Tet Offensive
1968

US and North Vietamese Strategy

by John Hill

In evaluating the various moves of the combatants in I Corps, it must be remembered that the fighting was neither predominantly conventional nor guerilla, but was sometimes one or the other or somewhere in between. It was a question of balance. That is, to defeat guerrillas requires pacification tactics with the diffusion of combat troops throughout the countryside being the most effective tactic.

At right, typical I Corps area terrain outside of Hue city. Note guard tower overlooking narrow-gauge railroad line, and nearby jungle outcroppings.

However, if the enemy suddenly sweeps through with a full division, most pacification teams will be eliminated. But, if your divisions keep together ready for the big conventional fight then the guerrillas will run throughout the territory. So, to maintain balance, a portion of your divisions must be parceled out in pacification teams to keep the guerrillas down, but there must also be enough of a "big" unit on hand to quickly contain and destroy any large enemy unit that might appear. Therefore, the whole trick of this kind of fighting is to "unbalance" your opponent before you hit. And this is basically what Giap tried to do prior to Tet.

The basic strategy Giap worked out for I Corps was superb. He would concentrate large regular forces against a single area, away from the target cities. And it would be a real concentration. It would be at least two divisions with cadre structures of perhaps four more.

It must appear that this is the main thrust, the great do or die attempt. If necessary, up to two divisions could be thrown away to add credence to the feint. Also in all other areas the larger regimental units would lay low and guerrilla activity would increase. Seeing the increased guerrilla activity the remaining large units, not drawn to the large "set" battle, would increase their antiguerrilla operations and break down further to go "Charlie hunting."

If all went as planned, the larger mobile Allied units would be focused on the "set-up" battle out in the "boonies," and around the cities there would be nothing but diffused battalions hunting down the elusive guerrillas. Then, the real attack would commence: Hue would be hit with a minimum of eight battalions, and Da Nang, Quang Tri, and Quang Ngai would each be hit with the equivalent of a reinforced regiment. The ARVN/USMC forces would be caught completely "unbalanced."

The only real question for Giap was where to make the feint, and the answer was readily found. There were few places as inaccessible as Khe Sanh. It had already been fought over heavily in April and May of 1967, and Allied intelligence would certainly believe that this would be the place for the final big NVA push.

The two divisions selected for the attack on Khe Sanh were the 304th and the 325C. Giap would also commit small elements of other divisions to create the illusion that all of the NVA forces were descending on Khe Sanh. Secrecy was paramount, even the units directly associated with the Khe Sanh push must believe that this was the main thing. In the wargaming sense, Giap would use the 304th and the 325th as "soak-offs" to gain a clear shot into Hue.

The whole plan was very "oriental." No Western society would have allowed its general to throw away two divisions of its men simply to gain a deception. Particularly, if Giap let it "leak" that he considered Khe Sanh the upcoming American Dien Bien Phu, the Americans would lose face in pulling out and not accepting the challenge.

The extent that Giap succeeded in this feint is best shown in the ofScial reports and evaluations of the Khe Sanh battle. By mid~anuary the Marine intelligence reports on Khe Sanh claimed:

    "The 304th Division had come across from Laos and had joined the 325C outside Khe Sanh. The 320th NVA Division was next identified, apparently poised for an attack on Camp Carroll. On 21 January, interrogation of a rallier from the 325C Division indicated that the elements of the 308th and 341st NVA divisions were also south of the DMZ."

Special Unit

For the Tet Offensive of 1968 the NVA created a special unit. Nominally it was a regiment, however, it packed the firepower of a division. In many ways it was like the taskforces which were being used by the USMC forces in I Corps. It was very flexible and could be tailored both on the basis of need, and on what was actually available. A unique feature was the duality of command. Both the nominal military headquarters and the attached party committee reported to a "higher" authonty. In 1968 the influence of the party committee was actually somewhat stronger than the convennonal military headquarters. This was why most of the city attacks were centered against political objectives, and why a number of the attacking forces made relevant military blunders. However, considering the nature of revolutionary war, it is still perhaps a desirable trait.

