The strategic purpose of the Confederate military during the Civil War was basically twofold: to protect the Southern states from outside invasion, and, failing in the first, to make the war so costly for the North that it would eventually be forced to give up from exhaustion.

The Confederacy also tried to prove its causus beli in order to be granted diplomatic recognition by a European country. Of the three branches of the Confederate military (army, navy, and 600-man Marine Corps) the army was the only branch to even come close to the stated goal.

The Confederate Navy's responsibility was the protection of the harbors and coast lines from blockade, and, hopefully, the establishment of a local superiority over the Federal Navy. The Confederate Navy was left with a blank check on methods and means to accomplish these aims. In February, 1861, the Confederate "Navy" amounted to some ten ships carrying fifteen guns.

The Union Navy on the other hand listed 90 vessels of all classes in the Navy Register for 1861. However, of these 90 ships, 21 were unfit to go to sea at all, 27 were laid up in various navy yards in need of extensive repairs or not ready to be launched, and 28 were in foreign stations, some as far away as China.

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So actually the Union Navy only had fourteen ships close enough to be called upon in case of emergency. Needless to say, the Union Navy could not hope to blockade a coastline some 3,600 miles long with what was on hand.

Thus in April, 1861, the two antagonists were as close to equality as they were to be for the remainder of the war. Of course, this situation would not remain static for long.

Mallory Appointed

On February 21, 1861, the Confederate Congress appointed Stephen R. Mallory as Secretary, Department of the Navy. He was in all probability one of the most well-qualified appointees to the Confederate cabinets. Mallory was experienced as an admiralty lawyer in his home state of Florida, and he served for a time as the chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee while he was a United States senator.

Thus the Confederate Navy gained a man who was capable of building the Southern Navy. The only questionable part of his character was an incident before the actual termination of diplomatic relations between the North and the South. The incident involved the capture of Fort Pickens and the Pensacola Navy Yard, both in Florida. The general opinion early in 1861 (while Buchanan was still president) was that these two areas could be easily taken for the South; but, through the work of Mallory and several of his associates, they were able to persuade both the Florida legislature and the President that these Union possessions were in no danger unless they were reinforced without warning.

This action was something for which many Southerners never forgave Mallory. As one of his subordinates Mallory appointed Duncan M. Ingerham to head the Bureau of Ordinance and Hydrography. He was to set up the Southern munitions works and armament industry.

The general feeling in the South was that, after April, 1861, the President of the United States could not hope to make a blockade effective because the English would not stand for losing one of their major markets of raw cotton. Unfortunately for the South, what was forgotten was that the abundant harvest of 1860 had already been exported and that, except for a long war, the English would have no immediate economic interest in the South.

Building Ironclads

The decision by the Confederates to build ironclads was not entirely unexpected because the United States Navy had been interested in the idea since shortly after the War of 1812. With the capitulation of the Gosport Navy Yard after the secession of Virginia, the Confederate Navy secured one of the few major navy yards it was to possess. In all, the Confederates captured more than one thousand naval guns of all calibers including 52 Dahlgrens, but ultimately more important than this was the capture of the 3,200 ton USS Merrimac, a steam frigate. Thus the Confederacy had the beginnings for their most famous ironclad, the CSS Virginia.

The Confederacy lacked many of the blessings that its northern neighbor had. For example, it lacked an adequate railroad system, proper naval repair facilities, rope walks, and, most of all, iron and steel mills. In 1861-1862 there were three major iron industries in the South. These were the Tredegar Iron Works, the Bellona Iron Works (both in Richmond, Virginia), and the Selma Naval Works in Selma, Alabama. These facilities became the mainstay for the Confederate armament industry throughout the war. In spite of the difficulties faced by the Southern Navy, work was begun on the CSS Virginia. In addition to the Virginia, work was also begun on four more "coastal ironclads."

The plan of these five was basically the same; they were all to be fitted with sloping side armor with their fore and aft decks slightly awash. This design was the brainchild of John L. Porter who was one of the most "progressive" thinkers in the South at this time. Porter's chief idea was to build an ironclad capable of ocean voyages, but the inability of the South to manufacture reliable machinery hampered him.

In late 1861, the work on the ironclads proceeded slowly. The main problems encountered were those of lack of adequate materials and of trained labor to do the necessary technical work. Nevertheless, the CSS Virginia was the primary ship on the completion list; even though the navy attempted to expedite mattes, work on the Virginia was halted due to bottlenecks in the Confederate rail transportation system.

