this? [To learn the answer,] one must look into the 'Church calendar,' see what sort of general this is, which province's troops he is commanding, in which province he is fighting, which troops he is cooperating with, etc., and then everything will become clear."

At the extreme, factions would enter combat against each other. This was particularly prevalent with Chinese Communist forces. There are hundreds of documented skirmishes between communist and non-communist forces, both sides being guilty of starting hostilities at various times. Most of these conflicts are too small to be explicitly represented at the Europa scale, but a few did occur at that magnitude. I give antagonistic factional units ZOCs versus other friendly units to represent the constant friction between them. Since the patchwork of wartime factionalism in China is far too complex to model in a game, I've simplified the situation and boiled it down to the 15 most significant factions and defined their military behavior with a simple "level of cooperation" system. The use of resource points and steps of supply as a way to modify the factional cooperation die roll is a simple way to model the use of military resources for political purposes.

Rule 46. Puppet Governments. The Japanese set up a plethora of puppet governments within occupied China. These governments ranged from local to regional and even "national" governments. On occasion, the puppet governments were actually rivals with one another, as they had been setup by different Japanese military units for the same purpose.

The purpose of the puppet government was multifold. On a grass roots level, the puppet government provided a mechanism for controlling the local populace and provided the trappings of law and order. Internationally, they were intended to give the illusion of legality and justify the invader's presence as liberator. Militarily, they provided manpower for various occupational duties. Ultimately the existence of the puppet regimes was intended to be a destabilizing force designed to help topple the KMT government.

Again, as with the other rules depicting the political situation in China, this rule is a simple model of the far more complex situation that actually existed. It captures the essence of what the Japanese were trying to accomplish and how they attempted to do it. The principle events concerning the puppet governments during the war can be simulated. I have not attempted to show the actual governments that were set up in China during the war, since the course of the conflict is instrumental in determining when and where the regimes would have been set up. Instead, I provide for a general capability that can be used by the Japanese player as it fits his progress in China. To minimize special rules, the pre-existing puppet governments of Manchukuo, East Hopei, Formosa, and Inner Mongolia are included as special cases of this rule.

The following gives a feel for the actual events. In 1937, the Japanese created the following Mongolian puppet governments: the Southern Chahar Committee at Wanchwan, the Northern Shansi Autonoumous Government at Tatung, and the Federal Autonnomous Government at Suiyuan. In November 1937, these three bodies were combined to form the United Mongolian Committee.

In North China's Hopei Province in July 1937 the Peiping Maintenance Committee was established and in August of the same year the Peace Maintainance Committee was setup in Tientsin. By mid-August, the Northern China Peoples' Autonomous Federation was set up and, in mid-December, the China Restoration Government was organized.

In other northern provinces a variety of governments were also setup. In the latter part of 1937, the Honan Province Autonomous Government was organized while, in mid-December, a set of self-governing provincial bodies were set up in Shansi Province. In January 1938, in Shantung Province, various peace maintenance committees were established at Tsinan and Tsingtao.

The above listed North China provincial governments were all affiliated with the China Provisional Government, an ostensibly "national government," until the spring of 1938. In Central China the Shanghai Tatao Government was setup in the first part of December 1937, while the Nanking and Hangchow Autonomous Committees were established in their respective cities in January 1938. These local bodies formed the basis for the China Restoration Government, the Japanese Central China Area Army's version of a national government, located in Nanking in the latter part of March 1938. Additional autonomous bodies were established in each district as the Japanese enlarged their occupied territory. All of these bodies were affiliated with the China Provisional Government in North China or the China Restoration Government in Central China, according to their location.

On March 31, 1940, after nearly two years in development, Wang Ching-wei, a formerly prominent KMT member, formed a new national puppet regime that was formally recognized by Japan on the 30th of November. His regime went by the same name as the KMT Nationalist government: The Republic of China.

More War of Resistance

War of Resistance: Introduction
War of Resistance: Japanese Order of Battle
War of Resistance: Chinese Order of Battle
War of Resistance: Japanese and Chinese Equipment
War of Resistance: Bibliography

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