And all the way to the top the Khe Sanh feint was completely accepted as the main effort. Westmoreland still believes it was:

    "Judging from the size of his buildup, and from his own statements, he (Giap) was hoping to achieve a military-political victory similar to the one 14 years earlier at Dien Bien Phu." (Report on Operations in South Vietnam, January 1964-June 1968.)

However, even if Khe Sanh was accepted for the main push, it still did little good, from Giap's viewpoint, if the resulting Allied redeployment did not indeed leave the approaches to the cities, particularly Hue, unguarded. And in this he would be aided by a combination of Allied bad planning, and bad luck.

Marine Corps Deployment

At this point, it is best to examine how the Marines in I Corps generally employed their troops. The Marine regiments were treated like independent brigades and infantry battalions were moved into and out of their control depending on their specific mission. This gave Marine divisional commanders great flexibility in shifting their combat strengths. However, this practice was strongly disliked by the regimental commmanders as they logically preferred retaining their own organic battalions. One regimental commander estimated that it took about two weeks of working with a new battalion to iron out problems of procedures and communications.

An example of this was the 26th Marine Regiment. In early January it had one of its battalions in Khe Sanh, one in Dong Ha, and one at Phu Bail. It's hard to imagine its commander, Col. Lownds, exercising effective control of such a dispersed regiment.

This practice of "battalion robbing" naturally gave rise to the "Task Force" concept. In Marine terminology, a Task Force was a unit larger than a regiment, but smaller than a division. Sometimes it would be formed to pursue a specific operation, or perhaps to care for a specific locality.

Now these doctrines are not necessarily bad, but they can lead to confusion, and in confusion errors of omission are more likely to occur. And one such error unfortunately occurred in the western approaches to Hue when the 6th NVA attack elements were moving to Hue.

Originally, the guarding of the western approaches to Hue was the job of elements of the 3rd Marine Division which was based in Thua Thien province. It did a good job. As long as it had been there, Hue was unmolested. However, with the increased pressure on Khe Sanh and the likelihood of a major showdown along the DMZ it was decided to move the 3rd Marine Division up to Quang Tri province where it could act as a mobile reserve to relieve Khe Sanh, if necessary.

To take over the job of guarding the western approaches to Hue, General Cushman created "Task Force X-Ray." Originally "TF X-Ray" consisted of the 1st and 5th Marine Regiments and would've been a fairly potent unit commanded by Gen. Foster Lahue. But, simultaneously with the formation of "TF X-Ray" the Marines began execution of "Operation Checkers" which was to have the 1st Marine Regiment swap provinces with the 4th Marine Regiment. Now, to add to the confusion it was also decided that since TF X-Ray had two regiments, on paper, it could, in addition to guarding the western approaches to Hue, take over the responsibility of guarding the Marine base at Phu Bai, and keep open Route 1 from Hue south!

As luck would have it, in the last week of January, when the NVA were moving in from the west, "Operation Checkers" got a little out of phase and the regimental exchange got off schedule. So, in that critical week Task Force X-Ray wound up with two regimental headquarters and three understrength infantry regiments! But its mission still was all three aforementioned tasks. X-Ray's commander, Gen. Lahue, elected to stay around Phu Bai until everybody was sorted out, which probably was the correct military decision. But, it meant that the western approaches to Hue were left open and the equivalent of an NVA division slipped through undetected.

The USMC 105mm howitzer in action. Marine training and superior firepower gave the Allied forces in I Corps area a distinct combat edge over the Communists.

The ARVN forces in I Corps were commanded by the durable Lt. General Hoang Xuan Lam who agreed with the U.S. intelligence estimates of the upcoming decisive struggle around Khe Sanh. Also, since the Americans were so very certain that all the main force NVA units would be used in it, General Lam felt he could increase the amount of his combat maneuver battalions in "Revolutionary Development," or pacification. So, by January 1968, of the available 35 combat ARVN battalions, 18 were assigned pacification duties and would not be in a position to react against the upcoming NVA regimental assaults on the cities.