Virginia

It had taken the Confederate naval engineers little more than a month to refloat and make the USS Merrimac ready to be reconstructed as an ironclad, but it took the Confederate iron industry and the railroads over eight months to get the necessary material to the Gosport Navy Yards. On her completion in February, 1862, the CSS Virginia was a force to be reckoned with; her armament consisted of six 9-inch Dahlgren smoothbores, two rifled 7-inch cannons, and two 6.4-inch Brookes rifles.

The Virginia was plagued by problems as late as March 5, 1862. For example, she was too light -- the eaves of her armor plate were on the water line instead of below it. The ship was extremely slow with a maximum speed of six to seven knots. She was extremely hard to handle; in fact, the steerage was so poor that it took from thirty to forty minutes to turn 180 degrees. Even with her shortcomings, the CSS Virginia was to be the foremost ironclad of the Confederate Navy.

About noon on March 8, 1862, the CSS Virginia officially "got under way" and started steaming toward Newport News. When the Confederates reached Hampton Roads, they ran into Union blockading forces which then consisted of five wooden-hulled frigates.

In the ensuing battle which lasted five hours, two Union ships were sunk, a third damaged, almost 300 Union sailors were killed, and 100 were wounded.

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The CSS Virginia and supporting craft of three unarmored gunboats suffered no major damage except to two guns on the Virginia and her ram.

Monitor vs. Merrimac

On the following moming both Union and Confederate spectators expected to see the CSS Virginia finish the remaining ships of the blockading force and then either head toward open sea or turn toward Washington, D.C. As the Virginia approached the scene of the battle, her pilot spotted a strange flat craft with a turret mounted on the center, which was recognized as the USS Monitor, which had been finished in time to take part in the battle.

The role assigned to the Union craft was to protect other Union wooden-hulled ships in the Norfolk Harbor area. Thus, the Monitor did not act as offensively as she might have under different circumstances. As the battle continued neither side was able to seriously damage the other, but the CSS Virginia was finally forced to retire because of the falling tide. The result of the battle was a tactical victory for the Union, because the Monitor had succeeded in protecting the remainder of the Union blockading fleet in the Norfolk Harbor area.

As both sides retired to lick their wounds, the wooden ship passed into obsolescence. The mere existence of the CSS Virginia caused a great deal of concern in the Union camp, especially where the plans of General McClellan were concerned.

At right, the Monitor's damage was limited to a few dents.

End of the Virginia

With the beginning of McClellan's peninsular campaign the military situation in northeastem Virginia held bleak prospects for the Confederates. In fact, in just a little over a month (May 9, 1862) the Norfolk Navy Yard was in danger from Union advances. Within 48 hours the CSS Virginia was to be no more -- she was deprived of her home port and had too deep a draft to be able to cross the shoals at that time of the month, so the Confederates had no choice but to scuttle her in order to prevent her capture.

Despite this setback, Mallory's aspirations were not finished. As early as August of 1861, Secretary Mallory had been visited by Asa and Nelson Tift of Georgia who, even though they were not ship builders by trade, possessed plans for ironclads that could be built without any curves and that, according to their statements, could be built by any house carpenters. Thus, by the time of the sailing of the CSS Virginia, four other ironclads were on the stocks, and others were in the advanced planning stage. It is possible that Secretary Mallory was confident to put his faith in several "home built" ironclads.

It would be foolish to think that Mallory relied upon the manufacturing ability of the South alone to challenge the North at sea. He realized that, if the war was to continue for any long period of time, the South would have to get outside support and possibly intervention to break the blockade.

To attempt to "hurry" this possibility Secretary Mallory appointed Commander James Dunwoody Bulloch to the post of chief naval agent. It was Bulloch's task to secure by nearly any means European naval aid for the Confederacy. The naval strategy that Commander Bulloch attempted to follow in his dealings with the European power, especially England, was:

1. To obtain cruisers as soon as possible to harass the commerce of the Union and to compel the dispatching of Union men-of-war to hunt these cruisers.

2. To construct a new class of warship in a foreign port to challenge the Union navy for control of the Southern coast.

3. To create and operate a fleet of special blockade runners that would be government-owned and manned by southern naval personnel.