The particular point in question was how this decision would affect the key ARVN unit in the Hue area, the crack ARVN 1st Infantry Division.

The "First," commanded by Brigadier General Ngo Quant Truong, had a good combat record, for in engagements with the best NVA regular units it usually gave as good as it got. It had been reorganized in 1966 with an increase to four battalions in each of its three regiments to give it an edge in regimental sized fights with the usual three battalion NVA regiment. It had been the first ARVN unit to be completely equipped with the M-16 rifle.

Also, General Truong was able to get at least two airborne battalions attached to it. This enabled him to concentrate practically full strength the division's twelve battalions in field operations and have the two airborne battalions stationed in Hue for a mobile reserve. To comply with Corps Commander Lam's decision to take over more of the pacification duties as the Marines deployed for the Khe Sanh battle, General Trnong assigned 6 battalions of the First to pacification. Five other battalions were assigned to area defense, primarily to the northwest of Hue. Only one battalion was assigned to the critical western and southem approaches to the city. But General Truong felt that was sufficient as, in theory, the newly-formed Marine Task Force X- Ray was adequately covering that ground.

This left only one battalion available as a reserve in Hue, but this didn't bother Truong, as he still had the two battalions of paratroopers. Then in mid-January, Saigon decided to change the method of airborne allocation. Previously, they had been parceled out to individual corps and divisions. But now it was decided to concentrate them into an airborne division capable of taking to the field and fighting as an independent mobile force. Consequently, two weeks before the attack on Hue, the two airborne battalions were called back into Saigon's General Reserve. This left a total garrison force in Hue of only one battalion to face an attack force of at least eight NVA battalions. So far Giap's luck was running good.

Communist Planning

In September 1967 the Communists began planning for the Hue operation. At that time Guang Van Vien, secretary of the Hue City Committee of the Communist Party was instructed to prepare Hue for liberation.

In October Comrade Son Lam was given the task of "reconnoitering" the military and political "targets" on the south bank.

By January 28 the offensive had been completely planned, thanks to the constant stream of information Van Vien, Lam and others were communicating to their superiors. A total of 196 priority targets had been selected. Most of these were political, rather than military in nature.

The actual military part of the operation was nominally commanded by the personnel of the 6th NVA Regiment which had been expanded to divisional strength, both in infantry battalions and in supporting artillery. It's exact strength is still not known, but it probably was between eight and ten battalions.

At 2 AM January 30 Comrade Lam was awakened by a messenger and told to report to a battalion headquarters just outside the city. There for the first time he learned the details of the NVA attack on Hue. He was assigned as a "liaison officer," to coordinate the operations of the troops now moving in and the existing NLF structure within the city. His area of operations was to be the entire south bank. He would move in with the 804th NVA battalion the following night. H-Hour was set for 3:30 AM, January 31.

At this point, one wonders if Allied intelligence was completely blind to the upcoming storm about to hit Hue. Actually Allied intelligence, at the venous levels, did receive indications of what was happening.

On January 22 the U.S. Command was given a report of evidence that the NVA would attempt a multi-battalion attack on Hue during or immediately after the Tet holiday. This report was taken with some seriousness, as it was forwarded immediately to the Pentagon for evaluation. However, neither the U.S. or the ARVN commands in Hue were informed of this report or its contents.

On January 28, a military advisor in Huong Thuy, a hamlet near Hue, reported that three NVA battalions had left their mountain bases and were deploying in the lowlands near Hue. He was dismissed as an excessive worrier.

Finally, early in the evening of January 30 a U.S. radio intercept station at Phu Bai picked up some radio transmissions of the 6th NVA as it co-ordinated the final moves towards Hue. However, the information was relayed to regional headquarters in Da Nang for posting and evaluation.

But, by this time Da Nang itself was under attack and the processing of this vital informnation was understandably delayed. By the time the MACV headquarters in Hue was informed of the possible danger, that headquarters was already fighting for its survival against two NVA battalions.

More Tet Offensive

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© Copyright 1979 by Don Lowry
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